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Die Zeit ist das Element der Erzählung, wie sie das 
element des Lebens ist, - unlösbar damit verbunden, 
wie mit den Körpern im Raum. Sie is auch das Element 
der Musik, als welche die Zeit mißt und gliedert, sie 
kurzweilig und kostbar auf einmal macht: verwandt 
hierin, wie gesagt, der Erzählung, die ebenfalls (und 
anders als das auf einmal leuchtend gegenwärtige und 
nur als Körper an die Zeit gebundene Werk der 
bildenden Kunst) nur als ein Nacheinander, nicht 
anders denn als ein Ablaufendes sich zu geben weiß, 
und selbst, wenn sie versuchen sollte, in jedem 
Augenblick ganz da zu sein, der Zeit zu ihrer 
Erscheinung bedarf. 
 
Thomas Mann, Der Zauberberg (1924) 
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PREFACE 
Although the world may not actually be made up of stories, it can be 
said that, as soon as there are people, there are stories. As is argued by 
theorists such as David Herman (2003b), human beings have a basic 
inclination to interpret the world around them in a narrative manner. 
Narrative, i.e. the representation of a temporal development, which 
consists of a succession of events, is an aspect of many things that are 
encountered in life. Therefore, these theorists argue, narratives are 
paramount in order to grasp the world in which the human subject 
lives.  
Since music is a temporal cultural expression, it would seem to 
make sense to assume that music has a narrative aspect as well. 
Nevertheless, the notion of musical narrativity is highly disputed. And 
indeed, verbal narrative is able to represent many phenomena, ideas, 
and views that cannot be represented in music in the same 
straightforward manner. For instance, in verbal narrative it is possible 
to posit an unreliable narrator. A verbal narrative can represent a 
character’s thoughts, or retell historical events. And music, because it 
lacks the referential qualities language has, is not capable of doing this. 
Therefore, as is argued by for instance Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990) and 
Werner Wolf (2002), music cannot be narrative.  
But is it really the case that none of these characteristics can be 
attributed to music? And if not, does that necessarily imply that music 
thus cannot be narrative? My contention is that music has more 
narrative traits than these critics assume. Moreover, I maintain that an 
object does not have to have the exact same characteristics a verbal 
narrative has in order to be considered as narrative. Rather, without 
specifying its medium, I define narrative as the representation of a 
temporal development. And I will assert that many musical works can 
be considered as narrative under this definition. 
This approach differs from those applied by other theorists who 
understand music in narrative terms. Anthony Newcomb and Gregory 
Karl, for instance, focus on the concept of musical plot. Carolyn 
Abbate, on the other hand, emphasizes the notion of voice in those 
exceptional instances where she does acknowledge that music can be 
narrative. And although these conceptions have their merits, I hope to 
show that my approach allows for a more precise articulation of the 
nature and characteristics of musical narrativity. 
In this study I primarily focus on the narrative analysis of 
contemporary, instrumental musical works, both acoustic, electro-
acoustic, and electronic. Furthermore, the object of analysis is music as 
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it is performed, i.e. a specific performance of a particular work. As I 
will explain in chapter 2, each performance of the same (narrative) 
musical piece results in a new musical narrative. Consequently, in my 
analyses I always specify which performance, that is, which recording, 
of a musical piece is used as my object.1 Nevertheless, in the case of 
acoustic musical compositions, I do include printed musical examples. 
For, apart from the joy that reading music might provide, the musical 
examples function as indices to specific musical moments that are 
discussed in the analysis. But bear in mind that the analyses in this 
study are not about these visual representations. The analyses are about 
the sounding music, of which the score is only an incomplete graphic 
abstraction. Besides being prescriptions for performance, scores 
necessarily are reductions of the object under analysis. As a 
consequence, I have refrained from providing printed examples 
entirely when electro-acoustic and electronic works are concerned, 
since, in these cases, the score is even more incomplete than those of 
acoustic works. 
The reason why I have chosen to concentrate on the narrative aspect 
of contemporary music in particular is twofold. Firstly, in doing so, I 
am able to articulate narrativity in a precise manner. Since many 
contemporary musical works question or problematize the notion of 
musical narrativity, the analysis of these works might be the key to 
identifying the limits of musical narrativity. Thus, although the main 
focus is on contemporary instrumental music, the results obtained in 
this study hold for all music: instrumental and vocal, classical and 
popular, ancient and contemporary. Secondly, I argue that, in assuming 
a narrative listening stance, the listener’s possibilities to comprehend 
contemporary music might be enriched.2 As I remarked above, the 
inclination to interpret the world in a narrative manner is a basic 
disposition that human beings share. Therefore, I expect that listening 
to contemporary, atonal music while assuming a narrative listening 
stance might lead to a greater degree of comprehension of this kind of 
                                                                    
1 The choice of particular performances was determined both by pragmatic and 
canonical considerations. Of some compositions, namely those written by Helmut 
Lachenmann, Pierre Boulez, Stephen Vitiello, and Kaija Saariaho, there existed 
only one recording at the time of analysis. The recordings of György Ligeti’s, Steve 
Reich’s, and Karlheinz Stockhausen’s pieces that I selected are regarded as 
reference performances. The recording of Morton Feldman’s composition, lastly, 
was selected because it was the only one that was available to me at the time. 
2 Apropos the listener: whenever I mention the listener in this study, I do not refer to 
an empirical listener. Rather, the listener is defined analogous to the definition Ernst 
van Alphen gives of the “reader” (1988: 20-21): the “listener” is a function, the 
embodiment of listening and other cultural conventions. S/he is the center where 
listening conventions can be localized. Furthermore, a listener can assume several 
listening stances at the same time, or one after another, one of them being a 
narrative listening stance. 
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music, which is often regarded as ungraspable. It might enable the 
listener to follow the music, to make sense of it. 
This narrative listening stance might be characterized as a form of 
anti-anti-structural listening. Just as György Ligeti’s Le Grand 
Macabre (1978) can be considered as an “anti-anti-opera,” i.e. a return 
to opera, but with a difference, after Mauricio Kagel’s anti-opera 
Staatstheater (1971), narrative listening is a return to structural 
listening, but with a difference as well. In narrative listening, a sense of 
comprehension can be established through musical structuring, but the 
activity of structuring, as is done in narrative listening, differs in 
important respects from structural listening. 
Structural listening, Rose Rosengard Subotnik states, is “[…] a 
method which concentrates attention primarily on the formal 
relationships established over the course of a single composition” 
(1996: 148). It tries “[…] to describe a process wherein the listener 
follows and comprehends the unfolding realization, with all its detailed 
inner relationships, of a generating musical conception” (150). 
Structural listening is a manner of listening in which comprehension of 
the music is realized by trying to establish relations within the music as 
it unfolds in time. Yet, in this kind of listening the listener does not try 
to establish just any relation, as Andrew Dell’Antonio notes: 
 
Structural listening strategies imply a model of one-to-one communication: 
the listener, in understanding the structural development of a musical text, is 
made privy to the composer’s creative processes. Under this model, the 
composer’s intentions are tied up with an individual’s understanding of the 
unfolding of a musical work. (2004: 201) 
 
Thus, according to Dell’Antonio, in the end structural listening is a 
manner of musical comprehension through the reconstruction of the 
composer’s intentions.3 
Moreover, Subotnik argues that 
 
[b]ased on an assumption that valid structural logic is accessible to any 
reasoning person, such structural listening discourages kinds of 
understanding that require culturally specific knowledge of things external 
to the compositional structure, such as conventional associations or 
theoretical systems. (1996: 150) 
 
By focusing on compositional structures only, structures that exhibit 
some kind of logic which is supposed to be understood by any 
reasoning listener, other crucial aspects of musical experiences that are 
                                                                    
3 Theodor W. Adorno, one of the theorists who advocate the notion of structural 
listening, however, does not imply that structural listening equals the reconstruction 
of the composer’s intentions. Thus, in this respect, Dell’Antonio’s critique does not 
apply to Adorno.  
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not part of the music itself are neglected. At the same time, Subotnik 
continues, structural listening implies an impression of objectivity, 
“[…] a unifying principle [that] establish[es] the internal ‘necessity’ of 
a structure as tantamount to a guarantee of musical value” (159). Music 
is valuable when it exhibits a structural logic that establishes the 
internal necessity of the musical structure, a structural logic that is the 
result of the composer’s creative processes. 
In the collection of essays, entitled Beyond Structural Listening? 
Postmodern Modes of Hearing (2004), edited by Dell’Antonio, this 
manner of listening is criticized. In the afterword to this collection, 
Subotnik remarks that 
 
[…] every contributor casts doubt, at some level, on the possibility and 
value of mastery as a concept within the framework of studying music. 
Here, perhaps, is a common link to my criticism of Structural Listening 
[sic], where many of the priorities I question, including a preoccupation 
with formal unity and an advocacy of stern formal attentiveness, have an 
affinity to ideals of mastery. In some instances in the present collection, 
writers reject the conception of the musical composition, even in the art 
tradition, as the outcome of a master’s power to exercise total control. 
(2004: 289) 
 
The contributors of Beyond Structural Listening? all take a more or 
less anti-structural stand; they devalue mastery of music to a certain 
extent, which is the central aim in structural listening. Furthermore, the 
composer’s ability to control and determine the listening experience is 
toned down. “Most music has never aspired to the autonomy demanded 
in the model of structural listening, and so it must be consigned to a 
lesser position,” Mitchell Morris (2004: 49), one of the contributors, 
remarks. Yet, he does not reject structural listening entirely, for he 
adds that “[i]t is better […] to imagine structural listening as part of a 
larger system of mutually incommensurable and incompatible 
strategies, to be employed as the occasion warrants” (49). Complete 
mastery of music is impossible. However, it cannot be denied that the 
listener can have a desire to master the music s/he is listening to. S/he 
might try to achieve mastery by attempting to grasp the music. But 
complete mastery can never be achieved, regardless whether the music 
is tonal or atonal. At most, the listener can achieve a sense, a certain 
degree, of musical comprehension.  
Narrative structuring can be a valuable addition to the possible 
manners of grasping music, and in this sense narrative listening is 
structural, and thus it cannot be regarded as anti-structural listening. 
But I do not maintain that this is the only manner in which musical 
comprehension can be attained, nor do I want to claim that musical 
comprehension is the single most valuable element in the experience of 
music. Moreover, the composer and his/her intentions do not play any 
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role in my conception of narrative listening. As a result, narrative 
listening is not entirely structural, either, but rather ant-anti-structural. 
Consequently, the narrative analysis of music does not result in a 
“roadmap” to a unique correct manner of musical comprehension. 
Rather, it is one of the many possible ways in which music might be 
grasped, while grasping and comprehending music are just some of the 
manners through which music can be appreciated. Narrative analysis is 
not what Martin Scherzinger calls a form of immanent analysis, which 
 
[…] yield[s] an interpretation of music that is eternally firm, rendered 
immobile by a kind of self-announced, wholly immanent meaning. By 
“immanent” I mean an account in which everything that is analytically 
relevant persists within the system under investigation. Such an 
interpretation would recognize neither a disjuncture between what the 
musical event means and its happening nor any appeal to independent 
criteria. (2004: 272, emphasis in original) 
 
Immanent analysis of music implies that the meaning of music is fixed 
and can be discovered by exclusively concentrating on the music itself, 
without involving extramusical concepts or even other musical works 
or traditions. In contrast, narrative analysis resembles Scherzinger’s 
conception of imaginative analysis (273), in that it offers an alternative 
possibility of experiencing the music. It gives rise to new perspectives 
and new ways of organizing musical sounds, while resisting the 
tendency to fix musical structures and look upon music as a medium 
having just one, single meaning that is eternally valid. 
Yet, as Joseph Dubiel notes, the notion of structure runs the risk of 
implying some kind of truth and universal value, and might even 
conflict with an open-minded manner of listening: 
 
[S]ome of the connotations of “structure” – those of logic, pertinence, 
comprehensiveness – may limit our imaginations […]; may even actively 
lead us away from good possibilities. Let us say that at least that the thing 
we hear, the thing we put together in experience, in reaction to, in 
consequence of, our encounter with a musical “structure” need not be 
expected to have those connoted characteristics. And in that case, why 
should we even take the trouble to expect the thing encountered to have 
those characteristics? (2004: 187) 
 
“Structure” presupposes a degree of clarity, of being univocal, perhaps 
even of truthfulness. Thus, if a listener expects to hear a musical 
structure, these presuppositions might influence his/her experience of 
the music. The listener might expect the music to comply with these 
presuppositions, which music probably is not able to do. Yet, this is a 
problem that many, if not all, listening stances share. Consequently, a 
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listener who assumes a narrative listening stance might expect too 
much of the music as well. 
Moreover, an analysis that focuses on the music’s capacity to reveal 
some kind of structure might, on the one hand, yield very clear results, 
in the sense that the outcome of the analysis is this structure. On the 
other hand, however, this can also be deceptive. The gravest risk might 
be that the clarity and straightforwardness of this kind of analysis leads 
to regarding it as being incontestably true. Yet, rather than being the 
aim of analysis, structure is a tool. It can help point out elements and 
relations in the object under analysis, but this identification is not the 
end of analysis, nor is it an indication of its correctness or objectivity. 
Instead, it can function as the starting point of the articulation of one of 
the possible manners in which the music can be interpreted, without 
claiming that this possibility is more correct than others, because it is 
based on structure. As Dubiel puts it: 
 
[A] notion like “structure” might serve as a way to hold open the possibility 
of discovery, the possibility of responding aurally to something in a piece to 
which I was not antecedently attuned. And although I may derive a stimulus 
from some bit of musical analysis, it is important that I avoid any sense of 
obligation to listen to, or for, the particular facts that the analysis manages to 
mention, in the terms in which it mentions them – obligation to push the 
experience back along the chain of its possible causes, one might say. 
(2004: 198) 
 
A structural analysis of a given musical work can be regarded as a 
suggestion for a particular listening strategy. It might point out 
characteristics in the music that might have remained unnoticed 
otherwise, without being prescriptive in the sense that the listener has 
to listen for any or all of the elements specified in the analysis. 
I consider the narrative listening stance that I propose in this study in 
the same manner: it is not a reconstruction of a listening experience, 
nor is it a recipe in order to arrive at a “correct” way of musical 
listening. Instead, I consider a narrative listening stance to be an 
alternative manner of musical listening, one that does not exclude other 
possibilities to experience the music, but can be added to the set of 
possible modes of listening. And, as a theorist, I articulate what this 
listening stance might imply. 
Fred Everett Maus maintains that a theorist is more than just an 
articulator and considers him/her as a re-composer: 
 
Listening experiences, with their passive qualities, would be the starting 
point and motivation for a narrative of reversal that ultimately places the 
theorist in active roles, as both the fantasy composer in an act of imagined 
re-composition and the writer who displays control over verbal material. 
(2004: 38) 
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Although many listening experiences may be passive, as Maus asserts, 
they are not always passive, especially when contemporary music is 
concerned. New music might offer new sounds and sonic structures 
that challenge the listener’s musical habits, which might force the 
listener to abandon these habits and to come up with a different, new 
manner of listening. As Maus asserts, theorists assume active roles, yet 
I am reluctant to call the theorist’s or analyst’s activities acts of re-
composition. I would rather compare the theorist’s role to that of the 
performer, for both the performer and the theorist give a particular 
account of a musical piece. Not by re-composing it, but by making 
explicit the music’s expressive potentialities.  
In her 2000 study, Jane O’Dea discusses the balance between the 
character of the performer and that of the musical piece performed. She 
argues that a player’s virtuosity must not corrupt or overshadow the 
character of a musical piece. The performer must not regard 
him/herself as more important than the work. It is the performer’s task, 
however, to bring a musical piece to life. Only then, O’Dea contends, a 
performer can transform the expressive structures of a musical 
composition into something that can be grasped aurally by an audience. 
In order to achieve this, O’Dea claims that a certain amount of 
virtuosity is necessary. To illustrate this point, she quotes Harry 
Haskell, who states that historically authentic performances often lack 
“[…] the play of the performer’s skill and personality on the 
composer’s creation [which is] the lifeblood of old and new music 
alike” (86), and thus sound far less lively than the composer perhaps 
would have wanted it to sound. Therefore, O’Dea concludes, a good 
rendition of a musical piece is to a large extent dependent on 
incorporating a proper amount of virtuosity into the performance. 
Likewise, the virtuosity of an analyst, i.e. the analyst’s theoretical 
baggage and his/her ability to apply this baggage, is necessary to turn a 
musical piece into a more meaningful object. As Lawrence Kramer 
puts it: 
 
Words situate music in a multiplicity of cultural contexts, both those to 
which the music “belongs” in an immediate sense and those to which it 
stands adjacent in ways that often become apparent only once the words are 
in play. In the process, words invest music with the very capacity to “speak” 
of its contexts that it is usually thought to lack, and is often prized for 
lacking. Neither the speech nor the contexts – this can’t be stressed too 
much – are “extrinsic” to the music involved; the three terms are inseparable 
in both theory and practice. (2003: 124-125) 
 
Analysis, which is a verbal account of a musical piece, allows the 
music to speak. It can enhance, and make explicit, the music’s 
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expressive qualities. And a virtuoso analysis enables the music to say 
things that would be left unsaid otherwise. 
O’Dea furthermore argues that finding a balance between the 
character of the performer and that of the musical piece performed 
comes down to the performer striving for internal goods instead of 
external goods, terms that she borrows from Aristotle. External goods, 
she explains, are things like fame, prestige and monetary reward. These 
goods are in short supply: they are competitive, as O’Dea calls them. 
Internal goods, on the other hand, are not in short supply. Goods such 
as technical facility, pride, satisfaction, and the thrill of learning to 
communicate meaningfully with your audience are not competitive in 
nature. As O’Dea remarks: 
 
Your developing an effective range of technical skills does not prevent 
anyone else from doing the same. Quite the contrary; your efforts in this 
direction might well enable and/or inspire others to do likewise. (2000: 27) 
 
That is why she finds it regrettable that in most professional music 
schools and other educational settings not the striving for internal, but 
rather the striving for external goods is advocated. In this way, O’Dea 
contends, it becomes very hard for students to achieve integrity in 
musical performance, which is a combination of the striving for 
internal goods and of finding a balance between virtuosity and 
communicating the character of a musical piece to an audience.  
A similar balance has to be found in analysis. Letting the music 
speak via analysis implies a certain reserve as concerns the application 
of theory with which the analyst can articulate aspects that s/he feels 
are relevant in a particular musical work. The temptation should be 
resisted to force the music to say what the analyst wants it to say, 
regardless of the character of the music. 
There are more resemblances between music analysis and musical 
performance. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 3, a musical 
score always allows for many different renditions of the same musical 
composition, since it is impossible to prescribe every musical nuance 
by means of a score. The score leaves many options open, which the 
performer can fill in as s/he likes. Likewise, sounding music, which is 
– at least in this study – the object of music analysis, is not wholly 
determined. More specifically, the meaning of the music the listener is 
listening to is not fixed by the music itself. Musical meaning emerges 
as a result of the interaction between the music and the listener. And 
the analyst is a particular kind of listener, one that articulates this 
interaction. As a result, just as the character of the performer 
codetermines a musical performance, the subjectivity of the analyst 
influences, to a large extent, his/her analysis of a musical piece. This 
again implies that many different analyses of the same musical piece 
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can, and will, exist, that do not necessarily exclude each other. But this 
does not mean that there are not also many analyses possible that make 
no sense at all. One reason why an analysis might make no sense might 
be when it has no relation with the music anymore, and only with the 
subjectivity of the analyst, or his/her urge to show off his/her 
theoretical virtuosity. It is because of these kinds of analyses that some 
critics argue that discussing musical meaning is a useless activity. 
These kinds of discussions are not objective, they contend, and at most 
tell us something about the subjectivity of the analyst, and not about 
the music.  
Kramer, to a certain extent, disagrees with these critics. The 
analyst’s subjectivity is not an obstacle in the discussion of musical 
meaning. Rather, this subjectivity is the very subject of inquiry,  
 
[…] understanding it as a socially constructed position made available by 
the music and occupied to a greater or lesser degree by the listener. 
Subjectivity so understood is not an obstacle to credible understanding but 
its vehicle. The semantic problem is solved by seeking, not to decode music 
as a virtual utterance, but to describe the interplay of musical technique with 
the general stream of communicative actions. (2003: 126)  
 
The fact that musical meaning is, to a very large extent, undetermined 
when isolating the music, is not a sign of arbitrariness, but rather, as 
Kramer calls it, “[…] the enabling condition of musical meaning, and 
the site where the interplay of music and culture is most fully realized” 
(127). So, just as I argued above, Kramer believes that musical 
meaning can only be studied in a meaningful way by focusing on the 
interaction between music and listener, and not by exclusively 
dissecting the music itself. The study of musical structure alone is 
insufficient to come up with a viable account of musical meaning. 
Verbal analyses of a musical piece, just as musical performances, 
are not analytic in the sense that they only get something out of the 
music that was already there. Because these interpretations are the 
result of the interaction between the music and the analyst, they are 
both about the music and the analyst, or, more precisely, about the 
music and the analyst’s approach to this music. For instance, the music 
analyses in this study are the result of the interaction between 
contemporary music and narrative theories, by means of which I 
articulate possible interactions between contemporary music and a 
listener who assumes a narrative listening stance. As a result, I am 
exploring the narrative potentialities of this kind of music. In so doing, 
I am trying to attain the goal of music analysis as Nicola Dibben 
envisages it, who claims that 
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[…] the important point is that music analysis and criticism are concerned 
with persuasion rather than proof, with providing ways of experiencing 
music – the ramifications of which are only slowly becoming apparent for 
psychological approaches to music listening. As others have argued, one 
function of theoretical accounts is to provide new ways of hearing (or 
imagining) music – in effect, to produce music. (2003: 200) 
 
Music analysis is supposed to supply alternative ways of listening and 
experiencing music, and this is indeed what I aim at achieving in this 
study. 
Regarded as such, music analysis cannot be a mere description of 
the music. Referring to Judith Butler about gender identity, Nicolas 
Cook argues the following about the identity of musicology:  
 
[T]here is no such thing as gender identity independent of the behaviour that 
“expresses” it; it is a matter of what your behaviour is, not what it 
represents. And there is an obvious affinity between this and the argument 
recently advanced by Philip Bohlman for seeing musicology as a “political 
act”; as he puts it, musicology “not only describes but prescribes through its 
acts of interpretation.” Musicology, in short, doesn’t just reflect practice; it 
helps mould it. (1999: 243, emphasis in original) 
 
Musicology, with music analysis as its principal instrument, is not the 
description of a musical practice, be it composing, performing, or 
listening to music. Rather, Cook, in following Philip Bohlman, 
contends that, to a certain extent at least, musicology forms these 
practices. Because of this formative role, Cook believes that Butler’s 
account of performativity is directly applicable to music theory: 
“‘[S]tructure,’ it would now read, ‘is performatively constituted by the 
very “expressions” that are said to be its result’” (243). Thus, musical 
structure is not something that is in the music itself. Rather, musical 
structure is created through the act of analysis, which is not an analytic 
act in Immanuel Kant’s sense, but a synthetic one. Music analysis is an 
act of creation. And it is performative in the sense that it affects, and 
even helps shape, musical reality. 
Christopher Norris acknowledges that music analysis can indeed 
have an influence on musical practices: 
 
There is an interesting question here about music, that is, whether reading 
an analysis of this or that musical work can actually have some decisive 
effect on our experience of the work in question, rather than our 
“knowledge” of it in some merely abstract, musicological sense. I think that 
it can, that musical understanding (“appreciation,” if you like) can be greatly 
enhanced by this kind of analysis. (Kermode and Norris 2003: 122-123, 
emphasis in original) 
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And again, this harks back to one of the principal aims of this study: 
exploring the ways in which the comprehension of contemporary 
music can be enhanced by assuming a narrative listening stance. 
 
In this study, each chapter addresses an element that I consider to be 
crucial for musical narrativity. Firstly, the ability to regard a musical 
work as a narrative implies that the listener has achieved some kind of 
GRASP regarding this piece. Therefore, chapter 1 starts off with a 
discussion of what it means to grasp a musical composition. Next, the 
problems regarding the grasp of contemporary, atonal music are 
addressed. Why is it that (Western) listeners seem to have no problem 
understanding tonal music, but seem unable to grasp atonal works? 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the possibility of grasping 
music through narrative structuring, and with the suggestion that a 
narrative listening stance might help the listener in comprehending 
contemporary music. 
A narrative listening stance is only useful when music can be 
interpreted in a narrative manner, i.e. when musical works can be 
considered as musical TALES. Chapter 2 deals with the question in 
which manner music can be considered as narrative. In this chapter I 
discuss the basic narrative elements that are distinguished in 
narratology, and explain how these can be modified, in order to come 
up with a musical narratology. The musical analyses in this chapter 
illustrate the ways in which narrative elements function in 
contemporary music, how contemporary musical compositions can tell 
musical stories, and in which sense these compositions might 
problematize these separate elements.  
Temporality is vital in both music and narrativity. Therefore, in 
chapter 3, I explore the relation between the representation of 
temporality in musical and verbal narrative, in order to see whether or 
not there are crucial differences between the two. In particular, I 
concentrate on the notion of what I call musical TENSE, which is the 
possibility music offers to establish a relation between the musical past 
and the musical present. 
In chapter 4, I relate the notion of musical temporality to another 
important characteristic of (musical) narrative: the sense that a 
narrative moves towards certain goals, or ENDS. Narratives suggest 
some sense of motion, a sense of going in some direction. Music elicits 
this sense perhaps even stronger than verbal narrative does. Therefore, 
in this chapter, I discuss the ways music can arouse this feeling of 
linearity and goal-directed motion within a narratological context. In 
order for music to elicit this impression during the listening, the 
listener must be able to plot his/her way through the music, i.e. able to 
structure the music and distill some kind of meaning from it. I argue 
that this is only possible because of musical tense; would the music 
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lack tense, the listener would have no opportunity to structure and 
reflect on the music. 
Eero Tarasti argues that musical narrativity emerges precisely from a 
series of emotions that are caused by the music itself. This would 
imply that musical emotion, i.e. that musical quality that makes that the 
listener is MOVED by listening to music, is a key ingredient in musical 
narrativity. In my account of musical narrativity, however, musical 
emotion does not play a central role. In chapter 5, I examine to what 
extent Tarasti’s account is compatible with mine. Psychoanalysis might 
be a suitable approach to address this question. Psychoanalysis might 
also be useful to address the second question that is discussed in this 
chapter: can a listener comprehend a musical piece that on the one 
hand elicits narrativity, but on the other hand frustrates the possibility 
of narrativity? Trauma theory, in which the impossibility of closure 
and the resistance to narrative integration are discussed, might be 
helpful in answering this question. 
The narrative structuring of music results in a musical narrative. Yet, 
the question remains what this narrative is about. Which THEMES can 
such a narrative cover? Since many theorists deny the possibility of 
musical narrativity exactly because they are convinced that there 
cannot exist a musical narrative content, this is an important question. 
Therefore, in chapter 6, I address this question by demonstrating that a 
musical narrative does have contents. In this chapter, I focus explicitly 
on the possible contents of atonal musical narratives, and contend that 
these musical narratives ultimately can be considered as 
metanarratives: they tell the story of the process of narrativization. 
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1 GRASP 
Intelligible Sounds 
When a piece of music begins, sounds can be heard, which last a 
certain period of time. Regarded in isolation, these sounds are just that: 
sounds. But because a listener hears them within a certain context and 
with certain expectations, s/he does not regard these sounds just as 
sounds, but calls it music. The vast majority of musical works consist 
of sounds that are associated with music as such. The sound of a violin, 
playing a note, is usually interpreted as a musical sound, whereas the 
sound of a drill is not. This qualification is not the result of some kind 
of universal law, but of the historical musical tradition. In other words: 
because the listener is familiar with particular musical conventions, 
s/he calls the sound of a violin a musical sound, as opposed to the 
sound of a drill. 
Music thus relies on conventions in order to be recognized as music. 
David Lewis describes a convention as a regularity in behavior. It 
restricts behavior without removing all choice (1969: 51). Within the 
constraints of a convention the subject has room to determine his/her 
own behavior. A convention thus creates a frame in which freedom of 
choice exists. One example of a convention is language; a language is 
conventionally determined, for the syntactical rules and the lexicon are 
more or less fixed, whereas the language user can determine, within the 
boundaries of these conventions, what s/he wants to say. 
Lewis argues that the principal function of conventions is the 
solving of coordination problems. Coordination problems are “[…] 
situations of interdependent decision by two or more agents in which 
coincidence of interest predominates and in which there are two or 
more proper coordination equilibria” (24). A coordination equilibrium 
is a “[…] combination in which no one would have been better off had 
any one agent alone acted otherwise, either himself or someone else” 
(14, emphasis in original). In other words: a coordination problem 
arises in situations in which two or more subjects have to adjust their 
behavior in order to realize a position which is as optimal as possible 
for all. Coordination can be achieved by making agreements or by 
following precedents. By reviewing the manner in which one acted in 
certain situations of the past one can predict future actions in similar 
situations (36-42). Acting according to agreements or by following 
precedents results in a regularity in behavior. And since a convention is 
a regularity in behavior, conventions are created out of these manners 
of acting.  
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According to Lewis, the notion of convention now can be defined as 
follows: 
 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, 
and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among 
members of P, (1) almost everyone conforms to R; (2) almost everyone 
expects almost everyone else to conform to R; (3) almost everyone has 
approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of 
actions; (4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on 
condition that almost everyone conform to R; (5) almost everyone would 
prefer that any one more conform to R’, on condition that almost everyone 
conform to R’, where R’ is some possible regularity in the behavior of 
members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S 
among members of P could conform both to R’ and to R. (78) 
 
How does this definition hold in the case of qualifying a sound as a 
musical sound? In this case, R is the qualification of a certain sound as 
a musical sound by members of P, every time this sound sounds, which 
is S. The qualification of a certain sound as a musical sound – R – only 
is a convention, if and only if almost all members of P qualify this 
sound as such. Moreover, every member expects the other members of 
P to qualify this sound as a musical sound, too, and every member has, 
in general, to qualify roughly the same sounds as musical sounds. In 
other words: not only do they have to agree on this particular sound, 
but on a whole range of sounds. Additionally, all members of P prefer 
that almost all other members of P qualify the same sounds as musical 
sounds. Finally, if any member of P were to disqualify a sound that 
s/he perceives, i.e. situation S, as a musical sound, then s/he would 
prefer that almost all other members would disqualify the same sound 
in S, on the condition that a sound cannot at the same time be qualified 
and disqualified as a musical sound within a population P. In short: R 
holds if P consists of listeners that have more or less the same 
knowledge which is necessary for the qualification of a perceptible 
sound, i.e. situation S, as a musical sound. As a result, P remains a 
population consisting of likeminded listeners, since they agree on 
which sounds are musical and which are not.  
Cynthia M. Grund, in her 1995 study into the ontology of music, 
gives a formal definition of music that is compatible with this 
conception. Her definition explains what a musical sound is and where 
the difference lies between a musical sound and “ordinary” sound. 
Grund acknowledges the fact that music is a succession of sounds, but 
she also contends that a sound only becomes music when these sounds 
are part of a so-called reference class. This class is not a collection of 
actual sounds, but of concepts that are stored in the mind of the listener 
and that are formed with the aid of musical precedents. In other words: 
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it is a set of musical conventions. According to Grund, a collection of 
sounds can be regarded as music, if and only if all sounds in this 
collection are compatible with the concepts in a reference class, i.e. 
satisfy the musical conventions the listener has (1995: 73-77). In short: 
only those sounds that are compatible with the concepts in a reference 
class are musical signs.1 
However, there is no such thing as a fixed, static set of musical 
sounds. New sounds are presented as musical sounds constantly, and 
the members of P have to decide whether these sounds are accepted as 
musical sounds or not. New coordination equilibria regarding these 
sounds have to be realized. Conversely, if a composer or musician 
wants to create music that is accepted by the members of P, s/he has to 
take into account the musical conventions that hold within P. In this 
case, a coordination problem between this composer and the members 
of P might arise. A member of P, i.e. a listener, compares the sounds, 
produced by the composer/musician, to the musical sounds s/he is 
already familiar with and tries to fit these sounds within this set of 
musical precedents. The composer/musician, on the other hand, has to 
try to connect in one way or another to the set of musical precedents of 
the members of P. That is, if s/he wants his/her music to be appreciated 
by this listener. For, as Bruce Ellis Benson remarks, a composer can 
choose between compromising his/her music in order to reach a large 
audience, and composing for oneself exclusively, without taking into 
account the listener and his/her musical conventions (2003: 174-175). 
But music listening comprises more than just the recognition of 
sounds as musical sounds. On the one hand, there is the recognition of 
musical sounds; the listener qualifies sounds as musical, because s/he 
hears certain characteristics that lead him/her to believe that s/he is 
hearing music. These sounds more or less comply with the musical 
precedents s/he is familiar with, and therefore s/he calls these musical 
sounds. This results in the listener assuming a listening stance that 
differs from everyday listening. As soon as s/he has decided to regard a 
series of sounds as music, other conventions, criteria, and precedents 
are used while listening to it. Once this stance is assumed, a melodic 
minor second, say, will be regarded as a leading note, and not as a 
                                                                    
1 For those readers who are familiar with formal logic, I give the formal 
representation of Grund’s definition of music, where x is a sound and Z’ is a subset 
of the set Z of all possible sounds. The predicate μ(x) means “x is a musical sound.” 
T is a reference class,  is the set of all reference classes, and u is a sound from the 
subset Z’. The counterfactual implication x  y must be read as “if x were the 
case, then y would be the case.” Grund uses this counterfactual implication, because 
a sound u cannot actually be a member of a reference class. The members of this 
class are all concepts, whereas u is an actual sound (Grund 1995: 77): 
 
x  Z [μ(x)  	Z’  Z [[u  Z’ 	T   (Z  T =   (T  
(Z)   
u  T))]  x  Z’]] 
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series of sound waves with a small difference in frequency. The 
acoustic material gives out, as it were, its original physical qualities in 
favor of musical qualities, as soon as a listener who assumes a musical 
listening stance experiences it. 
However, to be able to decide that a certain series of sounds 
represents a leading tone is a step beyond just regarding sounds as 
musical sounds. At that initial stage the listener’s musical experience 
consists of nothing more than a concatenation of perceptions of sounds 
that s/he identifies as being musical. Yet, the example of the leading 
tone shows that the listener’s musical experience does not equal the 
pure labeling of sounds. The listener is capable of relating musical 
phrases to other phrases within the same piece. Moreover, this relating 
is regarded as one of the most important characteristics of music. The 
composer Karlheinz Stockhausen, for instance, states that “[m]usic 
presents order relationships in time” (quoted in Grant 2001: 135).2 
Additionally, the listener may relate musical phrases to other musical 
works or practices, or to nonmusical ideas or phenomena. In short: the 
listener can structure music while listening to it.3 This capacity, 
together with the ability to recognize musical sounds, makes up a 
musical listening experience, with the experience of an event, or of a 
series of events, being a representation of that event or series of events, 
created by the experiencing subject. When a musical event is 
experienced, this event is somehow made discursive.4  
Both with the aid of musical conventions and with the expectations 
aroused by the music that has already sounded, a listener tries to make 
sense of the music s/he is listening to. Furthermore, as s/he receives 
more information by listening to the music, the listener can adjust and 
fine-tune his/her expectations. Jos Kunst calls this the unlearning-plus-
learning process (UNLL-process). New information, in the shape of 
sounding music, might not cohere with the ideas and expectations the 
listener has regarding this music. As a result, the listener is forced to 
reject these ideas and expectations, to “unlearn” these, and to create, 
i.e. to “learn,” new ideas and expectations that do cohere with both the 
music that has already sounded and the new sounds the listener 
perceives. These new ideas and expectations influence the manner in 
                                                                    
2 This is a surprising contention made by Stockhausen, if we take into account his 
ideal of composing music in moment form, i.e. compositions that consists of 
fragments that are completely disconnected from each other. Yet, on the other hand, 
Stockhausen himself also speaks of unity and form with regard to moment form, 
especially within individual moments (Stockhausen 1963: 189). Moreover, his later 
works have little or nothing to do with moment form. 
3 This structuring thus is not only the structuring of musical moments, but also of 
relating the music to extramusical phenomena. As a consequence, it is not a 
hermetic activity, but rather one that is influenced by social, cultural, and historical 
circumstances. 
4 In chapter 5 I will discuss this definition of experience in more detail. 
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which the listener experiences the continuation of the music. Every 
time ideas and expectations do not hold, the UNLL-process is put into 
operation (1978: 53-57). Thus, music listening is a two-directional 
process; earlier musical sounds influence the way the listener assesses 
future musical sounds, and new musical sounds can lead to a revision 
of the manner in which s/he views earlier musical sounds.  
In this manner, the listener constructs a growing set of precedents 
during the listening, with which new expectations are aroused. The 
larger this set becomes, the more focused expectation becomes. As the 
listener has more information, it becomes more and more simple for 
him/her to make musical predictions regarding the continuation of the 
music s/he is listening to. As a consequence, the impact of an 
unexpected musical event is far greater. The more certain a listener is 
regarding his/her prediction, the greater the surprise of an unexpected 
moment.5 Repetition, for instance, helps musical memory, which is 
crucial in music listening, as the composer Arnold Schoenberg remarks 
(1984: 282). Repetition can be a means to structure the music, by 
providing clues for the listener, while at the same time functioning as a 
pretext for a surprising moment that is yet to arrive. Ultimately, this 
process leads to what Kunst calls musical understanding (1978: 33-34). 
In his 1978 study, Kunst develops his account of the UNLL-process 
into a formal model, involving modal logic. This model is a “[…] way 
of representing listeners’ cognitive behavior” (116) with regard to a 
particular musical work. Kunst does not claim to predict, with this 
model, all possible behaviors a listener can exhibit. Rather, he proposes 
a mode of representation with which a particular listener’s cognitive 
behavior, while experiencing a piece of music, can be articulated. This 
general model is the result of a theoretical reflection on the way in 
which a listener can make sense of the music s/he is listening to, with 
the UNLL-process being the theoretical foundation of this model.  
Kunst furthermore regards music listening as an activity. For him, 
listening to music is not just the passive undergoing of the music, but 
rather an activity that aims at arriving at musical comprehension. And 
indeed, the UNLL-process can be seen as a description, or perhaps 
even a prescription, of the way a listener can gain a sense of 
comprehension. Likewise, the alternative listening stance that I 
propose in this study is an activity through which music, and 
contemporary music in particular, can be grasped. Thus, “grasp” is the 
activity of trying to make sense of the music, while “a certain degree of 
comprehension” is the result of this activity. 
                                                                    
5 In chapter 3, this phenomenon, which is called markedness, is elaborated in more 
detail. 
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Sensible Unities 
The composer Anton Webern claims that unity must prevail in order to 
ensure the intelligibility of musical thought (Street 1989: 77-78). 
Webern thus argues that, somehow, a musical piece has to be regarded 
as some kind of whole; it has to have a graspable structure, which 
makes it a unity and makes it possible for the listener to arrive at some 
kind of comprehension of the music. The recognition of musical 
structure is a prerequisite for the possibility of grasping the music, and 
thus to comprehend it. As I explained above, a musical listening 
experience consists of both the recognition of musical sounds, and the 
structuring of the music while listening to it, although this structuring 
is not only intramusical, but involves extramusical phenomena as well. 
And by trying – for a listener may not succeed – to structure the music, 
the listener tries to regard this music as constituting a whole. 
Showing the unity of music is also the aim of many forms of music 
analysis. As Jim Samson remarks, in music analysis at the beginning of 
the twentieth century,  
 
[u]nity and wholeness, whatever these may mean in a temporal art, were 
assumed a priori, and the analytical act was their demonstration. The work 
became a structure, and in that lays its value. It was at this stage of its 
development that music theory found common grounds with the emergence 
of a structuralist poetics in other art forms. (1999: 41) 
 
According to those forms of music analysis, music is valuable if and 
only if it consists of a structure that ensures its unity, and the sole aim 
of analysis is to articulate this structure, and thus its value.  
The idea of equating music analysis with the search for musical 
unity is criticized by many theorists, such as Alan Street. He argues 
that the demonstration of musical unity through analysis is nothing 
more than an arbitrary act. In his view, the demonstration of musical 
incoherence would be just as valid. There is nothing in the music that 
forces the listener to regard it as a unity, rather than a diversity: 
 
What I want to suggest […] is that, ubiquity apart, the unifying urge is by no 
means immune to doubt. Indeed, far from demonstrating its objectivity in 
every case, the same ideal constantly succeeds in exposing its own 
arbitrariness. By this reckoning, the championship of unity over diversity 
represents nothing other than a generalized state of false consciousness: 
illusion rather than reality. (1989: 80) 
 
Street thus concludes that musical unity is an illusion, not a reality. 
Yet, as I argued, it is the listener that structures the music into a 
graspable whole that can be comprehended. Hence, it is the listener 
that recognizes in the music a certain structure. As a consequence, this 
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might as well be an illusion, in the sense that the music does not 
“really” have this particular structure. But the reality is that the listener 
can grasp the music because s/he has distilled out of the music this 
structure. For his/her comprehension of the music, it is irrelevant 
whether or not this structure is the “true” musical structure (whatever 
that may be). Because s/he is capable of relating musical phrases to 
other phrases within the same piece, and of relating musical phrases to 
other musical works, practices, and/or extramusical phenomena, s/he 
can get some kind of grasp, and thus a sense of comprehension, of the 
music. This comprehension might be an illusion, since s/he has 
constructed this unity him/herself, but this does not take away the 
validity of his/her listening experience. 
Street furthermore maintains that methods of analysis that primarily 
focuses on musical unity transform music, which is a temporal cultural 
expression, into a spatial representation: 
 
[I]f, within the analytical project, the intention is always the same – to carry 
through a devotion to the principle of unity as an example of naturalized 
understanding – the result is also one-dimensional: subjugation of a 
genuinely temporal art to the service of a spatial aesthetic. (105) 
 
Music analysis, especially those that focus on musical unity, tends to 
reduce music, which is a temporal, aural form of expression, into a 
spatial and visual unified whole. Musical analyses often contain 
diagrams, which are visual representations of the musical structure. 
These do not always necessarily have to have a detrimental effect on 
the analysis in which they appear. On the contrary: often they can 
really help in gaining more insight in the music. In this case, this 
insight is based on spatial representations, but they can nevertheless be 
very useful in analysis, as long as these representations do not negate 
the temporal nature of music. But admittedly, the production of 
diagrams sometimes seems to be the only goal in analysis. Yet, a 
graver concern is the tendency to equate the music with the musical 
score, thus with the visual representation of the music. As a possible 
result, the music is treated as a spatial, rather than a temporal, art. This 
means that one might identify relations that are not audible, but only 
perceptible visually, many analyses based on pitch-class set theory 
being a case in point. In these cases, musical unity is recognized in the 
visual representation that is the score, whereas this unity might not be 
recognizable when listening to a performance of the music. 
Other theorists, such as Kevin Korsyn, interpret Street’s account as 
an argument for the irrelevance of music analysis: 
 
Alan Street […] has argued that “the championship of unity over diversity 
represents nothing other than a generalized state of false consciousness.” 
Chapter 1 
 
20 
Since he offers no alternatives to the privileging of unity, however, his essay 
reads like an obituary for music analysis. (1999: 61) 
 
On the one hand, one can agree with Korsyn and conclude that the only 
conclusion Street can draw is to refrain from music analysis altogether, 
since this activity is based on false premises. But on the other hand, 
one can read Street’s argument as an appeal to critically examine the 
grounds on which music analysis is based. Through this examination, 
we might obtain some interesting results, as Samson explains: “The 
[nineteenth-century] unified musical work, celebrated by the institution 
of analysis, was a necessary, valuable, and glorious myth, but it was a 
myth shaped in all essentials by a particular set of social and historical 
circumstances” (1999: 42). Thus, a form of music analysis that is 
focused on revealing the unity of a musical work only, is based on 
nineteenth-century premises, which do not necessarily hold today. 
Korsyn, too, acknowledges that unity in art might be related to myth, 
and more particularly to myths regarding the unity of man. Viewing a 
work of art as a peculiar kind of subject, he argues, 
 
[…] explains our investment in artistic unity: it is our own unity which is at 
stake. The aesthetic has become a “surrogate discourse” in which our hopes 
for the autonomy and freedom of the individual have been surreptitiously 
transferred to the aesthetic object. Indeed, the more precarious our hopes as 
real individuals have become, the greater the tendency has been to proclaim 
art the region where all restrictions on freedom and autonomy are 
transcended. This tempts us to make inflated claims for artistic unity, 
attributing to art a fantastic degree of autonomy, beyond the power of any 
artifact to achieve. (1999: 60) 
 
Although he does not want to disqualify music analysis altogether, 
Korsyn recognizes that regarding a musical composition, or artworks 
in general, as a unity might sometimes lead to exaggerated or even 
bombastic interpretations of those artworks. Yet, Korsyn 
acknowledges,  
 
[…] the unitary, monologic subject is the model for both the autonomous 
work of art and continuous history. Thus we can imagine a triangle that 
captures this complicity between music analysis and history: the repression 
of heterogeneity in analysis parallels the repression of discontinuity in 
history, and both originate in the repression of otherness that creates the 
monologic subject. (67) 
 
The myth of unity not only influences the human subject’s views on 
art, but also determines his/her views on history. In both cases, 
discontinuity is repressed, and continuity and unity are stressed.  
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Many musical works may not properly fit into this mold of unity and 
continuity, and this is why Street opposes to forms of music analysis 
that only focus on these aspects: 
 
While formalist and, more particularly, organicist attitudes are thought 
unshakable, attempts to investigate repertoire from outside the Austro-
Germanic line must […] fail to negate the suggestion of overly narrow 
traditionalism. To the contrary, the principle which still has to be grasped is 
that matter dictates manner, not vice versa; until then there can be no 
enlightened reinterpretation of any alternative musical heritage. (1989: 89-
90) 
 
Street thus calls for methods of analysis that respect the specific 
characteristics of musical works, instead of the other way around. As a 
result, not all compositions necessarily comply with notions such as 
unity. As Samson puts it: “[C]losed concepts of an artwork, involving 
such notions as structure, unity, wholeness, and complexity, are 
products of a particular kind of institutionalized analytic-referential 
discourse. They cannot be equated with the work itself” (1999: 43). 
The discourse dictates unity, whereas unity is not necessarily elicited 
by the artwork itself. 
This is particularly evident with regard to contemporary music. 
Robert Fink argues that “[…] to demand organic unity from 
contemporary composition is ultimately quixotic: it is hopeless to insist 
that music reflect, not the heterotopia [a disorder in which a large 
number of different possible orders reside simultaneously] in which we 
live, but some one of the many utopias in which we no longer believe” 
(1999: 132, emphasis in original). On the one hand, Fink observes that 
many contemporary musical compositions resist organic unity by being 
discontinuous. On the other hand, he contends that music which is 
composed today reflects today’s social conditions, which amount to 
disorder, and does not so much approach some ancient ideal of unity. 
Although it might be uncertain whether contemporary music indeed 
reflects contemporary social conditions (but it might very well be 
possible to interpret it as such), his observation regarding the relation 
between unity and contemporary music seems to hold. This kind of 
music often resists unity, in the sense that it is very hard to recognize 
relations – and thus some kind of structure – within the music. In order 
to respect the nature of such musical works, and to avoid the forcing of 
particular discourses on the music, Korsyn remarks that “[w]e need 
new paradigms for analysis, new models that will allow both unity and 
heterogeneity” (1999: 60). In quoting Mikhail Bakhtin, he argues that, 
in accepting these paradigms, “[t]he unity of the work of art changes 
into something more complex: ‘unity not as an innate one-and-only, 
but as a dialogic concordance of unmerged twos or multiples’” (63, 
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emphasis in original). As a result, this so-called dialogic analysis 
would  
 
[…] reverse the priorities of traditional music analysis. Rather than reducing 
difference to sameness, in an attempt to secure the boundaries of an 
autonomous, self-identical text, dialogic analysis would begin from this 
apparent unity, this unity-effect, but would move towards heterogeneity, 
activating and releasing the voices of heteroglossia. (64-65, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Korsyn thus proposes to take the work’s “veil of unity” as the starting 
point of analysis, and to investigate how other texts and discourses are 
interweaved into the music, and possibly weaken the impression of 
unity of the music. In short: Korsyn intends to focus primarily on the 
relation with other musical works, practices, nonmusical ideas, and 
phenomena. However, he does not explicitly suggest concentrating on 
possible intramusical heterogeneity or discontinuity. 
Yet, new music often resists unity primarily because the music itself 
is discontinuous, and not because of its intertextuality. But at the same 
time the listener has a natural inclination to regard musical works as 
unities. As I explained above, the listener in principle is capable of 
relating musical phrases to other phrases within the same piece, while 
s/he may also relate musical phrases to other musical works or 
practices. And, as soon as s/he assumes a musical listening stance, the 
listener oftentimes is inclined to create these links, which might result 
in regarding the music as a unified whole and to a sense of 
comprehension of the music.6 As a consequence, this stance may also 
be assumed when listening to contemporary music, in which the 
concept of musical unity may be problematized. Thus, while the music 
itself might be discontinuous, a listener – especially one that is used to 
listen to tonal music – still might try to turn it into a graspable whole. 
Fred Everett Maus puts it as follows: “One important kind of 
musical unity, I suggest, is the unity of a listening experience, or (in a 
more precise, if cumbersome, formulation), the unity and distinctness 
of a particular experience of listening to a composition” (1999: 179, 
emphasis in original). In regarding musical unity as such, the 
interaction between music and listener is emphasized, which “[…] 
locates unity, along with other musical qualities, in a particularized, 
contingent event, rather than an ontologically and experientially 
mysterious ‘work’ or ‘composition’” (180). Musical unity thus is 
established when listening to music. The locus of unity is not the music 
itself, but rather the act of listening to music. In referring to John 
Dewey, Maus explains this assertion:  
                                                                    
6 But I do not want to imply that the listener always tries to do so; at the end of this 
study I will discuss possible alternative listening stances a listener can assume. 
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Listening to certain musical compositions, one may have an experience that 
is demarcated from experience-in-general as a distinct event. This 
experience consists of interaction between the listener and the music, in 
which the listener both “does” and “undergoes” – that is, construes the 
music, and responds continuously, on the basis of previous construals, to 
new sounds. The experience can be described as unified, and the occurrence 
of such experiences is one reason to associate music and unity. (180) 
 
A listening experience differs from ordinary, everyday experiences, 
and thus can be considered to be a distinct, marked event. Moreover, 
during this event the listener is not just a passive receiver of sounds, 
but also a co-creator of the musical experience. As I elaborated above, 
the listener tries to make sense of the music s/he is listening to by 
adjusting and fine-tuning his/her musical expectations, as s/he receives 
more information by listening to the music, as well as reinterpreting 
past musical phrases in the light of new sounds s/he is hearing (the 
UNLL-process). The experience, during which the UNLL-process 
takes place, can be regarded as a unifying experience, in the sense that 
this process is not disturbed by other activities on the listener’s part. 
(Unless, of course, the listener is distracted. But for the sake of my 
argument, I am assuming a listener whose attention is solely focused 
on the music s/he is hearing.) As a result, the listening experience is a 
unifying experience, an experience during which the listener may try to 
grasp, and subsequently to comprehend, the music by establishing 
relations between musical phrases and between the music and 
extramusical phenomena. As a result, the music-as-listened-to is made 
discursive, for the listener is able to articulate and evaluate, verbally or 
otherwise, the musical relations s/he has recognized, both within the 
musical piece itself as well as the relations with extramusical 
phenomena.  
Serial Challenges 
A musical listening experience differs from everyday experience. It is 
an experience in which attention is focused on sounds which the 
listener labels as musical sounds, and in which s/he tries to relate these 
sounds to each other and to other phenomena. One can safely argue 
that musical listening thus is a more intense form of listening than 
everyday listening is. Yet, according to the composer Helmut 
Lachenmann, even when listening to music, the subject’s attention is 
not sufficiently challenged:  
 
The art of listening, which in an age of a daily tidal wave of music is at once 
overtaxed and underchallenged, and thus controlled, has to liberate itself by 
penetrating the structure of what is heard, by deliberately incorporating, 
provoking and revealing perception. This seems to me to be the true 
tradition of western art. (1995: 101) 
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Most kinds of music that are presented are too confirming; it does not 
present the listener something new or hitherto unheard. As a result, 
Lachenmann argues, the musical structures s/he derives from this 
music are almost meaningless, because these only confirm what s/he 
already knows: “Musical structures derive their strength solely from 
conscious or unconscious resistance, the friction between them and 
prevailing structures of existence and consciousness. Any concept of 
complexity which ignores this aspect is meaningless” (100). In order to 
create this resistance, Lachenmann proposes to shatter the familiar by 
interjecting so-called “non-music” throughout the music. This “non-
music” consists of sounds and phrases that are not conventionally 
associated with musical sounds and practices. When confronted with 
these novel sounds, the listener is forced to adjust his/her musical 
conventions, in order to incorporate these sounds, or to refrain from 
listening altogether. Despite the risk of losing the listener, Lachenmann 
is convinced that this is the only way to transform musical listening 
into what he calls genuine perception:  
 
[I]t is only by allowing oneself to experience this “non-music” that listening 
becomes genuine perception. It is only now that one begins to listen 
differently, that one is reminded of the changeability of listening and of 
aesthetic behavior, reminded, in other words, of one’s own structure, one’s 
own structural changeability and also of the element of human invariability 
which makes all this possible in the first place: the power of what one calls 
the human spirit. (101) 
 
Conventionally unmusical sounds underline the flexibility of musical, 
and other, conventions. It is through trying to incorporate these sounds 
in his/her existing musical paradigms that the human subject is made 
aware of the unstable nature of his/her ideas and views, which 
Lachenmann calls the human subject’s structure. Hence, ultimately, 
listening to novel music results in a deepening of the subject’s self-
knowledge. 
Integral serial music – music in which all musical parameters are 
ordered according to rows – can be regarded as an instance of such 
novel music.7 Although integral serial composition already is being 
practiced for over half a century, it still challenges the listener’s 
attempts to comprehend this kind of music. Moreover, as Umberto Eco 
remarks, integral serial music is not about the reconstruction of an 
origin, but the discovery of new possibilities: 
 
                                                                    
7 Although the main focus in this chapter is on integral serial music, most of the 
issues I discuss here hold for all atonal contemporary music. But because in integral 
serial music the discrepancies between method and perception are most evident, I 
will primarily focus on this kind of music in this chapter. 
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The main goal of serial thought is to allow codes to evolve historically and 
to discover new ones, rather than to trace them back to the original 
generative Code (the Structure). Thus, serial thought aims at the production 
of history and not at the rediscovery, beneath history, of the atemporal 
abscissae of all possible communication. In other words, the aim of 
structural thought is to discover, whereas that of serial thought is to produce. 
(quoted in Grant 2001: 213) 
 
Serial music8 thus complies with Lachenmann’s “non-music,” in the 
sense that listening to serial music is not a confirming activity, but 
rather an activity in which new views and ideas can be created.  
But why is serial music challenging for the listener? After all, serial 
music is composed according to strict rules, which order the musical 
sounds. Thus, one could argue that this would result in a musical 
structure that is clearly recognizable. In reality, however, this is not the 
case. Morag J. Grant argues that  
 
[r]ather than a method of ordering, serial technique […] appears as a method 
of unordering. It was a method of dissolving particular ties, so that others 
could come to the fore; its constraint was, not so paradoxically, its freedom. 
This depends on realizing that the relationship between working method and 
audible result is discrete rather than direct, and this is exactly where most 
analyses of serial music get into difficulties. (2001: 154-155) 
 
Serial music does not have the harmonic structure – which the listener 
can perceive – that tonal music has, and instead is structured by using a 
method that is both strict and arbitrary. It is strict in the sense that 
serial music is composed by following strict rules – although in more 
recent serial compositions these rules are applied in a less strict 
manner, whereas these rules are not aurally perceptible in the resulting 
composition. On the other hand, serial method is arbitrary in the sense 
that it puts fewer constraints on the ways serial music can be structured 
by the listener. Human memory is not capable to memorize the rows 
within a serial musical work and recognize their permutations, which 
means that the music does not determine the listener’s structuring 
activity as much as tonal music does.9 Although these rows and 
permutations might be clearly visible in the score, it is very hard, if not 
impossible, to hear them. Furthermore, in many cases it can be very 
difficult to hear symmetries, mirroring, and other proportions in serial 
music, as Grant remarks, whereas these are also easily recognizable in 
the score (63-65, 104-105). And as I argued above, analysis that focus 
                                                                    
8 Henceforth I will use the term “serial” instead of “integral serial.” With this term, I 
refer both to integral serial music and to dodecaphonic music, i.e. music in which 
only pitch is subordinated to rows. 
9 This is confirmed by experiments, conducted by Michel Imberty, which I refer to 
below. I will discuss the function of musical memory in the next two chapters. 
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on these musical characteristics equate the music with the musical 
score, and thus with the visual representation of the music, rather than 
with the sounding music. 
Grant observes that serial music is composed by using a 
combinatorial method, whereas tonal music is composed by using a 
dynamic approach. In other words: serial music is a form of 
constructivism, while tonal music is based on functional harmony 
(225-226). In serial music, functional harmony, the “natural” ordering 
of pitches, is replaced by a compositional method that clearly is a 
construction, a fabrication, a fiction (with functional harmony being a 
fiction, too, but disguised as a natural phenomenon).10 Serial music is 
not presented as a representation of some natural order, or of reality. It 
is presented as a construct. Brian McHale observes a similar 
phenomenon in the postmodern novel; this kind of novel “[…] has 
become less the mirror of nature, more an artifact, visibly a made 
thing” (1987: 30, emphasis in original). Moreover, postmodernist 
fiction “[…] is above all illusion-breaking art; it systematically disturbs 
the air of reality by foregrounding the ontological structure of texts and 
of fictional worlds” (221). As an example, McHale discusses Italo 
Calvino’s novel Invisible Cities (1972), in which descriptions of cities 
are given that obviously could not exist in the real world. On the 
contrary: often these cities are in contradiction with themselves, or 
with each other. For instance, according to the descriptions given by 
Marco Polo, there are three different cities that all encompass the entire 
space of the empire of the Great Khan. This empire, McHale 
concludes, thus is overtly fictional (43-45). Or take William Gass’s 
Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife (1968). In this book typography and 
page layout are exploited, which, according to McHale, results in an 
undermining of the reality of the fictional character “[…] by the book’s 
insistence of its own reality: its distractingly colored pages and 
distorted typography, its provocative and apparently irrelevant 
illustrations, its parallel texts which force the reader to improvise an 
order of reading, and so on” (180, emphasis in original). The 
foregrounding of the ontological structure of texts and of fictional 
worlds problematizes the grasping of postmodernist fiction, as 
conventions and expectations associated with conventional, “natural,” 
                                                                    
10 Some musicians, composers, and theorists claim that tonality is a natural 
phenomenon, since it is supposedly based on the harmonic overtone series, which is 
a natural, acoustic phenomenon. However, as for instance Anthony Storr (1992: 56-
64) explains, this claim is unfounded. The intervals that make up tonality only 
partially match with those given in the harmonic overtone series. Moreover, many 
forms of non-Western music do not make use of tonality. Does this mean that these 
musical expressions are less natural than Western music, because these are not 
based on something supposedly naturally given? I do not think that anyone would 
want to claim this. Rather, the belief that Western tonality is universal is nothing 
more than just that: a belief. 
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“realistic” fiction are not adequate in order to grasp postmodernist 
fiction. Oftentimes, these conventions and expectations are played with 
and manipulated, just as many contemporary musical works play with 
and manipulate musical conventions and expectations in a self-
reflexive manner. 
According to Grant, another important break with established 
musical conventions in serialism is the replacement of goal-orientation 
with nonlinearity (2001: 124-125). In serial music, she argues, the 
prediction of the course of a serial work remains momentary and is not 
preconditioned; “[…] we may predict change, but not a particular kind 
of change” (157). As a result, serial hearing amounts to a conscious 
concentration, not only on the (lack of) connections between different 
events, but on the internal structure and character of individual events, 
as opposed to structural hearing, which is a concentration on the large-
scale formal process (161). As a result, Grant contends, in serial music,  
 
[…] notes have an impact on surrounding notes but this impact is not pre-
defined, nor does it relate to a specific semantic system external to the work 
itself. This does not imply that past and future are not essential to the 
perception of new music, but […] there is a difference, What is past 
conditions how we hear the present, and may increase our expectation of 
what will come next; but this is a localized process. The description of serial 
form as moment form in no way contradicts the temporal structure of music 
– “moment” is itself a temporal category. (159, emphasis in original) 
 
Although I discuss notions such as linearity, goal-directedness, and the 
musical present extensively in chapters 3 and 4, at this point it is 
important to stress that serialism, or atonality in general, does not 
automatically imply nonlinearity. On a harmonic and melodic level, it 
is often very difficult to make precise predictions on the course an 
atonal musical work will take. In that sense, one could say that the 
listener’s attention indeed is primarily focused on the moment. Yet, 
this does not mean that, therefore, the music can in no way be linear or 
goal-directed. Parameters such as timbre, rhythm, and loudness can 
elicit linearity, too. But to listen for linearity by focusing on these 
parameters is quite different from tonal listening, and hence requires 
some getting used to. Therefore, listeners that are only used to listen to 
tonal music – which primarily implies a focusing on melody and 
harmony, although not always – might not regard atonal works as 
displaying linearity. Consequently, serial music is not “in the moment” 
exclusively, but might also be regarded as “going somewhere” and 
“coming from somewhere else,” as long as the listener does not limit 
his/her focus to melody and harmony only.11 
                                                                    
11 Integral serial music might problematize my contention, since in this kind of 
music all musical parameters, and thus timbre and dynamics, too, are organized 
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In sum, serial music complicates musical comprehension in several 
ways: firstly, the use of rational compositional methods, such as serial 
technique, need not necessarily lead to perceptibly rational results. 
Rather, these methods obscure musical structure, at least when 
listening to the music. At most, the structure literally becomes visible 
when studying the score. Secondly, serial technique is not “natural,” in 
the sense that tonal music is regarded as being “natural,” i.e. a 
construction using a tonal order, which is supposedly based on the 
natural overtone series. What this comes down to is that serial music 
does not make use of established tonal conventions, which are, 
consciously or unconsciously, known to the (Western) listener. As a 
result, tonal music only seems natural because the listener does not 
have to make a real effort to grasp it, i.e. to structure the music while 
listening to it. Yet, tonality is just as conventional as any other musical 
concept is, and atonal music makes the listener aware of this fact, a 
view that Lachenmann endorses. Lastly, in serial music conventional 
large-scale forms are abandoned. A large-scale form, such as the 
sonata, fugue, song, etc., has a clear, perceptible structure to which a 
listener can hang on. In serial music, however, the whole notion of 
form, or, perhaps more accurate, of perceptible musical structure, is 
problematized. Because linearity, goal-directedness, and repetition – 
those musical characteristics that are vital for the listener during the act 
of structuring the music – are hard to recognize (and in some cases 
even absent) in serial and other atonal music, the possibilities to 
structure the music, and thus to comprehend it, diminish as well. 
Comprehensible Surfaces 
Serial music is an example of music that is hard to grasp. This kind of 
music complicates musical comprehension in many ways, as I 
elaborated above. Serial music is composed by using rational 
compositional methods that, although perhaps clearly understandable 
when studying the score, complicate the possibility of comprehending 
the music when listening to it. The musical structures are often too 
difficult to grasp, and thus to comprehend, by ear. Yet, while serial, 
and all atonal, music is harder to comprehend, it is not at all impossible 
to grasp this music. There are ways in which the listener can structure 
serial, or atonal, musical works, and thus can comprehend these works. 
A first step in achieving this is to focus not solely on the melodic and 
harmonic musical material, but on the other musical parameters as 
well. In other words: to grasp atonal music, the listener cannot always 
                                                                                                                                     
according to rows. As a result, it becomes more problematic to put these parameters 
into operation in order to elicit some kind of linearity or goal-directedness. Yet, as I 
will show in chapter 3, a musical past, and thus a “coming from somewhere else,” 
can be discerned in Stockhausen’s Studie II, which is an integral serial work. 
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listen to this music in the same manner as s/he listens to tonal pieces. 
In atonal music, melody and harmony might provide fewer clues than 
rhythm, loudness, and timbre do.  
Fred Lerdahl, however, believes otherwise. He argues that the most 
important reason that serial music is so difficult, if not impossible, to 
grasp, is because serial compositional methods cannot be reconstructed 
by listening to the aural result of that method; serial music “[…] 
divorces method from intuition” (1988: 235). However, in his assertion 
Lerdahl relates musical comprehension to the reconstruction of 
compositional methods. As soon as the listener finds out how a piece is 
composed, Lerdahl argues, s/he has comprehended the music. In other 
words: he seems to claim that there is a single, true grasp of music, 
namely the knowledge of the compositional method. Yet, while 
knowledge of these methods might be helpful, it is by far not the only 
means by which the listener can structure the music, and in so doing 
gains musical comprehension. Rather, musical comprehension can be 
established through the UNLL-process described above, a process 
which allows for many different ways to comprehend the same musical 
piece. Musical comprehension depends on the relation between the 
(individual) listener and the musical work. Hence, the individual 
listener has a decisive influence on the way that work is grasped, which 
in turn results in the existence of many different musical structures by 
which the music can be grasped and comprehended. But this does not 
mean that every account of a musical piece is equally valid, although 
many different accounts of the same composition can exist, which can 
all be valid. At the same time, however, there are an infinite number of 
accounts that are unlikely or far-fetched, because these accounts do not 
bear in any way on the objects – the music, in this case – of which 
these are accounts. 
Lerdahl furthermore states that the musical surface must be available 
for hierarchical structuring by the listening grammar, a surface that is 
not available in serial music (239). In his Generative Theory of Tonal 
Music, or GTTM, Lerdahl contends that the comprehension of music 
depends on the recognition of hierarchical structures. These structures 
ultimately can be reduced to an underlying structure, which, according 
to Michel Imberty, “[…] corresponds to the most abstract and most 
fundamental organization of the musical piece, and which could 
perhaps be called […] the generative structure of the piece (that which 
most resembles [Heinrich] Schenker’s idea of ‘Ursatz’)” (1993: 328, 
emphasis in original). The adjective “generative” in “generative 
structure,” the ultimate structure that has to be recognized in order to 
gain musical comprehension, refers to a musical origin. Thus, Lerdahl 
seems to imply that there is only one possible correct way to gain 
musical comprehension, namely through discovering this origin. Yet, 
according to Lerdahl, this origin is inaccessible in serial music, for in 
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this kind of music there is no distinction between musical surface and 
depth. 
Fink relates the idea of music, and art in general, as having both 
surface and depth, and thus having a hierarchy, to thinking about 
society: 
 
The masses are animals, their life is all chaotic surface; only the bourgeois 
“individual,” who, like the musical master-works he loves, has both 
foreground and background, can “create and transmit connection and 
coherence.” Interiority, structure, hierarchy – these properties not only 
define the space of the masterwork; they define the psychic space within 
which we (bourgeois) can experience subjectivity. It is our inner “regions 
for soul-searching” that make us – and not the masses – truly human. (1999: 
135, emphasis in original) 
 
Depth and surface are characteristics of both a masterwork and the true 
bourgeois individual. Both distinguish themselves from the masses. “In 
the face of hostile, dehumanized mass culture,” Fink continues, “the 
subjectivity and interiority encoded by great art must be defended 
behind an impregnable skin: a surface-as-boundary that, though 
confusing and complex to the uninitiated, possesses the solid integrity 
of total organization” (136). According to Fink, those who regard 
music as being hierarchically structured, implicitly argue that a musical 
surface is necessary for the protection of a musical depth:  
 
Hierarchic music theories ask us to renounce the pleasures of the surface for 
the defensive security of the depths. We may not all want to make the 
exchange. Perhaps, after all, beauty is only skin-deep. Even in music. (137) 
 
Thus, Fink questions the value of hierarchical structuring of music, and 
asks whether concentrating on the musical surface alone might be more 
valuable. 
Maus believes that this indeed might be the case: 
 
Many writers seem to regard analytical experience as the source of musical 
comprehension, and use the musical surface as a mere source of data, rather 
than as the place where experience and enquiry should come to rest. (1999: 
178) 
 
Instead of trying to distill some deep structure out of the musical 
sounds – a structure that is not to be found in the music itself, but 
rather is a fabrication of the analyst – these sounds themselves should 
be the start and finish of musical analysis and the source for musical 
comprehension. Maus proposes to concentrate on the listening 
experience, which amounts to a concentration on the musical surface, 
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rather than on the compositional methods, even when discussing serial 
music: 
 
On the one hand, a twelve-tone piece may seem convincing, unified, and 
beautiful; on the other hand, the twelve-tone patterning seems undeniable. 
So, one feels bound to admit, somehow the patterning must explain the 
experiences, including the feeling of unity. One should resist such 
hypothetical analytical explanations – not primarily because they are false 
(though I think they are not known to be true), but because they change the 
subject of analysis, leading away from the articulation of experienced 
qualities of music. (176)  
 
In his view, musical listening experiences should be not just the testing 
ground, but also the main subject matter, of musical analysis and 
criticism. Maus asserts that the central task in critical writing about 
music is to articulate and communicate musical experience, not to 
reconstruct the genealogy of a musical piece. Musical comprehension, 
which is a part of musical experience, does not depend on knowledge 
of compositional methods.12 Grant argues along the same lines. She 
maintains that the use of the row is a constraint on the composer; it is 
not the aim of serialism that an educated listener could recognize the 
row and hear how this row is being permutated during the course of a 
composition (2001: 219). In other words: the recognition of rows and 
their permutations – and thus the compositional method – is not the 
same as grasping and comprehending serial music.  
Yet, is it possible to grasp and comprehend serial music altogether? 
Is it possible to structure this kind of music only by listening to it? 
John Snyder seems to doubt this. He argues that serial music lacks any 
clear patterning,13 which makes it very difficult for the listener to 
memorize this music; serial music “sabotages human memory”: 
 
Often referred to as “existing in the present only,” it provides either no 
memorable patterns or no basis for expectation, or both. This lack of 
memorability also tends to emphasize the qualities of individual acoustical 
events, rather than their relationship to each other as parts of larger patterns. 
(2000: 66)14 
 
Snyder thus claims that serial music cannot be structured, which 
implies that it cannot be comprehended, either. 
                                                                    
12 Yet, on the other hand, knowledge of the compositional method might influence 
the way the listener grasps the music. 
13 As I explained above, the music might be clearly patterned because of the use of a 
rational compositional method, yet this patterning is too complicated to be grasped 
by the ear. 
14 I will discuss in depth the notion of the musical present in chapter 3. 
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Imberty, however, thinks otherwise. He asserts, after conducting 
experiments in which listeners have to identify dodecaphonic series 
and their permutations in serial compositions, that serial music can be 
patterned after all. The structuring of serial music can be done by 
concentrating on the melodic, rhythmic and dynamic features of the 
music – which are all perceptible at the musical surface – rather than 
on the stabilities or instabilities defined by scalar hierarchies. He 
concludes that 
 
[a]tonal musical structure [the grasping of which leads to musical 
comprehension] rests on other polarities, not situated at the level of the 
series itself which hence cannot serve as a prototype or frame of reference in 
perception and memory. (1993: 327) 
 
This structure is always provisional, and always modifiable from 
hearing, which, according to Imberty, is one of the characteristics of 
atonal music, and “[…] more specifically of serial music, which is 
extremely fluid for the hearer, to have no definitive structure” (331). 
As a result, 
 
[…] it is clear that the perception and comprehension of atonal music 
remains more uncertain, or if you prefer, more and more open than the 
perception and comprehension of tonal music. The role of the listener, with 
his past, his culture, his knowledge, is more important in this case. (336) 
 
Just as I argued above, Imberty holds that musical structuring depends 
both on the music, the individual listener, and the cultural and social 
circumstances in which the music is listened to. As a result, several 
different manners in which to grasp and comprehend the same musical 
piece can, and will, exist. And in serial, or any kind of atonal music, 
this diversity might even be greater. Nevertheless, atonal music can be 
comprehended in the same manner, although comprehension might be 
harder to achieve in this kind of music than it is in tonal music. 
Narrative Structuring 
During a musical listening experience, which – as I explained above – 
can be regarded as a unifying activity, the listener tries to structure the 
music. And although in this experience the UNLL-process is always 
involved, the strategies used to structure the music may differ from 
listener to listener. Maus suggests that a narrative strategy might be 
successful in helping to structure the music: 
 
[T]he association of music with a story is a way of attributing musical unity: 
the parts of a story belong together, somehow, and in associating music and 
story one is, somehow, transferring that unity to a musical context. Second, 
as I understand it, the notion of a musical story is not an alternative to the 
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notions of musical experiences or musical world. They are related as 
follows: a listener may have a unified experience, and that experience may 
include the imagining of a fictional world, and the events within that 
fictional world may form a story. (1999: 182-183) 
 
In the course of a musical listening experience, a listener might regard 
the music s/he is listening to as a story, i.e. structure the music as if it 
were a musical narrative. In this way, the music is regarded as a 
structural whole, namely a narrative, and, consequently, musical 
comprehension might be gained. Thus, perhaps a narrative listening 
stance, i.e. a stance in which the listener tries to grasp the music as a 
narrative, might help the listener in comprehending contemporary, 
atonal music as well. In the following chapters, I will discuss the 
possibilities of narrativity in music, and in contemporary music in 
particular. I propose that a narrative listening stance indeed might aid 
in comprehending atonal music. But before discussing this, I will 
address the question what narrative comprehension might comprise. 
What does it mean to grasp something in a narrative manner? 
David Herman observes that human beings often interpret events by 
creating stories around them in order to get some kind of grasp of these 
events: “As accounts of what to particular people in particular 
circumstances and with specific consequences, stories are found in 
every culture and subculture and can be viewed as a basic human 
strategy for coming to terms with time, process, and change” (2003a: 
2). Moreover, Kitty Klein adds that “[n]arrative has often been viewed 
as the product of a universal human need to communicate with others 
and to make sense of the world” (2003: 65). Stories are important both 
in grasping the world and in communicating this grasp. Thus, broadly 
speaking, there are two functions of narrative, which are interrelated: 
on the one hand, narrative can be regarded as a means to make sense of 
the world, to structure the human subject’s experiences and to integrate 
these into a graspable whole. On the other hand, narrative functions as 
an account with which the human subject can make the events s/he 
undergoes discursive, i.e. to turn them into experiences. As Herman 
puts it: “[N]arrative is at once a class of (cultural) artifacts and a 
cognitive-communicative process for creating, identifying, and 
interpreting candidate members of that artifactual class” (2003b: 170). 
Stories are both cultural objects and the manner in which human 
subjects talk about those objects. 
Roy Schafer remarks that narrative is not an alternative to truth or 
reality; rather, “[…] it is a mode in which, inevitably, truth and reality 
are presented. We have only versions of the true and the real […] Each 
retelling amounts to an account of the prior telling” (quoted in 
Frawley, Murray, and Smith 2003: 88-89). Narrative is the manner in 
which the individual subject has access to other people’s experiences; 
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it is a way to distribute experiences and knowledge. Through stories, 
Herman contends, human subjects have “[…] a way of structuring the 
individual-environment nexus, constituting a principled basis for 
sharing the work of thought” (2003b: 185). Moreover, Herman 
continues, via stories the subject can have access to events that are 
separated from him/her in time and/or space:  
 
[N]arrative can be seen to facilitate intelligent behavior. Stories support the 
(social) process by which the meaning of events is determined and 
evaluated, enable the distribution of knowledge of events via storytelling 
acts more or less widely separated from those events in time and space, and 
assist with the regulation of communicative behaviors, such that the actions 
of participants in knowledge-yielding and -conveying talk can be 
coordinated. (2003a: 8) 
 
In short: stories are an effective means by which knowledge, 
experience, beliefs, desires, and fantasies can be represented. It is one 
of the most important means by which human beings communicate. 
Narrative is an instrument for distributing and elaborating the 
perspectives that can be adopted on a given set of events. Moreover, 
stories aid in enriching the whole of the past, present, and possible 
future events that constitutes the foundation of human knowledge. 
Narrative, Herman concludes, therefore serves a dual function:  
 
[…] correcting for biases and limitations that can result from a particular 
cognizer’s efforts to know; and integrating such individual efforts into a 
larger human project that takes its character from the way it is ongoingly 
distributed in social and historical space. In short, the process of telling and 
interpreting stories inserts me into the environment I strive to know, 
teaching me that I do not know my world if I consider myself somehow 
outside of or beyond that world. (2003b: 184-185) 
 
By producing and listening to narratives, the subject places him/herself 
within a social environment; through stories both his/her particular 
place can be articulated, and knowledge of this environment can be 
gained.  
Klein furthermore adds that “[o]ne of the marvelous features of 
narrative is that it can transform memories of unspeakably awful 
experiences into streamlined representations that lose their ability to 
derail cognition” (2003: 65). Thus, in addition to the possibility 
narrative offers to a subject to place him/herself within a social 
environment, narrative aids in coping with traumatic, or otherwise 
horrible, events. By creating a narrative around a stressful or traumatic 
event, Klein remarks, psychological wellbeing is enhanced by 
involving the subject’s cognitive functions: “[M]any psychologists 
believe that in addition to helping people understand stressful events, 
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narrative changes the memory representations of these events, making 
them less likely to erupt into consciousness” (77). By consciously 
integrating a traumatic event into a narrative frame, the subject might 
be able to control his/her trauma.15 
When a subject tries to make sense of events through the creation of 
a narrative, s/he has an inclination to construct a story that is as clear 
and simple as possible, H. Porter Abbott contends: “[A]s a general 
rule, human beings have a cognitive bias toward the clarity of linear 
narrative in the construction of knowledge” (2003: 143). Because 
narrative basically is nothing more than a “[…] basic pattern-forming 
cognitive system bearing on sequences experienced through time” 
(Herman 2003b: 170), the subject tries to structure these sequences in 
the most straightforward way possible, which is in a linear fashion. If 
possible, s/he interprets succeeding events as the former being the 
cause of the appearance of the next, as Klein explains: “Identification 
of causal relations is particularly important for narrative […], because 
to understand the text the reader must make numerous inferences to 
establish the relations between various parts of the narrative” (2003: 
75). Thus, causal relation is one of the most important kinds of 
structuring relations within a narrative. Richard J. Gerrig and Giovanna 
Egidi acknowledge this:  
 
[Research has] provided evidence that one product of readers’ narrative 
experiences are causal networks that represent the relationships between the 
causes and consequences of events in a story. Some story events form the 
main causal chain of the story whereas others, with respect to causality, are 
dead ends. When asked to recall stories, readers find it relatively more 
difficult to produce details that are not along that main causal chain. (2003: 
44, emphasis in original) 
 
Stories in which events are represented that are hard to connect 
causally are not as easily remembered as stories whose events can be 
causally related. This implies that stories that show many causal 
relations can be grasped in a clearer way than those that lack these 
relations. Klein elaborates how a subject detects causal relations:  
 
To detect causal relation, the reader must connect inferences from 
immediately preceding text still in working memory, information from 
earlier text, now located in long term memory […], and background 
knowledge that was not in the text but that is also in long term memory. 
(2003: 75) 
 
                                                                    
15 In chapter 5, I will discuss the relation between trauma and narrative frame more 
extensively. 
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As I will show in the next chapter, this process is similar to the process 
of detecting musical events within a composition that is aurally 
consumed. 
In that chapter, I will also explain that the notion of musical 
causation is used as a metaphor. Musical events do not actually, 
physically cause other musical events; they can only be interpreted as 
being a cause. Yet, as Herman observes, this is not only the case in 
music, but in literary narrative, too. In paraphrasing Roland Barthes, he 
remarks that 
 
[…] narrative understanding depends fundamentally on a generalized 
heuristic according to which interpreters assume that if Y is mentioned after 
X in a story, then X not only precedes but also causes Y. Indeed, one can 
detect the operation of this same heuristic in a variety of discourse contexts, 
as when language users are able to “read in” temporal and causal relations in 
the case of conjunctions that do not contain explicit time-indices or markers 
of causality. (2003b: 176) 
 
A narrative can be understood because its succeeding events can be 
interpreted as being related in a causal manner, regardless of this 
relation is a reality or a projection of the apprehending subject. Hence, 
music that can be interpreted as containing events that are somehow – 
metaphorically – causally related might be more easily grasped as well.  
Yet, can any object that is not a literal narrative, such as music, be 
interpreted in a narrative manner, which might result in a more 
profound comprehension of this object? Monika Fludernik believes 
this is possible. She contends that narrativity “[…] is not a quality 
adhering to a text, but rather an attribute imposed on the text by the 
reader who interprets the text as narrative, thus narrativizing the text” 
(2003: 244, emphasis in original). Thus, in the case of literature, it is 
the reading process that is “[…] fundamental to the construction of 
narrativity – that which makes a narrative narrative” (244). The act of 
narrativizing makes an object narrative, Fludernik argues, rather than 
narrativity being a characteristic inherent in the object itself. She thus 
seems to imply that the object itself is irrelevant to narrativity; it is 
only the act of the observer that makes an object into a narrative. Yet, 
is it possible to narrativize, say, an ordinary coffee cup? Perhaps stories 
around this cup could be made up, but the cup itself probably cannot be 
interpreted as a story. The object itself, too, has to have some qualities 
that invite the observer to regard this object as a narrative. The object 
has to have a narrative potentiality. Not just anything can be 
narrativized, only because the observer wants to. Nevertheless, I assert 
that music does have this narrative potentiality, which invites the 
listener to narrativization, and that it is possible to narrativize many 
musical compositions, and even many contemporary, atonal works. 
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The narrativization of cultural objects amounts to the creation of a 
construction, a structure in which (causal and other) temporal relations 
between events are identified. Some objects can more easily be 
regarded as narrative than other objects. Narrative depends on both the 
narrative potentiality of the object and the act of narrativization of that 
object by an observer in order for that object to become a narrative. By 
narrativizing an object, for instance an atonal musical work, the 
listener might comprehend this music in a better, or different, way than 
when assuming another listening stance. Turning atonal music into a 
story means establishing some kind of grasp of the music, a 
comprehension of something that, because of its apparent discontinuity 
and chaos, seems to be ungraspable. 
 
A musical listening experience is the recognition of its constituent 
sounds as musical sounds, and the ability to relate musical phrases to 
other phrases within the same piece, and to other musical works or 
practices, nonmusical ideas and/or phenomena. Experiencing a musical 
piece also implies having grasped and comprehended this piece, for 
after this experience the music is structured and made discursive. 
Contemporary, atonal music complicates musical comprehension, 
because it sometimes uses sounds that are not conventionally 
associated with music. Moreover, atonal music does not make use of 
established tonal conventions and musical forms, with which the 
listener is familiar, and this makes it more difficult to structure the 
music. However, as I contended above, and as confirmed by Imberty’s 
experiments, it is not impossible to do. It is important to listen to atonal 
music in a different manner than to tonal music, which generally 
means a focus not primarily on pitch – and thus on melody and 
harmony, but equally on other musical parameters, such as rhythm, 
loudness, and timbre as well. In this way, the listener might recognize 
relations that might have eluded him/her if s/he had just concentrated 
on pitch. 
A possible way to structure music is to narrativize it, i.e. to regard it 
as a narrative. A narrative can be regarded as a structure in which 
(causal and other) relations between events are identified. Evidently, 
some objects can be more easily regarded as a narrative than other 
objects. Yet, since narrative is not exclusively a characteristic inherent 
in an object, but also depends on the act of narrativization of that 
object in order for that object to become a narrative, music might be 
narrative, too. Narrative depends on the relation between object and 
observer. By narrativizing an object, for instance an atonal musical 
work, the listener might get a better, or different, grasp of it. Turning 
atonal music into a story means establishing some kind of control, of 
comprehension, over the music, creating a sense of certainty in an 
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uncertain situation, which listening to atonal music sometimes might 
be.  
However, in so doing, the listener assumes a “classical” listening 
stance, in the sense that s/he is trying to recognize structures in atonal 
music that are traditionally associated with tonal musical works that 
are composed by using functional harmony. Oftentimes, this kind of 
music can, with little effort, be interpreted as being teleological; 
generally, it is predominantly linear and goal-directed. Thus, in a way, 
when narrativizing contemporary atonal music, the listener is in fact 
“assimilating,” as it were, this music within the classical tradition. At 
the end of this study, I will discuss this issue more extensively, but for 
now I just want to remark that I do not want to argue that a narrative 
listening stance is the only possible stance the listener can assume 
when trying to comprehend contemporary music. It is, however, a 
stance that might seriously enrich the listener’s grasp of music in 
general, and of contemporary music in particular.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss what it means to regard a musical 
work as a narrative, by translating the theory of narrative into a theory 
of musical narrativity. In so doing, I will try to respect the differences 
between literature and music, in order to avoid a “literarization” (not to 
be confused with narrativization) of music. For, as Hayden White 
warns: 
 
[I]t should be remembered that the very effort to import literary theory into 
musicology implies fundamental differences between literature and music. It 
is unlikely that any set of critical or theoretical principles devised to deal 
primarily with verbal discourse can effectively address the principal 
problems of musical criticism and theory. (1999: 176) 
 
We will find out whether this holds for musical narrativity, too. 
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2 TALES 
A Narratological Trichotomy 
A piece of music starts at a given moment, manifests itself for a certain 
amount of time, and finally ends. In between the beginning and the 
ending, sounds can be heard. Because of the succession of sounds the 
listener gets the impression the music, constituted by these sounds, is 
moving forward. Often, during the listening, the listener has certain 
expectations about the direction the music will take while moving 
forward, and these expectations are either met or not. Unexpected 
moments may shed new light on moments that have already passed, 
while fulfillment of expectations may offer consolidation. It is the sum 
of all these, and other, musical characteristics that suggest that music 
tells a story. Yet, narrativity is usually associated with verbal and 
visual texts. Moreover, the mere possibility of there being something 
like musical narrativity is highly debated (see for instance Nattiez 
1990). Nevertheless, I will discuss many of these suggestive musical 
characteristics in this chapter, by investigating which narrative 
elements can be identified in a musical piece.1 According to Mieke 
Bal, “[n]arratology can be used on other objects than just narrative 
texts, just as narrative texts can sometimes be better approached with 
other methods than narratological” (1990: 730). With the aid of 
narratology, the narrative aspect of objects can be studied, regardless 
of whether they are linguistic or other. And I see no a priori objection 
why music could not have such a narrative aspect. 
I propose the following working definition of a narrative, which is 
derived from Bal’s narratology: a narrative is the representation of a 
temporal development. It is the representation of a succession of events 
that succeed each other in time. Thus, the construction of a house, say, 
can be regarded as a succession of events, but it is not a narrative. 
Rather, it is a process. But as soon as I record this process on video, for 
instance, this recording can be regarded as a narrative. After all, now 
we have a representation, namely a video recording, of a temporal 
development, i.e. the construction of a house. 
Drama, however, is not narrative, although it can contain narrative 
moments. Drama might in many cases be regarded as a temporal 
development, thus as a transformation from one state to another, but it 
is not a representation. Rather, it is a presentation, or a demonstration, 
of this development. Lyric poetry, on the other hand, might be a 
representation, but not all lyric poems can be regarded as the 
                                                                    
1 In chapter 6, I will discuss Nattiez’s arguments against musical narrativity. 
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representation of temporality, or of a temporal development. This is 
not to say that lyric poetry, or fragments within a lyric poem, can never 
be regarded as representations of a temporal development. In these 
cases one might conclude that this particular poem has narrative 
moments or characteristics. Conversely, novels such as Samuel 
Beckett’s The Unnameable (1953, English translation 1958) and James 
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) problematize the notion of temporal 
development in narrative. Yet, this does not automatically imply that 
the working definition of narrative I gave above has to be revised. 
Rather, it shows why these novels are not novels in any conventional 
sense: because they do not neatly fit into the category called narrative. 
Chronologies, time tables, and weather reports, lastly, are 
representations and do refer to temporal phenomena. Yet, to what 
extent can these objects be considered as representations of temporal 
developments? As I explained in the previous chapter, causality plays 
an important part in narrative. Because one can identify particular 
events as (metaphorically) causing other events the perceiving subject 
is able to regard this succession of events as constituting a 
development, a transformation from one state to another. Thus, if it is 
possible to identify causal relations within a chronology or a time 
table, one could conclude that this object is, to a certain degree, 
narrative. But I cannot say a priori whether or not these objects can be 
regarded as such. This depends on the particular representation that is 
considered. However, as I will try to show in this chapter, many 
musical compositions can be regarded as representations of a temporal 
development, and therefore as narratives. 
In literary theory, there exists a plurality of narratological theories, 
such as structuralist, poststructuralist, psychoanalytic and 
contextualist.2 Many of those theories can be useful for the study of 
musical narratology, and some are discussed in later chapters. In this 
chapter, however, I am looking for a structuralist theory that literally 
decomposes a narrative into its individual “building blocks,” and 
names them. In the theory developed by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, for 
instance, a distinction is made between story, text and narration. Story 
is the set of “[…] narrated events and participants in abstraction from 
the text” (1983: 6), text is the observable and object-like aspect of 
verbal narrative, and narration is the act of telling (6-8). Rimmon-
Kenan goes on to identify elements such as deep and surface 
structures, functions, characters, focalization, and narrative levels. Bal 
(1997) distinguishes similar, though not identical, narrative elements. 
Her theory is more or less based on the theories developed by Gérard 
Genette, and is more systematic than Rimmon-Kenan’s. In her 1997 
study, Bal aims at giving “[…] a systematic account of a theory of 
                                                                    
2 See Poetics Today 11 (1990) for a survey of literary narratological theories. 
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narrative for use in the study of literature and other narrative texts” 
(ix). Bal’s narratological theory indeed offers a very elaborate account 
of narrative elements in a systematic fashion, and therefore her theory 
functions as the starting point of my investigation here. 
A narrative text, according to Bal, is a text in which an agent relates 
a story in a particular medium. She distinguishes three layers in such a 
narrative text: text, story and fabula. A text is a finite, structured whole 
composed of language signs. A story is a fabula that is presented in a 
certain manner, and a fabula is a series of logically and chronologically 
related events that are caused or experienced by actors. An event is 
defined as a transition from one state to another state, whereas an actor 
is an agent that performs actions. To act, lastly, means to cause or to 
experience an event (1997: 5). 
The strict division of a narrative text into three layers is something 
that is typical for Bal’s theory. Genette also distinguishes between 
three layers, but not in a consequent manner. According to his theory 
narratives exist that only have two layers. In his 1972 study, Genette 
argues that the middle level, “story,” can be absent. In that case there is 
zero-focalization, as he calls it. Rimmon-Kenan’s trichotomy, on the 
other hand, is not rigorous in the sense that the level of narration is of a 
different ontological category than the other two levels.  
In music, too, identifying three different narrative levels is no 
common practice. A musical piece is regarded as consisting of at most 
two levels. Anthony Newcomb, for instance, argues that, in a musical 
piece, “[t]he individual series of events […] becomes a coherent story 
to the extent that we interpret its events according to sets of relatively 
conventional narrative paradigms” (1987: 166).3 Newcomb calls the 
act of interpreting the succession of musical events as a coherent story 
the listener’s “narrative activity.” According to him, this narrative 
activity 
 
[…] is stimulated by the challenge involved in patterning events into a 
series which is coherent and comprehensible as an intentional human action. 
The series might well outline some archetypical plot, but this plot need not 
be fleshed out with specific detail. (1994: 86) 
 
Newcomb regards a musical text as a series of events, which can be 
interpreted as a coherent story, out of which the listener can distill an 
archetypical plot. Therefore, in his view, a musical text consists of two 
levels: a level that consists of a series of events, and the plot level, with 
the plot being an extract of the aforementioned level.  
                                                                    
3 Newcomb here seems to presuppose that a listener always intentionally wants to 
hear a story in music, which might be too strong a claim, as I will explain below. 
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Gregory Karl, on the other hand, regards musical plot as the 
organizing principle of a musical work. He claims that the study of 
musical narrativity is 
 
[…] the effort to integrate structural and semantic-expressive aspects of 
musical works in the act of analysis by developing concepts capable of 
functioning simultaneously in both domains. Musical plot, defined as the 
integrated formal and semantic content of a musical work, is the most 
inclusive concept of this kind: the Ursatz of musical narrative, and a symbol 
of aspiration toward a grand unified theory of musical processes. The quest 
is to formulate viable models of plot and so give shape to what is as yet only 
an intriguing abstraction, is among the more formidable challenges in music 
theory. (1997: 14-15) 
 
For Karl, a plot has to contain the nucleus, as it were, of a musical 
piece. He intends to integrate into his conception of plot both the 
structural, i.e. the syntactical, and the semantic aspects of a musical 
piece, in order to formulate an all-encompassing musical theory. The 
musical plot, as he conceives it, has to be able to account for both the 
form and the meaning of music. While this is a very ambitious goal, 
and structuralist in its approach, it is also different from the conception 
of plot, or fabula as Bal calls it, which I will describe below. 
John Dack distinguishes between narrative and story, as does Jann 
Pasler. Narrative, according to Dack, 
 
[…] is not synonymous with any “story” as such though the two concepts 
are connected. If a story is that specific sequence which is being related or 
recounted, narrative can be defined as the active process of communication 
by which this takes place. Narrative is abstract: story is concrete. A story 
will generally consist of a series of events, which characters experience and 
initiate in a certain, often logical, order. Even allowing for techniques such 
as flashbacks, nested structures and extended descriptive passages the reader 
can generally understand why events occur in a certain order. (1999: 2)  
 
Dack defines story and narrative in the same manner as Rimmon-
Kenan does: story is a certain content, and narrative is the act in which 
that content is communicated. Dack thus does recognize a story level 
in music, but he does not acknowledge that, below the story level, a 
fabula exists. Moreover, he skips the text level and moves straight on 
to the act of communication itself, bypassing the medium in which the 
story is told. This is an omission that can be found in the theories of 
Newcomb and Karl, too. 
Jann Pasler seems to equate story with Bal’s fabula and narrative 
with Bal’s conception of story: 
 
A number of relationships between narrative and story can be manipulated 
when both are seen as inherently meaningful […] Concordances and 
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discordances […] may be constructed between the temporal order of events 
in the story and the pseudotemporal order of their arrangement in the 
discourse, the duration of events in the story and in the telling, as well as the 
frequency of repetition in both. If one views the standard idea of a sonata 
form as a work’s underlying signified, then any rearrangement of parts, such 
as placing a final cadence at a work’s beginning, can be discussed in this 
regard. (1989: 238)  
 
Pasler speaks about the manipulation of relationships between 
narrative and story, while Bal discusses ways in which the story can 
rearrange the events of the fabula. The remarks Pasler makes regarding 
the concordances and discordances that can be constructed are 
relevant, and are elaborated below, but because she writes about 
narrative, story and “telling,” without properly defining these terms, a 
more precise approach has to be chosen. 
It is exactly because Bal’s narratology consists of a trichotomy, 
rather than a dichotomy, that it is an appropriate model for the study of 
musical narrativity, and any narrative object in general. Especially 
when it concerns narrativity and intermediality, this trichotomy is 
crucial. If one were to use a theory based on a dichotomy, it would be 
very difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to discuss, in a precise 
manner, the consequences of relating the same story in different media. 
For, in this case, one only can distinguish between a fabula and 
narration, and with each change of the medium the entire narration 
changes as well, since text and story are conflated in this level. And, 
even more importantly, a trichotomy allows one to distinguish between 
the one who speaks (the narrator on the text level) and the one who 
perceives (the focalizor on the story level). 
Thus, the division of a musical text into three, instead of two or no, 
layers results in a more precise approach to musical narrativity. Such 
an approach may account for the way in music, as perceptible sounds, 
the listener recognizes a musical structure, and how s/he distils from 
this a series of logically and chronologically related musical events that 
are caused or experienced by musical actors. This top-down approach 
is similar to the one that Bal proposes. She regards her theory as “[…] 
a readerly device, a heuristic tool that provides focus to the 
expectations with which readers process narrative” (1997: xv). Her 
theory follows the order in which the reader gets access to and 
experiences a narrative text, for “[i]t is by way of the text that the 
reader has access to the story, of which the fabula is, so to speak, a 
memorial trace that remains with the reader after completion of the 
reading” (xv). 
The trichotomy musical text – story – fabula can be roughly equated 
with the trichotomy “perceptible sounds” – “musical structure” – “a 
series of logically and chronologically related musical events that are 
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caused or experienced by musical actors.” This trichotomy, however, 
requires further elaboration, for we have to define notions like musical 
events and musical actors in order to fully understand what this 
trichotomy can tell us about musical narrativity. In this chapter, I will 
do just that by following the top-down approach sketched above. 
Therefore, I will start with the musical text. 
Musical Text 
When Bal states that a narrative text is a text in which an agent relates 
a story in a particular medium, several questions arise when we want to 
use this definition as a starting point for a definition of a musical 
narrative text. First, we have to make clear what a musical text is. Bal 
defines text as a finite, structured whole composed of language signs 
(1997: 5). When translated to music, a musical text can thus be 
regarded as a finite, structured whole composed of musical signs. 
In discussing the concept of musical text, Robert Samuels states that 
“[…] a necessary assumption of musical narrativity [is] that music is 
textual, in the sense of defining relations and articulating codes in a 
genuinely semiotic fashion” (1994: 152), but that “[…] a musical text 
[…] is not a mere sequence of sounds any more than a literary text is a 
sequence of words” (154). At first sight, this definition seems to 
contradict Bal’s conception of a text. After all, Samuels claims that a 
musical text is more than a sequence of sounds, while Bal defines a 
text as a finite, structured whole composed of language signs. Now, a 
sign is not equivalent to a word, and a language sign is not a word, per 
se; a language sign is more comprehensive than a word. Samuels, 
however, does seem to emphasize in a stronger way that a text is more 
than the words or sounds it consists of than Bal does. The reason for 
this difference might be that Samuels regards a musical text in a 
Derridean sense, in that music can be located within all other 
discourses, “[…] whilst insisting on its self-demarcation” (154). He 
sees a musical text as inextricably connected with all other texts and 
discusses musical texts in this fashion. Bal, on the other hand, focuses 
on the internal traits of texts. But this does not mean that text is no 
more than just a structured whole for her; she acknowledges that  
 
[t]he finite ensemble of signs does not mean that the text itself is finite, for 
its meanings, effects, functions, and background are not. It only means that 
there is a first and a last word to be identified; a first and a last image of a 
film; a frame of a painting, even if those boundaries […] are not watertight. 
(1997: 5) 
 
As a result, Bal’s conception is not incompatible with Samuels’s. It is 
just that, in her definition, she focuses primarily on the structural 
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aspects of a text, while not ignoring those aspects that are not explicitly 
named by the definition.4 
The Uttering Body in Music 
The next question in relation to Bal’s definition of a narrative text is 
how one can define an agent that “relates a story in a particular 
medium” in music. According to Bal, such an agent is the narrator. To 
be more precise, a narrator is “[…] that agent which utters the 
linguistic signs which constitute the text or the equivalent of that agent 
in other media” (1997: 18). This means that in the case of a musical 
text, a narrator is that agent that utters the musical signs that constitute 
the musical text. One should be careful not to assume that a narrator is 
a person of some sort: a narrator is a function, “[…] and not a person, 
which expresses itself in the language that constitutes the text” (16). 
The musical narrator is not the composer him/herself, either, just as in 
literary texts the narrator is not the writer. 
In the case of literature, we need a narrator to turn words into a 
narrative text. Non-linguistic texts also need a narrator in order to 
become narrative. In her 2002 study on collecting, Bal puts this very 
clearly. In discussing the possibility of regarding collecting in a 
narrative manner, she defines the narrator as “[d]as semiotische 
Subjekt, von dem diese Darstellung [the relating of a story through 
signs that are comprehensible – “verständlich” – for others] 
hervorgebracht oder geäußert wird” (2002: 123), hence, as the semiotic 
subject that relates a story through signs that are comprehensible for 
others. She claims that collecting only becomes narrative as soon as a 
series of unplanned purchases suddenly changes into a meaningful set. 
This, writes Bal, is the moment in which a narrator begins to tell the 
story of this set and thus produces the semiotics for this story (124). 
That this narrator is neither the collector nor the objects in the 
collection, can be read in her remark that, as soon the narrator is telling 
the story, we can also look at the collection from the perspectives of 
the collector and of the objects that are part of this collection, in 
addition to looking at the collection from the perspective of the 
narrator (124). So, here, it is not the two elements that are necessary 
for the collection to exist, i.e. the collector and the collected items, that 
are considered to be the narrators. The narrator is a function that is 
posited in a text, as soon as this text is considered to be narrative, but is 
not assigned to the elements that are essential for the physical existence 
of the text. Likewise in music the composer and performer, the 
                                                                    
4 Bal emphasizes, for instance, that structural analysis is not, and cannot be, 
ahistorical, as she demonstrates while analyzing the narrative traits in I’m Six Years 
Old and Hiding behind My Hands (1996), an artwork by Ken Aptekar (see Bal 
1997: 66-75). 
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elements that are essential for the existence of a musical piece, are not 
necessarily the narrator, either. 
Bal distinguishes between an external and a character-bound 
narrator. An external narrator is a narrator that does not take part in the 
narrative, whereas a character-bound narrator is a narrator and at the 
same time a character within the narrative which it narrates (1997: 22). 
Furthermore, while a narrator is always present in a narrative, it does 
not have to be perceptible. An external narrator that does not explicitly 
refer to itself in a narrative is considered imperceptible (22). An 
imperceptible external narrator is a narrator that remains unmentioned. 
On the other hand, because a character-bound narrator is at the same 
time a character in the narrative, this implies that a character-bound 
narrator is always perceptible. The reverse, of course, does not 
automatically hold: a perceptible narrator is not always a character-
bound narrator. An external narrator can explicitly refer to itself, while 
not taking part in the narrative. In other words, there is a visible “I” 
that utters the words that constitute the narrative, but that “I” is not a 
character in the story it is telling (21-22). Furthermore, a narrative is 
not restricted to having a single narrator only. One or more narrative 
levels may exist in a work, each with its own narrator (43-52). 
An example of a narrative in which more than one narrator is posited 
is Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love (1997). The novel is for the greater 
part told by a character-bound narrator, as the opening sentences of the 
novel illustrate: 
 
The beginning is simple to mark. We were in sunlight under a turkey oak, 
partly protected from a strong, gusty wind. I was kneeling on the grass with 
a corkscrew in my hand, and Clarissa was passing me the bottle – a 1987 
Daumas Gassac. This was the moment, this was the pinprick on the time 
map: I was stretching out my hand, and as the cool neck and the black foil 
touched my palm, we heard a man’s shout. (1) 
 
Here, a visible “I” is relating the story, and at the same time this “I,” 
whose name is Joe, is also a character in the narrative he is telling. Not 
the entire novel, however, is related via this character-bound narrator. 
Chapter 9, for instance, begins with the following statement from Joe: 
“It would make more sense of Clarissa’s return to tell it from her point 
of view. Or at least, from that point as I later construed it” (79), and 
continues in third person, as the example below shows: 
 
He is for the moment conversationally deaf and blind, so Clarissa raises 
both hands, palms turned outward in surrender and says, “That’s great, Joe. 
I’m going to take a bath.” Even then, he does not stop, and probably has not 
heard. As she turns to go towards the bedroom, he walks behind her, and 
follows her in, telling her over and over in different ways that he has to go 
back into science. (81) 
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Were it not for the first sentence of this chapter, the reader could 
assume that this chapter is related via an imperceptible external 
narrator. There is no visible “I” that is telling the story; the “I” in the 
first two examples has changed into “he” and “Joe.” The first two 
sentences of this chapter, however, complicate things. One could argue 
that, in this chapter, the story is still related through a character-bound 
narrator, since the chapter starts with an “I” – Joe – and this “I” 
remains a character in the story that is told. One could also argue that 
the chapter is related via a perceptible external narrator, for the narrator 
is visible – the “I” in the beginning of the chapter – and tells about a 
Joe he does no longer identifies with, thus who is in fact someone else 
than the narrator. I myself opt for the second explanation. 
The narrative as a whole is related via an imperceptible external 
narrator, although the greater part of the novel consists of the story as 
told by Joe. The novel, however, also contains a chapter with a 
different narrator, two chapters that both consist entirely of a letter 
written by a character called Jed, a chapter that consists entirely of a 
letter written by Clarissa, and two appendices, of which one is a 
scientific article and one a letter from Jed that has never been sent. 
When we consider these appendices to be part of the narrative, then we 
can no longer assume that the narrative is related via a character-bound 
narrator, i.e. Joe. There has to be an external organizing function that 
relates all these parts, which together constitute the narrative. This 
function is not perceptible, for the chapters that consist of the letters 
are not in some way introduced by a narrator, the two appendices are 
introduced without referring to an “I,” and in the other chapters the 
only perceptible narrator is the character-bound narrator called Joe. 
Therefore, it has to be an imperceptible external narrator that relates 
the narrative as a whole. 
The way the function of narrator can be assigned in non-literary 
texts is shown in Bal’s analysis of Ken Aptekar’s artwork I’m Six 
Years Old and Hiding behind My Hands (1996), a mixed-media work 
that consists of a painting that depicts a part of an other painting, 
hanging on a wall, and a text that is sandblasted onto glass plates that 
are mounted in front of the painting. In the painting that is depicted a 
woman is shown, while the text on the glass is written in first person. 
According to Bal, in this work a character-bound narrator is posited in 
the linguistic text. Because the painted woman that is depicted is 
portrayed as a female painter during the act of painting, she figures as a 
character-bound narrator as well. An embedded external narrator, a 
narrator that does not take part in the story itself, is posited in the 
painting that depicts the painting hanging on a wall, and, lastly, a 
mixed-media external narrator is posited in the embedding text of the 
work as a whole (1997: 68). Despite all these narrators, one could 
question the narrativity of this work. Does it really represent a 
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temporal development, or is it more like the description of a certain 
situation? Is it perhaps just the representation of a single event, rather 
than the representation of a sequence of events? I do not try to answer 
these questions at this time, since my only aim here is to give an 
example of the way the function of narrator is assigned in a non-
literary text. And it is clear from this analysis that the external narrators 
that are posited in this work are not assigned to elements that are 
necessary for the existence of the work. Neither are the character-
bound narrators, although these narrators can be pointed out distinctly, 
as opposed to the external narrators, which are imperceptible here. 
The composer and performer do not automatically equal the function 
of narrator. A musical narrator, as long as it is an imperceptible one, 
cannot be pointed out distinctly in the music itself or in a performance 
situation, and is instead posited in the musical text as a whole, or in the 
embedded text in the case of an embedded narrator, as soon as this text 
is considered to be narrative. A perceptible narrator, on the other hand, 
can be pointed out in the music – which makes sense, for if this were 
not possible, then the narrator would not be perceptible.  
Many theorists regard the musical narrator as being an imperceptible 
external narrator only. Eero Tarasti, for instance, discusses the musical 
narrator in the following fashion: 
 
[I]t is the intentional subject emerging from the cooperation between 
composer, performer, and listener, and living in the no-man’s land between 
them, who is the subject properly speaking and who programs musical 
actors on the textual level. This subject places musical theme-actors in 
different narrative situations: one as a sender, the other as a receiver, one as 
a subject, the other as object, some in the role of opponent, some in the 
figures of Battle, return, Victory, Destruction, or Glorification. (1994: 111)  
 
In his Greimasian account of musical narrativity, Tarasti describes how 
a subject is posited as a result of the interplay between composer, 
performer and listener, a subject that assigns actantial functions to 
musical phrases. This subject, however, is not to be found in the music 
itself, but instead is posited in the musical text, just like an 
imperceptible external narrator. 
Lawrence Kramer also argues that a musical narrator is not a 
function that can be pointed out in the music itself: 
 
Even in the most literal-minded program music, the musical narrator is […] 
a “shadow” cast by the listener […] [T]he musical subject speaks with the 
kind of anonymous voice typical of literary discourse set in the ongoing 
present: the depersonalized yet intimate voice of lyric poetry or the 
uncannily blank voice of third-person present-tense narration. (1995: 199-
120) 
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Kramer equals a musical narrator to something that is posited in the 
music by the listener. Moreover, it seems as if Kramer asserts that this 
narrator is always an imperceptible external narrator. Furthermore, he 
explains that the listener posits this narrator due to his/her will “[…] to 
humanize [the] figure [of the musical narrator], to make it the vehicle 
of what [Edward T.] Cone calls the composer’s voice” (120). Because 
the listener wishes to hear the composer in the music s/he is hearing, a 
narrator is posited. 
Cone’s account resembles that of the implied author, which Bal 
describes as follows: 
 
It [the term “implied author”] suggests that the biographical author has a 
textual delegate behind which she can hide, a guarantee of discretion and 
cultural politeness morphed into a methodological de jure argument. But 
what the term really does is much more fundamental. This concept de facto 
operated the switch, not really from author to text as was the overt claim, 
but from author as speaker of the text to reader who construes an image of 
that person. The reading, the concept promised, would give all information, 
relevant and desired, about who “spoke” the narrative. Any questions 
beyond what about who wrote the book were indiscreet and redundant. 
Inscribed within the text by a “hand” she could manipulate at will, the 
author could be read off the page, and it fell to the reader to compose the 
image of the author from the data gleaned during the reading. (2004: 41) 
 
In musical terms: the concept of implied author suggests that the 
listener can compose the composer him/herself through listening to the 
music. As a result, the focus is not actually on the music, but rather on 
the construction of the image of the composer by the listener. In fact, 
Bal continues, the concept of implied author  
 
[…] authorized the interpretation one wished to put forward without taking 
responsibility for it. The phenomenological edge of he concept wore off. 
What was left was the authority of the constative statements that speaking of 
– but simultaneously for – the implied author afforded. Judgements based 
on the idiosyncrasies of individual readings could be presented with the aura 
of having detected what the author, willy-nilly, “meant to say.” Meaning 
thus collapsed into intention. (41, emphasis in original) 
 
In the end, the analyst can hide behind the concept of implied author, 
because it makes the implicit claim that the analyst is speaking on 
behalf of the author. 
Bal warns that even the whole concept of narrator is problematic in 
the sense that it can be used to sanction a particular interpretation of a 
narrative: 
 
[T]he presence of authority in humanistic studies allows the authorization of 
the interpretation to be naturalized. The concept of narrator is part of that 
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authorizing impulse. As a phantom presence, the author continues to lurk in 
the wings as long as the major analytical concepts partake of the author’s 
anthropomorphic shape. The attribution of intention that this concept of 
narrator facilitates is a weapon in subordinating the reader. (44) 
 
Through the concept of narrator the author might be reintroduced into 
the interpretation, which in turn might lead to the reintroduction of the 
implied author and the problems related to this concept that I just 
discussed.  
In an effort to eliminate authorship as the prime preoccupation of 
literary study the term “voice” is introduced. Yet, Bal observes, with 
this term authorship is let in again “[…] through the back door” (40). 
Voice, she claims, 
 
[…] insists too exclusively on illocution, that aspect of speech – and by 
extension, of all cultural utterances – that indicates the speaker’s intent. In 
the process it privileges the speaker, writer, or maker of images. Thus, the 
concept lends itself to subordinating and easily obscuring perlocution, the 
utterance’s effect, and thereby disempowers the listener, reader, or viewer. 
(45, emphasis in original) 
 
Voice implies a focus on intention instead of on the effect of that 
which is expressed, and thus neglects the interaction between 
expression and observer. Furthermore, the concept of voice, as well as 
the concept of narrator, tends to restrict narrative analysis to the 
inscription of time as foundation of narrativity, Bal asserts (46).  
As an alternative to the concept of voice, Bal suggests to put this 
concept “under erasure,” which means that it remains functional, while 
it is questioned and made liable to produce its own alternative (51). 
Instead, Bal proposes to focus on the concept of path. In this way, she 
contends, the anthropomorphic question “who?” is changed into a 
spatial question “where?” Path, Bal explains, 
 
[…] proposes a semantic construction whose building blocks are 
accumulative meanings. The spatial metaphor indicates that the reader 
strolls in the text, travels through it, but at each stretch she continues with 
more baggage. According to this metaphor, the linearity of reading is 
complicated by a progressive but unsystematic growth of “layers” of 
meaning. The architectural metaphor matters here. What results is a 
building, solid to the extent that it cannot be excised from the culture in 
which it was constructed; imaginary to the extent that its construction 
corresponds only partially to the architect’s design, or score. (47, emphasis 
in original) 
 
The metaphor of the path, Bal concludes, has the advantage that it 
“[…] de-naturalizes the individual genius ‘behind’ the work of art as 
the source, origin, and authority of its meanings and effects” (51).  
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The concept of path, as elaborated by Bal, is very similar to the 
UNLL-process that I described in chapter 1. Just as the reader in Bal’s 
account of path, the listener acquires more information about the music 
s/he is listening to during the UNLL-process. Older musical events 
influence newer events, while new events can shed new light on older 
ones. Thus, in the UNLL-process the listener travels back and forth, 
too. A listener can follow a certain path, for instance by interpreting a 
series of musical events as belonging together and forming a larger 
phrase. This path may prove to be an unfruitful one, in the sense that 
not all events can be grouped into a larger phrase. The listener then can 
“unlearn” this path, go back and take an alternative path that might be 
more successful in integrating into larger wholes the musical events 
that s/he identifies. The resulting musical structure is constructed 
within a particular culture; musical conventions, for instance, to a large 
extent determines the listener’s expectations, and thus his/her choice of 
path. As a result, this structure cannot be removed from the culture in 
which it was created. Moreover, repeated listening may lead to 
different constructions that do not necessarily exclude each other; there 
is no one “correct” path which has to be found and followed. Focusing 
on other musical elements results in following different, equally valid 
paths. 
Yet, the UNLL-process, as well as the following of musical paths, 
does not belong to narrative music exclusively. They are part of what 
Kunst calls musical understanding in general. Hence, the notion of path 
cannot really act as an alternative to the function of narrator, at least 
not in musical narrative. The notion of path is not a notion that is 
specific to narrativity. Therefore, I prefer not to do away with the 
function of musical narrator, while trying not to anthropomorphize this 
function or to use it to authorize my analyses. Moreover, a musical 
narrator does not always have to be external and imperceptible, as I 
will show in the analysis below. Consequently, it remains useful to 
specify which kind of narrator can be posited in a particular musical 
work.  
Geistreiche Erzähler 
The execution of a piece of music is a temporal process. The process of 
execution of this music is eliminated when a listener is no longer aware 
of the fact that the music is being produced. This is perhaps difficult to 
forget when a listener is at the same time a viewer when attending a 
live performance of the piece. In that case, the listener sees performers 
act in order to produce the sounds s/he perceives as music. So, 
forgetting the fact that music is executed is perhaps easier when 
listening to music via media other than live performances. But this is 
not the main issue here. What I intend to focus on in the following 
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analysis is whether or not the sounds the listener hears and identifies as 
musical signs that constitute a musical piece themselves conceal or 
eliminate the process of execution.  
The process of execution of a composition is something that can 
clearly be heard in Helmut Lachenmann’s Second String Quartet 
(1989), “Reigen seliger Geister” (“Dance of the Blessed Spirits”). In 
this quartet, the members often produce unconventional musical 
sounds; many of the sounds that can be heard consist of unpitched 
noises. These noises, however, are produced during the performance, 
by executing meticulously described/prescribed techniques. The 
listener can actually hear these techniques being prepared and applied 
while listening to the piece. The fact that the music allows all this to be 
heard means that the music does not try to conceal the process of 
execution. On the contrary: as I will try to show below, the central 
issue of “Reigen seliger Geister” is musical performance, or musical 
execution, itself. 
The piece begins with a pianississimo F sharp, played by the viola 
“mit Spannschraube,” i.e. the string is hit with the tension adjuster of 
the bow. This note is about the most conventional sound that is played 
in the first part of the piece, and it acts as a kind of remembrance of a 
tradition that has been parted from in this piece. The tone is followed 
by a series of unpitched sounds, produced by bowing dampened strings 
and other parts of the instruments. The “breathing” effect that results 
from this manner of playing does not bring to mind conventional music 
at all. At the same time, however, the actions the members of the 
quartet have to perform in order to achieve the desired sounds can be 
clearly distinguished. The placement and removal of the bow, the 
stroking of the instruments, the hitting of the strings and other parts of 
the instruments, the (almost) unpitched plucks, are all clearly audible, 
without them being concealed by a melody or harmony that draws the 
attention of the listener away from the process of execution, i.e. the 
physical labor that is necessary in order to produce music (ex. 2.1).5 
At 0’21” (as performed by the Arditti String Quartet in the recording 
released by Montaigne MO 782130; bars 6-8 in the score), the first 
violin hints at something that is reminiscent of a melody, but because it 
is played sul ponticello, the tones remain faint and distant (ex. 2.2). 
The second violin does the same at 1’18” (bars 20-22), but because 
here the other voices play less than at 0’21” (bars 6-8), the 
reminiscence of a melody is a bit stronger. Next, the second violin gets 
                                                                    
5 Contrary to conventional notation, every instrument’s part is notated using two, 
instead of one, staves. On the bottom staff, the actions the left hand has to perform 
are notated, whereas on the upper staff the same is done for the right hand. 
Furthermore, since the parts are notated at transposed pitch, a reduction at sounding 
pitch is written below the individual parts. Above the individual parts, lastly, an 
indication of the overall rhythmical structure is given. 
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to play a high-pitched note, a c’’’. The way this note is played, and the 
fact that it is played after the “semi-melody,” gives it a pastiche-like 
quality, an iconic reference to the virtuoso performance practice, here 
reduced to a virtual performance (ex. 2.3). 
Another reference to the virtuoso performance practice can be found 
between 5’30” and 6’34” (bars 85-112). Here all instruments play an 
alternation of chromatic and triadic arpeggios, alluding to a Paganini 
piece, both synchronous and asynchronous, audible and barely audible, 
suddenly ending in a unpitched breathing sound. 
Similar phrases can be found between 9’55” and 10’05” (bars 161-164) 
and between 10’18” and 10’22” (bars 165-167). After this, more and 
more pitched tones enter the music, and although these still have an 
unusual timbre due to the way these notes are played, they at least have 
a definite pitch. 
At 18’01” (bar 278), however, again a different radical break with 
tradition takes place. Here the first and second violins are to be played 
like a guitar: on the lap of the performers and with a plectrum. At 
18’24” (bar 281), the viola and the cello do the same. Not before 
23’43” – 24’09” (bars 354, 356, 358 and 360) the second violin, the 
cello, the viola and the first violin, respectively, are to be played again 
in a conventional manner. Still, any hope that the music will sound 
more conventional from that point on was already shattered between 
20’38” and 21’01” (bars 315, 321 and 323). There, the first and second 
violin, the viola and the cello had to be tuned down with one turn of 
every tuning peg, in such a manner that the strings were no longer 
tuned in fifths. As a result, the players no longer can control the pitch 
of the notes they play. The piece therefore ends, paradoxically, with 
determined unpitched noises and randomly pitched notes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 2.1. Helmut Lachenmann, Second String Quartet, bars 1-5. 
© 1989 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden 
Permission granted for research purposes only. 
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Example 2.2. Helmut Lachenmann, Second String Quartet, bars 6-10. 
© 1989 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden 
Permission granted for research purposes only. 
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Example 2.3. Helmut Lachenmann, Second String Quartet, bars 21-25. 
© 1989 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden 
Permission granted for research purposes only. 
 
In this composition, the execution of the sounds within the piece is 
not concealed by a melody or harmony that draws the attention of the 
listener away from the process of execution. It is rather that the sounds 
that are made often conceal the melodies that exist in this piece. In 
addition, there are moments in which the pitched notes are played at a 
barely audible level, and one has to listen very carefully to be able to 
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hear these through the unpitched sounds that are present as well. In 
these instances, the listener is always aware of the physical aspect of 
musical performance, since the sounds s/he hears do not remind 
him/her of music, but of the acoustic component of physical events. 
Defined in a semiotic fashion, these sounds can be regarded as indices 
that point to physical events. In order to produce these events, the 
performers have to follow precisely formulated techniques and the 
performers really have to stretch and play at the height of their powers 
in order to be able to execute this piece properly.6 They have to be top 
musicians. 
But, as soon as they are indeed being top musicians and give an 
excellent performance of this piece, they are not only producing music 
in a classical, traditional sense, but also acoustic components of 
physical events. Every now and then a hint or allusion of a melodic 
fragment can be heard, and sometimes even for a relatively long 
period. Furthermore, these fragments occasionally are louder than the 
surrounding sounds, and preceded by a crescendo, as if the fragments 
“escape” from the noise. These melodic fragments are perceived as 
remarkable moments in the piece. Thus, instead of regarding the 
pitched tones as unmarked terms, these are considered marked terms, 
moments that stand out in the music.7 As soon as a musician is doing 
his/her best as a musician and gives a proper performance of “Reigen 
seliger Geister,” s/he is in the process of redefining his/her identity as a 
musician. S/he is properly executing the prescribed sounds that are, 
however, not associated with classical, more traditional musical 
sounds. As a result, s/he is acting in a way that is apparently not 
audibly compatible with classical, traditional musical acting. Thus, in 
this piece the musicians redefine their qualities as musicians by 
showing those very same qualities. 
In addition to questioning musicality, the notion of narrativity itself 
is problematized as well. Initially, it is not at all clear whether or not 
the sounds the listener is hearing belong to each other, whether or not 
they are part of a process that is unfolding. It is not until later in the 
piece that the listener might realize that the sounds are connected, but 
not in the way traditional musical sounds are, that is, not through 
harmonic tension. Rather, it is the tension between conventional and 
unconventional musical sounds that creates a sense of unity in this 
composition. As a result, it is the interplay between musical and 
unmusical sounds that constitute the representation of a temporal 
development in this piece. 
                                                                    
6 Along with the musical score, a nine-page booklet is supplied in which all the 
different playing techniques are explained. 
7 In chapter 3, I will elaborate the concept of markedness.  
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Moreover, I contend that, in this composition, narrativity is 
challenged in other ways as well. In this piece, no effort is made to 
conceal or eliminate the physical labor that is necessary to produce the 
sounds that constitute the piece. On the contrary: on many occasions 
one can clearly distinguish the actions, which the members of the 
quartet have to perform in order to achieve the desired sounds. These 
sounds together do not constitute a larger whole – melodies or chords – 
in the way a sequence of conventional tones with a defined pitch 
would, but remain a succession of sounds, each referring to nothing 
else than their own origin, their own execution. Melodies and chords 
usually conceal the process of musical execution, since the listener’s 
attention is drawn to the larger wholes the individual sounds contribute 
to. In more traditional tonal music, the listener mainly focuses on the 
resulting melodies and chords, rather than on the execution of 
individual sounds. 
In discussing narrativity in nonfigurative paintings, Bal also focuses 
on the process of execution. In her discussion, she distinguishes 
between “imperceptible” third-person and “audible” first-person modes 
of representing objects in paintings: 
 
In painting, the abstract expressionism of artists like Pollock and de 
Kooning, by virtue of the emphatic inscription of the hand of the artist, 
comes close to being “first-person” narrative. This tells the story of its 
making, and the various layers or splashes of paint “tell” about the 
temporally distinct phases of that making. In contrast, images that eliminate 
references to the painting process present their objects, or contents, in a 
“third-person” mode. (1999: 177)  
 
Bal speaks about a painting that “tells the story of its making.” The 
noun “making” here does not refer to the process of invention, but to 
the process of execution. That is why this story has a distinctly 
temporal aspect. A painting that “tells the story of its making” can be 
considered as a first-person narrative, because it tells something about 
itself. The narrator itself acts as a character in the story it is telling, 
which is the story of its own coming into being. This means that the 
narrator of that painting can be considered as being character bound, 
too. 
Because of the constant self-reference of the sounds in “Reigen 
seliger Geister,” I contend that these sounds are telling the story of 
their own making as well. Therefore, in every occurrence of the 
unconventional sounds I described above, a character-bound narrator is 
posited that tells a story about itself, the story of its execution. It is a 
first-person narrative, since it is telling a story in which the narrator is 
itself at the same time the (sole) character; it tells about the process of 
its own coming into being. This first-person narrative, however, is not 
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the only narrative that is told. It rather is an embedded text with its own 
embedded narrator. As I have explained, the piece also can be regarded 
as telling the story about redefinition of musicality. Unpitched noises 
shout down traditional classical musical sounds, such as melodies and 
harmony. The character-bound narrator articulates a contemporary 
musicality while telling the story of its making, a story that is 
embedded in the story about the redefinition of musicality. This 
suggests that another narrator is posited in the piece. This narrator is 
not perceptible, so it cannot be a character-bound narrator, but only an 
external narrator. Ultimately, it is this imperceptible external narrator 
that relates the story in music.  
Musical Story 
Until now, I have spoken about story as if it were entirely clear what 
the meaning of that term is. In everyday language use, the term might 
be used conveniently without articulating exactly what we mean by 
that term. In narratology, however, the term “story” has a specific 
definition and thus has to be regarded accordingly. As I remarked 
above, Bal defines a story as a fabula that is presented in a certain 
manner, a fabula being a series of logically and chronologically related 
events that are caused or experienced by actors. According to Bal, 
there are different aspects that distinguish the structured story from the 
fabula, i.e. those elements of a story that can be different from the 
fabula (1997: 78). She mentions six aspects: sequential ordering, 
rhythm, frequency, character, space, and focalization.  
By presenting a certain sequential ordering of events in a story, 
anachrony, a deviation from the chronological order as presented in the 
fabula, can be created. Changing the rhythm of events in a story can do 
the same. With frequency, the numerical relationship between the 
events in the fabula and those in the story can be manipulated. With 
character, the actors that act in a fabula become “personalized,” while 
the events of the fabula can be placed in a space. By focalization, 
lastly, Bal understands the relations between the elements presented 
and the vision through which they are presented, i.e. the relation 
between perception, which is not only visual, and that, which is 
perceived. 
The aspect of character in music is in some ways a problematic 
notion. Discussion of musical character may lead, misleadingly, to an 
anthropomorphic view of this aspect. Bal herself defines character as 
“[…] the actor provided with distinctive characteristics which together 
create the effect of a character” (114), to which she adds that she 
employs the term “character” for “[…] the anthropomorphic figures the 
narrator tells us about” (114). As character, actors become real 
“personalities,” humanized figures readers can relate to. However, 
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musical actors do not necessarily have to be regarded as functions that 
can, or must, be personalized, as I will argue below. The question 
whether or not a musical actor is a basic element that has to be dressed 
up with the aid of the aspect of character, can only be answered after it 
is clear how a musical actor is defined. I therefore postpone the 
discussion of musical character until I have given a proper definition of 
the musical actor. 
The first three aspects, i.e. sequential ordering, rhythm, and 
frequency, on the other hand, can be explained here. Imberty remarks 
that 
 
[…] the macrostructure [of a musical piece] is first of all a schema of the 
structuring of time, an a priori ordering of sonorous events in time, 
according to rules stemming from perceptuo-cognitive mechanisms which 
allow the detection of changes and salient elements in the sonorous flux. In 
sum, the macrostructure of a musical piece is made up of the perception and 
retention in memory of some particularly significant changes, which 
determine the overall progression of the piece for the listener. (1993: 333)  
 
Music, Imberty argues, is a structure, an ordering of events in time, an 
ordering in a sequential fashion, which can be recognized by the 
listening subject. This subject recognizes in the sounds s/he is hearing 
the musical events and the sequential ordering of these events, which 
constitutes the structure of the music. And, according to Newcomb, it 
is this sequence of musical events that becomes a coherent story “[…] 
to the extent that we interpret its events according to sets of relatively 
conventional narrative paradigms” (1987: 166). The events are 
recognized with the aid of musical conventions and other mechanisms, 
which, as I will explain below, reside in the memory of the listener, 
and Newcomb contends that these events are themselves interpreted 
through “sets of relatively conventional narrative paradigms.” 
Newcomb here maintains that the existence of some sort of narrative 
convention enables the listener to interpret a series of events as 
forming a story. He does not explain, however, what these conventions 
(or conventional narrative paradigms, as he calls them) exactly are, but 
in arguing that such conventions exist and that a listener uses them 
while interpreting music, he seems to imply that a listener always 
interprets music in a narrative manner. He presupposes that a listener 
always intentionally wants to hear a story in the music. Why else 
should s/he apply “conventional narrative paradigms” while 
interpreting musical events? But to presuppose this is might be too 
strong a contention, and I suggest to change the phrase “sets of 
narrative paradigms” into “organizing principles,” which presupposes a 
much less strong a priori intention in the listener to try to grasp the 
music. This grasp might be accomplished by taking a narrative 
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listening stance, as I proposed in the previous chapter, but this does not 
mean that a listener always listens to music while taking such a stance.  
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that, in the study of 
musical narrativity, one has to pay special attention to the sequential 
orderings of events, as Francesco Giomi and Marco Ligabue argue: 
 
The study of narrative processes is based upon an interpretation of the 
different analytical levels through which we can assign to musical elements 
– as formal units, structural sections, syntagmatic chains [sequential 
combination of sound events which have unity, autonomy and a sense of 
coherence] even as single events – specific functions of signification. (1998: 
45) 
 
Giomi and Ligabue also stress the importance of studying the way 
events are formed and subsequently organized into larger units, i.e. 
sequences. They also argue that to all events and higher-order 
structures some sort of signification can be assigned, as a result of 
them being on a certain level of the narrative process. An event or 
sequence thus becomes meaningful as a result of its relation to the 
other events and sequences, because it has a specific position within 
the musical structure.8 
But, as Pasler remarks, paying attention to sequential orderings 
alone is not sufficient to give an adequate account of musical 
narrativity. In restricting our analysis to regarding these orderings as 
static entities, we overlook a crucial aspect of music: the fact that 
music is a temporal art. Narrative aspects like rhythm and frequency 
are typically noticed while listening to music. Of course, one can 
notice these temporal aspects, too, when studying the score – which, as 
I argued in the previous chapter, can have many drawbacks, but in this 
way the most important and illusive character of music, to use Pasler’s 
expression, is ignored: 
 
The ultimate reason narrative events are directed and connected is that they 
undergo or cause transformation, which is probably the narrative’s most 
important and most illusive characteristic […] [A] musical narrative must 
also start with something which is incomplete and enticing so that the 
listener is interested in its future possibilities […] Most analyses of narrative 
largely ignore this aspect of narrative because they emphasize structural 
relationships rather than their transformation in time, and static rather than 
dynamic relationships between the parts of a narrative. (1989: 241)  
 
So, according to Pasler, sequences have to be regarded as dynamic 
entities: they start somewhere and head for a certain goal, and during 
their course the listener will have some expectations regarding the 
                                                                    
8 This aspect of musical narrativity is elaborated in the next chapter. 
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direction the sequence will take, while the sequence itself will either 
comply with this expectancy or not. It is this dynamic quality of music 
that is of prime importance in studying musical narrativity.9 
Karl also uses the notion of sequence in his analysis of musical 
narrativity in Ludwig van Beethoven’s piano sonata in F Minor, op. 
57/i (1804), in which the ideas of expectancy and fulfillment play a 
central role. He distinguishes ten kinds of so-called functional 
sequences, i.e. actions that are the fundamental units of plots (1997: 
20-22). First, he mentions “enclosure,” which is a 
 
[…] sequence in which an agent is, within a closed unit of structure, directly 
preceded and followed by material playing an opposing role or representing 
a contrasting state; enclosures are often like verbal exchanges between two 
parties in which the first to speak also has the final word, refuting or 
sweeping aside an objection interposed by an adversary. (20) 
 
This is a very structuralist account of the term “enclosure,” since Karl 
puts oppositions as central. The next functional sequence he defines is 
“disruption”; “[…] a pattern resembling a failed enclosure in which the 
element to be enclosed proves uncontainable” (20). “Subversion” is 
“[…] the undercutting of the character or expressive qualities of one 
agent due to the influence, superimposition, or ascendancy of an agent 
in an opposing role” (22), whereas “counteraction” is “[…] a measure 
taken to counter the effects of a prior enclosure, disruption, or 
subversion” (22). “Realization” is “[…] the bringing about of a desired 
state or the fulfillment of a threat” (22) and “withdrawal” “[…] an 
introversive counteraction – a retreat from conflict” (22). The final four 
functional sequences Karl mentions without giving any additional 
explanation: “interruption,” “integration,” “divergence,” and 
“transfiguration.” 
Whereas Bal considers specific sequences to be deviations of the 
fabula, Karl argues that these sequences are constitutive of the plot.10 
While he is taking a Russian formalist stance by focusing on the notion 
of function as the central element of a plot, and he himself 
acknowledges that he is doing so (19), he goes one step further and 
introduces functional sequences into the plot, instead of sticking to the 
notion of function. He is forced, however, to divert from the pure 
notion of function, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
these kinds of functions in music. For how can the listener recognize in 
this medium “[…] an act of dramatic personae, which is defined from 
                                                                    
9 The notions of temporality and expectancy play a central role throughout this 
study, since the notion of expectancy is problematized in many contemporary 
musical compositions, as I have explained in chapter 1. In chapters 3 and 4, musical 
temporality and its relation to narrativity are discussed extensively. 
10 Plot and fabula are considered to be more or less equivalent in Karl’s article. 
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the point of view of its significance for the course of action of the tale 
as a whole,” which is the definition Vladimir Propp gives of a function 
(Propp, as quoted in Culler 1975: 208)? In other words, Karl is forced 
to alter the concept of function, but in so doing he crosses the border 
between story and fabula, which he also does by incorporating 
“character” explicitly into his notion of plot, since this aspect belongs 
to the story level rather than to the level of the fabula.11 
Treating a musical plot as he does, Karl cannot really discuss the 
way musical compositions play with standard musical forms, as has 
been done since the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards: 
 
The problematization of Classical form at the hands of late Beethoven, 
Schumann, Liszt, Wagner, Mahler, and the like marks one of the deepest 
differences between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music. This 
problematization is in turn one of the principal causes of the increasingly 
important narrative aspect in nineteenth-century instrumental music. It 
forces the listener to engage in the fundamental narrative activity that 
Ricoeur calls “following a story,” matching successions of musical events 
against known configurations, in order both to forge an understanding of 
what one has heard and to make predictions of possible continuations. 
(Newcomb 1987: 174) 
 
According to Newcomb, paraphrasing Paul Ricoeur, narrative activity 
starts when a musical piece enters into discussion with a standard form. 
Tarasti formulates this in more general terms: “Narrative structures can 
emerge particularly when, as a stylistic device, syntactical structures 
are deliberately broken” (1994: 31). Only when certain deviations 
occur, and the listener has to find out what has happened for which 
reason, and s/he tries to make predictions regarding the course of the 
music, s/he is really engaged in a narrative activity. So, despite the fact 
that Newcomb refers to the composer and the way s/he manipulates 
standard forms, he acknowledges that the narrative starts with the 
listener rather than the maker. Now, when we consider the fabula as 
such a standard form, then we are able, by analyzing the story level of 
a musical piece, to point out in what way this piece comments on this 
form. But in Karl’s analysis, this deviation is already built in his 
conception of plot, so he cannot show us how Beethoven plays with 
musical forms, i.e. the underlying plot or fabula.  
The question is, however, whether or not we really want to show 
this, since our focus here is on the way the listener can hear a narrative 
in music, rather than explaining how a composer treats musical 
conventions. Consequently, the following question Newcomb poses is 
less relevant in this context: 
 
                                                                    
11 I will discuss Karl’s conception of character below. 
Chapter 2 
 
64 
[I]n instrumental music one can see musical events as tracing, or implying at 
any given moment, a paradigmatic plot – in the sense of a conventional 
succession of functional events. The question then becomes: how does the 
composer handle this narrative; what is the nature of the interaction between 
paradigmatic plot and succession of events in the individual movement or 
piece? (1987: 167)  
 
At this point, Newcomb does return to the maker. He no longer focuses 
on the listener, but instead concentrates on the composer and his/her 
relation to the musical narrative. In this study, however, this relation 
does not play an important role, for music, as perceived by the listener, 
is the object this study is about. So, the relevant issue here is how the 
problematization of established conventional forms by a musical piece 
affects narrativity as perceived by the listener, an issue to which I will 
return in the next chapter. But in this case, too, Karl is unable to show 
us, in a proper narratological manner, the mechanisms behind this 
affection. 
Spacing Music 
Bal explains that the events of the fabula can be placed in a space 
(1997: 135-136). She argues that space can function as a frame, a place 
of action. Space, however, can also be “thematized,” which means that 
it becomes an object of presentation itself, “[…] for its own sake” 
(136). It then plays an important role in the narrative, and can even 
function as the central theme. 
Tarasti has a conception of musical space, which is derived from 
Algirdas Julien Greimas’s semiotic theory:12 
 
In a musical space, or “being,” the “will” (kinetic energy and goal-
directedness) appears in such a way that some point of the musical space is 
the object of a particular striving; for example, tonic in the inner space [the 
centripetal/centrifugal tendencies within a musical text, e.g. key relations in 
Western tonal music], a certain register in the outer [the different registers in 
music]. (1994: 87) 
 
Tarasti regards musical space as a collection of oppositions. An 
example of such a collection is the one Tarasti mentions here, that of 
“will.” In this case, “will be” is opposed to “not-will be” and “not-will 
not-be” to “will not-be.” These oppositions constitute a space, in which 
musical objects are placed. This object becomes meaningful by 
standing in a certain relation to the oppositions. The note G, for 
instance, “wants” to go to the note C, when it is sounding in a musical 
piece that is written in C major. Thus, in such a piece, G “will be” C, 
                                                                    
12 In Meelberg (2003), I investigate whether or not Greimas’s semiotic theory and 
its application to music are compatible. 
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whereas G “not-will be” B flat. In other words, Tarasti’s musical space 
is an elaboration of the notions of musical causation and expectation I 
discussed above. 
Tarasti’s conception of musical space is an interesting notion, but 
not compatible with Bal’s conception of space. Bal’s space is a “place 
of action,” whereas Tarasti’s space is a “cause of action.” Tarasti 
regards musical space to be those mechanisms that lie behind the 
phenomenon Snyder calls musical causation. This notion of musical 
space seems to be equivalent to Bal’s notion of actor, i.e. a function 
that causes or experiences events, rather than to Bal’s notion of space. 
In his study into computer aided composition, Eduardo Reck 
Miranda formulates two fundamental notions about music, viz. musical 
compositions carry abstract structures and music is sounds organized in 
space and time (2001: 1). To this he adds that 
 
[…] space is primarily associated with vertical (or simultaneous) 
relationships between sounds, whereas time is associated with horizontal (or 
sequential) relationships. The notion of space in terms of the geographical 
distribution of sounds in the performance area is an exciting new dynamic. 
Contemporary composers are increasingly exploring “real” (that is, 
geographical) space in their pieces by either distributing performers at 
different locations in a room and/or using sophisticated sound diffusion 
systems. (1)  
 
At first sight, Miranda’s remark that space can be regarded as the 
simultaneous relationships between sounds seems to be an adequate 
musical equivalent of narratological space. This relationship 
codetermines the interpretation of sounds and musical events; 
individual sounds are interpreted differently when occurring 
simultaneously with different other sounds. To give a simple example: 
a note E is interpreted differently when sounding together with an A 
major chord than when sounding together with a C minor chord. In this 
way, the simultaneous organization of sounds creates a frame, a 
specific context, and thus seems to comply with Bal’s definition of 
narratological space. Her definition, however, states that events can be 
placed in such a context. But the simultaneous organization of sounds 
is itself composed by a musical event, rather than constituting 
something external in which events can be placed, as the example I just 
gave shows. 
Furthermore, when more events are sounding at the same time, 
simultaneous relationships between events can be heard, and thus 
constitute a frame, too. In this case, events are indeed placed in a 
context, but this context is generated by the events themselves. The 
interpretation of an event here is dependent on the other events that are 
sounding at the same time, just as the interpretation of a note depends 
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on the other notes that are sounding simultaneously. Thus, since space 
is a context in which events can be interpreted, in music the 
simultaneous ordering of sounds and/or events themselves would 
constitute this context. As a result, in this conception musical space 
would not be a separate element in which events can be placed, but 
rather a phenomenon that occurs within, or between, musical events. 
Moreover, in this conception the specificity of narratological space is 
minimized, since it is now equated with context. But, because not 
every context is spatial, this conception of space is not specific enough. 
More useful is Miranda’s comment that contemporary composers 
make explicit use of geographical space. Yet, these composers do not 
only distribute the performers spatially. The musical sounds and 
musical events themselves are often distributed in physical space as 
well, especially when it concerns electronic or electro-acoustic music. 
In these compositions, the explicit demonstration and/or manipulation 
of the placement of musical events in the stereo or surround image is 
an important spatial musical characteristic. It is this characteristic that I 
would call musical narrative space, i.e. the aspect in which the events 
of the fabula can be placed. In chapter 6 I will give two examples of 
electro-acoustic works that articulate musical space. 
As a consequence, musical space is a rather marginal category, since 
mainly particular contemporary musical works make the placement of 
musical events explicit.13 This means that space only plays a part in 
those specific pieces. In contrast, space can nearly always be 
recognized in verbal narrative. Thus, whereas in verbal narrative space 
is a common category, in music it remains exceptional. Therefore, it is 
all the more important to specify the function of musical space when it 
occurs in a musical work. 
Performance as Focalization 
Focalization is the relation between the elements presented and the 
vision through which they are presented. In other words, it is the 
relation between perception and that which is perceived, with 
“perception” being more than just vision. Theoretically, there has to be 
a distinction between those who see and those who speak, i.e. the 
vision through which the elements are presented and the identity of the 
voice that is verbalizing that vision (Bal 1997: 142-143). Hence, we 
have to make a clear distinction between the function of narrator and of 
focalizor, which is the subject of focalization, the point from which the 
elements are perceived. This function can lie with a character, or it can 
                                                                    
13 Renaissance composer Adrian Willaert’s works for Venetian double choruses are 
examples of older music that exploits geographical space. In these works two 
choruses are positioned at a distance from each other, and sing in an antiphonic 
manner, i.e. one chorus responds to the other and vice versa.  
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be external (146). When analyzing narratives, several relevant 
questions concerning focalization can be asked, such as: What is the 
object of focalization? With what attitude does the focalizor view 
things? Who focalizes? Focalization is regarded as an important aspect 
of a story, since it is this aspect that defines the way the story is 
communicated to us. The narrator may be a function that in fact utters 
the linguistic signs that constitute the text, but it is through focalization 
that the specificity or limitedness of the image that the reader receives 
is determined. Bear in mind that “image” is being used metaphorically 
here, since focalization is not strictly visual.14 
Focalization is such an important aspect because it “colors” the story 
with subjectivity, to use Bal’s expression. The jazz composer and 
musician Carla Bley also uses color as a metaphor when describing her 
compositions: “I write pieces that are like drawings in a crayon book 
and the musicians color them themselves” (quoted in Benson 2003: 
135). Benson adds that this coloring never stays purely within the lines. 
“For the ‘coloring in’ that takes place in performance also consists of 
redefining those lines or, alternatively, redefining what it means to 
respect them” (135). The interpretation of a written score, which is the 
crayon book that is colored in during performance, is translated into 
sounds by that performance.  
Hence, the composer is not the only person who is necessary for the 
creation of music. Music, the way it is regarded in this study, is only 
music when the music is actually sounding, thus when it is performed. 
As Benson observes, the way music is traditionally preserved is via a 
musical score, via a notated script. With the aid of this script the 
performer or performers can give a rendition of the musical piece the 
composer has conceived. This rendition complies however only 
partially, at best, with the intentions of the composer. Since a written 
score leaves so many options open, they do “[…] make a work ideal – 
in the sense of being available to all – [but] they likewise allow a work 
to be detached from its composer and open to a wide variety of 
interpretations” (79). A score is a way to ensure the continuing 
existence of a musical work, while this manner of preservation is at the 
same time a guarantee for there being a wide variety of differently 
sounding performances of that work. As soon as the writing is done, 
the composer him/herself can no longer control the way the music will 
ultimately sound in performance, other than trying to be present during 
rehearsals and hoping the directions s/he gives will be acted upon 
                                                                    
14 Focalization does not determine the completeness of the image, since this would 
imply that, in theory, there could be a complete account. This would mean that there 
could exist some sort of zero-focalization, i.e. a relation in which no focalization is 
present, in the case of a complete account. Bal, however, contends that every 
narration has some sort of focalization, and thereby argues against Genette (1972), 
who does claim that narration with zero-focalization can exist. 
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during the performance of the piece.15 A musical text, then, which I 
earlier defined as a finite, structured whole composed of musical signs, 
does not receive its final appearance when the musical score is written 
by the composer, but only during performance; the moment in which, 
to use Benson’s expression, the musical work is “embodied” (82).  
Paraphrasing Wilhelm von Humboldt, Benson argues that the work, 
the ergon, exists as an activity, as energeia (125), and thus emphasizes 
the necessity of one or more performers in order to let a musical text 
exist. According to Benson, regarding ergon as energeia has several 
implications: first, the creation of a musical work, in the sense of 
writing a score, is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of making 
music. Likewise, the performance cannot be seen apart from the work. 
All this, finally, makes the idea of authorship much more complex 
(126). Because the performer has such a decisive part in both the 
existence and the contents of a musical work, Benson argues that the 
composer cannot be the sole author of a sounding musical piece. S/he 
might have written the musical score, but s/he only did that in order to 
create sounding music, and for that s/he needs performers. These 
performers themselves are at the same time co-authors, since the score 
from which they are playing off leaves many options open, which they 
can fill in as they like. The filling in of these options is a very 
important activity, for, as Benson argues, “[…] it is precisely what is 
not to be found in the score that we often most value” (84-85). The 
reason why a listener favors one performance of a musical work over 
another work cannot be found in the notes themselves. The lines in the 
crayon book, the musical score, stay the same, but it is the coloring 
within and over these lines that shape the listener’s preferences. The 
performance thus determines how the music is communicated to the 
listener: performance acts as musical focalization, the point from 
which the musical events are perceived.16 
A literary focalizor always gives a limited and specific account of 
events. Through focalization it is determined how limited or specific 
the image is that the reader receives. When performing a musical work, 
the “image” of the musical events that is given to the listener is also 
always limited and specific: the performer or performers have to make 
choices about the interpretation of the piece, by deciding for instance 
whether or not the rendition will be historically “authentic,” how to 
                                                                    
15 Yet, even when the composer him/herself conducts his/her own music, total 
control over the music is impossible. Benson for instance refers to the many 
recordings in which Igor Stravinsky has conducted his Le Sacre du Printemps 
(1913), with each of the recordings being very different from the other ones (2003: 
79). Of course, it cannot be ruled out that these differences could also have occurred 
because the views of the composer have changed between two subsequent recording 
dates. 
16 In the case of a recording, the musical focalizor is augmented with the technology 
and production that was necessary in creating the recording. 
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interpret dynamic and tempo marks, which are by definition only 
approximate, etc. In other words: the focalization in a musical work 
always results in a limited account of the musical story.17 
Still, it is not at all clear what it means to give a “true” account of 
musical events. It is not the transparent presentation of a musical score, 
if only because this would imply that improvised music would not be 
focalized. Yet, in the performance of improvised music, too, choices 
are made, options are rejected, and alternatives are selected. 
Consequently, in improvised music a limited and specific account of 
musical events is given as well. Moreover, the musical events in a 
score are not represented transparently, i.e. unfocalized. For the score 
of a musical narrative is itself a narrative text. And as a text, the score 
is itself focalized, which again results in a colored representation of 
events. Furthermore, the events in a score are necessarily of a different 
ontological category; they are turned from audible into visual signs. 
Therefore, unfocalized, and thus unperformed, musical events are 
necessarily abstract entities that can only be made concrete in a 
sounding text, which is always focalized.18 
Focalization does not manifest itself in music in the same way as in 
literature. First of all, whereas in literature the focalization or 
focalizations are identical for every reading of the narrative, in music 
the focalization can, and almost always will, change in each 
performance. No one performance is the same, and therefore different 
interpretations, and thus different focalizations, of the same musical 
work may exist. A reader interprets the focalization(s) in a novel in 
his/her own way and that interpretation can change with every reading, 
whereas the presentation of this focalization stays the same. In music, 
however, both the focalization and the listener’s interpretation can 
change with every performance. As a result, one cannot speak in 
musical narratology of different performances of the same musical 
narrative. Each performance of the same musical piece has to be 
regarded as a new musical narrative, a new work. Each of these 
                                                                    
17 Yet, the musical score is not the musical story. In fact, the score is itself a text that 
is different from a musical text, consisting of visual signs, relating a story, based on 
a fabula. This text, story, and fabula are related to the musical text, story, and fabula 
of the musical performance of the written piece, but are, by definition, not identical. 
For in my elaboration of musical text, story, and fabula I explicitly refer to sounds, 
rather than to visual signs. Consequently, musical scores are in no way compatible 
with a musical text, story, or fabula. 
18 As a result, it is impossible to have a sounding musical narrative that is not 
focalized, for performance, which is a necessary element in the production of 
sounding music, always implies focalization. Hence, one could regard a musical 
narrative as a making explicit of Bal’s assertion that a narrative is always focalized. 
In order to create a musical narrative – that in my definition is always a sounding 
musical narrative, the music has to be performed, which necessarily implies 
focalization. 
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performances has a different focalization, and thus every performance 
of the same piece results in a different musical narrative. 
Aleatoric music demonstrates this point in a very explicit manner. 
Two performances of the same aleatoric piece, say Imaginary 
Landscape No. 4 (1951) for twelve radios, 24 performers and a 
conductor, composed by John Cage, cannot be identical. If this piece 
can be considered as narrative, then the resulting narratives are very 
different. It is also possible that one performance of this piece can be 
regarded as narrative, whereas another performance cannot. The 
performance is such a radical determining factor in the experience of 
the piece, that it even can control the degree of narrativity of the work 
in question.  
Again, here I used a contemporary musical example, because it 
allows me to articulate my point in a precise manner. But in this case, 
too, my conclusion does not exclusively hold for contemporary music. 
Two performances of the same narrative tonal piece result in two 
different narratives as well. Probably not always as different as it 
would be in aleatoric music, but different nonetheless. One 
performance might be executed at a slower tempo, which might result 
in the identification of certain musical events that were unnoticeable in 
the faster performance of the same piece. One performance might be 
much more dynamic that another, to such an extent that dynamics 
becomes the most important parameter that determines the narrative 
character of a work, etc. 
In literature, more that one focalizor, the subject through whose 
perception the reader perceives the events, can be found, while in 
music there is only one focalizor. After all, there is only one 
performance of a piece at a given time that can be heard. Although 
many musical pieces have to be performed by more than one musician, 
each musician contributes to the performance as a whole, and it is this 
performance through which focalization takes place. A performance is 
the end result of the creation of an interpretation of a musical work, a 
creation in which each performer shapes his/her interpretation of 
his/her individual part in order to achieve the desired end result. A 
rendition of a musical work by an ensemble of musicians is not the 
presentation of several focalizors, each giving his/her own view on the 
musical events at the same time, but the joint presentation of a single 
focalizor, i.e. the performance. Or, more precisely: the performance 
acts as an external focalizor, i.e. an anonymous agent situated outside 
the fabula (Bal 1997: 148), whereas the individual contributions of the 
musicians can be regarded as partial focalizations. These focalizations 
are embedded in the external focalization, which is the performance as 
a whole. This does not mean, though, that there is also only one 
focalization possible. A focalizor can “change its mind,” as it were, 
and give a different “view” of the same situation. In a musical piece, 
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for instance, the same musical phrase can be repeated in different ways 
by the same focalizor. When this occurs, the function of external 
focalizor stays assigned to the same agent, i.e. the performance, and 
only the focalization, the way that phrase is performed, has changed.  
Lastly, there is one more important difference between a literary and 
a musical focalizor. Since there is only one focalizor in a musical 
narrative, which is external, this suggests that there is no internal 
focalizor in music. And indeed, in this conception of musical 
focalization it is impossible to point out an internal focalizor in the 
music; music is solely focalized externally through the performance. 
Electro-Acoustic Focalization 
Anthèmes 2 (1997), composed by Pierre Boulez, is in two ways an 
innovative work. Firstly, it is an innovation with respect to an earlier 
piece by Boulez, Anthèmes (1991), a work for solo violin. Secondly, in 
Anthèmes 2 live electronics are used in an innovative way. In this 
piece, written for violin and “disposif électronique,” the sounds made 
by the violin are electronically altered and spatialized in real time, 
while other sounds are added that are electronically generated, and 
triggered by the violin’s part. 
In Anthèmes 2, it is the interplay between the violin and the 
electronic sounds that constitute focalization. Here we can really speak 
of a genuine interplay, since the electronic part is not fixed. This part is 
not just a playback of a tape or a sequencer, but on the contrary can 
vary from performance to performance, just like the live played violin 
part. The electronic sounds literally are a reaction to the violin part, 
and, as a result, these sounds vary as much from performance to 
performance as the violin part does. 
The introduction of Anthèmes 2, “Libre,” starts with the violin 
playing a descending line that is reverberated electronically. Next, the 
violin plays staccato bowed notes, to which echoes are added, that 
sound more pizzicato than arco. The violin concludes this first phrase 
with a short pizzicato note, and after that the introduction ends with a 
long, bowed, electronically altered note. In this introduction, the 
electronic sounds are embellishments rather than constituting a 
separate voice. 
In the first movement, “Très lent, avec beaucoup de flexibilité – 
Libre,” electronically harmonized melodic bowed phrases with 
electronically generated pizzicato-like embellishments are played. A 
long, electronically altered tone, similar to the one that can be heard at 
the end of the introduction, concludes the first movement. The second 
movement, “Rapide, dynamique, très rythmique, rigide – Libre,” 
consists of a series of pizzicato notes, both played by the violin and 
generated electronically, as if engaged in some sort of dialogue. Often 
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it is not clear which notes are played by the violin and which are 
electronically generated. Later in this movement, at approximately 
00’53” (as performed by Hae-Sun Kang, violin, in the recording 
released by Deutsche Grammophon 463 475-2), a clearer distinction is 
audible. At 01’37”, the same long electronically altered tone that also 
appeared in the other movements is played, only this time it is repeated 
and varied. In these two movements, the electronic sounds break loose 
from the violin part, although they are still triggered by the violin. 
Only in the “libre” passages the electronic sounds appear to be more 
embellishments rather than constituting a separate part. 
The next three movements give the same impression. Reminiscent of 
the pizzicato phrase in the second movement, the third movement, 
“Lent, régulier – Nerveux, irrégulier – Libre,” starts off with fast 
staccato, bowed notes, again in dialogue with pizzicato-like 
electronically generated sounds. At 00’49”, harmonized long notes, 
followed at 01’11” by a variation of the beginning of the movement, 
are played. The movement ends just like the first movement, with a 
long, electronically altered tone. The fourth movement, “Agité, 
instable – Libre,” consists of bowed tremolo phrases in the violin, 
accompanied by reverberating sounds. Again, the movement ends with 
long note, this time repeated and varied. The fifth movement, “Très 
lent, avec beaucoup de flexibilité – Subitement nerveux et 
extrêmement irrégulier – Libre,” also starts with a tremolo violin 
passage, this time electronically harmonized, followed by a similar 
phrase in the violin, but with pizzicato-like electronic accompaniment. 
The ending again is similar to the previous movement. 
The sixth and final movement deviates form the structure of the 
previous ones. In the first part of this movement, “Allant, assez serré 
dans le tempo,” a tremolo phrase played by the violin and electronic 
pizzicato-like sounds can be heard, interrupted by staccato echoes of 
arco tones. The second part, “Calme, régulier – Agité – Brusque,” 
consists entirely of an alternation of fast notes of the violin played 
pizzicato and electronic tones, fast notes played arco plus electronic 
sounds, and soft arpeggios played pizzicato by the violin along with 
electronic reverberations. In the third and final part of the last 
movement, “Calme, sans traîner, d’un mouvement très régulier – 
Libre,” a repeated bowed motif is played by the violin, which is varied 
slowly, accompanied by electronic reverberations and interrupted by 
other violin phrases. At the conclusion of the movement a long 
reverberation along with a very soft, sustained note in the violin can be 
heard. The piece ends with a short, soft tone, played pizzicato by the 
violin, without any electronic accompaniment. 
Throughout the piece an alternation between electronic 
embellishments of the violin and the appearance of a genuine 
electronic voice alongside with the violin part appears. Both, however, 
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are generated by the performance of the violin part, and therefore the 
electronic part depends on the way this part is executed (which the 
listener can only be fully aware of when listening to several different 
performances of the piece). This is a reversal of the dependency 
relation in the performance of many electro-acoustic works, where the 
electronic part is fixed and the live performers have to adjust to this 
fixed part, for instance by playing along with a click track, since the 
electronic part cannot be changed during performance. But in 
Anthèmes 2 it is the electronic part that has to adjust itself to the way 
the live part is executed. 
This implies that the live performer determines, for the greater part, 
the focalization of Anthèmes 2. Here it is the human performer, and not 
the electronic device, that largely determines the manner in which the 
succession of musical events in this piece is communicated to the 
listener. S/he decides when a particular electronic sound or phrase will 
be audible, and even in part the way it will sound. This also implies 
that two performances of Anthèmes 2 will differ in more ways than two 
performances of an electro-acoustic work with a fixed electronic part 
would. The focalization in these performances of Anthèmes 2 will 
therefore differ considerably from each other. 
In other words: the musical events that constitute Anthèmes 2 can be 
told in different ways, as opposed to electronic works with fixed parts. 
Therefore, one could argue that these electronic works resemble a 
literary story more than a piece like Anthèmes 2 does, since the 
focalization in these works stays the same for each performance, just as 
for each reading the focalization in a literary narrative is identical. 
Musical works in which the occurrence of electronic sounds depends 
on the live parts thus contain more aspects that are characteristic of 
“traditional” music. Perhaps this is also the reason why Anthèmes 2 is 
such a fascinating piece: it is a modern electro-acoustic composition 
that is communicated to the listener via a classical musical focalization, 
i.e. the kind of focalization that can also be found in purely acoustic 
music. 
Musical Fabula and Musical Events 
Bal gives two different descriptions of fabula: a fabula is a series of 
logically and chronologically related events that are caused or 
experienced by actors, and a fabula is a memorial trace that remains 
with the reader after completion of the reading. These descriptions 
illustrate the two ways in which we can view the narrative trichotomy 
of text, story, and fabula. The second description of fabula complies 
with Bal’s aim to formulate a theory that follows the order in which the 
reader gets access to and experiences a narrative text, in which the 
reconstruction of the fabula is the final stage. The first description of 
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fabula, on the other hand, seems to comply more with a bottom up 
approach to narrativity. One could argue that such a fabula can be 
reconstructed by the reader after the reading is done, which means that 
the memorial trace that remains with the reader in fact consists of a 
series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or 
experienced by actors. In her discussion of fabula, however, Bal 
introduces notions like actor, location and time, which she considers to 
be basic elements that can be elaborated into a story. Although these 
elements can be extracted from a story, I would not go so far as to 
argue that, in the case of music, these elements in fact constitute the 
memorial trace that remains with the listener after the listening is done. 
Still, although this second characterization is more compatible with 
both musical cognition and with a top down approach to musical 
listening, I will now focus on the first one, since my aim here is to 
identify the narrative elements in a musical piece. A structuralist 
conception of fabula serves this aim better. Thus, in this section I 
regard a fabula a series of logically and chronologically related events 
that are caused or experienced by actors, whereby an event is regarded 
a transition from one state to another state, and an actor is an agent that 
performs actions, while “to act” is defined as causing or experiencing 
an event (Bal 1997: 5). 
As I remarked above, Imberty regards the macrostructure of a 
musical piece as made up of the perception and retention in the 
listener’s memory of some particularly significant changes, which 
determine the overall progression of the piece for this listener. These 
changes are constitutive of how the listener regards the music as 
divided into events. As I will argue below, however, events are not 
recognized in the music, but rather the representation of events, just as 
a verbal narrative is a representation of events rather than actually 
consisting of events. The listener thus recognizes the representations of 
individual events in a musical text s/he is listening to. 
In his study into musical cognition, Snyder addresses the question 
how the listener’s recognition of musical events and of the 
organization of these events is directed by the music itself. Snyder 
distinguishes three principles by which music can be divided into 
events, which he calls groupings: the principles of proximity, 
similarity, and continuity (2000: 39-43). The first principle states that 
sounds that are close together in time will tend to be grouped together. 
Snyder regards this principle as “[…] a primary grouping force at the 
melodic and rhythmic level” (40). He contends that “[…] of all the 
primitive grouping factors, temporal proximity appears to have the 
strongest effect and can often prevail over other grouping factors” (40). 
The time interval between events does not have to be large, since 
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[i]n the ongoing flow of acoustical events, a slight difference in timing can 
form a temporal grouping boundary as well as a large difference can – it is 
the change in distance that is important. All other things being equal, an 
increase in time interval between the beginning of two events in a sequence 
will establish a grouping boundary. (40, emphasis in original) 
 
With regard to the other principles by which music can be divided into 
events, Snyder remarks that the principle of similarity states that 
sounds perceived as being similar will tend to be grouped together 
(40). Concerning this principle, Snyder remarks that “[s]imilarity can 
create grouping in both vertical [simultaneous grouping] and horizontal 
[sequential grouping] dimensions of music” (41), so, similarity can 
create both harmonic and melodic events. The principle of continuity, 
finally, states that when a series of sounds consistently, or 
continuously, changes value in a particular direction in units of similar 
size, the sounds will tend to form events (43). 
These principles emphasize the importance of time in music. Timing 
is constitutive for the possibility of structuring events in music. And 
since music primarily is a structuring of musical events, as Imberty 
argues, music without timing is near to impossible.19 We have to bear 
in mind, however, that in a narrative reading music is a representation 
of a temporal development, while all music is itself a temporal 
phenomenon. As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, a piece of 
music consists of sounds. Because of the succession of sounds the 
listener can get the impression the music is moving forward. It is this 
forward motion, and the expectations this impression of movement 
generates, and which are either met or not, that we call musical 
development. Yet, not all music can be considered to represent a 
musical development, and therefore not all music is narrative. All 
music, however, is temporal, and some of this music shows a 
development in consequence of the interplay of expectations, or 
tension, and resolution, and thus might also be narrative. 
With regard to the forward motion that is suggested by musical 
events, Snyder remarks: 
 
[M]usical events are seen as “leading to,” or “causing” successive events 
that are close to and similar to them. This is, of course, all metaphorical 
because musical events do not actually cause each other in the way that 
other kinds of physical events do (although they can imply each other). It is 
interesting to note that causation is also an important factor in the 
construction of linear verbal narrative; sequences of narrative events are 
also often linked by chains of causation. (113-114, emphasis in original) 
 
                                                                    
19 Perhaps, this is why so many contemporary composers, such as György Ligeti 
and Stockhausen, problematize the concept of time in music. By problematizing 
time, one automatically problematizes music itself. 
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Snyder, too, acknowledges that music generates expectations, by 
giving the impression that musical events lead to or cause other events. 
It is not real causation that takes place in music, but rather a 
representation of musical causation. A dominant seventh chord, say, 
does not necessarily have to resolve to the tonic. There is no physical 
necessity for this chord to resolve. Rather, the listener expects this 
chord to resolve accordingly, as a result of the musical conventions and 
precedents s/he is familiar with. In other words: the listener interprets a 
dominant seventh chord as wanting to resolve to the tonic. This chord 
is a representation of musical tension, rather than actually being 
unstable or tense, whereas the physical makeup of this chord is as 
stable as any other sound. Thus: tension and resolution, which can lead 
to temporal development, are not physically present in the music, but 
are represented by it.20 
Furthermore, Snyder recognizes a relation between this phenomenon 
and verbal narratives, in which causation between events also plays a 
constitutive role. A verbal narrative consists of representations of 
events and it is the whole of these representations that is related to the 
reader. Such narratives, then, relate representations of the causality 
between the events, rather than presenting the actual causation. For 
example, in a story that tells about a person that falls out of a tree there 
is no physical necessity for this person to actually hit the ground. The 
words that make up this story do not necessarily, physically, cause this. 
The reader might expect the person to hit the ground, but this does not 
have to happen just because the story implies it. Real, physical 
causation does not exist in verbal narratives, and neither does it exist in 
music. 
Likewise, musical events themselves do not actually physically exist 
in music. The principles by which music can be divided into events all 
depend on musical tension and resolution. Without tension and 
resolution there would be no perceptible change, and therefore no 
recognizable musical groupings. Yet, musical tension and resolution 
are representations. Consequently, musical events are the result of 
representations. Therefore, musical events are themselves 
representations, rather than physical entities.21, 22 
                                                                    
20 The notions of musical tension and resolution might have become somewhat of a 
cliché in musicology. However, I do not take these notions at face value, but I have 
derived them from the cognitive theory as formulated by Snyder. As I explained in 
this chapter, his notions of closure and metaphorical causation constitute the basis 
of my conception of tension and resolution. Moreover, I reinterpret these notions 
within a narrative framework, which might be less of a cliché as far as musicology 
is concerned. 
21 Stockhausen’s moment form is an attempt to eliminate this particular 
representative force of music, in order to create music without events that could 
point to other events, music that literally has no direction. This also implies that 
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This manner of representing musical events implies that at a certain 
moment these events give the impression of having reached a closure, 
which signifies an end or a final state, a sense of completion of an 
event. Such a closure can be a temporal interval that is larger than the 
immediately preceding ones, a sound that is significantly different 
from the immediately preceding sounds or a halt in a continuous 
change. These kinds of closure are created by the interplay of tension 
and resolution as represented by the music, and therefore are 
representations rather than physical entities as well. A closure thus is 
not necessarily the same as a physical close. Pushing the stop button of 
a compact disc player in which a disc is playing can create a physical 
close. This, however, might not give a sense of completion of a 
musical event as a closure would. 
While closures can mark out individual events, this does not 
automatically imply that such events stand out alone in the music. As I 
remarked above, an event can metaphorically cause another event, in 
the sense that one event “points” to the next one. There is some kind of 
directedness implied between events, a directedness that is constitutive 
of regarding larger events as the combination of smaller events. An 
event can also resemble another event, or give in some other way the 
impression that the event is part of a larger grouping. These larger 
groupings, Snyder remarks, can be considered as constituting musical 
phrases, which can themselves again be regarded to be part of even 
larger events (54-55). Thus, in music, different kinds of closures can be 
represented: so-called soft closures that function as the basic 
articulation of individual events and closures of complete musical 
phrases that have more an effect of finality than soft closures have 
(59). 
One of the reasons why many contemporary compositions are 
regarded as ungraspable is exactly the inability to hear in the music any 
kind of closure; in this kind of music no individual events are 
detectable, nor any kind of directedness and expectations stemming 
from that directedness, Snyder asserts: 
 
In a sequence without any recognizable directed pattern of motion, any 
element can be the last one – we have no basis for predicting. To establish 
closure, especially at higher levels, we must have some basis for predicting 
                                                                                                                                     
such music is not narrative, either. On the other hand, narrativity within the separate 
events might still be possible. 
22 I do not want to argue that only narrative music can be regarded as consisting of 
musical events. Yet, the ways in which events can be recognized do in fact often 
rely on some kind of temporal development, at least some kind of momentary 
development. Therefore, we may conclude that musical events generally depend on 
some kind of local musical development, regardless whether the musical work as a 
whole can be regarded as showing a temporal development, and thus as a musical 
narrative. 
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what we think will come next. Although our predictions may be wrong, the 
very fact that we can have expectations creates a tension that carries us 
through a sequence and makes closure possible. (61) 
 
If a listener has no expectations with regard to the music s/he is 
hearing, then this means that the music does not represent musical 
events and musical phrases. No tension is created by this music, and 
thus no possibilities for representations of closure are available. This 
kind of music is in other words not a representation of a temporal 
development. One might even argue that in such cases the music is 
“static,” that it stands still, or that it is multi-directional, that it goes 
everywhere at the same time. There is a sense of motion, but the 
direction of that motion is anything but unequivocal (Kramer 1988: 
46).23 Many forms of contemporary music are regarded this way, i.e. 
having no direction at all or going in all directions at the same time. 
And since I have defined a narrative as being a representation of a 
temporal development, and this development is dependent on a sense 
of direction, music that has no direction, or is multi-directional, thus 
undermines or challenges its narrativity.24 
György Ligeti’s Désordre (1985), from his first book of piano 
etudes, might be considered as a contemporary musical composition in 
which no clear patterning can be discerned. And indeed, in this piece, 
the musical events are not represented in a clear, straightforward way. 
A first impression of this piece may be that it really is the 
representation of a disorder, as the title suggests. A cacophony of 
sounds is produced and it seems as if many different musical phrases 
are played at the same time. A constant stream of eight notes is audible 
throughout the piece, which makes it initially hard for the listener to 
discern individual events. One clearly noticeable closure is represented 
at 1’22” (as performed by Pierre-Laurent Aimard, piano, in the 
recording released by Sony Classical SK 62308; bar 98 in the score), 
where the music ascends and the density decreases (ex. 2.4). 
While this closure divides the piece into two parts, it is not the only 
closure that is represented. For, within this abundance of sounds, a 
melody can be discerned. This melody is articulated during the first 
four seconds of the piece (bars 1-4), where, amidst ascending notes, 
octaves are played. These octaves outline a seven-note phrase in the 
right hand and are accompanied by octaves in the left hand, played in 
the same rhythm as the octaves in the right hand (ex. 2.5). 
 
                                                                    
23 However, in the next chapter I will argue that true stasis in music is close to 
impossible. 
24 I will discuss this issue in more depth in chapter 4. 
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Example 2.4. György Ligeti, Désordre, bars 93-102. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
 
 
 
 
Example 2.5. György Ligeti, Désordre, bars 1-7. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
 
In these bars, closure is represented on different levels: the playing of 
octaves itself constitute a closure relative to the other notes that are 
played, while a different closure indicates the finality of the musical 
phrase. This closure is represented by a rhythmical shift of the octaves 
in the left hand. At 0’05” (bar 5), these octaves are played one eighth 
note later than the octaves played in the right hand, causing a blurring 
of the musical phrase that is transposed and repeated in the right hand. 
With every transposed repetition of the phrase, articulated by octaves 
in the right hand, the octaves in the left hand shift relative to this 
phrase. In this way, it becomes more and more difficult to recognize 
the phrase, and thus to perceive the representation of events that is 
constituted by the finality of this phrase. The closure that signified the 
finality of the initial event was represented by the shift of the octaves 
in the left hand relative to the right hand. This shift, however, becomes 
less and less noticeable when the distance between the octaves in the 
right and left hands becomes larger. This means that this shift cannot 
any longer be considered as the representation of a closure. Now it is 
because of the repetition of the phrase itself that events are still 
represented, but this repetition constitutes a softer closure than the 
initial one. These repeated events are themselves considered to be part 
of a larger event, whose finality is indicated by the closure that is 
represented at 0’51” (bar 54). From this moment on, the phrase is no 
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longer played in its entirety, but instead only fragments can be heard 
(ex. 2.6). 
 
 
 
Example 2.6. György Ligeti, Désordre, bars 54-63. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
 
The closure on another level, too, is absent now. Since from 0’51” 
(bar 54) onwards the music predominantly consists of octaves, the 
playing of octaves no longer constitutes a closure on the note level. 
Moreover, from 0’51” until 1’22” (bars 54-98) no clear events seem to 
be represented: no distinct closures can be heard, other than those, 
represented by the varied repetition of short musical phrases. The 
repetitions of these phrases can however only be regarded as very soft 
closures, since these repetitions are not clearly articulated. This 
blurriness in articulation is brought about by playing the phrases in 
both the right and the left hand, but not at the same time. The result of 
this is that the beginning and ending of each phrase run over each 
other. In this way, no distinct closures are represented, and therefore no 
stable representations of events can be recognizable. The apparent 
disorder that is represented in this part of the piece is constituted by the 
absence of strong closures. This disorder also undermines the 
narrativity of the music at this point. It is not until 1’22” (bar 98) that 
the initial melody is again articulated, which gives the music a sense of 
tranquility, although this music remains just as hectic as it initially was. 
Yet, in this piece a representation of a temporal development can be 
noticed: a building up of tension that is released at 0’51” (bar 54), 
followed by a section, which lasts until 1’22” (bar 98), that is unclear, 
and a final section in which clarity has returned, and that can be 
regarded as a resolution of the preceding section. 
The recognition of (representations of) musical events by the listener 
as described in this analysis takes place in short-term memory (Snyder 
2000: 11-12). Large musical phrases, on the other hand, such as the 
narrative outline of Désordre that I sketched above, can be stored in 
long-term memory. In long-term memory, so-called schemas reside 
that are organized sets of memories about sequences of events. When a 
number of different situations occurring at different times seem to have 
elements in common, they are eventually merged together into such a 
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schema. These schemas function as the context, the background, 
against which sounds, grouped together into events, are interpreted. 
These schemas are also responsible for the listener having 
expectations, since, as Snyder calls it, events can semi-activate 
memory networks, out of which schemas are built, and these networks 
possess potential associative connections. Hence, when a memory 
network is semi-activated, it may “[…] enter our peripheral 
consciousness as a ‘feeling’ of what is about to happen” (96). This 
conception of schema is both compatible with Grund’s reference class 
and with the notion of musical convention I described in chapter 1. 
This notion is also confirmed by experiments, as described by Imberty: 
 
In a series of experiments on Sequenza VI by Berio and Eclat by Boulez, [it 
is shown] that the listeners construct, during successive hearings of the 
works, which they do not know, and for which cues for tonal structures do 
not operate, a simplified schema of what they hear in the form of an imprint 
stored in memory, where the details are laid down in a prototype, unique 
with respect to the multiple variations from successive hearings. (1993: 332)  
 
Thus, in listening to modern, atonal music, too, schemas are used and 
new schemas are formed in the listener’s memory while listening to the 
music, in the same way Snyder describes this process. 
To recapitulate: a listener is confronted with an audible musical text, 
in which s/he distinguishes certain acoustic features that function as 
clues for him/her while recognizing musical events in the text s/he is 
hearing. This recognition is done in short-term memory, but with the 
aid of schemas that reside in long-term memory. These events can 
themselves be part of larger events, which are called musical phrases. 
The recognition of these phrases is also done by referring to schemas. 
Hence, the organization of the representation of events, which is done 
with the aid of closure and the principles by which music can be 
divided, takes place while perceiving the musical text, whereas the 
recognition of this organization by the listener is dependent on the 
schemas s/he refers to. Musical phrases, finally, can eventually be 
averaged together into an abstract memory framework, when they 
seem to have aspects in common. This memory framework can both be 
remembered and function as a new, added schema.25 Other phrases that 
stand out in the music, i.e. phrases that differ considerably and are 
therefore marked, can be stored in long-term memory, too; not to 
function as a schema, but as part of the memorial trace of a musical 
piece that remains with the listener when the listening is done.26 
                                                                    
25 This procedure is analogous to the one described in Meelberg (2001). 
26 See also chapter 3, where I will discuss the interrelations between musical events 
in much more detail. 
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The listening procedure described above is remarkably similar to the 
trichotomy musical text – story – fabula. Above, I equated the latter 
with the trichotomy “perceptible sounds” – “musical structure” – “a 
series of logically and chronologically related musical events that are 
caused or experienced by musical actors.” A confrontation of a listener 
with a sounding musical text means that this listener perceives the 
sounds which make up the musical text. S/he then distinguishes in the 
music events and larger phrases to which these events belong. In short, 
s/he discriminates a musical structure. Finally, these phrases are stored 
in long-term memory, where they can be remembered. And although 
this last step may not resemble the definition of the musical fabula that 
is used in this section, it does resemble the alternative description Bal 
gives of fabula, namely “[…] a memorial trace that remains with the 
reader after completion of the reading” (1997: xv), with “trace” being a 
lasting impression of the verbal narrative. Replace “reader,” “reading” 
and “verbal” with “listener,” “listening” and “musical,” respectively, 
and the resemblance is restored.27 
The manner of representing events, as elaborated above, is very 
similar to the methods Bal mentions, namely grouping on the basis of 
the identity of the actors involved, classification on the basis of the 
nature of the confrontation (verbal, mental, (un)successful, etc.), 
classification by placing events against a time lapse, or grouping on the 
basis of the locations at which events occur (193-195). Furthermore, 
musical events can be considered a transition from one state to another, 
and thereby complying with Bal’s definition of an event being a 
process, an alteration (182). In all three variations of the representation 
of a musical event, this is indeed the case: the first state consists of the 
start of a process that can be classified as one of the principles 
mentioned above, whereas the second state is a closure of some kind, 
i.e. a temporal interval that is larger than the immediately preceding 
ones, a sound that is significantly different from the immediately 
preceding sounds or a halt in a continuous change. Events that are 
                                                                    
27 Another remarkable resemblance is that between the trichotomy musical text – 
story – fabula and Charles Sanders Peirce’s trichotomy Firstness – Secondness – 
Thirdness. Peirce gives the following description of these categories: “First is the 
conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the 
conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. 
Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and a second are brought into 
relation” (1891: 32). Firstness thus is the first moment of observation, of being 
aware of something, and can be defined by the monad P(x), which describes an 
entity x that just is. Perceptible sounds can be considered such an entity. Secondness 
comprises the bringing into relation of x with an entity y. Therefore, it requires a 
relation R(x, y). A musical event x that is related to an other musical event y can 
thus be considered an instance of Secondness. Thirdness, lastly, requires the triadic 
relation M(x, y, z), which describes how an entity x mediates two entities y and z. An 
example of this relation is the memorial trace x, that relates the listener y to the 
musical piece z that has been listened to. 
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constituted by the first principle can be considered as a transition from 
a state wherein sounds start to be close together in time to a state where 
this is no longer the case. Following the second principle, events are 
considered to be a transition from a state wherein sounds begin to 
resemble each other to a state where this resemblance is fading. Events 
that are constituted by the third principle, lastly, can be considered a 
transition from a state of beginning continuity to a state where this 
continuity no longer takes place.28 
Location is one of the other elements of the fabula that can be 
elaborated into a story. Bal argues that location can be articulated with 
the aspect of space. In principle, location can be deduced from every 
narrative. Events have to happen somewhere, and therefore, when the 
narrative does not explicitly state the location where the events happen, 
the reader will supply one (214-215). Earlier, I defined musical space 
as the demonstration and/or manipulation of the placement of musical 
events in the stereo or surround image. Musical space makes the 
placement of musical events explicit, whereas in musical location this 
placement remains implicit, i.e. it is not manipulated or thematized. 
Hence, space and location both can be regarded as the placement of 
sounds and/or musical events in the stereo or surround image. Space is 
the explicit demonstration and/or manipulation of this placement. 
Location, on the other hand, is the placement of sounds and/or events, 
which remains implicit. 
The Characteristics of a Musical Actor 
Bal defines an actor as an agent that performs actions, as a function 
that causes or experiences events. A musical actor therefore can be 
defined as the musical parameter or parameters that cause closures, i.e. 
the musical parameter(s) that create(s) musical events. After all, an 
event is not complete until it has reached some kind of closure, and it is 
closure that makes the listener recognize the events and its 
organization in music. As a result, a musical actor can be a temporal 
interval that is larger than the immediately preceding ones, a 
significantly different sound or an ending of a continuous change. At 
the same time, a musical actor also can be the musical parameter(s) 
that change(s) during a musical event, since an actor not only can 
cause, but also can experience events. In this case the musical actor 
consists of those musical elements that are governed by the principle or 
principles by which the sounds are grouped. 
To give an example of the way musical actors can be identified in a 
musical composition, I would like to refer back to my analysis of 
                                                                    
28 This characterization of musical events again demonstrates that the constitution of 
the representation of these events generally depends on some kind of temporal 
development, as I argued above. 
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Lachenmann’s Second String Quartet. In this piece, it is the tension 
between conventional and unconventional musical sounds that creates 
a sense of coherence. The closures in this piece are thus constituted by 
the changes in timbre as well as by (sudden) differences in dynamics, 
rather than through harmonic or melodic changes. Therefore, the 
majority of the musical events are represented by timbral and dynamic 
changes, not by harmony or melody. This implies that the principal 
musical actors in this piece are the musical parameters timbre and 
dynamics, for these are the parameters that both create musical events 
and are the parameters that change during the musical events in this 
composition. Consequently, in “Reigen seliger Geister,” timbre and 
dynamics are the principal musical actors that both cause and 
experiences events.29 
In Lachenmann’s piece the principal actors are so-called secondary 
musical parameters, namely timbre and dynamics. Yet, this does not 
mean that primary musical parameters such as pitch and rhythm never 
function as principal actors in contemporary (atonal) musical 
narratives, as will be apparent in some of the analyses in this study. 
Likewise, in tonal musical narratives both primary and secondary 
musical parameters can function as principal actors. 
Defining a musical actor as I did above avoids the risk of sketching 
an anthropomorphic image of this function, a risk other theorists are 
willing to take. Tarasti, for instance, contends that modalization, the 
process that humanizes and anthropomorphizes music, in order to be 
able to unite music with the sphere of human values, is an essential 
element in the interpretation of music (1994: 72). He argues that 
through modalization, the listener assigns to musical phrases 
characteristics like “will,” “know,” “can” and “must.” With the aid of 
these characteristics the listener can follow the “story” the music is 
telling. 
In Karl’s discussion of the musical actor, which he names “role,” 
“will” also is a central notion. Karl purposefully gives an 
anthropomorphic account of the musical actor. He contends that “[…] 
roles do not represent independent characters, but should be 
understood as abstract personifications of opposing forces, 
impressions, and structures within the psyche of the persona” (1997: 
23). This is all in line with his conception of functional plot, and with 
actantial models, such as Greimas’s. He then continues to define the 
terms protagonist and antagonist, and relates these to the notion of 
persona. He defines persona as follows: “[A] particular composition 
will likely not correspond to any particular sequence of mental events, 
                                                                    
29 In Meelberg (2004a), I integrate this interpretation of the musical actor in 
Lachenmann’s string quartet within the analysis of this piece given at the beginning 
of this chapter.  
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either real or imaginary, but to an idealized fiction of mental life 
unfolding in the mind of an unspecified persona” (16-17, emphasis in 
original). A musical work, Karl argues, is not a representation of what 
goes on in a real person’s mind. One should rather regard music as 
something unreal, a fictitious entity. This entity, however, can be 
located somewhere, namely in the mind of a fictitious character, or 
persona, as Karl calls it. This persona is not an abstract listener, but a 
character that lives through the fictitious mental events represented by 
the music. This musical representation is established with the aid of the 
elements called protagonist and antagonist: “The element designated as 
the protagonist embodies the persona’s will to action and the seat of its 
identity, and for this reason it is the elements to which the fortunes of 
the persona are most closely linked. It is largely true, therefore, that as 
the protagonist fares, so too fares the persona” (23). The protagonist 
can thus be regarded as the persona’s driving force. The protagonist is 
the musical element that comes from the protagonist itself and sets its 
mind, and therefore the music, in action. The persona is not influenced 
by the protagonist only, though: 
 
The two terms [persona and protagonist] are not interchangeable […] since 
the persona’s experience encompasses all of the work’s forces and actions 
both fair and foul, while the term protagonist denotes only the material of 
the principal theme […] The antagonistic motive might be understood as the 
persona’s mental representation of an extrapersonal force or as some aspect 
of the self perceived as foreign or inimical to the persona’s interests. (23)  
 
While the protagonist is the initial intrapersonal motivator, the 
antagonist is an extrapersonal counterforce, often even a hostile one. It 
is the element that complicates the mental life of the persona, but it is 
at the same time a guarantee that the music does not just end after 
stating the protagonist. The fact that the antagonist enters into 
discussion with the protagonist, and thus with the persona’s 
motivation, ensures a prolongation of the music.30 
It is obvious that Karl does not try to hide the fact that he is giving 
an anthropomorphic account of the musical actor. Although these 
actors are not independent characters, they serve as personifications of 
forces that drive and hinder a persona. The fact that Karl himself 
speaks about personifications already hints at an anthropomorphic 
account. And one cannot deny that a persona is an anthropomorphic 
character, a character that has drives and that encounters setbacks 
while mentally acting out those drives. Karl, however, does not see any 
harm in describing musical actors as he does, since he claims that, in 
music criticism, 
 
                                                                    
30 I will discuss this “delaying of the musical ending” in greater detail in chapter 4.  
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[…] it is a common practice to refer to the principal theme of a movement, 
particularly a movement in sonata form, as its protagonist, and nearly as 
common to use the term antagonist or some equivalent to refer to elements 
at odds with the principal material. (19) 
 
However, such an account might not be abstract enough, in the sense 
that this account might be too much an act of anthropomorphic 
interpretation. To analyze a musical piece in such an anthropomorphic 
fashion implies that one restricts oneself to a large extent. In doing so, 
one cannot allow the music to “speak back,” to paraphrase Bal. By 
trying to fit every musical piece into the same anthropomorphic mold, 
many elements that are characteristic for that piece have to be 
disregarded. The end result might be that every musical analysis 
resembles any other and that the uniqueness of a musical piece is not, 
or inadequately, represented in the analysis of this piece.31 
Above, I remarked that the musical equivalent of “character,” which 
is the actor provided with distinctive characteristics, so that it can 
function as a anthropomorphic figure the narrator tells about, cannot be 
discussed until after a definition of musical actor is given. Now that I 
have given this definition, the question is whether or not a musical 
actor is a basic element that on the level of story can be seen as 
character. In my definition of a musical actor, i.e. the musical 
parameter or parameters that cause closures and the musical 
parameter(s) that change(s) during a musical event, there is room for 
such an interpretation. Suppose a musical event consists of a sound 
that, at a given moment t1, has a certain pitch, and at time t2 changes 
pitch. The musical actor then is the parameter itself, i.e. pitch, while 
the musical character is the changing of that pitch. Hence, the musical 
actor is the parameter, but otherwise unspecified, whereas the musical 
character consists of that parameter plus the values assigned to that 
parameter. In this view, both musical actor and character retain the 
basic characteristics Bal assigns to these functions, i.e. a function that 
causes or experiences events, and character seen as an actor provided 
with distinctive characteristics, respectively. Any anthropomorphic 
reference, though, is avoided. 
Duration in Minimal and Other Music 
Time is a very, if not the most, important characteristic of narrative. 
Bal distinguishes time from the temporal aspects of sequence, 
frequency and rhythm. Events in the fabula happen during a certain 
                                                                    
31 To a certain extent, all analyses ignore many characteristics of the object due to 
the method of analysis chosen. It is therefore of great importance to choose a 
method that “fits” the object, i.e. a method that allows those characteristics of the 
object to come out, of which the analyst believes are valuable to discuss (see also 
the preface to this study). 
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period of time and they occur in a certain order. Both the duration of 
events and the order in which these events occur can be altered on the 
level of story. 
There are two kinds of duration, Bal explains: crisis, which is a short 
time span into which events have been compressed; and development, 
a longer period of time, which, unsurprisingly, shows a development 
(1997: 208-209). Bal recognizes several implications in regard to the 
occurrence of either crisis or development: a development may present, 
in historical order, as much material as seems fit, whereas a crisis 
implies a restriction, since only a brief period is presented. Bal 
however stresses the fact that also a development needs selection. 
Choices always have to be made. Moreover, in a development, global 
significance is built up slowly from the strings of events, while in crisis 
the significance is central (210-211). 
According to many theorists, duration is a notion that is 
problematized in minimal music. Tarasti, for instance, argues that 
 
[m]inimalist works are […] objectifications of series of “now” moments. 
They represent pure durativity in the sense that they have neither beginning 
nor end, and, in fact, no temporal articulation. (1994: 285) 
 
In Tarasti’s view, minimal music does not express any tension, and 
thus does not articulate musical events. There is no sense of beginning 
or ending, just a seemingly infinite continuation. Tarasti therefore 
concludes that minimal music is not narrative. Pasler argues along the 
same lines; she states that “[…] there is no tension inherent in [the] 
openings [of minimal works], no peripety in the middle, and the 
transformations these works undergo is little other than the gradual 
unfolding of an objective process” (1989: 246). Pasler thus does not 
recognize in minimal music a necessity for this music to develop from 
a certain starting point to a certain goal. In her view, there is no 
representation of musical causation taking place in this music, and no 
expectation is aroused by it. Instead, the music represents a “gradual 
unfolding of an objective process.” With this last phrase, Pasler seems 
to presuppose that non-minimal music represents in some way a 
subjective process, but she does not elaborate this notion of objectivity. 
She seems to refer to the characterization many listeners give of 
minimal music, i.e. it being sterile, non-emotional or dispassionate, in 
contrast to music that is regarded as being full of emotions or 
passions.32 Her use of the term “objectivity” does not refer to the 
representation of musical processes alone, but rather to the 
                                                                    
32 In my view, however, many minimal works do have a strong emotional content 
and are anything other than sterile or emotionless. Moreover, I have no idea how to 
define “objective” music. 
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interpretation of musical works as a whole. Yet, one could argue that 
qualifying music as sterile is far from an objective interpretation. 
Pasler regards Steve Reich’s Piano Phase (1967), a minimal work 
for two pianos (or two marimbas), as a composition that lacks any 
tonal or thematic dialectic, and whose notes proceed continuously 
through repetition, addition and subtraction of the musical pattern, 
“[…] but without conflict or interruption, direction or goals” (1989: 
247). Both she and Tarasti argue that in this and other minimal 
compositions, the listener does not have anything musical to 
remember, that s/he cannot “look back” to musical moments that have 
already been. Instead, the music forces the listener to pay attention to 
the musical present only (Pasler 1989: 247; Tarasti 1994: 285). 
Piano Phase, however, does have a well-defined structure. It 
consists of three parts, in which a similar process is represented, albeit 
in different variations. The piece begins with piano 1 playing a twelve-
note motif – motif 1, which actually consists of two six-note phrases. 
Motif 1 is played 4-8 times, while the exact amount is left to the 
discretion of the player, as with all the repeats in this composition. 
Then, piano 2 fades in while playing the same motif 1, and together 
pianos 1 and 2 play motif 1 12-18 times. After that, piano 1 continues 
playing motif 1 in the same tempo during 4-16 repeats, while piano 2 
plays the motif slightly faster, until the moment that motif 1 starts on 
the second note relative to piano 1. From that moment on, during 16-24 
repeats, piano 1 plays motif 1 in the normal way, while piano 2 plays 
the same motif, but starting on the second and ending on the first note 
(ex. 2.7). 
 
 
 
Example 2.7. Steve Reich, Piano Phase, bars 1-3. 
Steve Reich "Piano Phase" © 1980 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 16156 
 
This alternation of acceleration and ending on the next note of motif 
1 in piano 2, while piano 1 plays the motif in its normal fashion and in 
a constant tempo, is executed twelve times in total, so that every note 
of the motif has acted as the first note. The twelfth time the motif in 
piano 2 again starts on the first note, during 4-8 repeats, while fading 
out. Finally, piano 1 plays motif 1 4-8 times, while piano 2 remains 
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silent. With this phrase the representation of the process, and therefore 
part one of the piece, has been completed. This process can be 
described as the exposition of a motif in a voice, which after several 
repeats is doubled by a second voice, which periodically shifts relative 
to the first voice, until the motif in the second voice regains its original 
shape. It then slowly fades out, while in the first voice the original 
motif continues. 
In part two of the piece this process is again represented, but with a 
different motif and ending. Here, piano 1 plays an eight-note motif – 
motif 2, which consists of notes 1-6, 9 and 12 of motif 1. After 6-8 
repeats, piano 2 joins piano 1 while fading in, playing a different eight-
note motif – motif 3. Pianos 1 and 2 play these motifs together 16-32 
times. After that, piano 2 accelerates very slightly during 6-18 repeats 
of motif 2 in piano 1, and ends with playing motif 3, but starting on the 
second note. Piano 2 plays motif 3 in this way against motif 2 in piano 
1 during 16-32 repeats. Here too, the alternation of acceleration and 
ending on the next note of the motif in piano 2 is executed repeatedly, 
but now eight times, thus, in the eighth time motif 3 is played in its 
original form against motif 2. These motifs are played together in their 
original form during 8-24 repeats, while piano 1 fades out. Piano 2 
alone finally plays motif 3 8-16 times and therewith concludes part two 
of the piece. 
Part three both has a different beginning and ending as compared to 
part one. Piano 2 continues by playing the first two notes of motif 3, 
one time only, and then by playing a new four-note motif – motif 4, 
that actually consists of notes 3-6 of motif 3. Motif 4 is played 8-24 
times by piano 2. Next, piano 1 fades in while playing motif 4 together 
with piano 2 during 24-48 repeats. Piano 2 then again accelerates 
slightly during 16-32 repeats of motif 4 in piano 1, until motif 4 starts 
on the second note. The alternation of acceleration and ending on the 
next note of the motif in piano 2 is executed four times. The last time, 
motif 4 is played in its original form in piano 2 against the same motif 
in piano 1. They play the motif in this way 24-48 times and then stop 
together, which marks both the ending of part three and of the piece as 
a whole. 
In this study, the working definition of a narrative is that it is the 
representation of a temporal development. If we want to regard Piano 
Phase as being narrative, we have to ask ourselves whether or not both 
the process that is represented in this piece and the varied repetition of 
this representation is a temporal development. Pasler clearly thinks it is 
not, since she argues that this piece has no direction or goal. Tarasti 
thinks so, too, for he states that 
 
[m]inimal music rejects temporal segmentation and traditional functions of 
musical time: in this music one can no longer distinguish among beginning, 
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end, introduction, or other temporal functions of music. Here music really 
has become a machine that stops time. (1994: 284) 
 
This statement, however, does not hold for Piano Phase, since the 
segmentation in this piece, as I described above, is clearly audible (at 
least as it is perfomed by Nurit Tilles and Edmund Niemann, pianos, 
on the recording released by Nonesuch 79451-2). One can distinguish 
the beginning of each part, for at the beginning a motif is introduced 
and joined by a second voice. The ending of each process, too, can be 
easily distinguished: the music thins out until the original motif is 
sounding alone.  
It seems that Tarasti himself, too, is not really convinced of his own 
statement, since, on the same page where the above statement can be 
found, he writes: 
 
In general, the influence of musical time, that almost imperceptible presque-
rien, is present in musical form in absentia. It influences from behind the 
scenes, and a composer can use it as a strategy for the timing of musical 
events. Nevertheless, in Reich’s music this temporal process has been made 
present. Reich aims for perfect audibility of musical form and is not 
fascinated by hidden musical structures. (284, emphasis in original) 
 
Now Tarasti contends that in Reich’s music temporality is a prominent 
element. Moreover, according to Tarasti, Reich attempts to make 
musical form perfectly audible. But how can one make musical form 
audible, when the listener cannot distinguish a beginning, end, 
introduction or other temporal musical functions in minimal music, 
such as Reich’s, as Tarasti also argues? It seems as if Tarasti is 
contradicting himself here, or that he does not regard Reich’s music as 
minimal music. 
A possible explanation for this contradiction is the role repetition 
plays in minimal music. Due to its repetitive character, minimal music 
might at the same time deny and put central the notion of temporality. 
Musical repetition implies a halt with regard to the representation of a 
temporal development, but it does not imply a halt in the representation 
of movement. Repetition does not give the impression of the music 
standing still. One just has to listen to contemporary electronic dance 
music such as house or techno to become convinced of this. This kind 
of dance music is very repetitive, but does at the same time represent a 
fierce movement. And since movement necessarily has to happen in 
time, it is closely tied to temporality. Perhaps it is in this sense that 
Tarasti considers minimal music to be a perfect representation of 
musical form, with musical form being musical temporality. But 
according to Tarasti, repetitive music does reject temporal 
segmentation and thus the traditional function of musical time. 
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Furthermore, Tarasti remarks that, since repetition is such a 
dominant characteristic in minimal works, it does not function as it 
does in conventional narrative: 
 
[W]hat is essential in repetitive music is that the principle of repetition has 
shifted to the position of the dominant idea of a work of art. Thus it no 
longer performs the task assigned to it by the Russian Formalists, that of 
producing surprise. The crucial artistic device now becomes the slightest 
change in the redundancy created by repetition. (1994: 284) 
 
Instead of repetition being a marked term, in minimal music it becomes 
the unmarked term, whereas the deviation from repetition becomes the 
marked term. In Piano Phase, the accelerations and the changing from 
one to two voices, and vice versa, can be considered to be the marked 
terms. Tarasti acknowledges the fact that minimal music can represent 
marked terms, or crucial artistic devices as he calls them, whereas 
Pasler is not convinced of this. She argues that minimal music cannot 
represent conflict or interruption (1989: 247). But without conflict or 
interruption no marked term can be represented, as I will discuss in 
detail in the next chapter. Moreover, Tarasti disagrees with himself: he 
denies the possibility of hearing any segmentation in repetitive music, 
but as soon as marked terms can be distinguished, and Tarasti argues 
that this is also possible in minimal music, segmentation takes place. 
Only music in which no marked terms are distinguishable has no 
recognizable segmentation, which is, as I outlined above, not the case 
in Piano Phase. If we disregard the repeats, this piece would consist of 
57 bars, and in 56 of those a new, clearly distinguishable, event is 
represented (the first and last bar of part one are identical). The fabula 
of Piano Phase, if this piece were to be regarded as being narrative, 
thus contains 56 events, and with the aid of repetition this fabula is 
elaborated into a story. The piece could actually comply with the 
definition of narrative, if the represented processes were temporal 
developments. My contention is that this is indeed the case.  
Above, I argued that in Piano Phase the beginning and ending of 
each process is clearly audible. Disregarding the repeats, in between 
the beginning and the ending one can hear a distinct development. It is 
because of the repeats that this development is less distinct, but that 
does not mean that with repetition the processes are no longer temporal 
developments. Rather, repetition in Piano Phase functions as a means 
to delay the ending of the piece, and not so much functions as what 
Tarasti calls the dominant idea of this work. Instead, the accelerations 
of one voice against an unchanging second voice, as well as the 
resulting phase shifts between these voices, constitute the principal 
idea. It is only one conflict, i.e. the acceleration of one voice against an 
unchanging second voice, which is represented in different contexts. 
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This conflict and its various representations are compressed into a 
short time span in the fabula, viz. the 57 bars mentioned above. If this 
piece would not make use of repeats and instead would just be a 
representation of this fabula, the execution of the piece would only 
take a mere 72 seconds, instead of the twenty minutes Piano Phase 
lasts.33 Therefore, I propose to regard Piano Phase as the 
representation of a crisis – the single conflict described above – that, 
with the aid of repetition, is elaborated into a story. These repetitions 
do not stop the representation of movement, but they do delay the 
unfolding of the crisis in its various contexts, and thus delay the 
representation of the temporal development. 
Piano Phase is a musical narrative. It can be considered as a 
representation of a temporal development, and it thus complies with 
the basic definition of narrative. Furthermore, in addition to complying 
with the basic definition of narrative, narrative elements such as 
musical actors (texture, i.e. the sounding together of the two pianos) 
and musical fabula can be identified in the piece.  
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that many musical pieces comply 
with this study’s working definition of narrative, i.e. it being the 
representation of a temporal development. All music, even the shortest 
piece, is temporal, and some musical works can be regarded as 
implying some kind of development. Many musical works elicit 
expectations, by giving the impression that musical events lead to or 
cause other events. Yet, there exists no real physical causation in 
music. It is the listener who interprets musical events as wanting to 
lead to other events, which amounts to musical expectation. Hence, 
music represents tension and resolution, rather than actually being 
tense (unstable) or resolved (stable). This interplay of tension and 
resolution results in the representation of a development. As a 
consequence, many musical pieces can be regarded as representations 
of a temporal development, and thus as being narrative.  
But, if musical narrativity is possible, and the above description of 
musical narrative is correct, this could imply that many, if not most, 
musical works are narrative. And if so, would this not make the 
category of musical narrative useless, as for instance Carolyn Abbate 
(1991) argues? Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam remarks in this respect: 
                                                                    
33 The indicated tempo of Piano Phase is 72 dotted quarter notes per minute, which 
makes 432 sixteenth notes per minute. Part one consists of 27 bars with 12 sixteenth 
notes each, which makes 324 sixteenth notes in total. Part two consists of 19 bars 
times 8 sixteenth notes, which makes 152 sixteenth notes. Part three has one bar 
containing two sixteenth notes plus 10 bars times 4 sixteenth notes, which makes 42 
sixteenth notes. The piece as a whole, without repeats, thus consists of 518 sixteenth 
notes. The tempo is 432 sixteenth notes per minute, which means that the total 
duration of the piece without repeats is: 518 divided by 432, which equals 72 
seconds. 
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Is there a danger in having a very extensive paradigm of musical narratives 
and a very small number of pieces that can be categorized as non-narrative? 
I don’t sense the danger Abbate warns about. In fact, there is nothing 
negative in the supposed “interpretational promiscuity” of the term, because 
“narrative” is not the end or the conclusion of any analysis or interpretation. 
On the contrary – it is just the beginning. To ask, as does Abbate […], 
whether or not a composition is “narrative,” as though that were the final 
goal of analysis, is a rather unfruitful and somewhat strange line of inquiry. 
The parallel in literary criticism would be to declare a certain 
literary/fictional text or passage thereof as narrative, and to shut off the 
inquiry at that point […] the really interesting questions regarding narrative 
are qualitative: how the narrative is constructed, how its boundaries are 
defined, how it is mediated. (1997: 137-138) 
 
The category of narrative literature is not rendered useless because all 
novels belong to this category. Moreover, analysis does not stop with 
the recognition that music belongs to a certain category. The 
categorization of music as narrative, as well as the identification of 
narrative elements in the music, is not an aim in itself. It is only the 
beginning of a more profound analysis of a musical piece. It is the 
foundation, the starting point, of a deeper analysis of a musical piece, 
deeper in the sense that the analysis goes beyond the mere labeling of 
musical elements. Analysis can be more than just a description of a 
given object – which labeling comes down to. Through analysis we 
might be able to articulate the potentialities of a given object, i.e. 
expose the many different ways an object may invite the observer to 
experience this object. 
And this is what my intention is in this study: investigating the 
narrative potentialities of a musical composition. Thus, I do not only 
try to determine whether or not a given piece can be regarded as a 
narrative. Rather, I aim at giving an account of what it means for a 
musical work to be narrative. In the next chapter I will do this by 
discussing the function of temporality within a musical narrative. 
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3 TENSE 
Musical Time, Musical Tense? 
A piece of music manifests itself in time. It needs a certain amount of 
time in order to let it be able to present itself to the listener. A spectator 
of a non-temporal work of art, such as a painting, also needs time to be 
able to look at and interpret the art work, but the object itself does not 
need time to unfold its presence. At every instance in time a non-
temporal artwork is exposed in its entirety to the spectator. Every 
moment a spectator looks at such a work it is completely visible. 
However, as Bal (1999) shows in her analyses of some of Caravaggio’s 
paintings, the viewer might be “guided” through the painting by the 
painting itself. In that case, the reading of such a work of art, a work 
that in itself is non-temporal, becomes a temporal process. Moreover, it 
can take a lot of time before the spectator gains any insight in a visual 
work of art, but that does not change the fact that the work as a 
perceptible object is always completely available.1 Conversely, to 
perceive a piece of music in its entirety takes as much time as the piece 
requires to be performed. 
Because music is a temporal art, this medium is an excellent 
candidate for representing a temporal development, and thus to be 
narrative. Richard Klein remarks that “[m]usic represents time as a 
medium in which both the inner historicity of subjective existence and 
the history of the external natural world reside.”2 Music represents the 
temporality both of the personal subjectivity of the listener and of 
natural processes, and these two temporalities are united in music. 
According to Klein, subjective time, the time as experienced by the 
listener, is measured against objective time, the time as indicated by 
our clocks, and vice versa. Albert Mayr seeks an explanation for this 
characteristic of music. He considers music to be a powerful Zeitgeber, 
i.e. an environmental factor that determines the temporal 
characteristics in the behavior of organisms (1993: 81). He remarks 
                                                                    
1 I realize that this is, to a certain extent, a gross generalization; the viewer cannot 
perceive many visual works in one instant because this is not possible physically, 
such as installation artworks and labyrinths. But this does not alter the fact that such 
works of art, too, are always completely present at any instance of time, in contrast 
to art forms such as film and music. 
2 “Musik bringt Zeit als ein Medium zur Darstellung, in dem sich die innere 
Historizität subjektiver Existenz und der geschichtliche Naturraum der Welt 
gemeinsam befinden.” (Klein 2000: 62, my translation) By using the term “reside” 
(“befinden”), Klein seems to give an essentialist account of music, which might not 
be desirable. Music might be able represent subjective and historic time, but does 
not actually contain these forms of time. 
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that “[…] until not so long ago, sound was the privileged medium 
through which we perceived (or were made to perceive) many natural 
and social temporalities in the environment” (88). Through sound 
human beings are made aware of the temporal nature of natural and 
social phenomena. Music has the ability to mark out time, too, since 
music consists of a succession of sounds. As I explained in the 
previous chapter, this succession can give the listener the impression 
that the music is moving forward, which in reality it does not. Yet it is 
the impression of this forward motion, and the expectations this 
impression of movement generates, that enables music to mark out 
time. In that chapter I concluded that we might call this impression 
musical development, which at the same time can be regarded as a 
temporal development.3  
In this chapter I will discuss the relation between the representation 
of temporality in musical and verbal narrative, in order to see whether 
or not there are crucial differences between the two. Abbate, for 
instance, argues that, because music cannot represent a past tense, 
music cannot be narrative. She states that “[…] musical works have no 
ability to narrate in the most basic literary sense; that is, to posit a 
narrating survivor of the tale who speaks of it in the past tense” (1989: 
230). I will elaborate my doubts regarding Abbate’s usage of the term 
“narrating survivor” later in this chapter. For now I just want to point 
out that, by referring to the narrator as “survivor,” Abbate seems to 
suggest that a narrator always is character bound. Moreover, it is a 
special kind of character-bound narrator, namely one that has lived 
through a particular experience and tells the reader or listener about it. 
Abbate does not seem to acknowledge the possibility of an external 
narrator. And thus she can claim that, because music does not posit a 
narrating survivor, the representation of temporality in music is not 
compatible with the representation of temporality in narrative:  
 
Does music have a past tense? Can it express the pastness all literary 
narrative accomplishes by use of past or preterit verb tenses, “it was early 
spring, and the second day of our journey.” To linger over “was” as opposed 
to “is” is to exclude music from the canon of narrative genres. (228) 
 
But a painting also presents itself as “now,” just as music does. 
Nevertheless, many pictures can be read in a narrative manner (see for 
instance Bal and Bryson 1991: 202-206). Moreover, Abbate argues that 
this pastness tells us that there is a narrator, whereas in music, in 
which, in her view, the time of telling is the time being told about, the 
narrator is absent (1989: 228). However, as I have shown in the 
                                                                    
3 With “musical development” I do not refer to the second part of the sonata form, 
but rather to a development that is noticeable in music. 
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previous chapter, a musical narrator can be pointed out in music, 
regardless whether the musical story is told in the past or otherwise. 
In regard to Abbate’s view the following questions arise: (1) Can we 
speak of a past tense in music? (2) Does narrating in the most basic 
literary sense indeed imply the positing of what Abbate calls a 
“narrating survivor” who necessarily speaks of the narrative in the past 
tense? (3) Is the representation of a past tense a necessary condition for 
narrativity? In order to address these questions, I discuss the temporal 
nature of music and relate the outcomes of this discussion to the way 
temporality is represented in verbal narrative. More specifically, I 
relate these outcomes to Susan Fleischman’s theory of temporal 
markedness in narrative. She presents comprehensive ideas about the 
relation between tense and storytelling.  
Fleischman regards the use and the switching of tenses in narratives 
as a textual strategy for creating cohesion and signaling different levels 
within a story. She focuses especially on the grammatical category of 
tense as used in narrative, 
 
[…] and specifically on their nonreferential or pragmatic functions. While 
these functions are less obvious and less well understood than the basic 
referential or grammatical functions, an understanding of the pragmatics of 
tense-aspect usage is central to the broader objective that this book 
proposes: the development of a theory of tense in narrative. (1990: 1) 
 
Fleischman thus argues that the nonreferential and pragmatic use of 
tense in narrative differs from the use of tense in ordinary language. 
She contends that the basic function of tense in ordinary language is to 
establish the temporal location of situations predicated in a sentence or 
discourse, whereas in narrative discourse the function of tense is 
pragmatic in nature. “Pragmatic” is understood as 
 
[…] referring to all types of meaning dependent on context. Of primary 
concern here are, on the one hand, discourse context – the portion of 
discourse or text that surrounds a given sentence or sequence of sentences – 
as well as the nature of the text as a whole (narration, conversation, oratory), 
and, on the other, situation context – the communicative context or setting 
in which the text as a speech-act occurs. (3, emphasis in original) 
 
This means that in narrative the function of tense is to establish 
relations between parts of texts and the text in which these parts occur 
and between the text as a whole and the situation in which this text is 
related. The function of tense in narrative thus is not limited to having 
a referential meaning only. Rather, tense in narrative has a pragmatic 
function. Fleischman divides this function into organizing and 
expressive functions. These functions guarantee that a text is internally 
coherent, that it fits in the setting in which this text is communicated, 
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and that it can relate personal attitudes towards what is being talked 
about. According to Fleischman, specifically these pragmatic functions 
are the functions of tense that are exclusive to narrative (5-7). The 
principal claim she makes is that “[…] the specifically narrative 
functions of tense and aspect developed as motivated pragmatic 
responses to the conditions of narrative performance in interactive oral 
contexts” (7). The special use of tense in narrative, i.e. the pragmatic 
functions of tense, is the result of the oral roots of narration. 
With regard to oral storytelling Fleischman makes a remark that is 
particularly interesting from a musicological point of view: 
 
In oral cultures, the unfolding of narratives is not so much linear as circular: 
oral narrators frequently return to events previously narrated and re-present 
them such that new meanings emerge cumulatively through repetition. (13) 
 
According to Fleischman repetition is an important characteristic in 
oral storytelling, and through the retelling of events new meanings are 
attached to these events. Tarasti recognizes a similar phenomenon in 
music: 
 
One of the basic properties of the temporal course of music is its 
irreversibility. Because of this fact there is no symmetrical repetition in 
music at all, and even in simple ABA form, the second A differs from the 
first. A “second time” does not exist for the receiver of a musical intonation. 
(1994: 61-62) 
 
Musical events that appear for a second time cannot be interpreted in 
the same manner as the first appearance of this event. One cannot erase 
that what has sounded between an event and its repetition, and these 
sounds influence the meaning attached to the second appearance of the 
event, just as in oral storytelling. 
Since repetition seems to be such an important characteristic in oral 
narration, it is all the more remarkable that repetition is considered 
problematic in musical narrativity: 
 
Recapitulations and other extended formal repetitions have posed a 
perennial dilemma for narrative and stage-dramatic accounts of musical 
structures because the architectonic requirements they satisfy in music have 
no counterparts in narrative literature or drama. Consequently, musically 
satisfying repetitions are often found to be dramatically superfluous, and 
have been discounted, rationalized, or simply left unacknowledged for in 
interpretations of musical plot. (Karl 1997: 27)  
 
Although it is doubtful whether repetitions indeed have no literary or 
dramatic equivalent, as Karl argues, it definitely has a counterpart in 
oral narration. Therefore, Fleischman’s account for the occurrence of 
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repetition in oral storytelling can at the same time serve as an account 
for the occurrence of musically satisfying repetitions in musical 
narratives. For oral narrators frequently return to previously narrated 
events as well, and re-present them such that new meanings emerge 
cumulatively through repetition.4 
A last function of tense in narrative that Fleischman recognizes is a 
metalinguistic function. With this function a language can talk about 
itself, it can signal a particular style, register, genre or type of 
language. “For languages that have an explicit narrative morphology,” 
Fleischman argues, “at least one function of this morphology is 
metalinguistic: it identifies a discourse” (6). This metalinguistic 
function is closely linked to the pragmatic functions described above, 
since it identifies a discourse and therefore establishes a relation 
between the text and the situation in which the text occurs. Thus, tense 
in narrative is not only used to represent time (the referential function), 
but also to establish relations between parts of texts and to relate texts 
to other texts (the pragmatic function) and discourses (the 
metalinguistic function). 
In music, too, relations with other musical texts and discourses can 
be established. A musical phrase may refer to another phrase within the 
same composition, by copying the shape of a phrase, for instance, or to 
another musical composition (the pragmatic function), or to musical 
genres or traditions (the metalinguistic function). Rokus de Groot even 
argues that music can refer to different time worlds:  
 
[In music] [t]here is an aspect of chronology, like in the relation between 
“archaic” or “primeval” (e.g., nature in its pristine state like in the 
Introduction to [Richard Wagner’s] Das Rheingold) and “present-day” (the 
latter being more evidently tied to the musical idiom current at the time of 
composition). (2001: 123) 
 
References to time worlds can be established by the juxtaposition of 
contemporary musical idioms and ideas about the past or future that are 
expressed in music. These ideas often have a mythical foundation and 
therefore these time worlds are fictitious. Regarding nineteenth-century 
music, for instance, De Groot remarks that “[t]he idea of an opposition 
between a world of ‘being’ and non-progressivity, and a world of 
‘becoming’ and progressivity becomes audible in the harmonic 
contrast between drone-based music and highly modulatory music” 
(123). The past is considered as being non-progressive, and therefore 
represented by non-progressive music, De Groot argues, whereas the 
present equals progression and therefore is represented by music that is 
harmonically complex. 
                                                                    
4 In the next chapter I will discuss musical repetition in more detail. 
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However interesting the idea of music referring to different time 
worlds might be, especially since it would allow us to speak of a 
musical past, present and future, it cannot really be considered to be a 
musical equivalent of tense in narrative. Although this kind of temporal 
reference would comply with a metalinguistic function of tense, I 
would not consider it to be a musical equivalent of tense just because 
of this compliance. For the pragmatic and metalinguistic functions of 
tense might be unique to narrative, the relations established by these 
functions can also be created by means other than tense. Citations, 
choice of words, or the emulation of a style, for instance, can also 
function as means to relate a text to other texts. In short: tense in 
narrative might imply relations between texts and other texts and 
discourses, but the existence of these relations in narrative does not 
necessarily imply tense. Likewise the existence of relations between 
musical texts and other musical texts, genres or time worlds (in short: 
intertextuality) does not necessarily imply musical tense. 
There is, however, at least one tense that music can express, namely 
the present. Music can only present itself in the “now,” as David 
Clarke remarks: “An essential aspect of the relationship between 
perception and time is that the former, strictly defined, can take place 
only in the present” (1989: 113). Therefore, music always unfolds 
itself in the present. Yet Fleischman remarks that the present tense, the 
tense that is most frequently used in everyday language, has an “anti-
narrative” function (1990: 6). This would imply that music ultimately 
is antinarrative. A paradox arises here, for on the one hand music, 
considered as unfolding in the present, is anti-narrative, but on the 
other hand music is a very appropriate means to represent time, and 
thus to be narrative, precisely because it is present in a continuing 
present.  
But why is this continuing presence in the present so appropriate to 
represent time? According to Günter Figal, time exactly is the 
concatenation of the present, it is “its decomposition into different 
steps and stages; it is the modification of presence into the past, present 
and future, and only to be recognized as such on the ground of this 
uniform presence.”5 Presence, which always resides in the present, is 
the means by which time can be perceived. Past and future can only be 
recognized when there is a present, a now. There can be no time 
without a present. This is why music is a powerful Zeitgeber, since, as 
Clarke contends, listening to music takes place in a continuing present, 
which means that music acts as a perpetual supplier of temporal 
reference points. 
                                                                    
5 “[…] ihr Auseinanderlegen in verschiedene Schritte und Stadien; sie ist die 
Modifikation von Präsenz in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft und als solche 
nur auf dem Grund einheitlicher Präsenz zu erkennen.” (Figal 2000: 16, my 
translation) 
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But, as Clarke himself remarks, only in a strict sense music exists 
only in the present. Edward A. Lippman argues similarly. He regards 
the existence of both a musical present, past and future as the most 
important characteristic of music: 
 
[T]he fundamental process that governs musical structure would seem to be 
one in which the patterns falling back into the past continue to be present 
either in images or in their influence on later perception. Music is a play of 
new patterns against older ones, a play in which an astonishingly close 
comparison of new with old permits the most various and subtle formal 
interrelationships. (1984: 140)  
 
Lippman describes the same process I elaborated in the previous 
chapter. A musical listening experience consists of the joint activity of 
the retention of past sounds, comparing these sounds to those that are 
sounding now, in the present, and predicting what will sound next, in 
the future. His remark that music is a play of new patterns against older 
ones presupposes, however, that music always allows for the 
representation of a before and after, a view that might not be shared by 
everyone. Svetlana Neytcheva, for instance, thinks otherwise: 
 
The only guarantee of [the] illusion [of time as an “image of time moving”] 
is in fact the stability of the earlier-simultaneously-later pattern. In music 
(especially in post-tonal music) this pattern is tested by any peculiar order of 
past-present-future events. “Destroying the illusion of time,” hence, is 
regarded as the result of this peculiar way (one can think of it as “the crux of 
creativity”) of ordering musical events and treating musical gestures. (2001: 
102)  
 
Neytcheva argues that the representation of a temporal development 
(“the illusion of time as an image of time moving”) is challenged by 
atonal music, since in this kind of music musical relations are 
problematized. Atonal contemporary music then would just be a 
presentation of a succession of “now” moments, instead of being, in 
the case of musical narrative, a representation of a temporal 
development. In her view the illusion of time can only be established 
by a certain ordering of events in the music, which correlates with 
Lippman’s account of musical listening. According to Neytcheva this 
ordering of musical events is 
 
[…] a kind of temporal structure based on the correspondence or 
overlapping of the past-present-future gestures and the simple order of 
earlier-simultaneously-later events, which principle is manifested through 
all musical devices involved. If the linear succession of now-moments in a 
given work is composed unequivocally as a linear and goal-directed 
movement, and there is no ambiguity as to past-present-future gestures 
being used in support to this movement, the illusion of time is the result. 
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This result – certainly in the case of tonal music – depends on the listener’s 
knowledge of certain conventions. (102)  
 
Representation of time in music can only be established when this 
music is unidirectional, and musical unidirectionality equals the 
possibility of distinguishing a past, present and future in music, which 
in part depends on the listener’s knowledge of musical conventions. 
But by explicitly distinguishing between tonal and atonal music 
Neytcheva seems to imply that only tonal music is capable of 
representing temporal development. If atonal music is indeed incapable 
of doing so, then Lippman’s suggestion that the existence of a musical 
present, past, and future is the most important characteristic of music 
has to be reconsidered, since, atonal music would lack this 
characteristic. Moreover, in that case I would have to rethink my 
assertion that contemporary music can represent a temporal 
development. 
Tonal, functional harmony gives tonal music a sense of direction and 
a goal, but this can also be constituted by means other than functional 
harmony. Yet Neytcheva regards atonal music as attempts at breaking 
the “illusion of time” in music, and in doing so eliminating the 
possibilities of representing a temporal development, exactly because 
this kind of music is not based on functional harmony. But music 
actualizes such representations not just through functional harmony, 
although that is a very efficient means. As I have argued in the 
previous chapter many musical pieces can be regarded as 
representations of events. A musical event can be represented either by 
sounds that are close together in time, that resemble each other, or that 
represent a continuing process. But in order to be able to represent such 
events, music has to be more than just a presentation of successive 
“now” moments. Rather, musical events are constituted by transitions 
from one state to another: an initial state consisting of the beginning of 
a process, and a second state being a closure of some kind, i.e. a 
temporal interval that is larger than the immediately preceding ones, a 
sound that is significantly different from the immediately preceding 
sounds or a halt in a continuous change. By contrasting new sounds 
with past sounds closures, and thus events, can be represented. These 
closures and events can be represented through functional harmony, 
but also by other means, as I have demonstrated in my analysis of 
Ligeti’s Désordre in chapter 2. This piece definitely is an atonal 
composition, but in this piece events and temporality are nevertheless 
represented. Therefore, this atonal piece does not distort the illusion of 
time, and a past, present, and future can still be sensed without making 
use of functional harmony. Désordre, being an atonal composition, is 
more than just a presentation of “now” moments. 
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While it can be said that music starts in the present, namely with the 
presentation of sounds, these sounds are subsequently regarded as 
belonging to a musical event. Sounds shift from belonging to a process 
– the succession of sounds – to belonging to a static group – the 
musical event. Therefore, at two different points in time, sounds can be 
interpreted differently; “[…] a phenomenological difference which in 
terms of time consciousness can only be described as an opposition 
between past and present” (Clarke 1989: 117). In the present a sound 
presents itself as part of a continuing process, an unfolding, whereas in 
the past a sound is part of the representation of an event. When a 
musical past would not exist music could not last, as David Burrows 
remarks: 
 
[T]he coupling of the flow of sounds with the attention of perceivers is 
controlled by the temporality of the sounds, and is therefore limited to a 
now whose content changes ceaselessly. Music takes place in its own almost 
total sonic absence. (1997: 529) 
 
The presentation of the flow of sounds is done in the present only, but 
experiencing these sounds as music, and thus recognizing the 
representation of musical events, can only be done in relation to the 
past. The contents of the musical present never stays the same and 
cannot be retained as such in the present. In sum: in music the relation 
between present and past equals the relation between perceptible 
sounds and represented events. 
This view on the musical present and past might be helpful in 
answering the question whether or not there is a musical equivalent of 
tense in narrative. Fleischman argues that tense is relational: tense 
establishes a relation between location time and reference time (1990: 
15), with the time of the narrator being reference time and location 
time the time of the events told (18). Can a similar distinction between 
location time and reference time be found in music? In the previous 
chapter I remarked that a narrator is an agent that relates a story in a 
particular medium, it is that agent that utters the signs that constitute 
the text. Likewise, a musical narrator is that agent that utters a 
succession of sounds by which a musical story, consisting of musical 
events, is related. The act of uttering a succession of sounds takes place 
in the present, for, as I already remarked, music always unfolds in the 
present. Therefore, the musical storytelling is done in the present, and 
thus reference time in musical narrative is the present in which the 
music presents itself. Location time, then, can be considered to be the 
time in which musical sounds are part of the representation of musical 
events, which is the past. As a result, because tense establishes a 
relation between reference time and location time, musical tense is 
supposed to establish a relation between the unfolding of musical 
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sounds and the representation of events, that is, between the musical 
present and the musical past. 
The Discrete Musical Past Versus the Continuous 
Sounding Present 
To answer the question what musical tense exactly is, we have to ask 
in which manner the relation between the unfolding of musical sounds 
and the representation of events is established. Therefore, the question 
I want to focus on now is in what way a relation between a continuous 
stream of sounds and static, discrete musical events is effectuated. 
Since studies into the experience and ontology of time address similar 
issues, I will examine some of these theories here. Johan van Benthem, 
for instance, tries to show in his study of the ontology of time that both 
the view of time as consisting of points and the idea that time consists 
of periods can be translated into a view of time as consisting of events. 
If Van Benthem succeeds in showing this, then perhaps an answer to 
our question about musical tense might be closer at hand. 
In his 1991 study Van Benthem states that time is traditionally 
regarded as a set of points, or instants, moments, without duration. 
Besides this traditional “point view” there exists a different tradition, in 
which it is claimed that periods, or intervals, time spans, should be 
regarded as temporal individuals (1991: 3). In everyday life, however, 
experiences are being perceived as events. Both the “point view” of 
time and the “period view” seem to be abstractions of the way time is 
presented to the human subject (4), and therefore Van Benthem tries to 
translate both points and periods into events. 
When time is being considered as a set of points, Van Benthem 
remarks, the question arises of how “complete” this set is. One 
possibility is to consider this set to be “infinitely divisible,” which 
implies that a continuum is approached. This infinite divisibility means 
that between every arbitrary couple of two members of a set, of which 
one member precedes the other, there is another element (17).6 When a 
set is not infinitely divisible, but discrete instead, then there is no other 
element between two successive elements (18).7 In these two 
possibilities time is regarded as an infinitely divisible and a discrete set 
of points, respectively, but according to Van Benthem they still do not 
form a point representation of time. In order to attain such a 
representation some additional conditions need to be formulated. These 
are the condition of transitivity, of irreflexivity, of linearity and of 
                                                                    
6 The formal representation of his possibility is given here (Van Benthem 1991: 17): 
x y (x < y  z x < z < y) 
7 A formal logic representation would be the following (Van Benthem 1991: 18): 
x y [x < y  z (x < z  ¬u x < u < z)], 
x y [x < y  z (z < y  ¬u z < u < y)] 
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succession. These conditions are necessary, for time goes forth and 
does not retrace its steps. Time has to keep on “flowing forwards.” 
Transitivity means that, for every x, y, and z, if x precedes z and z 
precedes y, x precedes y. Irreflexivity means that there can be no 
standstill. Linearity ensures that the “stream of time” only has one 
“bank,” which means that the stream of time flows in one direction 
only, and succession ensures an infinite expansion of the set, in order 
for time to be able to go on infinitely (15-17).8 
This account of time is in many respects similar to the way music 
presents itself. The conditions of transitivity, irreflexivity, linearity and 
succession also hold for the continuous unfolding of musical sounds. 
There are, however, two problems when we apply this account to 
music. Firstly, since music is finite it does not expand infinitely, and 
therefore the condition of succession has to be reformulated 
accordingly when applied to music.9 Secondly, these conditions hold 
for a point representation of time, which seems to imply discreteness. 
Van Benthem himself implicitly acknowledges that this point 
representation might not cohere with real continuous time, since he 
remarks that the “point view” of time seems to be an abstraction of the 
way time is presented to the human subject (4). Yet the unfolding of 
sounds is not necessarily a discrete process, despite the fact that 
sounds, and not just one single sound, are unfolding in time. The plural 
form of the noun “sound” does seem to hint at discreteness. But, as I 
argued in chapter 2, it is the retention in the listener’s memory, and not 
the actual moment of perception, of some particularly significant 
changes that make the listener regard the music as divided into events, 
and thus into discrete parts. The listener regards music as being divided 
into discrete parts after having perceived the presentation of sounds. 
Therefore, the sounds themselves, as presented, form a continuous 
flow. Even moments in which nothing is sounding belong to this 
continuum for, as Wolfgang Rathert argues, “in musical time the ‘not-
sounding’ is on the same footing with the sounding.”10 Silence, that 
what does not “sound,” has the same status in the temporal unfolding 
of music. It is only in hindsight that the listener perceives the 
difference between sound and silence, and might consider this 
difference as a closure of an event. Figal formulates this view as 
                                                                    
8 In formal logic these conditions read as follows (Van Benthem 1991: 15-17): 
x y z (x < z < y  x < y)  Transitivity 
x ¬x < x   Irreflexivity 
x y (x = y  x < y  y < x)  Linearity 
x y y < x, x y x < y  Succession 
9 Music can, however, give an impression of infinity, of a ceaseless continuation. I 
will discuss this phenomenon in more detail in the next chapter. 
10 “Für die musikalische Zeit ist das ‘Nicht-Klingende’ eine dem Klingenden 
gleichgestellte Dimension.” (Rathert 2000: 302, my translation) 
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follows: “The development of moments and their interrelations within 
a piece, the suggested tempo in which the piece is experienced, and the 
overall unity of its moments can be distinguished in reflection, but 
hardly in experience.”11 During the actual perception of music one 
cannot differentiate between discrete musical moments, let alone 
recognize relations between musical events; all this is done after the 
fact. In other words: the notion of discreteness is something that 
belongs to the musical past, as opposed to the presentation of sounds, 
which happens in the present. This presentation is a continuous process 
rather than a discrete one, for musical discreteness can only be 
perceived in relation to the past. 
Despite the apparent purely discrete account of time he has given 
thus far, Van Benthem nevertheless addresses the question what the 
exact difference is between discrete and continuous time with the aid 
of this account and by consulting an ancient colleague. In defining 
continuity and discreteness he follows Aristotle, who formulates the 
distinction between the two as follows: “the continuous is that of which 
two adjacent parts have the same boundary, the discrete is that of 
which two adjacent parts have two direct boundaries” (quoted in Van 
Benthem 1991: 30). Van Benthem interprets Aristotle in the following 
manner: a time span A, in which every point x precedes a point y, and 
all points x belong to A, is continuous if and only if these points x are 
being preceded by points y. In this way A resembles an ink spot that 
spreads (30).12 
Van Benthem concludes that one cannot decide whether time is 
continuous or discrete. Both interpretations have their merits, 
depending on the discourse in which time is discussed. Van Benthem 
contends, however, that a transition from a point to a period structure 
can take place, and vice versa. A representation of the structure of time 
can change from points to periods and vice versa, where the points are 
“atoms,” the smallest elements of the structure that can be grouped into 
periods (80-99). These periods can themselves be grouped into events. 
                                                                    
11 “Die Entwicklung des Werkes in seinem Momenten und sein 
Sinnzusammenhang, das von ihm vorgegebene Erfahrungstempo und die 
konstellative Zusammengehörigkeit seiner Momente lassen sich in der Reflexion, 
kaum jedoch in der Erfahrung trennen.” (Figal 2000: 17, my translation) The 
question remains, however, whether or not one can actually experience something 
without reflection. See for instance Van Alphen (1999), and chapter 5. Therefore, 
the distinction Figal makes between experience (“Erfahrung”) and reflection 
(“Reflexion”) is rather dubious. That is why I speak about “perception” and not 
about “experience.” 
12 This conception of continuity is formally represented below (Van Benthem 1991: 
30): 
 
A [(x x A  x (x  A  y (x < y  y  A))   
x (x  A  y (y < x  y  A)))  x (x  A  y (x < y  x  A))] 
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Finally, a (finite) set of events constitutes a context. Comparisons of 
and causal relations between events can only be made within a context, 
and thus only when there is more than one event, since one event has to 
be compared to another event. According to Van Benthem these events 
constitute the subject’s primary source of information with regard to 
the world. They are the simple generalizations of complex occurrences, 
themselves built out of periods that consist of points, in the case of 
discreteness, or of a continuous “ink spot” (113-120). 
There are many similarities between Van Benthem’s account of 
events and my discussion of musical events in the previous chapter. 
Van Benthem mentions the ability to compare events, the occurrence 
of causal relations between events and the fact that events are 
simplifications of reality, which is all compatible with the account of 
musical events I gave earlier. However, the aforementioned 
presupposition of Van Benthem’s method, namely to regard time as 
consisting of points only, remains. Even when he tries to give a formal 
definition of the continuum, he uses (discrete) points that belong to 
time spans. To claim that a continuous time span is really an infinitely 
divisible set, in which the points are infinitely small, does not change 
this, since Van Benthem keeps on referring to points. Yet one cannot 
regard a continuum as consisting of points, as George E. Hughes and 
Maxwell J. Cresswell argue. They hold that time considered as being 
continuous means that between every two moments there is a third, 
which means that it is no longer useful to talk about the next moment 
after a given moment (1996: 180). But we have seen that Van Benthem 
always talks about moments or points, and therefore, according to the 
definition Hughes and Cresswell formulate, his conception of time 
cannot really be continuous. Time, considered as being discrete, on the 
other hand, means that one thinks about time as a moment, that is 
followed by a next moment, that is followed by another moment, etc. 
(180), just like Van Benthem continually (no pun intended) does in his 
investigation of the formal structure of time. This conception is not 
unproblematic; Rudy Rucker reminds us of Zeno’s paradox of the 
arrow, a paradox that arises only because one thinks about time as 
consisting of moments or points. When we regard a continuous stretch 
of time as a set of durationless time points (no matter how small they 
are), then, at any of these points, the arrow is not moving, and as a 
result the arrow is never moving (1995: 244). Therefore, Van 
Benthem’s representation of time is less suitable as a starting point for 
a representation of the musical present, for the kind of logic he uses 
always implies a discrete account of time. The unfolding of sounds, 
however, is a continuous process. 
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer, on the other hand, takes an approach 
that has not so much to do with logic, but more with phenomenology. 
In his dissertation, published in 1907, he avoids giving an account of 
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time that always implies some form of discreteness. In his dissertation, 
Brouwer writes that intuition is 
 
[...] the substratum, divested of all quality, of any perception of change, a 
unity of continuity and discreteness, a possibility of thinking together 
several entities, connected by a “between,” which is never exhausted by the 
insertion of new entities. (quoted in Placek 1999: 28) 
 
Brouwer calls this intuition “the intuition of time.” According to 
Brouwer time is the origin of all perception; without time there cannot 
be any perception whatsoever. Thomasz Placek argues that this 
intuition of time, which he calls the Brouwerian “form” of passage 
from one sensation to another, can be identified with continuous time 
(28). Thus, in this view time is continuous, but experienced through the 
passage from one (discrete) sensation to another. Time-as-continuous 
cannot be experienced as such: time can only be grasped as a 
succession of discrete events. This is compatible with the above 
elaboration of the musical present and past. The musical present is a 
continuous presentation of music, a presentation that never stays the 
same and cannot be retained as such in the present, while in relation to 
the past the music is interpreted and retained as passing from one 
(discrete) event to the next.  
Brouwer furthermore holds that the experience of the falling apart of 
moments, which happens over time, causes the intuition of two-
oneness, the “basal intuition of mathematics” (1983: 80). According to 
Brouwer, this intuition creates both the numbers one and two and all 
finite ordinal numbers, and can eventually create the smallest infinite 
ordinal number . Moreover, he claims time is “[…] the only a priori 
of mathematics” (quoted in Van Atten, Van Dalen, and Tieszen 2001: 
8).13 Only because time exists one can experience, or intuit, finite and 
infinite numbers, and even the linear continuum. In other words: in 
order to be able to intuit the continuum one has to have a notion of 
time. This does not automatically mean, however, that Brouwer thinks 
time is also continuous. Remember that the basal intuition of 
mathematics consists of the falling apart of moments, which can be 
regarded as a discrete process. Brouwer does not believe discreteness is 
just some sort of uncompleted state of continuity, but considers them 
as two irreducible, indefinable and primary notions (Placek 1999: 28). 
Brouwer argues that in the basal intuition of mathematics, 
 
[…] continuity and discreteness occur as inseparable complements, both 
having equal rights and being equally clear, it is impossible to avoid one of 
them as a primitive entity, trying to construe it from the other one, the latter 
                                                                    
13 In Meelberg (2004b) I discuss Brouwer’s ideas on mathematics in more detail. 
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being put forward as self-sufficient. (quoted in Van Atten, Van Dalen, and 
Tieszen 2001: 3) 
 
Neither discreteness nor continuity has primacy over the other. One 
cannot reduce the one to the other. Both continuity and discreteness are 
irreducible and primary.14 
This particular characteristic of continuity and discreteness plays a 
prominent part in Brouwer’s conception of time. He distinguishes 
“internal,” intuitive time from “external” time and claims that time is 
the basic form of the stream of consciousness. Mark van Atten, Dirk 
van Dalen and Richard Tieszen explain that the intuitive continuum 
can be understood in connection with internal time and the stream of 
consciousness (3). The intuitive continuum, however, cannot be 
understood as a set of durationless points. According to Brouwer, this 
would be an atomistic, static view of the continuum and would make it 
disappear (8), and as we have seen other theorists do not favor such a 
view either. In the experience of the flow of time the human subject is 
not conscious of any durationless “now” point. When s/he is 
constructing successors through time, for instance when s/he is 
experiencing the basal intuition of mathematics, or listening to music, 
s/he is constructing an idealized grid over the continuum. S/he always 
does this against the background of the flow of inner time (5). Brouwer 
underlines this view when he argues that the discrete and the 
continuous are complementary, for in order to have discreteness of 
moments in time one has to recognize that there exists something 
“between” these moments, which implies continuity. On the other 
hand, the awareness of the movement of time is only possible through 
the recognition of a past and present moment, which in turn implies 
discreteness (6). To regard the discrete and the continuous as 
complementary perhaps comes closest to the way the human brain 
interprets time, and continua in general, as Rucker remarks when he 
cites recent psychological experiments, and concludes that “[o]ne 
could, perhaps, go so far as to say that it is the left brain that counts up 
pebbles, but it is the right brain that perceives continuous expanses of 
space” (1995: 243-244). The left-brain constructs successors through 
time, while the right brain experiences the continuous flow of time.  
In order to capture the complementary nature of time Brouwer 
proposes to replace the element-set relation with a part-whole relation. 
He states that each subinterval, belonging to a continuum, is of the 
same nature as its parent interval. The relation of “subinterval,” which 
is a whole-part relation, is the fundamental relation of the continuum. 
The order relation between disjoint subintervals is the natural order of 
                                                                    
14 Brouwer’s view on continuity and discreteness can be compared to the way light 
is regarded: light is considered to be both a particle and a wave, depending on the 
context in which light is discussed.  
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the continuum, abstracted from the progression of time (Van Atten, 
Van Dalen, and Tieszen 2001: 8-9). In other words: the part is as 
continuous as the whole, but it is at the same time demarcated. It is a 
smaller piece of the whole, while retaining the same ontology of that 
whole, and this act of demarcating time is done against the background 
of the continuous flow of time.15 Moreover, the whole cannot be 
retained as a continuum: one can only grasp the continuous whole by 
dividing it into parts, by constructing successors through time, which 
are by definition discrete.16 
This interpretation of the experience of time is analogous to the 
account of the musical present and past I gave above. But does 
Brouwer’s account help us in answering the question regarding musical 
tense? According to Fleischman, tense in narrative establishes a 
                                                                    
15 Although Brouwer drew up his theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
his ideas about the complementary nature of time still hold. More recent studies on 
the ontology and perception of time, such as Treisman (1999), can be read as a 
confirmation of Brouwer’s ideas. 
16 In his 2002 study, Ulrich Baer criticizes the interpretation of photographs as 
“frozen moments” which artificially halt the flux of continuous time that, in reality, 
“[…] carries us forward from event to event in an unstoppable stream” (3). As an 
alternative to this Heraclitean view on time and history, he advocates a more 
Democritean conception of the world as occurring in bursts and explosions, a 
conception which privileges “[…] the moment rather than the story, the event rather 
than the unfolding, particularity rather than generality” (5). Baer argues that, on the 
one hand, the Heraclitean conception implies that it is the shutter of the camera that 
fragments the world. On the other hand, however, this conception ignores the fact 
that one cannot be certain about the time before and after the moment of the taking 
of the photograph, while the Heraclitean view does imply a before and after. A more 
Democritean approach of photographs, Baer concludes, makes it possible “[…] to 
view each image as potentially disclosing the world – the setting for human 
experience – as nothing but atoms moving in a void” (5). The Heraclitean view 
seems to be more compatible with the Brouwerian view on time than the 
Democritean conception would be. The conception of a Democritean void in which 
atoms move is incompatible with a non-retainable whole which can be divided into 
discrete parts, while these parts have the same ontology as the whole. If we were to 
regard the Democritean void as this Brouwerian whole, this would imply that the 
atoms that are moving in this void are also empty of content, since part and whole 
have the same ontology. Rather, Brouwer stresses the artificiality of the division of 
time, just as taking photographs is an artificial discretization of continuous history 
in the Heraclitean view. And in this case Baer’s criticism regarding this view 
becomes apparent. For if we take Brouwer’s part-whole definition seriously, this 
would mean that we can no longer regard photographs as an interpretation of 
history, but only as an actual part of history. The photograph would have to be part 
of the continuous flow of time, and it would have to have the same ontology as 
history itself. Ultimately, history-as-retained would be the sum of all photographs 
taken in history, and nothing more. As a result, we cannot be certain of the time 
before and after each image, only of the images itself. This leads to an utterly 
fragmented view on history, one in which no coherence or “grand narrative” can be 
found, hereby contradicting the Heraclitean view of time and history as a 
continuous stream. Rather, this fragmented view on history resembles the 
Democretian conception of the world. Therefore, the Heraclitean conception indeed 
seems inadequate to account for the relation between photographs and history. 
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relation between reference time and location time, with reference time 
being the time of the narrator and location time the time of the events 
told. And if we follow Brouwer’s argument, we have to conclude that 
musical tense is equal to a part-whole relation. When we combine 
Fleischman’s and Brouwer’s accounts, we can conclude that musical 
tense is supposed to establish a relation between the unfolding of 
musical sounds, which is the musical present, the whole, and the 
representation of events, which is the musical past, a collection of 
parts. The musical present is the whole, the continuous presentation of 
music, but a whole that cannot be retained. Music-as-retained, i.e. 
music-made-discursive, i.e. musical experience, is music that is 
regarded as representing discrete parts, and it is the sum of these 
representations that constitute the musical past. Hence, musical tense is 
the possibility music offers to represent retainable parts, i.e. musical 
events, in a non-retainable whole, which is the continuum of sounds by 
which the music presents itself.17 
This account of musical tense may not seem to have much in 
common with verbal tense as it is normally looked upon. The reason 
for this is that I have taken as a starting point the special function tense 
has in narrative, as discussed by Fleischman, instead of a more general 
account of verbal tense. An important difference between verbal and 
musical tense is that it is not possible to literally point to a certain 
element in the music and say: “This is an instance of musical tense,” in 
contrast to tense in verbal narrative. In such narratives, tense is literally 
represented in the text. Musical tense, on the other hand, is not an 
element that can be represented directly: it is the establishing of a 
relation between the unfolding of musical sounds and the 
representation of events. This implies that musical tense itself cannot 
be pointed out directly, but only indirectly: the observation that a 
                                                                    
17 A remarkable resemblance with Walter Benjamin’s views on history can be 
noticed here: according to him, the present is not a transition but rather has its origin 
in time and immediately comes to a standstill, and thus belongs to the past (1974: 
704). A true chronicler, Benjamin argues, recounts events without distinguishing 
between the great and small. Only in this way s/he would account for the truth 
(694). However, just as Brouwer regards time-as-experienced as a construction, for 
Benjamin history-as-remembered, and thus historiography, is also a construction 
that consists of discrete parts. The historical writer, Benjamin remarks, always 
empathizes with the victor. As a result, history is interpreted as a concatenation of 
interrelated, discrete, victorious moments. But the Angel of History, Benjamin 
writes, sees only one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of 
rubble and hurls it before its feet, were we see the concatenation of events (696-
698). This concatenation implies a continuum, but it is not, as Brouwer teaches us. 
It is a discrete construction the human subject him/herself constructs in order to 
make sense out of time and history, in order to be able to survive within the single 
catastrophe that is history, which at the same time both is one whole and an endless 
growing collection of rubble, or, in Brouwerian terms: an unretainable whole. 
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listener can detect retainable parts in a particular musical piece acts as 
an index for musical tense in that piece. 
As a consequence, musical tense is a prerequisite for the possibility 
of musical narrativity. As I explained in the previous chapter, in a 
musical narrative three levels can be identified: musical text – story – 
fabula, a trichotomy that can be equated with the trichotomy 
“perceptible music” – “musical structure” – “a series of logically and 
chronologically related musical events that are caused or experienced 
by musical actors.” In other words: in order to talk about a musical 
narrative, one has to be able to talk about musical events. And since I 
have defined musical tense as the possibility music offers to represent 
events, a musical piece without musical tense cannot represent events 
and thus cannot be narrative. Therefore, I assert that musical tense is 
necessary for musical narrative, and that its function is pragmatic in 
nature. 
A Past Present in Rothko Chapel 
Morton Feldman’s Rothko Chapel (1971), for viola, celesta, 
percussion, chorus, solo soprano and solo alto, can be considered as a 
work in which the power of musical tense is put to the test. In 
Feldman’s writings we can read that he wants to destroy the memory, 
to erase every reference to previous elements, in order to focus the 
listener’s attention on the moment only (Moelants 2003b: 226). In 
other words: he intends to eliminate musical tense by obstructing the 
music’s possibility of representing retainable parts in the continuum of 
sounds, constituted by the performance of the composition. As Dirk 
Moelants observes, in the majority of his compositions Feldman wants 
to  
 
present the sounds just as they are, separate from each other; he tries to 
eliminate the context, the linear structure, as much as possible; the 
horizontal is being suppressed by the vertical. This creates an uncertainty 
with regard to the form, an illusion of infinity. The key for this momentary 
is the slowness with which the elements succeed each other, which is 
characteristic of Feldman’s work.18 
 
By letting the musical elements succeed each other at a very slow rate, 
Feldman intends to destroy the horizontal, i.e. the possibility of linking 
one element to the next, in favor of a focus on the inherent qualities of 
                                                                    
18 “Feldman wil de klanken op zich laten horen, los van elkaar; hij probeert zoveel 
mogelijk de context uit te schakelen, de lineaire opbouw; het horizontale wordt 
verdrongen door het verticale. Dit creëert een onzekerheid over de vorm, een illusie 
van oneindigheid […] De sleutel voor het momentane ligt echter bij de – voor 
Feldman zo kenmerkende – traagheid waarmee de elementen elkaar opvolgen.” 
(Moelants 2003a: 7, my translation) 
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the elements themselves, which is the vertical, or rather the 
simultaneous. Feldman’s musical ideal thus is that the listener cannot 
combine musical elements into musical events and subsequently into 
musical phrases. 
To attain this ideal, Moelants remarks, Feldman makes use of the 
way short-term memory works. As I explained in chapter 2, the 
recognition of musical events by the listener takes place in short-term 
memory, and this account is similar to Moelants’s. He states that short-
term memory is the kind of memory in which the human subject 
immediately organizes sensory data into units, which subsequently can 
be interpreted. Moelants calls short-term memory a buffer, which 
constitutes the perceptual present (2003a: 7). In short-term memory 
sensory data are combined into discrete units, and this is something 
that can only be done in relation to the musical past, as I argued earlier. 
However, to name short-term memory the perceptual present implies 
that the organization of perception, such as the perception of music, 
into units is also done in the present, and this does not correspond with 
the above account of musical past and present. Moreover, the 
perceptual present is a pleonasm, at least when the musical present is 
concerned. The musical present is the presentation of the flow of 
sounds; it is that part of music, which presents itself to the listener’s 
ears. Therefore, the musical present always is perceptible.  
Moelants furthermore remarks that, when listening to music, the 
listener can grasp a length of about three seconds. If subsequent sounds 
are presented within this time frame, then the listener can connect them 
rhythmically and s/he can recognize melodic and harmonic relations.19 
In order to destroy the horizontal, i.e. the possibility of linking one 
element to the next, Feldman uses time intervals that transgress this 
limit of three seconds. In this way, Moelants writes, the listener 
perceives tones and chords as individual elements. Now, the listener’s 
memory buffer is completely preoccupied with one single event, which 
s/he subsequently has to analyze in its entirety. The importance of the 
relations with sounds in its vicinity is minimized. Instead of creating 
larger connections s/he can only observe the difference between two 
successive elements:  
 
Just as Rothko works with space, Feldman works with duration. There is no 
real rhythm, at least not from the observer’s point of view. In this way 
Feldman uses the limitations of our memory to make us acquainted with the 
wealth of individual sounds.20 
                                                                    
19 In relation to the musical past, of course, and not in the musical present. 
20 “Net zoals Rothko met ruimte werkt, werkt Feldman met duur. Van een echt ritme 
is nauwelijks sprake, althans niet vanuit het standpunt van de waarnemer. En zo 
maakt Feldman gebruik van de beperkingen van ons geheugen om ons de rijkdom van 
de individuele klanken te leren kennen.” (Moelants 2003a: 7, my translation) 
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Like the artist Mark Rothko, Feldman uses the limitations of human 
perception and memory in order to focus the listener’s attention to the 
characteristics of individual elements. However, Feldman’s Rothko 
Chapel is not just an attempt to achieve this goal. In this composition 
some almost lyrical passages can be heard, which rarely happens in 
Feldman’s music. But the movements of the melodies and rhythms in 
these passages are frequently superseded by abstract soundscapes, 
which are timbres with a certain duration, rather than distinct melodies 
or chords.21 
Because these soundscapes transgress the limits of short-term 
memory, in theory they also eliminate the possibility music offers to 
represent retainable parts in the continuum of sounds by which the 
music presents itself. The listener cannot bracket events within the 
continuum, which is the soundscape. The soundscape itself is the only 
event that is represented, but it cannot be recognized as an event 
because its duration exceeds the three-second limit of the listener’s 
short-term memory. This means that this musical passage does not 
know a past tense. The passage is in the present only, since only in 
relation to the musical past music is regarded as a representation of 
discrete events. And discreteness is not noticeable in a soundscape 
such as described above. And thus, at least in theory, these 
soundscapes give the impression of being static, non-moving, for 
movement, i.e. going from one (discrete) moment to the next, implies 
discreteness. Movement in music can only be perceived in relation to 
the musical past, a past that is absent here. 
In Rothko Chapel, however, not only static soundscapes are 
presented. In this piece also more or less conventional melodies can be 
heard. This means that Rothko Chapel is not entirely in the musical 
present only, which it would be if it would consist of soundscapes that 
sabotage short-term memory only. In other words: if Feldman, with the 
aid of abstract soundscapes, would attain his ideal, i.e. if the listener 
cannot combine musical elements into musical events and phrases, 
then there would be an alternation of the musical past and present in 
Rothko Chapel; an alternation of melody and soundscape.  
With regard to the alternation of past and present in narrative, 
Fleischman observes the following: 
 
The ability of the PR [present tense] to interrupt or suspend the narrative 
event line […] makes possible the suspense that typically accompanies 
peaks of narrative tension, which are often reported in the PR. The fact that 
the PR is the unmarked tense of the mimetic rather than the diegetic mode, 
the tense of actual speech, motivates its use to transform narration into 
                                                                    
21 On the other hand, one could argue that the soundscapes are superseded by 
conventional melodies and rhythms. Melody and rhythm are the anomalies in 
Feldman’s music, not the soundscapes. 
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performance, thereby emphasizing, above and beyond the information value 
of a story, its value as a piece of verbal craftsmanship. (60, emphasis in 
original) 
 
The present tense implies performance, which is consistent with the 
fact that Fleischman regards the present as reference time, the time of 
telling. The telling of a story indeed is a performance, namely the 
uttering of language signs. Fleischman argues that by stressing the fact 
that a story is told by a narrator, by using the present tense, the 
attention is drawn to the art, the craftsmanship, of storytelling instead 
of to the story itself. A remarkable parallel with Feldman’s ideal can be 
observed here: by using the present both in verbal narrative and in 
music the attention is drawn away from the representation of events in 
favor of a focus on the means through which such events normally are 
represented, i.e. the craft of storytelling and the sound itself, 
respectively. By switching between past and present, Rothko Chapel is 
supposed to focus both on the representation of events and on sound 
itself. So, let us now investigate whether or not this indeed takes place 
in this composition. 
A soft, distant rumble, caused by the timpani played pianississimo, 
marks the beginning of Rothko Chapel. Then the viola enters, playing a 
melody that will reappear many times in different variations, such as 
between 0’44” and 2’22” (as performed by Klangforum Wien and the 
Südfunk-Chor Stuttgart, directed by Rupert Huber, with Julie Moffat, 
soprano, and Ulrike Koch, alto, in the recording released by Col Legno 
WWE 1CD 20506; bars 8-26 in the score), where it is frequently 
alternated by percussion rolls (ex. 3.1). At 2’26” (bar 27) a faster viola 
melody sounds together with a chord played in the celesta and the 
vibraphone. As I already mentioned, the appearance of a melodic line 
is a rare event in Feldman’s music, but a melody that is so explicitly 
melodic as the one that is played now is even rarer. It is followed by 
the first appearance of the chorus at 2’35” (bar 29). In this first 
appearance the chorus sings a homophonic melody, interrupted by the 
viola playing a three-note melody. Between 3’18” and 4’06” (bars 38-
49) again an alternation between viola and percussion can be heard, 
with celesta chords accompanying the viola. 
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Example 3.1. Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, bars 1-14. 
Morton Feldman "Rothko Chapel" © 1973 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 15469 
 
Static, soft chords sung by the chorus and accompanied by timpani 
rolls, alternated by rest, appear between 4’07” and 5’02” (bars 50-62). 
These chords, however, do not last so long that they function as 
independent events that are not related to the rest of the piece. Perhaps 
one could regard these chords as a prelude to the soundscapes that have 
yet to sound. In bars 58 and 60 the static character of the chorus is 
interfered with because the chorus sings a crescendo. The viola 
imitates the static character of the chorus between 5’03” and 5’25” 
(bars 63-68) by repeatedly playing a B flat flageolet, and in this way 
extending the prelusive character of this section. Between 5’25” and 
5’54” (bars 68-75) the viola continues playing this flageolet, 
simultaneously with the vibraphone and celesta playing a chord and 
alternated by rests. At the same time, the chorus sings a homophonic 
melody which ends at 5’54” (bar 75). Then, a descending two-bar 
melody is played in the viola, while a chord sounds in the vibraphone 
and the celesta. One bar of silence, one bar in which a static chord 
sounds that is played by the viola, vibraphone and celesta, again a bar 
of silence, the same chord, a bar of silence and again the same chord 
are presented before the chorus sings a new homophonic melody 
between 6’24” and 6’54” (bars 84-93). At the same time, the viola, 
celesta and vibraphone continue playing the same chord, alternated by 
a bar of rest (ex. 3.2). 
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Silence again. Chords in the viola, vibraphone and celesta. A 
descending three-note melody in the vibraphone. Again chords, the 
vibraphone melody, silence, and finally a crescendo chord in the 
chorus, out of which a descending viola melody flows. Then a 
homophonic line in the chorus and the same descending viola melody 
can be heard, immediately followed by a chord played by the celesta, 
chimes and viola. Between 8’33” and 9’25” (bars 119-130) an 
alternation of viola melody and a chord sung by the chorus appears, 
concluded by a celesta chord and an ascending viola melody. Silence. 
The music has arrived at 9’51” (bar 135). Here, a steady rhythm is 
played by the timpani, consisting of a quarter note rest, a quarter note 
D, an eight note rest and an eight note B’. This rhythm really functions 
as a Zeitgeber: the individual voices of the chorus sing their own 
separate parts, with the texture gradually thickening. In their parts a 
rhythmic pattern can be heard, but it is the rhythm in the timpani that 
stresses the temporal progression. At 10’30” (bar 148) the viola joins 
the chorus, while between 11’13” and 11’23” (bars 162-166) a solo 
alto voice sings long notes. At 11’31” (bar 169) the timpani rhythm 
stops and two chords are sung by the chorus; the first molto crescendo 
and the second pianississimo. The viola plays a crescendo solo melody 
between 11’49” and 12’22” (bars 171-178). 
A ppppp chord sung by the chorus acts as an introduction for the 
melody that is sung by the solo soprano between 12’26” and 12’46” 
(bars 180-184; ex. 3.3). Then the same “Zeitgeber rhythm” appears in 
the timpani, interrupted at 12’59” (bar 189) by the same ppppp chord 
in the chorus. In other words: rhythm and stasis alternate. Next, two 
bars of timpani, then a celesta chord, followed by a melody in the 
viola, and finally a timpani roll. The chorus enters, which is now 
divided into two separate choruses, resulting in a doubling of the 
number of voices. Until 14’19” (bar 205) movement can be noticed in 
the chorus, but after the rest in bar 206 a static chord is sung, followed 
by a note sung by the basses and next by the sopranos. A short 
pizzicato line in the viola sets the stage for the next event. 
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Example 3.2. Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, bars 76-100. 
Morton Feldman "Rothko Chapel" © 1973 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 15469 
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Example 3.3. Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, bars 179-184. 
Morton Feldman "Rothko Chapel" © 1973 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 15469 
 
This event can be regarded as the climax of the piece. The event 
starts at 14’51” (bar 211) and ends at 18’12” (bar 242). One chord is 
sung by the chorus, and because the voices in the two choruses 
alternate the chord can be sustained the full 32 bars. During this event, 
a new Zeitgeber appears: different chords played by the chimes in a 
steady, even rhythm. Were it not for the chimes, a feeling of 
timelessness could really be felt.22 At this point in the composition the 
chorus represents, for an extended period of time, an abstract 
soundscape, a harmony that is not so much harmony but rather a 
timbre, a color (ex. 3.4). 
Between 18’12” and 22’23” (bars 243-301) an alternation between a 
viola melody and a soprano melody, alternated with sporadic timpani 
rolls, can be heard, creating a contrast with the preceding, static event. 
Only at 22’05” (bar 298) there is a reference to the static character 
evoked by the chorus, for here the bass voices sing a whole note B flat. 
                                                                    
22 On the other hand, one could argue that it is because of the chimes, this Zeitgeber, 
the listener can feel what it means to experience timelessness. Here, stasis and 
movement are juxtaposed, in order to make the listener aware of the difference 
between the two. 
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Between 22’24” and 22’37” (bars 302-304) again a static chord is sung 
by the chorus, followed by a celesta chord. Next, again a chord sung by 
the chorus, but now both crescendo and decrescendo. The chorus 
concludes by singing a static chord between 23’06” and 23’12” (bars 
312-313). 
 
 
 
Example 3.4. Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, bars 211-217. 
Morton Feldman "Rothko Chapel" © 1973 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 15469 
 
A next static sound is created in a new way at 23’13” (bar 314): the 
vibraphone plays a continuing, repetitive eight-note pattern in which 
no motion can be felt. The individual notes of the pattern are not 
perceived as such; the pattern as a whole resembles a timbre rather 
than a motif, because of the tones sustaining and running into one 
another. At 23’19” (bar 320) a new, lyrical melody is played by the 
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viola, two times in total, the second time transposed up a perfect fourth 
(ex. 3.5). This melody has a folksong-like quality and is almost an 
anomaly within the context of the piece. Next, at 24’10” (bar 360) the 
motif in the vibraphone continues and is doubled in the celesta, while 
the chorus first sings a static chord, then a crescendo and decrescendo 
chord and finally again a static one between 24’36” and 24’38” (bars 
370-371). Bars 314-359 are repeated, followed by a variation of bars 
360-371: the vibraphone is no longer doubled by the celesta, the length 
of the chords in the chorus differs and these chords are sung more 
dynamically. While the vibraphone stops, a decrescendo chord is sung 
in the chorus, which marks the ending of the piece. 
 
 
 
Example 3.5. Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, bars 314-339. 
Morton Feldman "Rothko Chapel" © 1973 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., 
London/UE 15469 
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Rothko Chapel never really switches between past and present, 
because there is never a completely static, abstract soundscape to be 
heard that both lasts so long that the listener cannot connect it to the 
rest of the music and is not interfered with in some way or another. 
This is surprising, since many of the static chords that are played 
and/or sung last longer than three seconds. But then again, Moelants is 
the first to admit that the three-second limit of human short-term 
memory is somewhat theoretical: 
 
When we take a look at the writings of Feldman himself, we find that he 
wants to destroy the memory, to erase every reference to previous elements, 
in order to concentrate on the listener’s attention on the moment. This 
philosophy would suggest a choice for intervals over three seconds. On the 
other hand, we can never really destroy the content, we never really hear a 
sound within a composition just as we hear it out of the composition. 
(2003b: 226) 
 
As Moelants argues, the listener perceives and experiences sounds 
within the context of a composition. This means that, in experiencing 
these sounds, not only short-term memory is at work, but also long-
term memory, as I explained in the previous chapter. In long-term 
memory schemas reside which are organized sets of memories about 
sequences of, among other events, musical events. It is here where the 
listener has stored his/her musical knowledge – in the form of schemas 
– with which s/he interprets musical sounds. It is also the place where 
the listener stores the marked events s/he encounters in a musical 
piece. Thus, it is because s/he has long-term memory that the listener 
can listen to music within a context. And since long-term memory is 
not susceptible to a three-second limit, the context in which an abstract 
soundscape sounds is never eliminated. A soundscape, no matter how 
long it lasts and how static it might be, can never be perceived as an 
isolated sound, but will always be related to the composition as a 
whole because the musical context is always present in – literally – the 
back of the listener’s mind. 
For this analysis of Rothko Chapel it is irrelevant whether or not 
Feldman himself knew that a pure isolated presentation of sounds 
within the context of a musical composition is impossible. But it is 
remarkable that he, at least in this piece, never seems to really try to 
achieve this. All, but one, static moments that in theory could be 
qualified for acting as an abstract soundscape either do not last long 
enough or are accompanied by other sounds that are not static, but 
dynamic. The only moment in the piece where the feeling of stasis has 
a substantial length is in bars 211-242. But here the chimes chime in 
and destroy the purely static character by playing a steady rhythm. 
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Hence, nowhere in Rothko Chapel can a true switching from the past to 
the present tense be found. 
However, this is not the whole story I want to tell about this piece. 
For although Feldman’s ideal of the listener concentrating on the 
individual sound only is not realized, a clear distinction between the 
more melodic and the more static phrases can be noticed. Because the 
music alternates between melodic and more static moments the listener 
is able to find out what the difference is between movement and stasis, 
without the music itself actually switching between movement and 
absolute stasis, so between the past and the present. Only a feeling of 
stasis, of the present, is evoked within a moving context, which I 
termed the past. In other words: in Rothko Chapel the musical present 
– absolute stasis – is represented as an effect of the musical past. 
Because stasis is represented within a moving context, the listener is 
made aware of what it is to experience stasis. 
The Marking of Time 
In the above analysis I did not discuss whether Rothko Chapel is 
narrative. The part from bar 1 until bar 313 can be considered as 
representing a temporal development, with a temporal suspension of 
this development in bars 211-242. Yet, from bar 314 onward a 
completely different section begins, that has almost nothing to do with 
the preceding section. Moreover, this last section cannot be regarded as 
the representation of a proper development. As a result, the 
composition can be regarded as narrative until bar 313 only, while bars 
314-427 act as some kind of non-narrative epilogue. 
This narrative with a non-narrative ending demonstrates that as soon 
as some phenomenon is represented in music, it is represented in the 
musical past. And this corresponds with the pragmatic function of 
musical tense. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, in verbal texts, 
the pragmatic function of tense serves to establish relations between: 
parts of texts, the text in which these parts occur, the text as a whole 
and the situation in which this text is related. I have already explained 
one such relation musical tense establishes: the relation between the 
musical text as a continuous whole and discrete musical events, i.e. the 
relation between the musical present and the musical past. This 
relation, Burrows argues, is constitutive of the true nature of musical 
narrative: 
 
Music has the character of a proto-narrative, a narrative without things in it, 
and so without the places they are in, without characters and so, except by 
sometimes strained attribution, without genders, personalities, life histories 
– narrative without words, except as they are smuggled in along with titles 
and song texts. Concentrating on sound involves a turning away from the 
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range of the world we interpret as stable and locatable, and a turning toward 
pure movement and time. (1997: 533)  
 
The concentration on sound involves focusing on movement and time. 
And this necessitates a focus on musical tense. The concentration on 
sound is only in part equal to the act of listening: this concentration 
also is an act of interpretation. The perception of movement is the 
perception of the passing from one event to another, for in a continuum 
movement cannot be noticed. Therefore, movement in music can only 
be perceived in relation to the musical past, when music is regarded as 
a representation of (discrete) events, and to regard of music as a 
representation of events implies more than just listening to sound; it is 
a listening experience, the making discursive of what the listener hears. 
And as soon as this step is taken the music can still be regarded as a 
“narrative without words,” but not as a “narrative without things in it.” 
From that moment onward the music metaphorically “contains” 
representations of events, which can subsequently be interpreted, say, 
as being musical characters, as being placed in a musical space, and as 
being part of a musical story, as I explained in chapter 2. Hence, a 
musical narrative may not be a narrative “with things in it,” as Burrows 
writes (but neither are verbal narratives); it is nevertheless a narrative 
which can represent things, just like a verbal story. But it all starts with 
the concentration on movement and time, which is the beginning of all 
listening experiences. 
It is because of musical tense that music can be regarded as being 
organized, as Andreas Luckner’s remark in regard to meter and rhythm 
suggests: 
 
Just as a running meter by itself is mechanical and rigid, the spontaneous 
activity or pure energy of random accents do not constitute a form; in this 
case these cannot even be regarded as proper accents. Only in the moving 
order of rhythm, which is nothing but the coordination of these two 
movements, meter and accents constitute a vivid unity.23 
 
Meter, which in itself is not audible or represented in music, is the 
organizing principle by which the musical events can be ordered. 
Meter is what Brouwer would call the idealized grid over the temporal 
continuum that the listener constructs while listening to the flow of 
musical sounds. It is the marking off of time; it is the temporal 
                                                                    
23 “Wie das durchlaufende Metrum fur sich genommen mechanisch und starr ist, so 
bilden andererseits die einer spontanen Aktivität oder puren Energie entspringenden 
willkürlichen Akzente für sich genommen keine Gestalt, ja im Grunde verböte sich 
hier die Redeweise von ‘Akzenten’. Erst in der beweglichen Ordnung des 
Rhythmus, der nichts anderes als die Koordinierung dieser beiden Bewegungen 
darstellt, bilden Metrum und Akzente eine lebendige Einheit.” (Luckner 2000: 132, 
my translation) 
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reference to which musical events are related. And again, this 
comparison can only be made on the basis of a musical past.24 
Because the rhythm of musical events does not equal the pulse of 
meter these events stand out in the music. This phenomenon is an 
example of markedness, which Fleischman defines as the situation in 
which, in case of an opposition, one member of the opposition feels 
more normal, unmarked, than the other(s), which are therefore marked 
(1990: 52). In the case of rhythm meter is the unmarked term, whereas 
the musical event that stands out rhythmically in the music is the 
marked term. In her theory Fleischman applies the concept of 
markedness as follows: 
 
The theory of tense in narrative elaborated [here] is founded on the 
proposition that the PFV P [perfective past] (= PRET) [preterit] is the 
(pragmatically) unmarked tense of narrative language […] One of the 
principle claims [in Fleischman’s theory] is that when in a narrative the PR 
[present] – or any other tense than the PRET is chosen, the narrator’s 
objective (often unconscious) is to neutralize one or more of the properties 
that collectively define PRET as the unmarked tense of narration and in turn 
define the norms for narrative discourse. (55)  
 
In storytelling the past tense is unmarked; the use of this tense is 
characteristic of narrative, and Fleischman contends that any deviation 
of this tense in narrative is therefore marked, for it is in opposition with 
the norms for narrative discourse and hence stands out. 
Markedness is a concept that is applied in musicology, too, and most 
notably by Robert S. Hatten. In his theory of musical markedness he 
proposes “[…] the grounding of musical relationships in the cultural 
universes of their conception, in order to address the expressive 
significance of formal structures in a richer way” (1994: 66). Hatten 
intends to study musical relations within their proper musical context 
and to investigate in what manner these relations stand out or not in 
this context. He argues that a musical event becomes meaningful 
because it is related to other musical events within a context in such a 
way that this event is the marked term. And since Hatten contends that 
“[…] the marked entity of an opposition has a narrower range of 
meaning with respect to the unmarked one” (63), he regards such an 
event as being more meaningful than the unmarked terms.  
Burrows’s view on the relation between markedness and meaning 
seems, at least in part, to be incompatible with Hatten’s: 
 
A patterned interaction between a participant and the flow of sounding tones 
unfolds in each particular performance, and the experience of a listener 
                                                                    
24 The process of meter-finding in music by the listener is elaborated in Temperley 
(2001). 
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grows up around the process of matching the hypothesis to the flow of 
tones. Meaning emerges from the match between hypothesis and tones. 
Carried past a certain point, an imperfect match destroys meaning. 
However, up to that point it has the effect of raising the intensity of the 
experience. In musical terms, an unanticipated modulation would serve as 
an example. (1997: 537)  
 
Burrows argues that meaning equals the affirmation of expectation. As 
soon as the listener’s expectation is not sufficiently met meaning has 
vanished. According to him, moderate deviation from this expectation 
is not devastating for the emergence of meaning, but as soon as the 
music deviates too much it no longer has any meaning. This implies 
that only a moderately marked term can be meaningful. But how 
moderately must a term be marked to still be meaningful? Burrows 
seems to suggest that music always has to conform to the stylistic 
conventions appropriate to this composition in order to convey 
meaning. This view might be too restrictive, for Hatten remarks: 
 
The interpretation of a work leads to an appropriate level of complexity 
through the strategic interpretation of new categories (types) and their 
unique instances (tokens). Markedness plays a role in the interpretation of a 
work’s strategies beyond the encoded oppositions of style, as well. This 
strategic markedness, however, may or may not survive in the style, but 
certainly exists in the “systems” (thematic and other) the work creates for 
itself. (1994: 65, emphasis in original) 
 
Hatten admits that the interpretation of an individual work, the token, 
is done while referring to a certain style, the type, but he also allows 
for marked events to transgress this particular style. As he points out: 
“[W]hile style constrains expectancies, it must also provide room for 
unique strategies of realization” (11). These unique strategies 
subsequently may be assimilated in the style, and in this sense 
contribute to the growth of this style.25 Style types guide the 
interpretational strategies applied to individual works, the tokens. With 
style types, the listener seeks correlations between the individual work 
and the style the listener feels it is compatible with. Interpretations of 
individual works create cultural units that can be added to the style 
types (30). Nevertheless, every singular composition must be allowed 
to contain idiosyncratic characteristics, without correlating to any style 
type. To conclude: a musical piece can still be structured, and thus 
convey meaning (for the recognition of marked and unmarked events, 
which forms the basis of meaning, is the result of musical structuring), 
even if stylistic boundaries are transgressed. Only when it is impossible 
                                                                    
25 Note the similarities with Kunst’s UNLL-process I described in chapter 1, as well 
as with the process of the forming of new schemata in long-term memory that I 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
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to structure music, i.e. when music is ungraspable, it is literally 
meaningless. Consequently, musical events can be marked to a great 
extent and at the same time be meaningful. 
A typical example of a marked term in music is the musical theme. 
At least in traditional tonal music, a musical theme often is the element 
around which a composition is constructed; it is the nucleus of a 
musical idea. The theme has to stand out in the music; it has to be 
recognizable as a theme. Therefore, Hatten concludes, it has to be 
marked: 
 
Any consistent use (repetition, variation, development, return) of a musical 
idea helps to define its thematic status as a subject of discourse. But the 
significance of an idea emerges to some degree from foregrounding […] 
Thus, that which is thematic in a work is by definition strategically marked, 
above and beyond whatever stylistic markedness (or unmarkedness) its 
constituents may posses. (112-113)  
 
When a musical idea stands out in the music, which means that it is 
foregrounded, it is marked. It is in part, the way this idea is used that 
foregrounds and converts it into a theme, apart from the inherent shape 
of the idea itself. Still, Hatten remarks, “[…] a theme [that] is 
intentionally constructed to be stylistically unmarked, also occurs” 
(126, 128). He does not really elaborate this notion, but it seems to me 
that this theme still is marked, albeit within a different context. Such a 
theme might not be a marked term within the musical piece itself, in 
that it does not stand out compared to the other musical events. As a 
musical theme, however, it does stand out when compared to other 
musical themes. The normal state of musical themes is that they are 
marked. Therefore, the unmarked state for themes is, that they stand 
out, in relation to other musical events. But now we have a theme that 
does not stand out within a composition, which is an abnormal state for 
a theme. Therefore, in relation to the conventional notions regarding 
themes this theme is marked. 
Fleischman points out that a marked term does not have to remain 
marked permanently. By pragmatically unmarking a marked term, this 
term “[…] loses its distinctiveness (its mark) in a particular context 
through frequency of use” (1990: 54). Hatten gives an example of this, 
by referring to the case of a repeated occurrence of a Picardy third in a 
cadence: “In this case the Picardy third is still marked with respect to 
any earlier minor triads, but the composer has created a new 
environment where it is possible for another chord to be used in place 
of the Picardy third” (1994: 42-43). Because the Picardy third occurs 
so frequently here it no longer stands out in the music, it has become 
an unmarked term, whereas it originally was marked. As a 
consequence, when after the repeated occurrence of the Picardy third 
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another chord sounds, that chord becomes marked: it has taken over 
the function that the Picardy third originally had. 
The fluctuation from markedness to unmarkedness and vice versa is 
an important element in music, not only in tonal music, but also in 
atonal music. Dack, in referring to studies done by Giomi and Ligabue, 
points out that in this kind of music markedness functions in a similar 
fashion: 
 
Smallest units of signification are identified […] These units can be 
subsequently listed in paradigms demonstrating criteria of equivalence. 
Chains of units and, it is hoped, meaning might then begin to emerge. 
Generally, the process is continued until the materials are exhausted, new 
units are chosen and the entire process repeated. Thus, by means of the 
immanent structures of the work its message can be described and 
understood even if the code is unknown – hardly an uncommon situation in 
contemporary music. (1999: 1)  
 
These smallest units of signification can only be identified because 
these stand out in the music: they are marked. However, since many 
contemporary musical compositions, especially atonal ones, do not 
make use of standardized musical conventions, such as functional 
harmony, or correlate to style types, paradigms have to be created 
anew for every piece. This is done by comparing marked and 
unmarked terms, which in the case of contemporary, post-tonal music 
comes down to observing which sounds stand out in relation to other 
sounds within the composition. Next, these terms can be combined into 
larger events, thereby creating larger (sub)contexts in which new 
markedness relations can emerge. Hatten calls the clustering of terms 
in order to create larger (marked) entities markedness assimilation 
(1994: 64).26 
Properly speaking, the identification of marked terms and 
markedness assimilation is identical to the process of recognizing 
musical events and musical phrases I described in chapter 2. Closures 
are marked terms, and because closures mark off musical events these 
events are marked as well. Musical events can themselves be grouped 
into larger entities, i.e. musical events can be clustered into larger 
musical phrases, which is an act of markedness assimilation. Within 
these phrases an event a may be unmarked relative to a different event 
b in that same phrase, whereas event a was marked when related to the 
musical piece as a whole, or vice versa. In other words: markedness 
and markedness assimilation is the organization of a text (in this case a 
musical composition) and the attribution of meaning to the events in 
this text as a result of this event being marked, while the meaning of an 
                                                                    
26 Markedness assimilation may in turn lead to a new, added schema that resides in 
long-term memory. 
Chapter 3 
 
130 
event depends on the subcontext within that text to which the event is 
related, since in these contexts markedness relations can differ.  
This process is in line with the pragmatic function of tense as 
Fleischman envisages it in relation to markedness: “[A]ny context or 
subcontext may set up its own norms [regarding markedness relations] 
in contrast to those of the larger context” (1999: 55). Tense acts as a 
metalinguistic signal of narrative genres. This means that adult 
speakers appear to possess a typology of narrative forms as part of 
their linguistic competence, and there “[…] appear to be grammatical 
features […] that correlate predictably with these narrative primes” 
(123). But a narrative may deviate from this typology. Markedness 
relations may be changed within a narrative, creating a subcontext 
which, as a whole, stands out in the text, but in which other types of 
markedness relations prevail compared to the text as a whole. It is the 
pragmatic function of tense that makes possible these subdivisions and 
the relations between subdivisions and the text. Likewise, it is because 
of musical tense that musical events and phrases can be recognized in a 
musical piece. Musical tense is the music’s possibility of representing 
events, while the higher-order organization of music, i.e. the 
organizing of events into musical phrases, also only can be done in 
relation to the musical past. After all, musical phrases, too, are discrete 
parts that belong to a continuous whole which is the musical present. 
Moreover, markedness also is dependent on musical tense, since 
comparing can only be done in relation to the musical past and 
markedness is the outcome of a comparison. As a result, musical tense 
makes possible the organizing of music, and therefore indeed complies 
with the pragmatic function of tense. Moreover, it is because of 
musical tense that music can be meaningful, since musical meaning 
depends on markedness. 
The Narrator’s Presence as Narrative’s Present 
Musical representation always implies a musical past. Even if one were 
to represent the musical present this representation has to take place in 
the musical past, as Rothko Chapel teaches us. While the presentation 
of a succession of sounds, which together constitute a musical piece, 
takes place in the present, in the past music is the representation of 
musical events. In relation to this phenomenon Fleischman remarks: 
 
[T]he resolution of [the paradox of narrative temporality, which arises 
because, within an inherently retrospective discourse, the movement of 
narrative time is prospective] is to be sought in the process of 
“narrativization” – a configurational operation whereby the unordered data 
of an experience are converted into structures of language, for it is only in 
telling the tale that we retrace forward what we have already traced 
backward. (1990: 167) 
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Fleischman thinks of the representation of a present and a future in the 
past as a paradox, a paradox that is resolved by involving the process 
of narrativization. Fleischman defines this concept in about the same 
manner as Fludernik does (see chapter 1): narrativization is a 
structuring activity in which a subject interprets an object as a 
narrative.27 The process of narrativization is in many respects similar to 
the way the listener identifies representations of discrete musical 
events in the continuous stream of sounds, in that unordered sensory 
data are structured into discrete units. A difference between my 
account of the musical present and past and Fleischman’s definition of 
narrativization, however, is that she seems to suggest that in narrating a 
tale the structuring takes place. In other words: events are already 
structured when the narrator relates a story. In my account, on the other 
hand, the unfolding of the continuous stream of sounds – the musical 
present – equals the musical storytelling, whereas the structuring of 
events is done by the listener in relation to the musical past. Hence, it 
is not in the musical telling that past events are retraced forward, but in 
the listening. 
This difference has consequences for the distinction in musical 
narrative between what Fleischman calls speaker-now and story-now. 
Speaker-now refers to the time of the telling of the story, whereas 
story-now refers to the time during which the events of the story are 
assumed to have taken place (125). At first sight it seems that speaker-
now equals reference time and story-now equals location time. After 
all, reference time is the time of the narrator and location time the time 
of the events told. Indeed, the time of the telling of the story can be 
equated with the time of the narrator. By defining story-now as the 
time during which the events of the story are assumed to have taken 
place, however, an important shift has been made. “The time of the 
events told” can be considered as the time in which musical sounds are 
part of the representation of musical events. But is this also the time 
during which the events of the story are assumed to have taken place? I 
have argued that in the musical past, which is location time, music is 
the representation of discrete events. This does not imply, however, 
that these events also actually take place in this past. The structuring of 
music into events is not the same as the taking place of events. 
Everything that is going on within an event happens in the musical 
present, for it is in the present that musical sounds present themselves. 
As I argued earlier in this chapter, between the continuous flow of 
sounds and discrete musical events a part-whole relation exists. This 
means that an event whose representation starts at moment t = x and 
                                                                    
27 However, as I also remarked in chapter 1, not just every object can be 
narrativized; an object has to have narrative potentialities that invites the subject to 
interpret this object as a narrative. 
Chapter 3 
 
132 
stops at t = y consists of the same sounds as the whole continuum of 
sounds during the time span between t = x and t = y. As a result, 
everything that happens within an event has already happened in the 
present. And this would imply that speaker-now is the same as story-
now.  
This equalization occurs as a result of the difference between my 
account and Fleischman’s with regard to the structuring of events. As I 
already mentioned, Fleischman argues that events are structured while 
telling a tale. In my account of musical narrativity, however, events are 
structured while listening to the musical tale, and thus after the telling, 
which results in the equalization of the time of telling and the time in 
which the events are happening. The discrete events are not recognized 
as such until after the fact, but the sounds out of which the events 
consist have already been presented by then. Hence, the distinction 
between speaker-now and story-now is not very useful when talking 
about musical narrative.28 
Perhaps the impossibility of distinguishing between speaker-now 
and story-now in music is one of the reasons why Abbate persists in 
the impossibility of musical narrativity. She claims that music cannot 
represent a past tense. Possibly, in claiming this, she is thinking of 
something like speaker-now and story-now, with the latter being the 
past. And in that sense music indeed cannot represent a past tense. 
However, earlier in this chapter I have shown that music can represent 
such a tense, albeit with the musical past being location time rather 
than story-now. 
A different argument against musical narrativity mentioned by 
Abbate is that musical works have no ability to posit a “narrating 
survivor” of the tale who speaks of it in the past tense. At the 
beginning of this chapter I already pointed out that, with the term 
“narrating survivor,” Abbate seems to exclude the possibility of an 
external narrator. She only seems to acknowledge a character-bound 
narrator, and in so doing she also rules out other types of narrators that 
Fleischman mentions. Fleischman distinguishes between four kinds of 
so-called narrative perspectives, each being characterized by the way 
tense is used. Actually, by using the term “narrative perspective,” 
Fleischman is conflating the functions of narrator and of focalizor. This 
is problematic, since in this case there is no distinction between the one 
who speaks and the one who perceives. Below, I will discuss the 
consequences of this conflation in more detail. For this moment, I 
prefer to use the term “narrative position,” rather than “narrative 
perspective,” in order to avoid this conflation.  
                                                                    
28 Instead, the distinction between speaker-now – the time of utterance – and 
listener-now – the time of interpretation – would make more sense. 
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The first position Fleischman mentions is the narrator that speaks in 
the unmarked preterit, and thus adopts the position of the historian. 
When the imperfect tense is used, the events are told from the position 
of the painter, who depicts rather than narrates (63). These can be 
regarded as external narrators, and therefore as narrators that are not 
recognized as such by Abbate. Only the narrator that, in Fleischman’s 
words, views events from the position of a memorialist, is a true teller 
of a tale according to Abbate. For in this position, Fleischman explains, 
explicit reference is made to personal experience. This position is taken 
when the narrator speaks in the compound past (63).  
The last position Fleischman recognizes is the position of a 
performer. This position is also incompatible with Abbate’s account. In 
this position the present is used, i.e. 
 
[…] the tense conventionally used for mimetic discourse (actual speech and 
its direct representation), [which] enables narrators to remain within the 
diegetic mode but at the same time to “represent” (rather than “narrate”) 
what they purport to observe, and to “perform” the report of it. (63)  
 
At first sight, the position of the performer is the narrative position that 
is adopted in the case of musical narrativity. The time of the musical 
narrator is indeed the present, and a musical narrative can be regarded 
as a representation. However, when we look more closely at the 
description of the position of the performer Fleischman gives, it 
actually resembles the definition I gave of the musical focalizor, i.e. 
the performance of a musical work, rather than the definition of the 
musical narrator. This is not that surprising, since “perspective,” the 
term Fleischman uses, is more or less synonymous with “focalization,” 
as I mentioned above. In her following remark Fleischman indeed 
acknowledges that she is characterizing different kinds of narrators by 
the respective focalizations they embody: 
 
[T]he narrating personae I have referred to as the historian, memorialist, 
painter, and performer are essentially alternate focalizations of the narrator, 
distinguished not so much along a scale of epistemic access to the mental 
states of story participants or to situations that cannot normally be observed 
as along a scale of subjective involvement with these situations and 
participants, yielding the different modes of reporting I have referred to 
respectively as diegetic, memorial, pictorial, and mimetic. (220, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Furthermore, she argues that the use of tense alternations can signify 
shifts involving the focalizor, and more specifically the focalization of 
the narrator (255). However, if she defines the different kinds of 
narrators by the perspectives they take, she deviates from the definition 
of the narrator and the focalizor, as I explained earlier. There has to be 
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a theoretical distinction between those who perceive and those who 
speak, so between the (metaphorical) perception through which the 
elements are presented and the identity of the voice that is verbalizing 
that perception. But Fleischman seems to do the exact opposite: the 
identity of the verbalizing voice is determined by the metaphorical 
vision through which the elements of a story are presented. 
Fleischman’s definition of the different narrative perspectives thus 
can be read as definitions of different focalizations, but with an 
important exception. In the above quotation she claims that the 
focalizations of the narrator she mentions (the historian, memorialist, 
painter, and performer) do not refer so much to the mental states of 
story participants, but rather to the degree of involvement of the 
narrator within the story. This is a restriction compared to Bal’s 
conception of focalizor, in which a story can also be focalized through 
the mental states of story participants. Hence, narrative perspective is 
not identical with character-bound focalization. 
But regardless of the fact that Fleischman’s narrative perspectives 
are kinds of focalizations rather than kinds of narrators, the 
perspectives of the historian, the painter, and the performer remain 
incompatible with Abbate’s account. These perspectives do not 
conform to the notion of narrator as “narrating survivor,” and are 
therefore no true narrators according to Abbate. Nevertheless, it cannot 
be denied that such perspectives actually can be found in narratives, 
just as external narrators can be found. As a consequence, the 
restriction of “narrator” to “narrating survivor” is problematic to begin 
with, for it rules out many other types of narrators through which a 
story can be related.  
Abbate apparently holds on to a set of very strict norms with which 
she defines a narrative. In fact, they are so strict that they exclude 
many texts that are regarded as narratives according to Bal’s theory. 
Fleischman, on the other hand, lists a set of narrative norms that are 
less strict. She holds that narratives have to refer to specific 
experiences that occurred in some past world (real or imagined) and 
are accordingly reported in a tense of the past. Narratives also have to 
contain both sequentially ordered events and nonsequential collateral 
material, but it is the events that define narration. Furthermore, the 
default order of the events in a narration has to be iconic to the 
chronology of events in the fabula. Lastly, Fleischman states that 
narratives have to be “[…] informed by a point of view that assigns 
meanings to their contents in conformity with a governing ideology, 
normally that of the narrator” (263). 
With the exception of the fourth norm, all norms are about the 
temporal dimension of narrative. The fourth norm is, at least, a partial 
confirmation of Bal’s claim that a narrative always is focalized. Again, 
Fleischman assigns focalization primarily to the narrator, but this time 
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she adds the adverb “normally,” as if to say that focalization can be 
more than just the narrator’s perspective. Regrettably, she does not 
elaborate the notion “governing ideology” here, but she probably refers 
to the ideology that belongs to the focalizor. 
 In the other norms Fleischman states that narrative reports about 
past events, which have been ordered in a certain way, while the 
temporal order of the events in the fabula represents the default order 
of the events on the story level. This view is in accordance with Bal’s 
theory, although in her theory it is not explicitly stated that a narrative 
has to be a report about past, instead of present or future, events. 
However, it is necessary to look closer at this norm in order to be able 
to answer the third question I posed at the beginning of this chapter: Is 
representing a past tense a necessary condition for narrativity? The first 
two questions have already been answered: yes, we can speak of a past 
tense in music, and no, narrating in the most basic literary sense does 
not necessarily imply the positing of a narrating survivor who 
necessarily speaks of the narrative in the past tense. On the contrary, 
the term “narrating survivor” is problematic to begin with. The third 
question, on the other hand, has not yet been explicitly addressed. 
As I just remarked, Bal’s theory does not list as a characteristic of 
narrative that it has to refer to specific events that occurred in some 
past world and are accordingly reported in a tense of the past. The way 
she discusses events in the fabula and how the order of the events can 
be altered in the story level, which make phenomena such as analepsis 
and prolepsis possible, does imply, albeit very indirectly, that a 
narrative can be about past events. But this does not imply that it 
therefore also is a necessary condition for narrativity to represent a past 
tense. As we have seen Fleischman herself acknowledges that a 
narrator can employ different kinds of tenses in order to relate a story, 
and thus can assume different narrative positions. Moreover, there are 
narratives that are completely written in the future tense, but at the 
same time are fully narrative, such as the prophecy of the Apocalypse. 
But even if representing a past tense were a necessary condition for 
narrativity, a musical narrative would comply with it. For as I argued 
throughout this chapter, and have shown in my analysis of Rothko 
Chapel, it is possible to speak of a past tense in music; it is that 
moment in which musical sounds are regarded as belonging to a 
musical event.  
The musical past is location time, the time of the events told. It is the 
time in which the music is regarded as consisting of musical events. 
The musical present, on the other hand, is reference time, the time of 
the narrator. It is the moment in which music presents itself as a 
continuous stream of sounds. By using the expressions “told” and 
“narrator” here, I imply that the musical past and present are crucial in 
musical narrativity. Musical tense, i.e. the possibility music offers to 
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establish a relation between reference time and location time, is a 
necessary condition for music in order to be narrative. As a result, 
reference time and location time, i.e. the musical present and past, are 
necessarily attributed to music that is narrative, too.29 
The Shape of Things to Come 
Although the above list suggests that this set of narrative norms is 
absolute, Fleischman stresses the possibility of deviating from these 
norms. In fact, by making exceptions of the norms one is in fact 
illuminating these norms, Fleischman remarks, and therefore 
exceptions regarding tense in narratives are always possible (263). As 
an example she – again – mentions the use of the present tense in 
narrative, which operates metalinguistically to make a statement 
against the narrative prototype. Fleischman states that “[…] just as 
certain linguistic protocols and categories of grammar have been 
shown to be instrumental to the process of narrativization, others are 
instrumental in denarrativization – in producing storytelling ‘against 
the grain’” (264). Now, if a musical piece were to present itself in the 
present without evoking a musical past, then it would be considered as 
a truly denarrativized work. And although composers such as Feldman 
try to write against the grain in order to create denarrativized music in 
this fashion, the analysis of Rothko Chapel has shown that it is very 
hard to attain this ideal. But this analysis has also shown that it is 
possible to make the listener aware of what it is to experience stasis – 
which is sufficient to constitute a denarrativized musical environment – 
albeit within a moving, and thus potentially narrative, musical 
context.30 In other words: a composer might be able to represent, 
within a musical piece that itself can be narrative, a denarrativized 
context.31 
                                                                    
29 Yet, I do not claim that one can only distinguish between a musical past and 
present when it concerns narrative music. Musical past and present depend on 
musical tense, and musical tense is not exclusive to musical narrativity. 
30 I do not want to imply that it is simply not possible to create music that is not 
narrative. I only want to point out that it is very difficult to compose music without 
evoking a musical past. 
31 In his analysis of Frédéric Chopin’s Prelude in Bb major, op. 28, no. 21 (1838), 
De Groot argues that in this piece there is a fragment that can be considered as 
being denarrativized, as a result of the static character of this fragment compared to 
the dynamic character of rest of the piece. Given the static character of this 
fragment, De Groot concludes, it is “[…] strongly contrasting with the dynamic 
original context, one could speak here of ‘denarrativization.’ As if from a desire to 
protect ‘subjectivity’ from a disturbing original ‘context,’ the former is temporarily 
placed outside the narrative” (2002: 177). Thus here, too, it is within a narrative 
context that denarrativization is represented. Moreover, it is because it is placed 
within a narrative, dynamic context that the denarrativized character of the fragment 
shines out. 
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Giomi and Ligabue list a set of narrative strategies in music which 
are constitutive of musical discourse and which, to a great extent, 
correspond to Fleischman’s narrative norms. They distinguish between 
introductory strategies, ending strategies, the use of analepsis and 
prolepsis, and semantic associations. With the exception of semantic 
associations, which deal with associations that can be evoked with the 
listener while hearing certain musical events, these strategies are 
compatible with Fleischman’s narrative norms. Introduction strategies 
are used to “[…] find a sort of ‘organized beginning’ which has a 
function of ‘introduction’ to the composition” (1998: 46). The question 
is not how the composer starts his/her piece, but “[…] whether the 
listener perceives the beginning as having a real introductory structure” 
(46). Ending strategies are necessary in order to both represent a 
section that formally concludes a composition and to provide for the 
representation of “[…] a sort of cadenza able to suggest a sense of 
conclusion” (46). Both the introductory and ending strategies can be 
related to Fleischman’s second norm, which states that narratives 
contain sequentially ordered events. The use of analepsis and prolepsis, 
finally, can be related to both this norm and the third, i.e. the temporal 
order of the events in the fabula represents the default order of the 
events on the story level. Regarding this strategy Giomi and Ligabue 
remark: 
 
At several levels of the musical discourse we find procedures we can 
identify as narrative repeat (analepsis) and narrative anticipation (prolepsis). 
Some elements of narration are anticipated or repeated inside the general 
development of the sound text; this can happen at different levels, clearly at 
the level of events and syntagms, but also for whole sections or for the 
musical realization of some sound parameters. (47)  
 
Giomi and Ligabue discuss the ways in which the default order of a 
musical narrative can be altered. They do not mention in what way one 
can identify a default order in a precise manner, but at least in tonal 
music this can be done. One can recognize harmonic progression and 
its alterations fairly easy. In atonal music things get a bit more 
complicated. Before the listener is able to perceive alterations of a 
default order in an atonal musical piece, paradigms have to be created 
for this piece. This can be established, as I explained above, by 
comparing marked and unmarked terms. Only after this is done it is 
possible to identify analepsis and prolepsis. 
If it were not possible to create paradigms in atonal music, this 
music would be considered to be ungraspable and impossible to 
comprehend. For, as Albrecht Wellmer argues, it is the musical form 
that makes possible relating music to something outside the music 
itself: 
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While the link between literature and some kind of reality is established at 
its origin, since it can already be found in the linguistic material itself, the 
link between music and reality [hypothetical or otherwise] only arises from 
the music’s specific “formal” structure of its temporal organization.32 
 
According to Wellmer, it is the music’s temporal form that allows the 
possibility of attributing meaning to a musical piece and making it 
comprehensible to the listener. Moreover, Newcomb contends that this 
form also is constitutive of musical narrativity: 
 
The musical detours, ambiguities and challenges-to-sense that invite […] 
interpretative activity constitute […] the internal musical element […] of 
what I mean by musical narrativity. These detours, ambiguities and 
challenges are then complemented by the second element [of musical 
narrative], contributed by the individual listener, to produce the narrative 
itself, which […] may vary widely according to the listener, the listening 
occasion and the cultural context. (1994: 88)  
 
Musical detours and ambiguities are all what I would call marked 
terms. And as I explained above, marked terms can only be identified 
within a known musical context, i.e. the musical paradigm or style 
type, or, more generally: the musical form of the composition. And, as 
Newcomb also acknowledges, it is up to the individual listener to 
recognize this musical form and thus to make sense of the musical 
piece. 
The process of music transgressing style types and the establishment 
of idiosyncratic strategies of realization within a musical composition 
contribute to the creation of musical narrativity as well. As Newcomb 
remarks: 
 
As I locate these detours and ambiguities in the music and propose 
interpretations of them, I am interested in what some theorists of narrative 
call breach of canonicity […] the canonical script into which the listener, 
following subtle generic and stylistic signs, fits the action places some limits 
on what is permissible in that kind of action. The breaches challenge the 
listener’s ability to bring this succession into harmony with these limits in 
order to produce […] a “coherent” series, which means one whose parts can 
be accommodated to this whole. (88-89)  
 
The canonical script, the style type in Hatten’s terminology, can be 
broken with in order to create a unique musical piece. And, as I already 
elaborated, it is up to the listener to seek correlations between this 
individual work and the style the listener feels it is compatible with, 
                                                                    
32 “Während der Weltbezug der Literatur gewissermaßen an ihrem Anfang steht, 
nämlich bereits in ihrem sprachlichen Material steckt, entspringt der Weltbezug der 
Musik erst aus ihrer spezifischen, ‘formalen’ Form der Zeitlichen Organisation.” 
(Wellmer 2000: 54, my translation) 
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while trying to turn this work, with all its individual exceptions to the 
norm, into a unified whole. Hence, the basic act of narrative musical 
comprehension is the act of relating a particular musical work to a style 
type and to make sense of the deviations from this type within that 
work. 
Again, it is easier to carry out this basic act of musical narrative 
comprehension while listening to a tonal piece than it is while listening 
to an atonal work. Pasler expresses this difficulty as follows: 
 
In recent years, there has developed a gap between music whose 
organizational principles or lack thereof are used to stretch the limits of our 
perceptions (such as totally serialized works and some chance-determined 
ones), and music whose experience is easily perceptible but vaguely 
structured (such as some minimal music and Pauline Oliveros’ meditation 
music). Both have risks – the intricate complexity of the former may be 
imperceptible, while the utter simplicity of the latter may appear without 
meaning. (1989: 249)  
 
Atonal music makes no use of standardized style types, but rather 
creates its own idiosyncratic structures. It is up to the listener to create 
paradigms with which s/he can interpret the music. Some compositions 
allow for this creation more than others, and Pasler mentions two 
musical extremes that challenge the listener in creating these 
paradigms: serial music, which has a very complex structure (as I also 
discussed in chapter 1), and minimal music, which is almost lacking 
any structure. But music that challenges the listener is not the same as 
music that is impossible to interpret. In the previous chapter I already 
showed that Reich’s minimal composition Piano Phase does not lack 
structure. At this point I want to look closer into a serial musical piece; 
Studie II (1954), an electronic work composed by Karlheinz 
Stockhausen. 
Studie II challenges the listener because it is an integral serial 
musical composition: both pitch, duration, loudness, and timbre are 
ordered according to matrices. These matrices consist of numbers that 
represent the musical proportions by which the musical parameters are 
organized: pitch, duration, loudness, and the number of sine tones per 
note – which constitute the timbre – are constructed along the same 
organizational principles, which results in treating all parameters as 
being equally important.33 As a consequence, established tonal musical 
paradigms might be inadequate to interpret the music. The question 
                                                                    
33 I do not go into the details of the compositional method Stockhausen used in 
creating this piece. For more information on this, I would like to refer to the booklet 
accompanying the recording I used to analyze the piece, which is volume three, 
“Elektronische Musik 1952-1960,” of Stockhausen: Gesamtausgabe, released by 
Stockhausen-Verlag. Stroh (1973) and Bozzetti (1973) also discuss the 
compositional principles of Studie II. 
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remains, however, whether this piece is too complex to perceive its 
organizational principles, and if so, if this has consequences for its 
possibilities to be understood as narrative. If this music is so complex, 
is it then impossible to have musical expectations while listening to 
this kind of music? Or can the listener still create new musical 
paradigms to which the musical shapes that s/he is hearing can be 
related, and even intuit what future musical shapes might sound like? 
First and foremost I would like to stress that I do not think it is 
necessary to perceive the organizational principles of a musical piece 
in order to comprehend the music, as Pasler seems to argue. As I 
explained in chapter 1, the listener does not need to know how a 
composer organized the musical material of a composition, nor does 
s/he need to recognize this organization in the music s/he is listening 
to. The possibility of comprehension, narrative or otherwise, of the 
music does not require the revelation of the composer’s intentions – 
his/her compositional principles, but instead it has to offer possibilities 
to the listener to literally follow the music. It must be possible to 
regard the music as consisting of discrete events, which implies a 
musical past tense, and it must be possible to have musical 
expectations while listening to the music, a possibility which I 
tentatively would like to regard as an index for a musical future tense. 
Grant believes that Studie II cannot be comprehended in a narrative 
manner in this sense, for she argues that, in this composition, 
 
[...] our idea of aural reality becomes shattered. The sounds vibrate and 
move, yet break off so abruptly that they seem ripped out, abstracted from 
any natural phenomenon, even though each fragment is clearly an excerpt 
from the original. (2001: 101-102) 
 
Each musical phrase, in itself, can be interpreted as belonging to a 
larger musical whole, which Grant calls the original. The way these 
phrases are concatenated, however, implies that the musical 
composition can only be interpreted as a discontinuous entity. This 
implies that, although the piece can be considered as consisting of 
discrete events, it is not possible to distill out of these events a 
narrative thread, a guiding line by which the listener can follow the 
course of the music. However, exactly because of this permanent 
discontinuity, it is possible to predict what will sound next: most likely 
a different musical event that again will sound as if it were ripped out 
of some other aural context. The musical piece as a whole, however, in 
Grant’s view remains a discontinuity. But at the same time she 
identifies Studie II as an example of what the artist Paul Klee calls 
constructive unity: “[...] a unity within the confines of the pictorial 
frame, or here, the piece” (79-80). The composition is a unity because 
it creates a sound universe that is unique to this particular work. Thus, 
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on the one hand, Grant regards Studie II as a fragmented, discontinuous 
piece, while on the other hand she argues that the composition is a 
unity, because it creates its own universe.  
In contrast, music theorists such as Wolfgang Martin Stroh and 
Elmar Bozzetti regard Studie II as a continuous well-structured whole. 
They claim that the piece has a clear musical structure that can easily 
be identified by ear. Although Bozzetti only refers to the musical score 
when explaining this structure, he remarks that the five segments, 
which together constitute the composition, “[...] can be easily 
recognized both while reading the score and while listening to the 
piece.”34 Stroh adds that the five-segment structure of the piece 
actually is a fairly traditional one, in which contrast, repetition, 
variation, and recapitulation play a prominent role. These musical 
elements, he remarks,  
 
are all traditional formal constants of composing, that clearly are valid for 
Stockhausen, too. This is remarkable, because for instance Boulez’s 
Structures Ia, and other early serial pieces, have avoided such 
characteristics. They have avoided adopting any traditional “narrative 
character.” Both this division and structure function as an important 
listening grid for the listener of Studie II.35 
 
In two ways Stroh’s view here differs from Grant’s: firstly, he argues 
that the unity in Studie II is created by using traditional musical 
elements, instead of by constructing a new, unique musical universe, 
and, secondly, he claims that the structure of the piece acts as a guide 
for the listener, instead of being a concatenation of discontinuous 
fragments.  
My analysis of Studie II I tends more toward Stroh than toward 
Grant, but not on all accounts. For instance, in this piece I distinguish 
between nine, instead of five, segments. This distinction is not 
established by concentrating on the parameter that is the most 
characteristic of electronic music, i.e. timbre. Because the timbre in 
Studie II is very uniform, it does not offer sufficient marked terms by 
                                                                    
34 “Die 5 texturen lassen sich sowohl beim lesen der Partitur als auch beim Hören 
des Werkes leicht erkennen.” (Bozzetti 1973: 21, my translation) 
35 “Kontrast, Wiederholung, Variation, Zusammenfassung – das alles sind 
herkömmliche formale Konstanten des Komponierens, die offensichtlich auch bei 
Stockhausen noch Gültigkeit haben. Dies ist deshalb durchaus beachtenswert, weil 
zum Beispiel Boulez’ Structures Ia und mit ihnen noch einige andere frühe serielle 
Stücke alle derartigen Anhaltspunkte, alle derartige Übernahme traditionellen 
“Sprachcharakters” vermieden haben. Diese Einteilung und gliederung ist für den 
Hörer der Studie II ein wesentliches Hör-Raster.” (Stroh 1973: 218, my translation) 
Although “narrative character” is not a literal translation of “Sprachcharakter” 
(“Sprache” means “language,” so the exact translation would be “language 
character”), I think that the meaning of the term, as used within the context of the 
quotation, is preserved better this way. 
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which the music can be segmented. Quite surprisingly, it is by focusing 
on conventional musical elements that it is possible to organize this 
piece.  
At 0’10” (on volume three, “Elektronische Musik 1952-1960,” of 
Stockhausen: Gesamtausgabe, released by Stockhausen-Verlag) the 
piece opens with a distinct five-note phrase, followed by a short rest. 
Then, the first phrase is answered by a different five-note phrase in a 
lower register. This first phrase functions as an opening statement, 
because of its distinct, clear shape.36 After the second phrase again a 
short rest appears, followed by several pitched and non-pitched sounds 
with a rather short duration. Next, long pitched sounds can be heard; 
several pitches are repeated. This first segment concludes with a new 
five-note phrase with a distinct rhythm, consisting of a dotted quarter 
note, three eight notes and a quarter note. At 0’37” a general pause 
marks the ending of the first segment. In fact, throughout the piece, the 
nine segments that together constitute the work are separated by 
general pauses. Apart from these pauses, many segments also represent 
closures in other ways, such as the five-note phrase in this first 
segment. 
The fact that it is possible to point out these specific, marked 
musical events in this segment implies a past tense in this segment of 
Studie II. After all, the musical past is the time in which the music is 
regarded as consisting of musical events. As soon as the listener can 
identify discrete events in the music s/he may assume a musical past 
tense, for this is an ability which acts as an index for musical tense. In 
the first segment of this piece this clearly is the case. Moreover, since it 
is possible to divide Studie II into nine (discrete) segments, a past tense 
may be assumed throughout the entire composition. 
The second segment opens with a descending melodic perfect 
fourth, followed by a repetition of the first note and a note that sounds 
approximately a major tenth below the previous one. The perfect 
fourth, an interval that is frequently used as an opening interval in tonal 
music, functions as an opening statement here. Next, an eight-note 
phrase can be heard, which has a distinct rhythm that consists of two 
quarter notes, a quarter note tied to a sixteenth note, followed by four 
sixteenth notes. The phrase ends with a dotted quarter note. 
Subsequently, long sounds with occasional short tones are produced, 
and the second segment ends with short tones in which an ascending 
melodic major second can be noticed. This short phrase is marked 
relative to the long notes which could be heard before and acts as a 
closure. Again, a general pause marks the ending of this segment, at 
0’54”. The third segment consists of long tones, which often have little 
                                                                    
36 Perhaps this phrase can also be interpreted as an apostrophe or an invocation, and 
maybe other musical openings or musical themes can be regarded as such, too. 
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or no attack and rapidly turn louder, interrupted by percussive sounds. 
These sounds act as opening statements: they appear out of nothing and 
gradually become more and more present by increasing in loudness. 
Despite their duration, these sounds are not static and are interrupted 
by short sounds, and thus the listener may still assume a musical past 
tense here. The segment ends with a short four-note phrase, which, 
because of its distinct shape, acts as a closure. The general pause, 
which marks the ending of the third segment, can be heard at 1’28”. 
The fourth segment opens with the same long, crescendo tones that 
appeared in the previous segment. These tones are followed by random 
short tones, ranging from low to very high-pitched sounds. Although 
these sounds are all short, and thus discrete when taken individually, it 
is very difficult to identify musical events within this fragment. Only 
the fragment as a whole can be regarded as an event. This event is too 
short to evoke a feeling of stasis, but it does give an impression of how 
intensive movement can suggest stasis. Thus, just as in Rothko Chapel, 
in this fragment the musical present – stasis – is represented in the 
musical past. Only, in that piece, stasis is represented by non-
movement, whereas in Studie II it is established by extreme movement 
in which no discrete events can be identified. The segment ends with 
longer sounds, in which a distinct harmonic perfect fourth can be 
heard. This interval acts as a closure here, just as in tonal music a 
harmonic perfect fourth can act as a closure. At 1’51” the general 
pause appears which marks the ending of the fourth segment. The next 
segment opens with long, crescendo tones, followed by sounds that 
have a clear attack, but no definite pitch. This segment has no distinct 
closure, only a general pause, and at 2’00”, marks the ending of the 
fifth segment. The sixth segment does have a distinct closure. This 
segment starts with long, distant sounds that gradually increase in 
loudness, as if these sounds were approaching the listener, and then 
suddenly stop. Incidentally, during these sounds other short, not clearly 
pitched, sounds can be noticed. The segment closes with a low sound 
in a fast crescendo and which suddenly stops, leaving a general pause 
at 2’13”. This sudden stop acts as a closure in this segment. 
The seventh segment consists of an alternation of phrases in which 
short, pitched sounds can be heard, as well as longer, crescendo 
sounds. Two short pitches, creating an ascending melodic minor third, 
represent the closure of this segment. The general pause between this 
and the next segment appears at 2’29”. The eighth segment opens with 
an alternation of short and longer tones, and ends with two short tones 
at more or less the same pitch, followed by a louder pitch, 
approximately a major third lower, and a general pause at 3’00”. The 
final segment consists of three “rolling,” very low sounds, which 
increase in loudness and subsequently turn softer. They are too low to 
have a clear pitch. With these sounds, the work ends at 3’09”. 
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As I remarked above, during the piece, the timbre of the sounds 
stays more or less the same; only the density of the sounds varies. In 
this way Studie II indeed creates its own universe, as Grant argues. But 
in other ways the piece can be placed within a tonal musical tradition. 
As I have remarked throughout my discussion of the piece, many of the 
opening statements and closures are created by making use of musical 
figures that also function as such in tonal music. Paradigms that are 
normally associated with tonal music thus are still useful here: it is 
because these figures are identified as opening statements and closures 
in tonal music, that the opening and closing force of these phrases is 
that strong in this piece. 
Regarding the ending of Studie II, Giomi and Ligabue argue that 
“[...] even though the composer denies a narrative element in his serial 
plans for the piece, he seems to add a well-defined distinctive element 
as a conclusion” (1998: 48). Indeed, the ending of the piece is very 
different from the rest of the work: it gives the impression that the 
music literally “washes away.” Stroh remarks that this ending is 
created by deviating from the serial principles with which Studie II is 
constructed (1973: 221-222). This is a confirmation of Giomi and 
Ligabue’s contention that Stockhausen has deliberately added a distinct 
conclusion to the piece, and thus has inserted a narrative element in his 
music. 
But regardless whether or not the composer intentionally has created 
a narrative moment at the ending of the piece, throughout Studie II 
opening statements and closures can be heard, next to repetition, 
recapitulation and variation of musical material. Moreover, as I 
explained above, established musical paradigms still can be applied, 
albeit in a limited way. A telling example is the opening of the piece, 
in which a melodic phrase is answered by another melodic phrase. 
Although these melodies are not diatonic, they do constitute a more or 
less traditional opening statement. Or, perhaps more accurate, this 
phrase allows for a reading in which the phrase is interpreted as such. 
Likewise, other moments in the piece can be read in a more or less 
conventional manner. And because these moments act as orientation 
points in the music, it is possible to follow the course of the 
composition and even to have expectations of the musical shapes that 
will sound next. Thus, Studie II, an electronic integral serial 
composition, allows for a reading in which established musical 
paradigms still are useful to a certain extent. I would even go so far as 
to claim that, just as in tonal, acoustic music, pitch is the main musical 
actor in this piece. Furthermore, throughout the composition the 
listener is able to identify discrete events in the music, an ability that 
acts as an index for a musical past tense. Moreover, these events 
constitute a musical context in which the events can be interpreted. For 
instance, they can be interpreted as representing tension or resolution. 
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As a conclusion, I maintain that we both can regard Studie II as being 
comprehensible in a narrative manner and may assume a musical past 
tense throughout the work. Established musical paradigms are still 
useful and it remains possible to discern discrete events in the piece. 
These events together constitute an interplay of tension and resolution, 
which in turn leads to the representation of a temporal development. 
 
Although musical tense is primarily derived from Fleischman’s theory 
of verbal narrative, it is not a translation of a general account of verbal 
tense. As I explained in this chapter, it is the musical equivalent of the 
special function tense has in narrative. It cannot be pointed out in the 
music directly, as opposed to tense in verbal narrative. It is only 
because the listener can detect discrete, retainable segments in a 
particular composition, an ability that acts as an index for musical 
tense in that work, that s/he is made aware of musical tense. 
Actually, my definition of musical tense is nothing else but an 
elaboration of the process during which a listener makes sense of 
perception in narratological terms. It is the process of making sense of 
what the listener is hearing. Put differently: musical tense is the 
condition that makes musical comprehension possible. Moreover, 
because of musical tense the perception of music can be made 
discursive.  
Yet, for some, the communication of a musical experience might 
equal its corruption, a simplification. However, I maintain that music 
analysis can make a musical experience more complex, rather than 
simpler. A discursive account of a musical piece can enrich music 
listening. It is in principle impossible to grasp the complete musical 
experience in a discursive account. But by focusing on certain 
potentialities of music instead, and discussing these potentialities in 
depth, one might arrive at an articulation that is an intensification of 
the listening experience, rather than a mere description of it. In this 
way, this experience might be enriched, rather than only strictly 
analyzed. In this study I hope to contribute to this enrichment, for 
instance by focusing on another important characteristic of (musical) 
narrative: the sense that narratives move toward certain goals. 
Narratives suggest some sense of motion, a sense of going in some 
direction. Music elicits this sense perhaps even stronger than verbal 
narrative does. In the following chapter, I will discuss the ways music 
can arouse this feeling of goal-directed motion within a narratological 
context. 
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4 ENDS 
Longing for Linearity 
Musical motion is a spatial metaphor, while music is a temporal art. In 
music, movement is represented by the succession of sounds – and 
succession is a temporal notion. This succession is only noticeable 
because of musical tense, i.e. the possibility of discerning discrete 
events – the musical past – within the continuum of sounds – the 
musical present. It is because of the perception of discrete events that a 
listener can have expectations regarding the course the music will take, 
and, consequently, that s/he perceives the music as taking a certain 
course.  
In verbal narrative a similar phenomenon can take place. Novels also 
display a sense of direction, a sense of laying out a certain path which 
the reader can follow. Peter Brooks argues that it is because of the 
phenomenon he calls “plotting” that the reader experiences such 
sensations. He defines plotting as: 
 
[t]hat which moves us forward as readers of the narrative text […] seeking 
through the narrative text as it unfurls before us a precipitation of shape and 
meaning, some simulacrum of understanding of how meaning can be 
construed over and through time. (1984: 35) 
 
Through plotting, the reader seizes the active work of structuring 
revealed or dramatized in the text (34-35). Plotting thus is the activity 
of distilling structure and meaning from a text while reading it.1 In 
other words: plotting is the activity that ultimately leads to a sense of 
comprehension. 
Brooks gives different definitions of plot: plot is the design and 
intention of narrative, what shapes a story and gives it a certain 
direction or intent of meaning. But it is also the logic or syntax of a 
certain kind of discourse, one that develops its propositions only 
through temporal sequence and progression (xi). Yet, plot is the logic 
and dynamic of narrative, too, while narrative itself is a form of 
understanding and explanation (10). Furthermore, plot can be looked 
upon as the constant of all written and oral narrative, in that a narrative 
without at least a minimal plot would be incomprehensible. In this 
sense, plot is the principle of interconnectness and intention which the 
                                                                    
1 With “meaning” I refer to the result of an act of interpretation by the listener, one 
which is compatible with Hatten’s account of meaning (see chapter 3): a musical 
event becomes meaningful because it is related to other musical events within a 
context in such a way that this event is the marked term.  
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reader, or listener, cannot do without in moving through the discrete 
elements of a narrative (5). In short: plot is a structuring operation 
elicited by, and made necessary by, those meanings that develop 
through succession and time (12). 
Brooks contends that narrative, and plot as its shaping force, plays a 
prominent role in the way the human subject thinks, perceives and 
interprets the world around him/her: 
 
Narrative is one of the ways in which we speak, one of the large categories 
in which we think. Plot is its thread of design and its active shaping force, 
the product of our refusal to allow temporality to be meaningless, our 
stubborn insistence on making meaning in the world and in our lives. (323) 
 
His contention is similar to the argument I elaborated in chapter 1: 
because a human subject cannot but interpret temporality – s/he has to 
make sense of the things that happen to him/her, and around him/her, 
in time – s/he creates narratives. Through narrative, Brooks argues, 
s/he can grasp time, and, conversely, narrative meanings are developed 
in time (282). According to him, the manner in which a subject 
interprets time and in which narrative meanings are created differs 
from poetry. Poetic meanings, he argues, are not developed in time: 
 
Lyric poetry strives toward an ideal simultaneity of meaning, encouraging 
us to read backward as well as forward (through rhyme and repetition, for 
instance), to grasp the whole in one visual and auditory image […] 
[N]arratives […] are temporal syllogisms, concerning the connective 
process of time […] Plot as a logic of narrative would hence seem to be 
analogous to the syntax of meanings that are temporally unfolded and 
recovered, meaning that cannot otherwise be created or understood. (20-21)  
 
In other words: in contrast to poetry, narrative meaning is related to 
linearity, i.e. some kind of forward motion that is implied by the 
narrative, with plot being its shaping force. Poetry, on the other hand, 
arouses no real, compelling sense that the reader has to read on to the 
next sentence, the next page, the next chapter. Instead, poetry invites 
the reader to read the poem in all kinds of directions, and not explicitly 
in a linear fashion. Poetry generally is nonlinear, whereas narrative is 
predominantly linear. 
In music, too, a distinction between linearity and nonlinearity can be 
made. Jonathan D. Kramer argues that virtually all music utilizes a 
mixture of linearity and nonlinearity. He defines musical linearity as 
the determination of some characteristics of music in accordance with 
implications that arise from earlier events of the piece. Musical 
linearity thus is processive (1988: 20). It evokes a sense of motion, 
created by a succession of musical events, in which earlier events 
imply later events and later events can be regarded as consequences of 
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earlier events. Defined as such, musical linearity complies with the 
listening process I described in chapter 2: the listener recognizes 
musical events and musical phrases and then organizes these into 
larger units while listening to the music. At the same time, musical 
linearity can be regarded as a musical counterpart of forward motion in 
narrativity, as described by Brooks, while nonlinear music can be 
regarded as the musical equivalent of poetry. Kramer defines musical 
nonlinearity as being nonprocessive. It is “[…] the determination of 
some characteristic(s) of music in accordance with implications that 
arise from principles or tendencies governing an entire piece or 
section” (20). Events in nonlinear music cannot be regarded as the 
consequence of earlier events, but rather as the consequence of general 
principles, or, to use the terminology I introduced in the previous 
chapter, of musical paradigms.2 
Tonal music is an example of music that exhibits such a general 
principle. More specifically, it is functional harmony that can be 
regarded as the organizing principle of tonal music. This type of music, 
however, is not nonlinear. On the contrary: tonal music is perhaps the 
most linear music the Western listener can listen to.3 Because of 
functional harmony, tonal music is both linear – the listener has a sense 
of direction and motion when listening to tonal music – and 
teleological; it is goal-oriented. While listening to tonal music, the 
Western listener often has clear expectations about the direction the 
music will take, so, what the goal of a musical phrase might be, and 
can recognize and qualify – to a certain extent – possible deviations 
from the “normal” tonal path the music might take, and thus whether 
this goal has been reached or not. This is possible both because the 
Western listener is familiar – consciously or not – with the general 
principle that underlies tonal music and because the musical events 
seem to be interrelated. This characteristic also depends on the general 
principle of functional harmony.4 Thus, we can say that general 
principles or style types govern both linear and nonlinear music. Linear 
music, however, also exhibits more or less clear cause-and-effect 
                                                                    
2 Bear in mind that, strictly speaking, phenomena like musical linearity and goal-
directedness are not in the music itself, but are represented by the music. All these 
phenomena depend on musical motion, which is evoked by the succession of 
musical events, that themselves are representations, rather than actual physical 
entities, as I explained in chapter 2. 
3 Here, I make an explicit distinction between Western and non-Western listeners, 
since functional harmony is a product of Western culture. Functional harmony is not 
some kind of universal principle, as some musicians, composers, and theorists want 
to believe (see chapters 1 and 6). Therefore, it is not at all self-evident that a non-
Western listener experiences functional harmony in the same way as a Western 
listener does. 
4 Obviously, in tonal music nonlinear passages can also be heard. Tonal music is not 
exclusively linear and goal-directed. 
Chapter 4 
 
150 
relations between subsequent musical events, which create a sense of 
forward motion. 
Linearity and goal-directedness is more difficult to achieve in 
contemporary, atonal music, as Kramer observes. He remarks that, 
though much twentieth-century music exhibits some degree of 
linearity, only some of that linearity is goal-directed. Many atonal 
compositions are, like tonal music, in constant motion, but the goals of 
this motion are not always unequivocal (39-40). But this does not mean 
that strong linearity and goal-directedness is impossible to achieve in 
contemporary music, although many theorists seem to argue otherwise. 
Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf is not one of them. He acknowledges that, in 
atonal music, pitch does not create as strong a sense of linearity and 
goal-directedness as in tonal music. This does not mean, however, that 
he believes rhythm thus is the only remaining musical parameter that 
establishes a sense of directedness in atonal music: 
 
It seems as if in (more developed) atonality only the rhythmical dimension 
establishes a sense of temporality (whereas in tonality musical time is 
predominantly established by harmony). This would mean that musical 
discursivity is no longer entirely structured temporally. Despite the 
predominance of rhythm, this contention can be qualified, in the sense that 
both musical discursivity and temporal processes can be directed by other 
parameters (such as pitch, timbre, density).5 
 
It is not just functional harmony that gives the music a sense of 
linearity. Although functional harmony is a very effective means to 
create linearity, it is not the only way in which this can be established. 
And this is a point many theorists seem to overlook when discussing 
notions like musical linearity or musical narrativity. As Christopher F. 
Hasty remarks: “The assertion that in new music events are necessarily 
disconnected and that this discontinuity is so absolute as to negate 
temporal succession is […] unfounded” (1986: 73). In other words: 
although there is no functional harmony in a contemporary, atonal 
musical composition, this does not automatically imply that the 
musical events within this musical piece are unrelated. It still is 
possible, and even probable, that earlier events in this musical work 
imply later events and later events can be regarded as consequences of 
earlier events, and thus creating linearity, and in the end perhaps even 
                                                                    
5 “[Es] scheint […], als ob in der (fortgeschrittenen) Atonalität die Dimension des 
Rhythmus allein zeitkonstitutiv ist (während in der Tonalität vor allem die 
Harmonik die musikalische Zeit ausprägt). Das hieße, daß musikalische 
Diskursivität nicht mehr ingesamt zeitlich strukturiert wäre. Trotz aller Priorität des 
Rhythmischen ist dieser Gedanke jedoch insofern einzuschränken, als auch über die 
anderen Parameter (etwa Tonhöhe, Farbe, Dichte) sich die musikalische 
Diskursivität auf der einen, zeitliche Abläufe auf der anderen Seite steuern lassen.” 
(Mahnkopf 2000: 365, emphasis in original, my translation) 
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narrativity, although this would be established with the aid of means 
other than functional harmony. 
Regarding the possibility of goal-directedness in contemporary, 
atonal music, Neytcheva observes the following: 
 
As the main force behind the goal-directed time in music – tonal harmony – 
lost its power, the possibilities for creating a variety of contextual orders of 
musical events grew: from time reduced to one frozen “now” to the 
sophisticated structures of “multiple-directed time.” Gestures shaping time 
in music of the post-tonal age can hardly be called “conventions.” They are 
products of the composer’s particular style, technique, or time concept, 
rather than parts of the common vocabulary. (2001: 103) 
 
Rather than looking upon the loss of functional harmony as a loss of an 
effective means to create goal-directedness, Neytcheva regards this 
loss as an opportunity to represent in music other forms of temporality, 
such as stasis.6 She furthermore remarks that these new possibilities are 
the result of, what I called in the previous chapter, the idiosyncratic 
paradigms that the contemporary composer has to conceive anew for 
each composition. However, she is not explicit about the question 
whether or not atonal music can be goal-directed. 
Kramer is more outspoken about this: 
 
For a posttonal composition to be temporally linear with goals, there must 
be a clear sense of continuity, provided by the voice leading or perhaps by 
other directional processes in some parameters. Furthermore, goals must 
either be defined contextually (by reiteration or emphasis, as in the Webern 
Cantata) or established a priori (by reference to (neo)tonal procedures, as in 
the Hindemith sonata). (1988: 39, emphasis in original) 
 
Goals thus can be created either within a musical work itself, and in so 
doing establish their own idiosyncratic paradigm. Goals can also be 
created by referring to existing style types, such as tonality. In this 
fashion, the music gives the listener something to go by, to make sense 
of the music. In Brooks’s terminology: these musical characteristics 
allow the listener to plot, i.e. to distil structure and meaning (which 
depends on structure, i.e. the sum of the relations with both 
intramusical and extramusical phenomena) from a (contemporary) 
musical piece while listening to it. As a consequence, this concept of 
plotting in music is related to the process of organizing musical sounds 
into larger units, and to the creation of musical contexts, and thus also 
to musical comprehension and to the UNLL-process I discussed in 
chapter 1. It is through organizing – and thus structuring – the music 
the listener is hearing that s/he can distil some kind of meaning out of 
                                                                    
6 In the previous chapter, I have shown that it is very hard, if not impossible, for 
music to actually be static, this in contrast to the representation of stasis in music. 
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it, and that s/he might ultimately regard it as a narrative. In the analysis 
below I hope to show that this is also possible in the case of atonal 
music. 
Plotting Atonality 
Ligeti’s Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet (1968) can be regarded as a 
collection of ten short studies on the ways in which plotting can be 
elicited or disturbed. In this composition, every second piece is a kind 
of a mini-concerto featuring one instrument as soloist, while in the 
other pieces a unified ensemble can be heard. And although the title 
suggests that the composition consists of ten separate pieces, these 
pieces actually are interrelated in some way or another. In fact, I 
maintain it is possible to interpret the work as a whole in a narrative 
manner, even though some pieces of this composition, viewed in 
isolation, might appear to be non-narrative.  
The first piece, “Molto sostenuto e calmo,” starts off with the 
instruments playing soft, slowly moving chords. Between 0’04” and 
1’22” (as performed by the London Winds in the recording released by 
Sony Classical SK 62309; bars 1-12 in the score), the individual 
instruments play short phrases that seem to move in and out of those 
chords. This fragment can be regarded as being in what Kramer calls 
nondirected linear time. He explains that in nondirected linear time, 
there is no clearly implied goal, despite the directed continuity of 
motion (1988: 46). There is a sense of motion, created by those phrases 
that move in and out of the chords.7 This motion also is continuous, as 
it is repeated over and over, but there is no clear goal implied by the 
movement of the phrases and the chords. The motion is more or less 
circular. There is no clear development noticeable and hence also no 
clear goal. After all, the implication or anticipation of a goal can only 
be created by some kind of development. Thus, if there is no 
development to be discerned, no anticipation of a goal is created.  
Starting at 1’23” (bar 13), the circularity is broken by an 
acceleration of movement. At the same time, the voices are thinning, 
resulting in a very short moment of silence at 1’31” (bar 16; ex. 4.1). 
This moment acts as a closure, and at the same time can be seen as an 
anticipated goal.8 As the voices are thinning, the listener expects a 
further thinning and softening of the music s/he is listening to. And 
                                                                    
7 Again, the phrases do not really “move,” but rather suggest movement by the 
succession of sounds that constitute the chords and phrases. These sounds represent 
movement by succession. Likewise, an eventual temporal development that can be 
noticed in the music is a representation, too (see chapter 2). 
8 One could argue that all goals are at the same time closures, but this is not always 
the case. A melody can work towards some anticipated note, for instance, but this 
note does not have to be a closure. When this note is followed by, say, a period of 
silence, this period is regarded as a closure, rather than that particular note. 
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indeed, at 1’31” (bar 16) the ultimate softness, i.e. silence, can be 
heard, albeit extremely briefly. To phrase this in terms of plotting: The 
diminuendo and thinning of the texture allow for the distilling of a 
structure and meaning while listening, namely the working towards 
silence. Or, in narratological terms: dynamics and texture are the 
musical actors, as they create musical events and/or change during 
these events. At the same time, a musical context is created in which 
musical sounds can be interpreted as heading towards a certain goal.  
The first piece ends by first implying a new goal: between 1’33” and 
1’46” (bars 17-19) a loud crescendo interval can be heard; the flute, 
clarinet, horn, and bassoon play a C sharp, while the English horn 
plays a G sharp. At 1’47” (bar 20) the horn and bassoon change to a D 
natural, creating tension with the other instruments. Between 1’47” and 
1’51” (bars 20-21) the flute and the English horn, playing a B natural 
and an F sharp, respectively, resolve this tension. Next, dissonance is 
created again by the bassoon playing an E flat. At 1’58” (bar 22), 
finally, the volume suddenly drops and the piece ends with the 
instruments playing a soft chord (ex. 4.2). Thus, one could argue that 
in bars 17-21 there is a buildup of tension, with pitch being the main 
musical actor, which asks for some kind of resolution which actually 
occurs. The ending of the piece, while acting as a closure, arrives 
unanticipated, and therefore is not regarded as a goal. 
However, it is not at all certain that the tension in bar 20 asks for the 
specific resolution as it can be heard in bars 20-21. This tension could 
be resolved in many other ways. Moreover, since this a piece of atonal 
music, one could also argue that there is no tension at all; the listener 
only interprets bar 20 as such because s/he has heard a resolution next, 
and thereby retroactively interpreting bar 20 as creating tension. S/he 
can only label bar 20 as a cause after s/he has experienced the effect in 
bars 20-21.9 As a result, the listener is only able to anticipate the 
resolution as a genuine goal if s/he can remember this resolution during 
a second or later hearing of the piece. Regarding this issue, Charles D. 
Morrison, in his analysis of this piece, remarks the following: 
 
[I]t is often not easy to determine what the goals are before we reach them, 
and when we do reach them we are cognizant of arrival more through 
conditions such as agogic accent, dynamic exposure, and rhythmic caesura, 
than through specific functionally directed progressions. In these instances it 
is only after the location and functions of the piece’s structural points are 
realized. (1985: 159, emphasis in original) 
 
 
                                                                    
9 This reversal of causal hierarchy already has been described by Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1966: 804), and can be regarded as a model of the general procedures of 
deconstruction, as elaborated by Jacques Derrida (see for instance Derrida 1967). 
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Example 4.1. György Ligeti, Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet, first piece, bars 11-19. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
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Example 4.2. György Ligeti, Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet, first piece, bars 20-25. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
 
Morrison, too, acknowledges that many goals can only be perceived as 
such after the fact. He observes that it is mostly through dynamics and 
rhythm that these goals are anticipated. Remarkably, he does not 
regard these anticipations as what he calls functionally directed. It is 
not exactly clear what he views as a functionally directed anticipation, 
but it seems as if he believes that these kinds of anticipations can only 
be achieved by a succession of pitches. He contends that  
 
[…] while the ear inevitably connects contiguous (and even non-contiguous) 
pitches […] which are in a stepwise relationship to one another, such 
connections are particularly significant, and indeed most palpable, when the 
stepwise event […] connects points otherwise articulated, established, and 
thus contextually anticipated as points of “centric orientation.” In such 
cases, stepwise continuity may be heard as contextually directed towards a 
discernible goal, appreciable in light of a known structural framework, 
rather than through tendencies intrinsic to the progression itself. (159)  
 
In the terms I introduced in chapter 3, Morrison argues that melodic 
stepwise motion creates a musical context. This musical space again 
points to a known style type, within which the listener can plot his/her 
way through the composition towards a goal. Interestingly, Morrison 
seems to imply that, only when the musical context can be related to a 
style type already established, goals can be discerned. He seems to 
deny the possibility of creating a new style type while listening to the 
music by claiming that goals cannot be discerned through tendencies 
intrinsic to the progression itself. Yet, the question then remains about 
how these existing style types originally where established. As I 
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explained in the previous chapter, for many, if not most, contemporary 
musical works new style types have to be formed by listening to these 
works, since they do not comply with conventional types. But this is a 
manner of creation which Morrison does not seem to acknowledge.  
Instead, Morrison suggests that pitch-class sets form a suitable 
structural framework with which the listener can anticipate goals. He is 
convinced that the listener can perceive musical completion, 
anticipation, and resolution via the aural recognition of these sets. This, 
however, is very hard to accomplish. While pitch-class set theory 
might be an adequate means to analyze contemporary music, it cannot 
be regarded as a model for the way a listener organizes the music s/he 
is hearing. As I remarked in chapter 1, music analysis sometimes tends 
to reduce music, which is a temporal, aural form of expression, into a 
spatial and visual one. Indeed, when studying the score one might be 
able to identify pitch-class sets and find out how these sets constitute 
goals, but trying to do the same while hearing the music only, is 
something else completely. Hence, Morrison’s analysis of goal-
directedness in Ligeti’s Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet cannot serve as an 
adequate account of the way a listener can plot his/her way through the 
music. Below, I will try to show how such an account can be given, by 
analyzing the remaining nine pieces of Ligeti’s work. 
The second piece of this composition, “Prestissimo minaccioso e 
burlesco,” begins with an alternation of staccato chords and short 
clarinet phrases between 0’00” and 0’07” (bars 1-8). In this alternation 
some kind of direction and development can be observed, as the 
clarinet phrases grow gradually longer, which can function as a clue 
for plotting. Thus, rhythm is the main musical actor here, while a 
musical context is generated by the interplay of the chords and the 
phrases. Between 0’08” and 0’11” (bars 9-12), the clarinet end up in a 
long descending phrase, partly accompanied by the flute and bassoon. 
This phrase is clearly goal-directed, with pitch being the musical actor. 
The next part, however, is not. Between 0’13” and 0’16” (bars 13-15) 
fast phrases in what Kramer calls multiply-directed linear time, can be 
heard (ex. 4.3). As I explained in chapter 1, Kramer defines multiply-
directed linear time as time in which “[t]here is a sense of motion, but 
the direction of that motion is anything but unequivocal” (1988: 46). 
The phrases, played by all five instruments, elicit a strong sense of 
motion, but do not imply one clear goal or direction, and thus provide 
no clear clue for plotting. A staccato chord, which functions as a 
closure, suddenly interrupts this motion at 0’17” (bar 15). This closure 
cannot be regarded as a goal, since it was not anticipated in any way. 
Between 0’20” and 0’26” (bars 18-22) again an alternation of staccato 
chords and melodic phrases can be heard, and then a closing phrase, 
played from 0’27” to 0’29” (bars 23-24) by all instruments. This 
phrase acts as a cadenza, and can be seen as a goal of the preceding 
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part. Out of this cadenza, a single, long clarinet note rings through, 
which almost sounds like the tonic of the piece. Although it seems as if 
this were the end of this piece, from 0’34” to 0’37” (bars 28-29) a fast 
crescendo ending is played by all instruments. This part can be 
regarded as a kind of coda. 
 
 
 
Example 4.3. György Ligeti, Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet, second piece, bars 12-15. 
© By kind permission of the publisher Schott Musik International, Mainz, Germany 
 
The beginning of the third piece, “Lento,” resembles the beginning 
of the first, but instead the chords seem to move toward resolutions. 
Between 0’42” and 0’51” (bars 8-9) a building up of tension through a 
crescendo repetitive phrase in the flute, the clarinet, and the bassoon is 
created. Texture is the main musical actor here. This resolves into a 
long phrase played by the flute, the English horn, and the bassoon in 
nondirected linear time, while the clarinet and horn play longer notes 
that gradually increase in volume, adding a stronger sense of motion to 
the part in nondirected linear time, and presenting dynamics as a 
musical actor. Still, no obvious clues for plotting can be discerned. The 
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ending of this part at 1’09” (bar 14) acts as a closure. During the 
remainder of this piece tempo is the main musical actor, for a 
decelerating repetition of a melodic minor second in the flute and a 
major second in the clarinet anticipate the ending of the piece, which 
also is the goal of this phrase, i.e. a total stop. 
The fourth piece, “Prestissimo leggiero e virtuoso,” consists of flute 
phrases, accompanied by the clarinet and bassoon, all in multiply-
directed time, while the fifth piece, “Presto staccatissimo e leggiero,” is 
in nondirected linear time, presenting texture and dynamics as the 
musical actors. The sudden crescendo at the end of the piece, which 
sounds like a cadenza, and thus like an anticipated goal, is no longer in 
nondirected linear time. Therefore, this part is the only moment in 
these two pieces that the listener has a clear clue for plotting. The sixth 
piece, “Presto staccatissimo e leggiero,” also does not provide such 
clues, and neither does the seventh. The sixth starts off as a 
continuation of the fourth, that is, in nondirected linear time, but 
culminates in an alternation of static chords and multiply-directed oboe 
phrases. The seventh piece, “Vivo, energico,” begins in a similar way 
as the second does, except for the short phrases that alternate with the 
chords. The piece develops into longer chords and staccato phrases, 
which are all unanticipated. 
Despite the lack of clues for plotting within these pieces themselves, 
up until the end of the seventh piece, coherence in the composition as a 
whole is created by the referring to parts of earlier pieces in later ones. 
Thus, while it is sometimes very hard to identify structure within the 
pieces, it is possible to plot a way through the composition. Moreover, 
some kind of development can be noticed during the course of the 
work, since phrases that refer to earlier pieces are modified, and this 
modification can be interpreted as resulting from the music that is 
played between the original and the modified phrase. 
The beginning of the eighth piece, “Allegro con delicatezza,” has 
some resemblances with the ending of the third. A sonic continuum, 
resembling stasis, is represented by the repetition of the same melodic 
thirds in the flute, the clarinet, and the bassoon, each playing these in a 
different rhythm. Gradually, the pitches and rhythms change and 
nondirected phrases emerge. Then, an alternation of long chords and 
phrases can be heard, culminating in a more or less goal-directed 
melody that is played by the horn, with pitch as the musical actor. At 
1’55” (bar 37), long notes in the other instruments accompany this 
melody. At 2’11” (bar 40) a long, moderately dissonant chord can be 
heard, that is resolved at 2’19” (bar 42). As a result, while the 
beginning of this piece adds to the structure of the composition as a 
whole, its ending provides clues for plotting a way through the piece 
itself. 
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A high E flat, played by the piccolo, the oboe, and the clarinet, starts 
off the ninth piece, “Sostenuto, stridente.” Since the dynamics stay the 
same, and the only changing element is the breathing of the players, on 
the one hand this phrase provides no clue at all for plotting. On the 
other hand, however, because of its static character, the phrase suggests 
a continuation of this stasis, and this could be regarded as a clear 
structuring clue. However, at 0’28” (bar 8), the feeling of stasis is 
dissolved when a dissonance is created, as the clarinet changes to an E 
natural, while the piccolo and the oboe continue playing an E flat. This 
dissonance is resolved as soon as the piccolo plays a D natural and, and 
the clarinet plays the same D natural a little later. During the remainder 
of the piece, the notes gradually rise, arousing the expectation that the 
notes will continue rising, and the piece indeed ends with the highest 
note of the piece. As a result, this piece does not offer clear 
possibilities for relating it to the rest of the composition – it stands out 
on its own within the context of the work. Yet, it does provide clues for 
structuring the piece on its own, and in two seemingly contradictory 
ways; both by stasis and movement clues for structuring the piece, and 
thus for plotting, are suggested. 
The final piece, “Presto bizzarro e rubato, so schnell wie möglich,” 
begins with short phrases, in multiply-directed time, which are played 
by the bassoon, with frequent interruptions by the oboe, the clarinet, 
and the horn from 0’00” to 0’18” (bars 1-8). The shape of the phrases 
does not refer to other pieces, but the structure of this part, i.e. the 
alternation of short phrases and interruptions, does. Between 0’18” and 
0’25” (bars 8-9) the bassoon plays a repetitive solo phrase that 
gradually slows down – and suggests a goal, i.e. a total stop, which 
however never arrives. From 0’25” to 0’32” (bars 10-11) the piccolo 
echoes this phrase. After a bar of silence, between 0’33” and 0’43” 
(bars 13-15) short phrases in multiply-directed time are played by all 
instruments except for the piccolo. This instrument plays a long note 
during the remainder of the piece, accompanied first by the clarinet at 
0’44” (bar 16) and next by the bassoon from 0’45” to 0’49” (bars 17-
18). This accompaniment has a strong repetitive, circular character. At 
0’56” (bar 21), the piccolo suddenly stops playing, while a short, 
staccato note in the bassoon signals the end of the piece and at the 
same time acts as a closure of the composition as a whole.10 
                                                                    
10 In the score, published by Schott Musik International Mainz in 1969 (renewed 
1997), under the final note the following quotation from Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland is written: “‘… but –’ There was a long pause. ‘Is that 
all?’ Alice timidly asked. ‘That’s all,’ said Humpty Dumpty. ‘Good-bye.’” This 
quotation can be interpreted as indicating that the ending has to be sudden and must 
not sound like an ending, but rather like the arousing of an anticipation of a 
continuation, which will not happen. However, the final note acts as a very clear 
closure, albeit perhaps an unexpected one. Hence, the ending indeed might appear 
sudden, but still sounds very much like an ending, at least to my ears. 
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In the above analysis, I mainly focussed on the manners in which 
Ligeti’s work allows for plotting, with plotting regarded as an activity 
through which structure is distilled from a musical piece while 
listening to it. However, plotting is more than that; it is also an activity 
through which meaning emerges. It seems as if, in my analysis, I have 
disregarded this aspect of plotting. Yet, as I elaborated in the previous 
chapter, a musical event becomes meaningful once it is related to other 
musical events, and with extramusical phenomena, within a context. In 
other words: by structuring music one also ascribes meaning to it. For 
it is only then that marked and unmarked terms can be identified, 
which forms the basis for meaning attribution. The goals, the closures, 
the resistance against and the providing for structural clues that I 
identified in Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet all can be regarded as 
marked terms, and thus can be interpreted as meaningful within their 
proper contexts.  
Moment, Repetition, Endlessness 
The analysis of Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet shows that several kinds 
of motion can occur in music, such as motion in nondirected or 
multiply-directed linear time. One of the most extreme kinds of motion 
is non-movement, or, as Stockhausen and Kramer call it, moment 
form. According to Kramer, this kind of motion can be noticed in 
music that consists of moments, whose order is seemingly arbitrary. It 
appears as if the piece has no beginning and no ending, no 
development, no order, no movement. Kramer furthermore argues that 
it still might be possible to detect motion within the separate moments 
– although even that might be eliminated – but there is no movement 
noticeable between the consecutive moments. Each moment is an 
island (1988: 202-203). 
Since the individual moments themselves can contain motion and 
linearity, Pasler argues that moment form can still be narrative in a 
sense. Although moment form would seem to imply that a large-scale 
narrative curve is inapplicable, it can still impose some kind of 
narrativity. If each moment is self-contained and can be appreciated for 
itself, it does not need to have any connection to succeeding or 
preceding moments. Individual sections or moments indeed can have a 
number of narrative curves. Thus, Pasler asserts, compositions 
consisting of moment form only seems to resist the notion of narrative 
when these compositions are taken as a whole. Its constituent parts can 
still be interpreted in a narrative manner (1989: 244-245).11 
                                                                    
11 In a similar fashion, in chapter 2 I argued that the recognition of musical events 
generally depends on the representation of temporal development, regardless 
whether the musical work as a whole can be interpreted as such a representation. It 
is because one can detect some kind of momentary, local development that we can 
identify musical events. 
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But is moment form indeed a discontinuous form, a collection of 
isolated events? As I showed in the analysis of Feldman’s Rothko 
Chapel, it is very hard, if not impossible, to attain stasis – non-
movement – and real discontinuity in music. Although one can insert 
long pauses in the music, or juxtapose musical events that seem to have 
nothing in common with each other, the human mind always tries to 
find a way to create some kind of unity in the music it is digesting.12 
Kramer, too, argues that this kind of music still has form, and thus 
some kind of unity. He maintains that  
 
[…] even music purely in moment time does have discernible form and that 
the form comes from the proportions and/or consistencies of the moments: 
both nonlinear principles […] As we listen to a piece, we accumulate more 
and more information concerning its form. The more we hear, the more we 
understand the nonlinearity embodied in the consistency and balance (or 
lack of it) that generate the nonlinear form. (1988: 52)  
 
The process Kramer describes here resembles plotting (and the UNLL-
process I described in chapter 1), in the sense that, as the listener 
proceeds in listening to a composition, s/he gains more and more 
understanding of the overall structure of the piece. While listening to 
the music, s/he might construct a musical paradigm appropriate for this 
work. And it is with the aid of this paradigm that s/he can place and 
interpret the events within the piece.  
Although moment form “[…] uses the linearity of listening to 
destroy the linearity of time,” as Kramer formulates it (1988: 219), and 
moment time tries to defeat memory, in reality it only challenges 
memory: 
 
When discontinuities seek to destroy the connectedness of successive 
moments, we are led to search our memories for other viable connections, 
which we may or may not find. Our memory of a discontinuous piece can 
become an unordered reconstruction of the totality of its moments and of 
their possible interrelationships (or lack of relationship) across absolute 
time. Cumulative listening enables us to appreciate moments for their 
contribution to the whole. (206)  
 
Kramer here stresses the importance of repeated listening. As the 
listener listens more often to a particular piece, s/he might gain more 
insight in the music. Elements and relations, which s/he did not notice 
initially, because the music overwhelmed him/her, for instance, might 
be perceived by him/her when s/he listens to this piece more than once. 
Even though Kramer stresses that genuine musical discontinuity is 
very hard, if not impossible to achieve, he does not deny the possibility 
                                                                    
12 Bear in mind that, while narrativity often implies unity, not everything that is 
unified is also narrative. 
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of absolute stasis in music. In discussing other types of musical 
motion, he distinguishes a type of music that he calls “vertical music” 
and defines it as music that consists of “[…] a single present stretched 
out into an enormous duration, a potentially infinite ‘now’ that 
nonetheless feels like an instant” (55). He furthermore adds that 
“[l]istening to a vertical musical composition can be like looking at a 
piece of sculpture” (57), and that “[t]he context of vertical music 
allows a listener to make contact with his or her own subjective 
temporality. It is music of subjectivity and individuality” (57). This 
sounds very similar to the ideals regarding absolute musical stasis 
Feldman had set for himself and which I discussed in the previous 
chapter. But, as I also have tried to show in that chapter, these ideals 
are close to impossible to realize. Hence, I doubt whether a listener 
will ever be confronted with a musical piece that s/he could consider to 
be a genuine vertical musical composition. 
In contrast to vertical music, which supposedly is in the “now” and 
feels like an instant, Kramer argues that a nonlinear composition in 
moment time evokes a feeling of endlessness: “[A] nonlinear 
composition in moment time [the time sense of music that is not linear 
yet is still markedly discontinuous] does not really begin. Rather, it 
simply starts, as if it had already been going on and we happened to 
tune in on it” (50). Interestingly, Leonard B. Meyer notices a similar 
feeling when listening to the opening measures of Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart’s Piano Concerto in D Minor, K. 466 (1785). He remarks that 
this opening sounds very ambiguous: were it not for the placement of 
theses measures, it would not be sure whether these indeed constitute 
an opening, an introduction, or an accompaniment (1956: 184). It 
rather sounds as if the listener is just tuning in on some music that was 
already playing, as Kramer puts it. However, this Concerto is 
everything but a nonlinear composition in moment time; it is rather a 
tonal, linear work with goals.  
18 (watery variation) (2001), for electric guitar and tape, composed 
by Stephen Vitiello, is another example of a musical work which is not 
nonlinear in moment time, but nevertheless evokes a feeling of 
endlessness. This piece begins with a repetitive sound that resembles 
the sound of the propeller of a ship, together with a static, constant 
sound in which a harmonic perfect fifth can be noticed. Pitches that are 
producing, in a fairly irregular rhythm, melodic perfect fifths, 
accompany these sounds. Percussive, metallic, “industrial” sounds can 
also be heard, along with an oscillating, constant, very high-pitched 
tone. The moment the piece starts, all these sounds can be heard 
immediately. They are not introduced in any way or faded in, but can 
be heard right away at the same volume they will sound during the 
composition. This gives the feeling of “opening a door,” or turning on 
the radio, and hearing something that has already been going on for an 
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indeterminate period of time. The end of the piece, on the other hand, 
is clearly marked. The sounds stop, and the guitar fades out. As a 
result, the piece as a whole cannot be perceived as being “endless.” 
Only the beginning gives the listener the feeling that the music has 
already been going on for quite a while. 
The beginning of 18 (watery variation) not only challenges the 
notion of a musical beginning, but also the distinction between 
repetition and stasis. As I remarked in the previous chapter, both 
musical repetition and musical stasis are in a way problematic. Musical 
stasis is problematic because it is very hard, if not impossible, to 
achieve genuine musical stasis. Musical repetition within a 
composition, on the other hand, is considered problematic in musical 
narrativity, because it is believed that it does not have a literary or 
dramatic equivalent. It is argued that repetition distorts the narrative, 
goal-oriented linearity by returning to something that has already 
passed, instead of going forward.13 However, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, repetition within narratives does have a counterpart 
in oral narration, and therefore repetition in oral storytelling can serve 
as an account for the occurrence of musically satisfying repetitions 
within musical narratives. 
With regard to repetition of narratives as a whole, Brooks claims 
that “[n]arrative always makes the implicit claim to be in a state of 
repetition, as a going over again of a ground already covered: a sjuet 
[story] repeating the fabula, as the detective retraces the tracks of the 
criminal” (1982: 285). Thus, repetition is in a way inherent in 
narrative. A narrative implies always being in a state of repetition. The 
fabula is repeated in the story; the story makes possible the 
comprehension of the fabula. Hence, repetition of the fabula leads to its 
comprehension. Viewed as such, Brooks remarks, repetition in 
narrative resembles the Freudian notion of repetition, in which 
repetition is the movement from passivity to mastery (1984: 97-98). 
“Repetition works as a process of binding toward the creation of an 
energetic constant-state situation which will permit the emergence of 
mastery,” Brooks asserts (101, emphasis in original). 
“Binding” is a Freudian term and refers to the limiting of the free 
flow of energies and to the interconnecting of these energies in order to 
arrive at relatively stable states (Laplanche and Pontalis 1968: 221). 
Brooks believes that repetition of and within narrative serves a similar 
aim: 
 
                                                                    
13 Edward W. Said, in his book Musical Elaborations (1991), contends that linearity 
in music is a typical Western ideal, whereas in much non-Western music one strives 
to attain a feeling of repetition and endlessness. One could then conclude that in 
much non-Western music, consciously or not, musical narrativity is avoided by 
avoiding linearity. 
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Repetition in all its literary manifestations may in fact work as a “binding,” 
a binding of textual energies that allows them to be mastered by putting 
them into serviceable form, usable “bundles,” within the energetic economy 
of the narrative. Serviceable form must, I think, mean perceptible form: 
repetition, repeat, recall, symmetry, all these journeys back in the text, 
returns to and returns of, that allow us to bind one textual moment to 
another in terms of similarity or substitution rather than mere contiguity. 
Textual energy, all that is aroused into expectancy and possibility in a text, 
can become usable by plot only when it has been bound or formalized. 
(1984: 101)  
 
Expectation and anticipation, which according to Brooks make up 
textual energies, have to be bound, in the sense that it has to be 
possible to group them into a certain form in order to be able to handle 
them and to arrive at graspable narratives. In short: textual binding is 
the plotting of narrative; it is a structuring of expectations, 
anticipations, and meanings that develop through succession and time. 
And repetition helps in structuring these textual energies. 
Can repetition in 18 (watery variation) have a similar function? In 
this work, repetition within the piece starts, somewhat paradoxically, 
right at the beginning. The sound of the rotating ship’s propeller, and 
the other oscillating sounds, all imply repetition. After all, oscillation is 
nothing else but the repetition of a certain cycle. However, if we take 
the equalization of oscillation and repetition seriously, we would have 
to conclude that all pitches actually are some kind of repetition, and 
thus that music consists of nothing but repetition.14 This, in turn, would 
imply that stasis and repetition are identical, for a sustained tone 
evokes a feeling of stasis, while at the same time being a pitch, and 
thus a repetition of a cycle. Obviously, this would turn musical 
repetition into a useless notion. The question that arises thus is the 
following: when can we speak of musical repetition in a sensible 
manner? Can we say that the beginning of 18 (watery variation) 
consists of repeating sounds, or is it rather a collection of static sounds, 
their oscillations resulting not in repetition but rather in stasis, just as in 
an individual pitch? Or, to rephrase the question: what is the difference 
between repetition within a piece and stasis? 
Brooks remarks that the concept of repetition within narrative hovers 
ambiguously between the ideas of reproduction and change, that is, 
between forward and backward movement. Repetition through this 
ambiguity appears to suspend temporal process, or rather, “[…] to 
subject it to an indeterminate shuttling or oscillation that binds 
different moments together as a middle that might turn forward or 
back” (1984: 100). If we would regard repetition within a composition 
                                                                    
14 A pitch is defined by its frequency, which is the number of oscillating wave 
cycles per second. 
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as a suspension of temporal process, as Brooks does, then it would be 
very hard to tell the difference between this form of repetition and 
stasis, for stasis also is a suspension of temporal process (and thus of 
linearity and narrativity). On the other hand, in the case of repetition 
within a piece, this suspension is created by an oscillation between 
different moments. Moreover, Brooks regards repetition within 
narrative as a means to make connection and to understanding, “[…] to 
see past and present as related and as establishing a future that will be 
noticeable as some variation in the pattern” (99). He regards rhyme, 
alliteration, assonance, meter, and refrain as forms of repetition that 
take the reader back in the text, “[…] which allow the ear, the eye, the 
mind to make connections between different textual moments” (1982: 
287-288). Thus, repetition within a piece connects past and present, 
and in so doing it creates both a suspension of temporal process, as 
well as a context within which future events can be interpreted. This in 
contrast to stasis, in which, as I argued in the previous chapter, the 
focus is on the “now” exclusively, thereby eliminating musical tense 
and thus the connection between past and present. In short: repetition 
within a piece is a suspension of temporal process by connecting past 
and present, whereas stasis is a suspension of temporal process by 
eliminating the connection between past, present, and future. 
So, does the beginning of 18 (watery variation) consist of repetition 
or stasis? As I mentioned above, the piece starts with oscillating 
sounds. More specifically, it consists of sounds that repeatedly fade in, 
stay at a constant volume for a (very) short while, and then fade out. 
Closures between the individual cycles of sounds thus can be noticed 
(the fading in and out of the sounds), and therefore we may conclude 
that the beginning indeed consists of a constant repetition of an event. 
It is a very brief event – and this may be the reason why the beginning 
of the piece arouses some kind of static feeling, but it nevertheless can 
be perceived as an actual musical event (because it can be regarded as 
containing a closure), which subsequently can be repeated.  
Both the oscillating sounds and the percussive and melodic sounds 
that can be heard at the beginning of 18 (watery variation) contribute 
to the linearity of the piece. There is some kind of forward motion, but 
the goal of that motion is not clear. In Kramer’s terms, the opening of 
the piece is in nondirected linear time. And in more psychoanalytical 
terms: some kind of forward motion is aroused by the repetition of 
these sounds. Repetition bounds the expectations, aroused by the 
sounds, into a feeling of forward motion. Starting at 0’12” (as 
performed by David Tronzo, electric guitar, in the recording released 
by New Albion Records NA115), an electric guitar accompanies the 
other sounds by producing long, overdriven tones that almost feed 
back. At 0’46” a sustained synthesizer sound, in which a harmonic 
perfect fifth can be heard, is added, together with a pulsating, high-
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pitched tone. These sounds, except for the guitar, contribute to the 
somewhat ambivalent character of the piece, i.e. the evoking of a 
feeling of stasis within a repetitive, nondirected linear context. 
Incidental metallic percussive sounds can be heard at 1’12”, which 
have an irregular rhythm. Because of this irregularity, i.e. the lack of 
perceptible structure or repetition, these sounds do not arouse clear 
expectations, which allow them to be more “free,” i.e. more difficult to 
be bound in a more or less stable manner. As a result, these sounds add 
a touch of multiply-directed linear time feeling to the piece. This 
feeling is superseded at 1’58”, when a high-pitched sound enters, 
although it is sustained, it nevertheless gives a strong sense of linearity 
to the music. Normally, sustained sounds rather evoke a feeling of 
stasis, since no individual events can be noticed within these sounds. 
This is also the case with this particular sound, but because this sound 
has a particular mimetic quality, it does feel linear: the sound 
resembles the fast winding of an audiotape. Because of this quality, the 
winding sound can be bound. As a result, this sound as a whole can be 
interpreted as a coherent whole and as implying a sense of motion, 
which results in a feeling of linearity.15 From 2’40” onwards, this 
winding tape sound’s pitch is modulated, and a melodic line is created 
by this modulation. Now, the sound is both linear because of its 
mimetic character, and multiply-directed linear because of the melody, 
which has a sense of direction, but not an unequivocal one. The 
melody does not seem to head for an explicit goal, which means that 
the listener cannot have clear expectations regarding the course this 
melody will take. Hence, the melody cannot be bound so easily. 
Approaching 3’01”, a global sense of goal-directed linearity is evoked, 
because all oscillating sounds are slowly synchronized. All sounds 
arouse a similar expectation, for they all move toward a common 
frequency. Soon after this goal is attained, however, the synchronicity 
is again released at 3’31”. 
At 4’01”, without any warning (i.e. without this point being 
anticipated as a goal), the character of the music changes, and sounds 
with a slightly different timbre replace the older ones. Now, too, a low 
oscillating sound can be heard, but it does not remind the listener of the 
sound of a ship’s propeller anymore. The “watery” connotation is gone 
from this point on. It is mainly because of the oscillation that the 
listener can relate this part to the one s/he has previously listened to. 
During the remainder of the composition, incidental guitar sounds, 
high pitches, and xylophone-like sounds can be heard at irregular 
intervals, which result in a lack of clear expectations. At 5’45” a male 
                                                                    
15 Perhaps it even results in a feeling of goal-oriented linearity, since we expect an 
audiotape, which has a finite length, to be fully wound at some point. This point, 
then, would be the goal. 
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voice, uttering a short, incomprehensible sentence, appears. It seems as 
if the voice is speaking through an intercom, and as if the uttered 
sentence is some kind of announcement. Perhaps the voice is 
announcing the end of the piece, for, shortly after its performance, the 
piece ends with the guitar fading out. However, the listener can only 
regard the male voice at the end of the piece as the announcer of the 
ending after s/he has listened to the complete work. Only when s/he 
listens to the piece for a second, or later time, the listener might 
interpret the music from this point on as heading towards a definite 
goal. In other words: this part can only be bound after the listener has 
listened to the piece as a whole for two or more times. Thus, by 
listening repeatedly to this, or any, piece the listener might interpret it 
in a different way, as opposed to listening to it a single time only. 
According to Brooks, repetition of a narrative can be a kind of 
remembering, a way of reorganizing a story whose connective links 
have been obscured and lost (1984: 139), which in the case of grasping 
the ending of 18 (watery variation) indeed functions accordingly. He 
furthermore argues that a narrative has to elicit the feeling that the 
repetition of an entire work almost is mandatory: “It is the role of 
fictional plots to impose an end which yet suggests a return, a new 
beginning: a rereading” (109). Narratives thus have to arouse the desire 
to re-experience these narratives. And as I explained above, these re-
experiences themselves can add to the grasp of these narratives, or 
more specifically, to the comprehension of the fabula.  
Brooks interprets repetition within a narrative differently: 
 
This inescapable middle [created by repetition through the oscillation 
between different moments within a narrative] is suggestive of the demonic: 
repetition and return are perverse and difficult, interrupting simple 
movement forward. The relation of narrative plot to story may indeed 
appear to partake of the demonic, as a kind of tantalizing instinctual play, a 
re-enactment that encounters the magic and the curse of reproduction or 
“representation.” (100)  
 
Repetition within a narrative distorts its linearity. Instead, the reader is 
subjected to a repetition which might be interpreted as involuntary, in 
case the reader wants to go on reading about the next event instead of 
rereading past events. This leads to a feeling of what Sigmund Freud 
calls the demonic: a feeling which arises from involuntary repetition. A 
story, too, might be considered as a cause for a feeling of the demonic, 
since it is a reworking of the fabula. A story is a fabula that is 
presented in a certain manner. In a story, deviations from the 
chronological order as presented in the fabula can be created, as well as 
changes in frequency and rhythm of events in the fabula. All these 
modifications add to the postponement of the unfolding of the fabula, 
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in order to arrive at a story that is a particular representation of the 
fabula – but of course it is not the only possible representation; there 
are many, perhaps even countless, representations possible of the same 
fabula. For this reason, Brooks regards repetition in narration as a 
formalization “[…] that forces us to recognize sameness within 
difference, or the very emergence of a sjuet [story] from the material 
of a fabula” (101). This formalization creates delay in the story, in that 
the ultimate pleasurable discharge will be complete. When this is 
accomplished, we might say that an adequate representation of the 
fabula has been created. Thus, repetition within narrative gives aid to 
an adequate representation of the fabula, whereas the repetition of a 
narrative as a whole – i.e. the repetition of the repetitions within the 
narrative – leads to comprehension of the fabula. 
 With regard to 18 (watery variation), I explained that the repetition 
of the complete work contributes to the comprehension of the piece. It 
makes possible the binding of expectations that the events within the 
piece arouse. Yet, the question I have not yet addressed is whether this 
piece can be regarded as a narrative. I believe it is very doubtful that 
we can call 18 (watery variation) a narrative work, because of the 
repetitions within the piece. Whereas, in a regular narrative, repetition 
is used to delay the unfolding of the fabula, in this composition any 
unfolding or development is obscured by repetition. Except for the 
fragment starting at 3’01”, where the different repetitions gradually 
become synchronized, and the appearance of the voice at 5’45”, the 
events that make up the composition do not really suggest a 
development. There is only a sudden change of musical character at 
4’01” and a more or less anticipated ending of the piece. The 
beginning, too, is sudden, and does not behave at all like a beginning 
or start of a development. Rather, it sounds like a repetition that has 
been going on for an indeterminate length of time, a repetition that the 
listener just happens to tune in to. All this contributes to the 
impossibility of distilling a fabula out of the composition. Thus, 
despite the local representations of temporal developments which lead 
to the identification of musical events, and the possibilities for binding 
that are established through repetition within 18 (watery variation), 
this repetition is not a means to postpone the unfolding of a fabula, but 
is rather the replacement of a fabula; repetition is the theme of the 
piece. 
The Use of an Ending 
Despite the fact that I ultimately concluded that 18 (watery variation) 
cannot be regarded as a narrative, I could not tell for sure whether this 
piece was narrative while listening to it for the first time. As Pasler 
asserts: “[N]arrative is the sense that one has of a certain kind of a 
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whole when one has reached the end, not necessarily while one is 
listening to each and every part in its middle” (1989: 252). So, 
although I ultimately came to the conclusion that 18 (watery variation) 
is not narrative, the fact that I did or did not have the impression that 
the piece was narrative while listening to it is not crucial to the 
labelling of a composition as being narrative or not. “It is at the end 
[…] that recognition brings its illumination, which then can shed 
retrospective light” (Brooks 1982: 282). Only when the listener has 
heard everything can s/he interpret the events of the piece within its 
proper context. Or, as Wolfram Ette asserts: 
 
The present cannot be understood as heading for the future, but rather is 
understood from the viewpoint of the future. The basic relation that is 
paramount here is that between the present and the end of the work. The 
awareness of the fact that the work ultimately ends and returns to the silence 
it arose from is crucial to the listening experience itself.16 
 
Ette argues that, although the present can, and will, create expectations 
with regard to the future, in the end (no pun intended) a listener can 
only fully interpret musical events retrospectively. And finally, all 
these events are interpreted with the knowledge that the music will turn 
silent as the work ends. 
Ette’s argument resonates within my elaboration of musical tense, as 
was done in the previous chapter. There, I explained that the act of 
uttering a succession of sounds takes place in the present, as music 
always unfolds itself in the present. This present cannot be grasped at 
the moment it is sounding; the present rather is the moment in which 
music presents itself as a continuous stream of sounds. Only in relation 
to the musical past, the time in which music is regarded as consisting 
of discrete musical events, can the music be grasped. As a result, music 
is always interpreted after the fact, and thus the present can only be 
understood from the viewpoint of the future. Moreover, music can only 
make sense because it has an ending, as Luckner contends: 
 
In musical rhythm – regarded as an audible model of the act of coordination 
done by the mind – the tones, which are, when taken separately, abstract and 
finite, are related to each other in such a way that they become part of larger 
units, and ultimately become forms of movement. In order to achieve this, 
the fading out of the tones is almost mandatory: there would be no rhythm if 
                                                                    
16 “Die Gegenwart wird nicht als auf die Zukunft zutreibend, sondern von der 
Zukunft her verstanden. Die elementare Beziehung, die hier eine Rolle spielt, ist die 
zum Ende des Werks […] Das Bewußtsein, daß das Werk endet und zurücksinkt in 
das Schweigen, aus dem es kam, ist für die Hörerfahrung selbst zentral.” (Ette 2000: 
157, my translation) 
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the tones would not be finite, just as the moving form necessarily manifests 
itself in time as being momentary and provisional.17 
 
Notes, phrases, and entire compositions have to be finite. If not, there 
would be no closures, and thus no discrete events, and ultimately no 
musical grasp. The listener can only make sense of the music in 
relation to the musical past, the time in which the music is regarded as 
consisting of discrete musical events. Endless music has no ending, 
obviously, and thus is not discrete, either. To paraphrase Brouwer: one 
cannot grasp actual infinity, and therefore infinite music is ungraspable 
as well. 
In literature, too, infinity and meaning are incompatible, as Brooks 
observes:  
 
The very possibility of meaning plotted through sequence and through time 
depends on the anticipated structuring force of the ending: the interminable 
would be the meaningless, and the lack of ending would jeopardize the 
beginning. We read the incidents of narration as “promises and 
annunciations” of final coherence, that metaphor that may be reached 
through the chain of metonymies: across the bulk of the as yet unread 
middle pages, the end calls to the beginning, transforms and enhances it […] 
We might say that we are able to read present moments – in literature and, 
by extension, in life – as endowed with narrative meaning only because we 
read them in anticipation of the structuring power of those endings that will 
retrospectively give them the order and significance of plot. (1984: 93-94)  
 
Plotting, the activity of distilling structure and meaning from a text 
while reading it, is possible because the reader knows there will be an 
ending. The meaning of the middle pages is in part determined by the 
knowledge that the text is finite and that it is coherent to a certain 
extent. The reader expects the concatenation of events – a metonymic 
relation – that are represented in the text to lead to some kind of overall 
meaning of the text – the resulting metaphor. As a consequence, the 
end influences the manner in which the beginning is interpreted. 
Moreover, the reader recognizes a beginning because s/he knows there 
will be an ending: “The sense of beginning, then, is determined by the 
sense of an ending” (Brooks 1982: 283). As I remarked earlier, 18 
(watery variation) does not really have a beginning, but seems to have 
been going on indefinitely before the listener happened to tune in on it. 
                                                                    
17 “Im musikalischen Rhythmus – als einem hörbaren Modell der 
Koordinierungstätigkeit des Geistes – sind die für sich allein genommenen 
abstrakten und endlichen Töne so aufeinander bezogen, daß sie zu Teilen größerer 
Einheiten, eben Bewegungsformen werden. Hierfür ist das Verklingen der Töne 
geradezu Bedingung: Es gäbe keinen Rhythmus, wenn die Töne nicht endlich 
wären, wie auch umgekehrt die Bewegungsform sich notwendig in der Zeit und nur 
so manifestiert, daß die Form momentan und provisorisch ist.” (Luckner 2000: 129, 
my translation) 
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The listener can label this moment as a beginning, though; only once 
s/he has heard the ending. Then, in retrospect, s/he might conclude that 
the moment s/he tuned into the piece really was the beginning.  
Each piece of music starts at some point, and this beginning arouses 
the desire to listen to it, from the beginning onwards. The beginning 
elicits desire, the desire to hear a piece of music and to hear it until the 
ending of the work. To paraphrase Brooks, the beginning is desire, and 
this desire ultimately is the desire for the end (284). With regard to 
beginning and ending, Brooks recognizes a parallel between narration 
and life: “All narration is obituary,” he contends, “in that life acquires 
definable meaning only at, and through, death” (284). Life is finite, and 
because it is finite, and thus has an end, it has meaning. Hence, death is 
the final reason life makes sense. Yet, the human subject is not 
supposed to achieve this ultimate meaning-giving moment too soon, 
Brooks writes in reference to Freud: 
 
[T]he self-preservative instincts function to assure that the organism shall 
follow its own path to death, to ward off any ways of returning to the 
inorganic which are not immanent to the organism itself. In other words, 
“the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion.” It must struggle 
against events (dangers) which would help it to achieve its goal too rapidly 
– by a kind of short-circuit. (290-291)  
 
Living organisms instinctively head towards death, but only in a way 
that is proper to them. So, it must not be reached too quickly, and 
neither in a way which does not suit them. 
This drive toward the end, the Freudian death instinct, operates in 
the text through repetition and deviation. Repetition and deviation 
ensure that human subjects do not reach the end too soon, that there is 
some kind of tension between progression and stasis. Yet, the textual 
energy in narrative stems from the narrative being always on the verge 
of premature discharge, of short-circuit. Because of this, the reader 
experiences the fear – and excitation – of the improper end (296). 
Detours are necessary to facilitate the right end, to avoid short-circuit 
and reaching the end prematurely (1984: 103-104). However, as I 
explained in relation to 18 (watery variation), a narrative can only 
contain a maximum amount of detours. Too many detours may obscure 
the end it originally was heading for. Therefore, 
 
[…] the desire of the text (the desire of reading [or listening]) is hence 
desire for the end, but desire for the end reached only through the at least 
minimally complicated detour, the intentional deviance, in tension. (Brooks 
1982: 292, emphasis in original) 
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But despite its detours, Brooks concludes, narrative desire remains 
contradictive, because its fulfillment would be both its destruction and 
its meaning (1984: 58). 
Ette recognizes a parallel between the finiteness of life and of music, 
in which birth and death also play a major role. The beginning and 
ending of human lives are both present and absent in the human 
subject; s/he can never really experience his/her own beginning and 
ending, but only experiences “symptoms” that point to his/her birth and 
death. In music, on the other hand, the listener can really grasp the 
beginning and the ending. The start of a musical work does slip back 
into the past and the final moments of the piece are anticipated in some 
future, just as it is in real life. Yet, the listener can consciously 
experience this beginning and ending, in contrast to the listener’s own 
lives. Therefore, Ette concludes, in musical experience the listener 
contemplates his/her life more or less from the outside (2000: 154-
155). But, we might reply, is this then the case in all temporal, finite 
experiences human subjects have? After all, each one of these 
experiences has a beginning and an ending that one can consciously 
undergo. So, what is so special about music that stimulates the listener 
to contemplate his/her life while listening to it? 
Christa Widlund tries to answer this question. She contends that 
music has its roots in primary process thinking, i.e. the thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing as the human subject does in his/her early 
infancy. Ruth Mätzler explains that the human subject’s sensitivity to 
music stems from the time s/he has spent in the mother’s womb before 
s/he was born: 
 
It seem to be possible to connect music to modes of perception, which have 
started even before birth in the body of the mother, a body which itself is a 
resonant body. It is not just the melody of the mother’s voice, which the 
unborn child can perceive through vibrations, but also the numerous noises 
within the body itself, such as the rhythm of the heart and of breathing.18  
 
Since, in contrast to vision, the unborn child is exposed to sounds, 
Mätzler contends, human subjects have a certain sensibility with regard 
to sounds, and thus to music, that differs from the other senses. And 
because music refers back to the time human subjects, as pre-infants, 
spent in the mother’s womb, Widlund believes that music brings the 
listener back to a mode of reliving his/her infancy, characterized by 
passivity and an overflowing of emotions, a condition in which the 
                                                                    
18 “Es scheint möglich zu sein, mit Musik an Erlebnisweisen anzuknüpfen, die 
bereits vor der Geburt im Körper der Mutter, beginnen, der ja auch ein 
Resonanzkörper ist. Es ist nicht nur die Melodie der Stimme, die das ungeborene 
Kind mittels Schwingungen wahrnimmt, sondern auch ihre vielfältigen 
innerkörperlichen Geräusche, wie z.B. der Rhythmus des Herzens und der 
Atmung.” (Mätzler 2002: 6, my translation) 
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things could not yet be named. This, she continues, might as well be 
the power of music: “music activates the unspeakable, lost experiences, 
and at the same time shows that these experiences can be controlled 
and expressed, which makes that we do not become submerged in 
chaos.”19 Widlund’s thesis is that listening to music helps the human 
subject to face his/her own finiteness. Listening to music is practicing 
to die. The reason music can do this far better than, say, a (finite) 
tennis match, is because music can activate the human subject’s most 
essential and intense feelings. Moreover, it can frame these feelings in 
a manner that shows that they can be controlled and this might lead to 
consolidation (1992: 10). Thus, because music harks back to the time 
the human subject spent in the mother’s womb, and shows that the 
unspeakable events s/he underwent can be controlled, Widlund 
believes music, in contrast to other temporal experiences, can do the 
same with human feelings and apprehensions regarding death. 
Widlund and Ette are arguing along the lines of Brooks’s view 
regarding the relation between death and narrative. He argues that it is 
death that provides the reader the very “authority,” as he calls it, of the 
tale in narrative, “[…] since as readers we seek in narrative fictions the 
knowledge of death which in our own lives is denied to us” (1984: 95). 
So, just like music, narrative fiction might provide the subject with 
“information,” or, perhaps more accurately, emotions, regarding 
his/her own death, which life itself will never provide. The way in 
which music and narrative fiction might offer these sensations differs, 
though. Music can provide the listener with these sensations because it 
can control unspeakable experiences, whereas narrative fiction can 
offer the promise of “[…] a significant retrospect, a summing-up, the 
coming to completion of a fully predicated, and readable, sentence” 
(96). Fiction thus might present death as a sensible completion of a 
meaningful life, a completion that all human subjects want to reach, 
but which has to be reached in their own proper, delayed manner. 
In narrative, either verbal or musical, the forward motion that takes 
the observing subject from beginning to end has to be tempered in 
order to avoid short-circuited and improper endings. At the same time, 
these delays heighten tension, since in that case the fulfillment of 
expectation, namely the reaching of the end, is delayed. And just as 
instant gratification annihilates desire, the postponement of fulfillment 
enhances desire. Musical tense makes possible the detours that 
postpone the ending, while at the same time making sure that the 
listener can interpret these detours as delays. As a result, musical tense, 
which I characterized in the previous chapter as a necessary condition 
                                                                    
19 “[M]uziek activeert de onzegbare, verloren belevingen en laat tegelijkertijd zien 
dat die beheerst en geuit kunnen worden, zodat we niet in de chaos verzinken.” 
(Widlund 1992: 3, my translation) 
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for music in order to be narrative, is also a necessary condition for the 
arousal of musical desire. 
 
Both musical and verbal narrative can give the impression that it is 
moving in a certain direction and that it is heading for a certain end. In 
order for music to elicit this impression during the listening, the 
listener must be able to plot his/her way through the music, i.e. be able 
to structure the music and distill some kind of meaning from it. This is 
only possible because of musical tense; would the music lack tense, 
then the listener has no opportunity to reflect on the music. However, 
as I contended above, music without tense is close to impossible. As a 
result, it is always possible to reflect on the music, but this does not 
automatically imply that the music is also always narrative.  
Because of musical tense, music perception can be made discursive. 
Musical tense makes talking about musical experiences possible. 
Because of this, the listener can label a musical fragment as, say, being 
linear or nonlinear. But what exactly does it mean to make something, 
say, listening to a musical piece, into something that can be 
communicated? Ultimately, it means that the listener has created a 
representation of it. It is through representations that human subjects 
communicate, and narrative is one such form a representation can take. 
By creating a representation, some distance with respect to the 
original experience is created as well. When I give an account of, say, 
the presence and absence of goal-directedness in Ligeti’s Ten Pieces 
for Wind Quintet, one might understand what I mean, but one does not 
actually undergo this goal-directedness. To tell about goal-
directedness, or desire for the end, or repetition, in music is not the 
same as actually experiencing it. Yet, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, I am convinced that a verbal account of a musical experience 
can be an enrichment: it can enrich both our understanding of music 
and the listener’s future musical experiences. Likewise, a narrative 
interpretation of a musical piece is on the one hand necessarily a 
reduction, but on the other hand it might be a valuable addition to the 
possible modes of listening to that piece. 
Perhaps the element of a musical experience which is the most 
difficult to convey in a verbal account is musical emotion. Yet, 
according to Tarasti, musical narrativity emerges precisely from a 
series of emotions that are caused by the music itself. This would 
imply that musical emotion is a key ingredient in musical narrativity. 
In the next chapter I will examine to what extent Tarasti’s account of 
musical narrativity is compatible with mine. In addition, I will 
investigate whether a listener can comprehend a musical piece that on 
the one hand elicits narrativity, but on the other hand frustrates the 
possibility of narrativity. 
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5 MOVED 
A Psychoanalytical Perspective on Music 
Somehow, music seems to possess the power to touch the listener 
emotionally. But this is the case with whatever kind of music, narrative 
or not. Musical emotions do not seem to be constitutive of the 
emergence of musical narrativity in particular. Yet, Tarasti believes 
otherwise. He argues that “[…] musical narrativity emerges precisely 
from a series of emotions (caused by the music itself)” (1994: 74). In 
his view, musical narrativity is the result of a concatenation of 
emotions that are caused by the music that is listened to. This would 
imply that emotion, or affect, is a necessary ingredient in musical 
narrativity. More accurately, Tarasti regards this series of emotions as 
the sole cause of musical narrativity. At first sight, this account of 
musical narrativity seems to be incompatible with mine. As I 
elaborated in chapter 2, I define narrativity as the representation of a 
temporal development, and many musical works comply with this 
definition. Furthermore, I argued that, during the listening to a 
composition, the listener has certain expectations about the direction 
the music will take, and these expectations are either met or not. This 
amounts to a feeling of tension and resolution while listening, and the 
interplay of tension and resolution leads to the representation of a 
temporal development, and might ultimately lead to musical 
narrativity. Musical tension and resolution, and thus musical 
narrativity, can only be perceived because of musical tense. Only 
because the listener can distinguish musical events within the 
continuum of sounds by which the music presents itself, can s/he 
perceive musical tension and resolution. This distinction, and 
ultimately musical narrativity, is made possible because of musical 
tense. Note that I have not incorporated affect or emotion in my 
elaboration of musical narrativity, and thus my account seems to have 
nothing in common with Tarasti’s. However, as I will argue in this 
chapter, our respective accounts are more alike than they may initially 
seem.  
Psychoanalysis might be an appropriate means to demonstrate that 
Tarasti’s account and mine are compatible. “Psychoanalysis,” Bal and 
Norman Bryson remark, “is a mode of reading the unconscious and its 
relationship to expression, and as such it is semiotic theory” (1991: 
195). Semiotics is the study of signs, with signs being objects, 
utterances, or even thoughts, which stand for something to somebody 
in some respect. Human expression, which for instance can take the 
form of an artistic utterance, can be regarded as a sign that stands for 
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some conscious or unconscious state of mind. It is the relation between 
these signs and the mental states they might stand for that is studied in 
psychoanalysis. But we do not want to reconstruct the state of mind of 
the producer of an artwork, which is a specific form of human 
expression, nor predict the way in which the observer of an artwork 
will be affected by it when incorporating psychoanalytical methods 
into our analysis of that artwork. According to Bal and Bryson, the 
point of psychoanalysis here is “[…] neither the diagnosis of a psyche, 
nor its contribution to the interpretation itself, but the possibility it 
offers to gain access to issues of visual art” (197). In the same vain, I 
assert that psychoanalysis can gain access to musical issues, too. 
Bal and Bryson distinguish three basic methodological models when 
applying psychoanalysis to art: the analogical model, the specification 
model, and the hermeneutic model. The analogical model is based on 
an assumed analogy between the processes and products of the 
practices of psychoanalysis and art. Bal and Bryson remark that the use 
of this model does not protect the work against arbitrary 
interpretations, for, in this model, the theory and its interpretive 
schemas are taken “[…] as a whole, as a story in themselves, which is 
superimposed on the work” (196). According to Bal and Bryson, this 
leads up to allegory, which is “[…] a flight away from the signifier 
toward an elusive, logocentric meaning outside” (196).  
The other two methodological models are less problematic than the 
analogical model, partly because these models do not imply the 
projection of narratives onto the artwork. In the specification model, 
psychoanalysis is used as a searchlight theory, allowing specific 
features of the work to be illuminated. The goal is not to confirm the 
psychoanalytic content of the material, but “[…] to make explicit in 
what ways the presumed subject exposes itself as existing through 
various psychoanalytically theorized problems” (197). This model does 
not try to give some kind of allegorical reading of an artwork, which 
results in a reduction of the work, but expands the meaning of the work 
by giving an interpretation that can be regarded as an addition to other 
interpretations, rather than a replacement. The hermeneutic model, 
lastly, does not use the content of psychoanalysis to inform the work 
but, instead, “[…] draws upon psychoanalytic assumptions and axioms 
such as its theorization of repression, its views on semiosis, and its 
theory of the subject, and it uses these as descriptive concepts” (197). 
This approach focuses on traces of the unconscious and the manner in 
which these disturb or influence the interpretation of an artwork that in 
itself might seem coherent. 
Nonetheless, Pinchas Noy remains rather skeptical about the 
application of psychoanalysis to art: 
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[M]ost of what is regarded today as “psychoanalytic interpretation of art” is 
based on the tacit assumption that meanings are always related to a 
narrative, and the function of interpretation is therefore to reconstruct the 
hidden narrative line out of its unconscious symbolizations, displacements, 
condensations, and other distortions. The problem is that such an approach 
is justified only in the case of interpreting content, but not for interpretating 
[sic] form. Although we know that form too may represent in some cases an 
unconscious content, in other cases it may represent nothing beyond itself. If 
so, perhaps many of the interpretations that assign varieties of latent 
meaning to elements of form are nothing more than the projections of the 
creative imagination of the interpreter himself. (1993: 125-126, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Noy argues that many psychoanalytic analyses of artworks consist of 
the projection of narratives – created out of psychoanalytic theories – 
onto the work. In this way, the artwork is forced to fit into a certain 
theoretical mold, regardless of whether this mold is suited to interpret 
this particular artwork.1 Noy remarks that especially form is unsuited 
to be analyzed in this way, while the content of an artwork can be fit 
into this theoretical mold. This remark is particularly important in the 
case of music, since music is considered by many to consist of nothing 
else but moving, sounding form. When we would take this view on 
music, that was originally formulated by Eduard Hanslick (1854), 
seriously, then psychoanalysis can be of no help in the analysis of 
music. 
However, two questions arise: (1) Is it really the case that form 
cannot be analyzed in a psychoanalytical fashion? (2) Is music indeed 
nothing more than moving, sounding form? To answer the second 
question first: music can be interpreted as consisting of more than just 
form, as numerous analyses of musical works by, for instance, Abbate, 
Fink, and Tarasti, have shown. In contrast to Noy’s argument, it is 
possible to articulate some kind of musical meaning through the 
analysis of musical form. The listener’s appreciation of music does not 
end with the admiration of its temporal organization, i.e. its form. As I 
argued in chapter 1, an important aspect of musical listening 
experiences is grasping the form of music – next to the recognition of 
sounds as musical sounds. But a musical listening experience also 
consists of relating the music to extramusical phenomena, which 
already is more than exclusively appreciating musical form. 
Besides, Hanslick’s contention does not exclude the possibility of 
musical narrativity. A moving form also can be a representation of a 
temporal development, and thus comply with the working definition of 
narrative. Moreover, many, if not all the narrative elements I have 
                                                                    
1 This criticism is similar to mine with regard to an exclusively anthropomorphic 
interpretation of music, as I elaborated in chapter 2. 
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discussed in chapter 2 are related to formal musical characteristics. But 
the regarding of music as narrative does not end here. As I argued in 
chapter 2, music does not really move. Rather, this movement is 
represented by the succession of sounds. Thus, the musical moving 
form is the result of a representation. Next, this form can, and most 
probably will, itself be interpreted again, namely as an interplay of 
tension and resolution. And this interplay, too, can be interpreted.2 A 
psychoanalytic analysis of this interplay would not be less justified 
than the psychoanalytical analysis of some content. Moreover, what 
kind of musical content would a listener be left with if one would 
disregard musical form? After all, this form is articulated by the 
succession of sounds. Content is always mediated by form. But if the 
listener does not pay any attention to musical form, there remains very 
little that could be considered as a relevant aspect of musical sound, 
and which would constitute some content that the listener can focus on. 
The only aspect that would be left are the sounds themselves, as they 
are, isolated and atemporal. This, of course, might in itself be a 
valuable manner of music appreciation, but it implies that musical 
temporality is ignored. For if we would relate these sounds temporally, 
we would again create a musical form. Therefore, besides these 
isolated atemporal sounds, musical form is the only available musical 
content that can be analyzed. Access to the music, regarded as a more 
or less structured whole, can only be gained through its form. As a 
result, music is sounding moving form, but analysis does not end with 
merely describing this form. Musical form can itself be interpreted 
again (whereas the interpretation of this form can be interpreted as 
well, and the interpretation of this interpretation, ad infinitum), in order 
to attribute some kind of meaning, emotional or otherwise, to it, and 
thus surpassing the level of appreciation of musical form only. With 
this remark, I can formulate an answer to the first question I posed 
above: musical form, which in the end is more than just sounding 
moving form and which can lead to musical narrativity, indeed can be 
analyzed in a psychoanalytical manner. 
The Affected Listener 
Gilbert J. Rose gives the following explanation of the emotive power 
that many artworks seem to possess: 
 
Perhaps the broadest definition of an expressive artistic form is that it 
consists of a symmetrical resolution of opposing forces of tension and 
resolution […] An idea of fundamental importance because of its bridging 
nature is that these same forces of tension and resolution already exist in 
                                                                    
2 This is in line with Peirce’s semiotic theory. Peirce regards a sign as something 
that stands for some object and that can be interpreted. This interpretation, the so-
called interpretant, can itself function as a sign that can be interpreted again.  
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perception itself. There they constitute the expressive quality of perception – 
the capacity to perceive with feeling. (1993: 68)  
 
One can be touched emotionally while perceiving something, Rose 
argues, because in perception, forces of tension and resolution can be 
identified. Human perception is intertwined with the satisfaction that 
the subject experiences in his/her temporal anticipations and 
expectations, and the fulfillment of these expectations. This fulfillment 
(i.e. resolution), or lack of fulfillment (i.e. tension), evokes sensations 
of pleasure/unpleasure.3 
The (emotional) reaction to perception depends largely on the 
perceiving subject’s personal memory and experiences, Rose remarks: 
 
The response to any stimulus will depend in large measure on the conscious 
and unconscious ideation, memories, images provoked by the stimulus – its 
cognitive meaning in the light of past experience. But for there to be an 
emotional response of any significant degree, pleasure/unpleasure 
sensations must be involved. (73) 
 
Thus, the human subject reacts emotionally on perceptions when 
pleasure/unpleasure sensations are involved, and these sensations in 
turn are dependent on tension and resolution, as well as on his/her 
personal memory and experiences.4 
Musical structure is based on the interplay of tension and resolution, 
too; namely on the recognition of musical events and closures, a 
recognition that involves this interplay. This is in line with Rose’s 
view, for he concludes that in music, too, degrees of tension and 
resolution underlie the sensations of pleasure/unpleasure, which in turn 
constitute emotional reactions (73-74). Music, and art in general, 
consists of structures which have themselves been created in such a 
way as to explore, or even exploit, the tension and resolution inherent 
in ordinary perceptual experience. All thought and perception is 
accompanied by an interplay of tension and resolution, while this 
interplay is in part determined by the perceiving subject’s knowledge 
of reality and personal experiences. An interplay of tension and 
resolution in perception accounts for an elementary biological aspect of 
                                                                    
3 This account can be related to the way musical meaning emerges, which I 
explained in chapter 3: a musical event becomes meaningful because it is related to 
other musical events within a context in such a way that this event is the marked 
term. An event is marked because it stands out in the music, i.e. that is considered as 
tense in relation to its context. As a consequence, meaning – as a result of 
markedness – and pleasure/unpleasure – evoked by the interplay of expectation and 
(lack of) fulfillment – are established in a similar fashion. 
4 Moreover, the recognition of tension and resolution depends on the individual 
listener, too. As I argued in chapter 2, music is not physically tense or resolved. 
Rather, it is the listener who interprets musical events as wanting to lead to other 
events. 
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perception, i.e. the capacity to perceive with feeling. Since music, too, 
is based on the interplay of tension and resolution, there is a 
correspondence in type of structure between the opposing forces of 
tension and resolution in music and in perception. As a result, it is to 
be expected that these forces are also constitutive of the emotional 
qualities of music. 
David Epstein argues that music deals with a fundamental aspect of 
the subject’s humanity; the need to organize the passage of time. Music 
that speaks to this innateness arouses, according to Epstein, a deep 
fulfillment: 
 
[The] various modes by which our innate sense of periodicity is played with 
exert affective effect. In their special ways, they deal with this fundamental 
aspect of our humanity – our need to organize the passage of time, and with 
a physiology has evolved in a way that makes this organization possible. 
Music that speaks to this innateness, which deals congruently with these 
propensities is, not surprisingly, a deep fulfillment. Obviously this 
congruence enjoys a broad spectrum of means. All of them play with our 
expectations, and ultimately, respect them. The satisfaction that results 
complements those other aspects of affect that deal with musical symbolism, 
and through it, probe our inner states of being. (1993: 121-122)  
 
Epstein furthermore claims that motion has long been recognized as a 
prime component of musical feeling (100). He concludes that musical 
motion thus has to be intimately tied to musical affect: 
 
It is motion, with its correlated affect, that makes ultimate sense of the 
music, the nature of its flow – in brief, how it will “go.” In this respect, 
motion subsumes, integrates, and provides the broadest context for all other 
musical elements. (101) 
 
Epstein does not elaborate why exactly this is so, but when we relate 
his contention to Rose’s account of emotive perception and to my 
account of musical tense, it is possible to give an explanation. Music is 
some kind of organization of the passage of time, and this organization 
has been made perceptible precisely because music is based on a 
structure of tension and resolution, for the passage of time is marked 
by moments of tension and resolution. Therefore, it is because of the 
interplay of tension and resolution (and thus because of musical tense) 
that musical motion can be perceived at all. Musical motion and 
tension/resolution are two sides of the same coin. As a result, the 
relation between musical motion and the listener’s emotional response 
to music can be explained, since it is the interplay of tension and 
resolution that is responsible for both the listener’s capacity to perceive 
with feeling and the possibility of perceiving musical motion. 
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In Epstein’s view, music embodies a fusion of affective qualities and 
musical structures, which are often symbolic. He admits that we cannot 
and need not describe, by means of language, the feelings evoked by 
the music. Furthermore, Epstein claims that the affect of the artwork is 
unique, impervious to translation across media. He does not regard 
translation as a necessity, though. What he wants to understand is in 
what way motion in music is responsible for the affective qualities of 
the music (119). My contention is that music has these qualities 
because tension/resolution and motion are necessarily related to each 
other. Epstein, however, does not discuss this possible explanation. He 
only argues that, if we would investigate the musical symbols that are 
responsible for the emotional response the listener gives, we would 
enhance our knowledge of affects (100). 
Epstein derives his account of musical affect from Suzanne Langer’s 
remarks. Music, she suggests, can articulate with clarity and precision 
subtle complexes of feeling that language, for all its denotative power, 
cannot even name: “A composer not only indicates, but articulates 
subtle complexes of feeling that language cannot even name, let alone 
set forth; he knows the forms of emotion and can handle them, 
‘compose’ them” (1976: 222, emphasis in original). Therefore, Epstein 
concludes, “[…] music, in its affective connotations, provides a 
symbolic representation of an inner state” (1993: 96). Here, Epstein 
seems to suggest that music can represent human feelings. In other 
words: the listener recognizes emotions that are actually represented by 
the music. If he indeed does suggest this, then music is more 
denotative than he claims it is. After all, he seems to argue that the 
listener can read the emotions that are represented musically. However, 
I prefer to understand an inner state as being aroused in the listener by 
the music, without the need of this state actually being represented by 
the music. Hence, the representation of emotion in music is not 
necessary in order to establish a relation between music and emotion.  
The fact that Epstein follows Langer in regarding music as a 
symbolic representation of an inner state has important consequences 
for his view on the relation between affect and contemporary, atonal 
musical compositions. Because this kind of music does not make use 
of traditional harmony and melody, Epstein concludes that no specific 
affective connotations exist (119). Atonal musical compositions create 
their own idiosyncratic universe and they do not make use of 
established musical conventions. To use the terminology I introduced 
in chapter 3: these musical works do not correlate to style types, and 
musical paradigms have to be created anew for each of these kinds of 
pieces. Therefore, Epstein concludes that contemporary music cannot 
represent emotional states that subsequently can be recognized by the 
listener. This is consistent with his account of the relation between 
music and emotion, but implies that the listener cannot be touched 
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emotionally by this kind of music. Only music that uses traditional 
tonal harmony can be emotional, Epstein seems to contend. The view 
that an inner emotional state is aroused within the listener by the music 
because of its movement, without the need of this inner state really 
being represented by the music, on the other hand, does not imply this. 
In this view, music does not have to represent some emotion that the 
listener subsequently recognizes, and this allows contemporary music 
to be able to cause emotional reactions, too.  
Epstein, for his part, seems to regard musical representations as 
actual representations of affect, rather than as signs that arouse 
affective states performatively. Moreover, he claims that our insight 
into affective states, caused by the music, may be more precisely 
grasped if we can determine the nature of musical symbolism itself 
(96). This nature has to be found in musical motion, for it is this 
characteristic of music that is responsible for arousing musical feeling. 
If Epstein is implying that affect can somehow be located in the 
musical symbol itself – which he does not explicitly state, but which he 
seems to imply by suggesting a relation between the nature of musical 
symbolism and the nature of affective states – then his account is at 
odds with Isobel Armstrong’s, who follows Freud’s conception of 
affect. She explains that affect is a triple combination of bodily 
discharge, perception of that motor action and a qualitative assessment 
of pleasure or pain, held together by an indefinable “core” experience 
(2000: 110). Emotions, feelings, passions, moods, anxiety, discharge of 
psychic energy, motor innervation, pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, rapture, 
and depression are all affects, Armstrong remarks. She differentiates 
between these affects and does not regard them to be similar (108). 
Nevertheless, while referring to Freud, Armstrong does argue that 
every affect includes both particular motor discharges and certain 
feelings. These feelings are both direct feelings of pleasure and 
unpleasure related to the affect, perception and interpretation of those 
feelings: 
 
An affect includes in the first place particular motor innervations or 
discharges and secondly certain feelings; the latter are of two kinds – 
perception of the feelings that have occurred and the direct feelings of 
pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, give the affect its keynote. But I 
do not think that with this enumeration we have arrived at the essence of 
affect. We seem to see deeper in the case of some affects and to recognize 
that the core which holds the combination we have described together is the 
reception of some particular significant experience. (Freud, as quoted in 
Armstrong 2000: 110) 
 
In short: affect is both a bodily reaction and the interpretation of this 
reaction. As a consequence, because of its bodily aspect, affect cannot 
be a characteristic of the artwork itself.  
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But art, in a sense, can act as a temporal suspension of the feeling of 
being out of control that is associated with affect. Some artworks can 
be interpreted as representing situations that can be characterized as 
being affective, and which are subsequently resolved. In this way, the 
artwork might give the impression that such situations and the related 
emotions can be overcome. Yet, Armstrong argues, this kind of 
representation is subject to a paradox, for successful representation 
annihilates affect:  
 
The poem as successful triumph over depression is the defeat of affect […] 
Achieved language, betokening separation from the mother, the matricide 
which summons language because separation enables language to stand in 
for the lost object, engenders symbol-making but represses affect as a 
necessary outcome of its success. It has achieved the work of full 
representation rather than what Hanna Segal called the search for a primitive 
equivalent of experience, an equivalent which would be a kind of quasi-
object, not a symbol. (112)  
 
Artworks might for instance stand in for a lost object, a loss that is the 
cause of, for instance, grief. These symbols might then heal the grief in 
a certain sense (at least within the context of the representation), but at 
the same time it represses affect. Now it functions as a full 
representation rather than as an equivalent of experience. Such an 
equivalent, Armstrong concludes, cannot be a symbol. Affect is a kind 
of energy and bodily discharge, which cannot be fully captured 
symbolically. At most, representations can be an impetus for an 
affective reaction. Or, as Rose puts it, “[…] human emotion cannot 
exist embedded in the inorganic structure of aesthetic form. The 
structure can only offer the necessary perceptual conditions for an 
emotional response to occur” (1993: 71). 
Ludwig Haesler follows Armstrong in contending that music is an 
object that can fill the gap, created by the separation of one person 
from another. However, as I will explain below, he has a conception of 
affect, which is in conflict with both Armstrong’s and Rose’s account 
of affect. Haesler defines “object” as the relational aspect of specific 
forms of involvement with another person, including the affective 
interchange with that person. Object is the term for an internalized 
experiential structure, including the specific complex affective modes 
and patterns of experiencing and of relating and interacting with 
another person (1992: 32). These objects are formed by fantasizing, 
and subsequently are projected onto outer material things to represent 
them. In this way, a person may fill the gap that has been created in the 
course of having to realize the not being with one another. This gap 
comes to the fore when experiencing the loss of unity with the other 
longed and sought for, originally with the mother. To compensate for 
Chapter 5 
 
184 
this loss, a sort of substitute is formed in a fantasy, allowing it to 
recreate, dominate and master, in an illusionary manner, what is absent 
in reality, including the whole spectrum of affective implications of 
this process. Following Donald W. Winnicott, Haesler calls those 
objects that are meant to fill this gap in this specific manner 
transitional objects. These are mainly formed in a specific 
developmental phase during infancy, although the transitional object 
will continue functioning well into adulthood. Haesler argues that they 
form “[…] the basis of creative fantasy, of play, artistic creativity, 
creative playful thinking, of philosophical and religious thinking in 
later life” (33).  
Since, according to Haesler, musical and affective semantics are 
intimately related to each other, music can have the quality and 
function of such an object:  
 
Musical and affective semantics are […], being born from the same matrix, 
intimately related to each other so that […] music may well acquire, by its 
specific sensual structure and quality, the dynamic quality and function of 
an object, by representing within and through its specific semantic structures 
of iconical, indexical and symbolical qualities the specific affective 
semantical structures and qualities of the dynamical mutual interchange 
between the evolving self and object. (36-37) 
 
Because Haesler maintains that something like an affective semantic 
structure can be articulated, his account of affect is at odds with 
Armstrong’s. Armstrong regards affect as both a bodily reaction and 
the interpretation of this reaction. Therefore, affect cannot be a 
characteristic of a (musical or other kind of) symbol. Yet, by relating 
the terms “semantic” and “structure” to affect, Haesler does imply that 
affects can be such a characteristic.  
As I argued before, music is not primarily a symbolic representation 
of an inner state. Instead, an inner state is aroused in the listener by the 
music, without the need, or, more accurately, the possibility, of this 
inner state really being represented by the music. It might be possible 
that music can function as an object that fills a gap that is created by 
the separation of one person from another. However, this is not 
because musical and affective semantic structures are intimately 
related to each other. It is impossible to speak of affective semantic 
structures. Because the human subject can interpret affects, some kind 
of meaning, and thus semantics, can be attributed to affect. But the 
affect underlying this meaning cannot be fully articulated in any 
structured (or unstructured) manner in music or otherwise, because of 
the bodily aspect of affect. Rather, music can function as a transitional 
object because it can be interpreted as representing situations that can 
be characterized as being affective, and which are subsequently 
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resolved.5 But, as Armstrong argues, this means that affect is 
annihilated. As a result, music, through its interplay of tension and 
resolution, can arouse affect, while it is impossible to speak of affect as 
a proper characteristic of music itself. 
How does all this relate to Tarasti’s account of musical narrativity? 
As I explained at the beginning of this chapter, he holds that musical 
narrativity emerges precisely from a series of emotions, which are 
caused by the music itself. In the preceding discussion I concluded that 
one of the reasons that affective responses are aroused in the listener is 
because music is based on a structure of tension and resolution. It is the 
fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of anticipations, aroused by the 
interplay of tension and resolution that can cause sensations of 
pleasure/unpleasure. This interplay is an index for musical tense, i.e. 
the possibility of discerning discrete events within the continuum of 
sounds. It is because of the recognition of discrete events that the 
music can evoke some sense of linearity and goal-directedness, which 
is the result of the listener’s perception of an interplay of tension and 
resolution, and reacts affectively to music. At the same time, the 
interplay of tension and resolution leads to the representation of a 
temporal development, and might ultimately result in musical 
narrativity. Thus, in the end, both musical narrativity and affective 
responses to music can be caused by the same phenomenon, i.e. the 
interplay of tension and resolution. As a consequence, Tarasti’s 
account of musical narrativity is not as remote from mine as it may 
seem; the same cause underlies both accounts. 
Traumatic Listening? 
The listener can be affected by music because of the interplay of 
musical tension and resolution, which might result in the music’s 
linearity and goal-directedness. One of the reasons that a listener wants 
to listen to music might be because s/he knows it can affect him/her. 
But does this also mean that s/he has a compulsion to listen to music, 
because of the relation between affect and musical linearity and goal-
directedness? Is this relation the cause of the desire that makes the 
listener want to listen further? 
If it is really only musical affect that the listener is longing for when 
listening to music, then we can conclude that it is not only because of 
the relation between affect and musical linearity and goal-directedness 
that s/he wants to listen to music. After all, the interplay of tension and 
resolution is just one of the possible ways in which music can arouse 
affect. A composition that does not show a predominant linearity or 
                                                                    
5 Thus, music can be interpreted as representing something, but music cannot be 
seen as a symbolic representation with a more or less fixed meaning, as Haesler 
seems to imply by regarding semantics as a property of musical representation. 
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goal-directedness – no inclination to head towards an end – is not 
automatically unpleasurable to listen to. If this were the case, then we 
could even conclude that listening to all non-narrative music would be 
unpleasurable. Therefore, we cannot conclude that listening to music, 
which is not linear or goal-directed, is not pleasurable at all. Moreover, 
the interplay of tension and resolution does not necessarily have to lead 
to music that is predominantly linear and goal-directed, although 
linearity and goal-directedness always imply this interplay. As a result, 
music that shows little or no linearity or goal-directedness, such as 
some atonal compositions, is not necessarily unpleasurable, for an 
interplay of tension and resolution might still be noticeable. 
But what about music that, on the one hand, displays some kind of 
development, but on the other hand frustrates this development? Music 
that on the one hand hints at narrativity, on the other hand ends up 
being non-narrative. Is this music unpleasurable to listen to, because 
the desire for the end is aroused, yet not fulfilled? Referring to this 
kind of music, Kiene Brillenburg Wurth argues that “[…] these musics 
display or enact the (violent) break in the context, the paradox of the 
immemorial, and, in relation to this, the inability of closure or 
resolution that also typifies the ‘experience of trauma’” (2002: 255, 
emphasis in original). She regards music that both represents and 
frustrates temporal development, by lacking closure, and therefore 
fulfillment, as enactments of traumatic events. With “enactment” she 
refers to the possibility of music voicing or staging “[…] a rupture 
embodying or performing the rupture of trauma: a rupture that resists 
narrative integration and, as such, resist an inclusive synthesis” (255, 
emphasis in original). Such music thus can be regarded as a 
representation of what a traumatic event is: an event that resists 
narrative integration. So, clearly this does not mean that listening to 
this kind of music is a traumatic event for the listener. Rather, 
Brillenburg Wurth recognizes a structural analogy between this kind of 
music and traumatic events.  
Following Judith Herman, Brillenburg Wurth defines a traumatic 
experience as “[…] an intrusive experience of an overwhelming and 
often terrifying event that […] is not so much out-of-the-ordinary 
because it occurs rarely, outside the range of everyday life, but because 
it overthrows and interrupts ‘the ordinary human adaptations to life’” 
(249). As a result, 
 
[…] traumatic events are those events for which no context is (as yet) 
available to deal with them in an effective manner: to place or situate these 
events, to associate them with previous experiences in the networks of 
memory, and to thus integrate them in existing meaning schemes. (249) 
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Referring to studies of the work of Pierre Janet on memory and trauma, 
done by Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, Brillenburg 
Wurth furthermore argues that traumatic memory is outside the reach 
of narrative memory and language. It remains forgotten because it is 
not stored in an available memory network, and yet it remains 
unforgettable because it has not yet been processed by those networks 
(253-254). 
However, the notion of traumatic experience, as Brillenburg Wurth 
uses it, is not unproblematic, as Ernst van Alphen’s account of the 
relation between experience, memory, and trauma shows. This account 
differs from Janet’s, and thus from Brillenburg Wurth’s, in the sense 
that Van Alphen speaks of the symbolic order and of discursivity, 
rather than of mental schemes or networks. In so doing, he is implying 
that an experience can no longer be seen as strictly individual:  
 
Although experience is subjectively lived, it is at the same time culturally 
shared […] Experiences are not only culturally shared because they are 
grounded on cultural discourses; this shared background also makes 
experiences and memories “sharable.” The discourse that made them 
possible is also the discourse in which we can convey them to other humans. 
Our experiences and memories are therefore not isolating us from others; 
they enable interrelatedness – culture. (1999: 37)  
 
Our experiences and memories make culture possible. At the same 
time, experience depends on discourse to come about, as Van Alphen 
asserts, after feminist scholars such as Teresa de Lauretis and Joan W. 
Scott: “[F]orms of experience do not just depend on the event or 
history that is being experienced, but also on the discourse in which the 
event is expressed/thought/conceptualized” (24). An event only 
becomes an experience once it has been made discursive. The notion of 
experience already implies a certain degree of distance from the event, 
Van Alphen contends: “[E]xperience is the transposition of the event to 
the realm of the subject. Hence the experience of an event is already a 
representation of it and not the event itself” (27, emphasis in original). 
Trauma, then, is the impossibility of experiencing, and subsequently 
memorizing and representing, an event. Therefore, Van Alphen argues, 
it is contradictory to speak of traumatic experience or memory. 
Experience is somehow discursive, while trauma is the impossibility of 
dealing with an event in a discursive manner (26). Thus, Brillenburg 
Wurth’s characterization of traumatic events as “[…] precisely those 
events that are marked by a lack of distance, a lack of mediation” 
(2002: 249) does seem to comply with Van Alphen’s account. Yet, her 
definition of a traumatic experience (a term which in itself already is a 
contradiction in Van Alphen’s view) as an intrusive experience of an 
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overwhelming and often terrifying event is at odds with Van Alphen’s 
account.  
As I mentioned above, Brillenburg Wurth argues that some musical 
pieces can be labeled as representations of the phenomenon of a 
traumatic event, because these pieces do not allow for closure or 
resolution. She asserts that, if the events of a musical piece cannot be 
brought together in any way on some kind of metalevel, so that if the 
music cannot be related to an appropriate style type, then this piece is 
said to be a representation of what a traumatic event is (2002: 268). As 
an example she takes a musical piece that starts off tonally, using 
functional harmony. “[I]f the tonal center suddenly falls apart within a 
specifically tonal setting,” Brillenburg Wurth explains, “this catches 
the ‘autonomous gaze of experience’ off-guard, leaving it with little 
else to feed on so as to organize and control listening as a tonal, 
synthetic listening” (264). Because the piece begins tonally, a sudden 
disruption of tonality cannot be united in any way with the tonal 
context, but at the same time the listener cannot think of an alternative 
style type to relate the music to instead of functional harmony. 
Therefore, Brillenburg Wurth argues, tonal listening is the only 
remaining option. As a result, the “[…] synthetic activity bumps 
against a sonorous matter that literally resists to be brought into 
relation […] and in this way opposes a formative activity feeding on 
recall, recognition, and integration” (265). When disruptions occur 
frequently, but with each disruption being different, this hinders the 
recognition of the specific disruption, which leads to fragmentation of 
the music. This, Brillenburg Wurth concludes, means that, after the 
disruption, the music never regains a final synthesis; the disruptions 
leave a gap in the whole of the music (266). And this, she argues, in 
turn leads to an absence of framework, of a style type, or metalevel as 
she calls it, in which this music can be fit, and subsequently can be 
remembered, which results in the music being a representation of what 
a traumatic event is.6 Yet, is the absence of an appropriate style type, 
and with it the inability of closure or resolution, sufficient to establish 
such a representation? Trauma might imply the inability of closure, 
resolution, and the absence of a framework. However, this does not 
mean that the inability of closure or resolution and the absence of a 
framework automatically implies trauma. There is more to trauma than 
just this inability. 
In order to show this, I would like to refer again to Van Alphen’s 
account of trauma. He claims that one of the reasons many Holocaust 
survivors cannot give a proper account of what they underwent, is 
                                                                    
6 Listening to music always leaves gaps in the memory of that music, since it is 
impossible to remember all of the music that is listened to. This, however, has 
nothing to do with this music being a representation of the phenomenon of trauma. 
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because there exists a lack of a plot or narrative frame, by means of 
which the events of the Holocaust can be narrated as a meaningful 
coherence (1999: 28). This is more or less what Brillenburg Wurth 
contends regarding traumatic events, too. However, Van Alphen adds 
that the plots or narrative frames that are available or that are inflicted 
are unacceptable, because they do not do justice to the way in which 
one partakes in the event:  
 
Narrative frameworks allow for an experience of (life) histories as 
continuous unities. It is precisely this illusion of continuity and unity that 
has become fundamentally unrecognizable and unacceptable for many 
survivors of the Holocaust. The camp experience continues, whereas the 
camps only persist in the forms of Holocaust museums and memorials. The 
most elementary narrative framework, which consists of the continuum of 
past, present, and future, has disintegrated […] It is precisely for [the 
survivors, for whom] the past of the Holocaust continues that narrative 
frameworks that make use of the sequence past, present, and future are 
inadequate. (35)  
 
Linearity, i.e. the sequence past, present, and future, do not coherently 
apply when characterizing the way in which Holocaust survivors 
continuously, i.e. in the present, undergo the camp events, which have 
happened in the past. There are no narrative frames available with 
which they can make these events discursive, and thus make them into 
experiences and a part of the past. 
I would like to suggest that music can be said to be a proper 
representation of the phenomenon of a traumatic event, as soon as this 
music generates similar impossibilities regarding the musical past, 
present, and future. When it is no longer possible to distinguish in 
music between discrete musical events, that belong to the musical past, 
and the continuous unfolding of musical sounds, which is the present, 
then this music can be regarded as such a representation. This implies 
that this kind of music equals the absence of musical tense in music, 
since musical tense is supposed to establish a relation between the 
unfolding of musical sounds and the representation of events, that is, 
between the musical present and the musical past. Musical tense 
ensures a distance between the music and the listener, a distance that is 
gone in music that I would regard as a proper representation of what a 
traumatic event is. Musical tense makes musical events – and 
ultimately the musical work as a whole – discursive. Music that lacks 
musical tense cannot be framed anymore. Neither can it be regarded as 
a representation of events, for events are only represented in the 
musical past. Moreover, the listener cannot retain music that exhibits 
these characteristics, nor can s/he reflect upon it.  
However, I doubt whether such music actually exists. It goes 
without saying that a listener cannot literally remember every moment 
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of a piece of music s/he has been listening too, but this does not have 
to lead to the impossibility of reflecting on the music. Even if the 
music was ungraspable and/or chaotic, it is close to impossible to 
arrive at a complete lack of distance between the music and the 
listener, caused by the absence of musical tense. It is as hard to create 
actual musical stasis, as it is to create music that lacks musical tense.7 
In fact, as I explained in the previous chapter, stasis equals focusing on 
the “now” exclusively, thereby eliminating musical tense and thus the 
connection between past and present. Hence, stasis equals the absence 
of musical tense and thus equals music that is a representation of the 
phenomenon of a traumatic event. As a result, it is as impossible to 
create music that can be regarded as a proper representation of this 
phenomenon as it is to attain musical stasis. On the other hand, below I 
will try to show that certain sounds might be regarded as a 
representation of the phenomenon of a traumatic event. Yet, it is close 
to impossible to create, through musical structures alone, a musical 
piece that could act as such a representation.8 
In order to show why a proper representation of the phenomenon of 
a traumatic event cannot be constituted through musical structures, I 
would like to refer to a composition by Louis Andriessen; Sweet for 
recorders (1964), for alto recorder and tape. On the first page of the 
score (as published by Donemus Amsterdam in 1964), Andriessen 
writes the following introduction: 
 
Sweet for recorders is a piece for treble (alto) recorder solo where at a 
certain moment something happens, which is known in the [sic] psychiatry 
as a “black-out” (mental block). The soloist is incapable to continue playing, 
one hears a continuous grey emptiness during 1’45”; and after that period 
the soloist continues, not, or hardly influenced by his passed psycological 
[sic] situation (which is in this composition an auditive situation); or it 
should be the fact that he hardly plays new musical material, but most 
repetitions of previous musical elements. 
 
Indeed, the piece begins with a virtuoso recorder part, in which large 
intervals and complicated rhythms can be heard. Then, at a very 
                                                                    
7 But I do not want to imply that, because all music has musical tense, all music is 
narrative. As I argued in chapter 3, musical tense is necessary for musical 
narrativity, but not vice versa. Ergo, musical tense does not automatically imply 
musical narrativity. 
8 In my view, the only musical structure that really is static and could act as such a 
representation would consist of a single, uniform sound, which will sound forever 
and has always sounded. As soon as a uniform sound stops, we can identify a 
closure. The result would then be that we have arrived at a piece of music that 
consists of one single event, but at least it rules out the possibility that we cannot 
reflect on it. We have bracketed it by turning it into an event, and therefore made it 
an event of the past on which we can ponder. We have succeeded in making the 
music discursive. 
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unexpected moment, the recorder stops and a uniform noise, 
resembling the hiss you can hear while playing a blank audiotape at a 
high volume, sets in during 1’45”.9 After that, the recorder part returns, 
as if nothing has happened, playing a variation of the last phrase that 
was played before the noise entered. The piece continues with 
variations of earlier musical material and ends in a fairly standard 
manner with a distinct closure.  
During the course of the entire composition closures, and thus 
musical events, can be identified, the largest event being the 1’45” of 
noise. Within this period, no closures can be perceived, so only the 
fragment as a whole can be regarded as an event. As a result, one could 
say that there is a lack of musical tense during that period. But if we 
consider this period as being embedded within the piece, then, at most, 
we can say that musical tense is temporarily suspended. Moreover, 
since the timbre of the noise itself reminds the listener of a blank 
audiotape being played,10 we might consider this fragment as an 
explanation of what a traumatic event is: the recording of an event, i.e. 
the original function of a tape recorder, but at the same time the 
impossibility of retaining and communicating this event, i.e. the blank 
audiotape that is audible. Hence, in a paradoxical manner, this 
fragment can be seen as a representation of the phenomenon of a 
traumatic event after all. Paradoxical, because it can be considered as a 
representation of an unframeable event as a result of the listener’s 
understanding – and thus the framing – of the sound s/he is hearing. 
Only once the listener has recognized the sound as the hiss of a blank 
audiotape playing, s/he can subsequently label this sound as such a 
representation. Moreover, it is because of the indexical quality of the 
sound itself – i.e. the sound pointing to a blank audiotape that is being 
played – that the listener arrives at this interpretation, and not because 
the fragment as a whole constitutes a rupture in the music. Thus, not 
because of the musical structure, but because of the qualities of the 
sound itself, the listener can regard the fragment as such. 
Still, the 1’45” of noise does not seem to fit in the piece as a whole 
at all. Its character differs fundamentally from the rest of the piece, 
without it being announced or anticipated in any way. Likewise, the 
return of the alto recorder after the 1’45” also comes unexpectedly, as 
the noise is uniform during the entire period and does not anticipate its 
                                                                    
9 Interestingly, the only recording of this piece that I could find (performed by 
Walter van Hauwe in 1988, released by Attacca Babel 8847) deviates from the 
original score here. Instead of a uniform noise, in this recording an electronically 
altered recorder part is inserted, accompanied by synthesized sounds. Perhaps the 
prospect of having to disturb the virtuoso instrumental part by random noise was, 
dare I say, too “traumatic” for the performer?  
10 Admittedly, the title of the composition aids in identifying the 1’45” of noise as 
the hiss of a blank audiotape being played – the hiss is the second recorder: a tape 
recorder, to be more exact. 
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ending. In other words: Sweet for recorders seems to be a composition 
that is incoherent, as it consists of two incompatible parts, one part 
dividing the other. But does that mean that the work is a representation 
of the phenomenon of a traumatic event? The listener cannot 
synthesize the parts into a coherent whole, because they are so utterly 
different. It is composition that has no coherence. Therefore, no 
appropriate style or type seems to be available to the listener with 
which s/he might grasp the music.  
Yet, the listener might be able to comprehend this composition after 
all, because s/he can still structure the music. The music can be divided 
into three parts, the first and the third being closely related, while 
recognizing the complete difference of the second part in relation to the 
other parts. In this way, a structure is created. It is a structure that 
acknowledges the work’s incoherence, but that does not make it a 
lesser structure. After all, structuring is not the same as assimilation; 
deciding which parts are and which parts are not related, amounts to 
the creation of a structure, and thus to a degree of comprehension as 
well. 
Consequently, incoherent music, such as Sweet for recorders, does 
not necessarily have to be ungraspable, and thus cannot automatically 
be regarded as a representation of what a traumatic event is. Music is 
not a proper representation of a traumatic event until it lacks musical 
tense. And as I mentioned above, Sweet for recorders does not comply 
with this criterion. Thus, although the piece might seem incoherent, it 
does not lack tense. Hence, it is not a representation of the 
phenomenon of a traumatic event. Only the fragment that points to the 
playing of a blank audiotape might be regarded as such a 
representation, because of its timbral qualities, not because of its 
structural qualities. Therefore, incoherence, which is a structural 
quality, is not sufficient to establish a representation of what a 
traumatic event is. 
To return to the original question posed at the beginning of this 
section: is music such as Sweet for recorders unpleasurable to listen to, 
because the desire for the end is aroused, yet disturbed? Well, the alto 
recorder piece is not predominantly goal-directed, although it is mostly 
linear. There is some kind of forward motion noticeable in the music, 
enough to arouse the feeling of heading towards a certain end, although 
it is unclear what this end exactly is. The noise fragment is a clear 
disturbance of the original linearity. If the composition would end with 
this noise, we would have a composition in which some kind of desire 
for the end is aroused, but disturbed, and finally unfulfilled. I am not 
sure whether this would mean that the piece is unpleasurable to listen 
to; there still can be a longing to hear it, and to hear it for the end. 
However, Sweet for recorders does not end here, but continues in a 
linear fashion and, as I remarked above, ends with a definite closure. 
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Thus, in the end, the original promise of an end is kept and desire is 
fulfilled. 
 
Both musical narrativity and affective responses to music can be 
caused by the same phenomenon, i.e. the interplay of tension and 
resolution. Yet, this is not the only way in which musical emotions can 
be elicited. But this interplay, which the listener can notice because of 
musical tense, does allow for the experience of being moved by the 
music and for a possible narrative structuring of music.11 Thus, on the 
one hand, musical tense offers the possibility of making music 
perception discursive and to communicate a musical experience (and, 
in doing so, reducing it to something that it is not, i.e. a representation). 
On the other hand, musical tense makes the arousal of musical affect 
possible, which cannot be fully articulated in any way in music, or 
words, or otherwise, because of its bodily aspect. Musical affect can 
only exist because of the relation between music and listener. 
Consequently, musical tense makes the representation of musical 
experience possible, but it remains impossible to give a complete 
account of this experience. 
One aspect that I have not yet discussed in this chapter is that 
listening to music can be a shared experience, which might also be a 
reason that listening to music is pleasurable. As Robin Maconie 
remarks: 
 
For many people, sharing music in the company of others is part of its 
enjoyment. It suggests agreement but without the necessity for discussion. 
An individual can enjoy the reassurance of the reality of a musical 
experience without any lingering sense of personal anxiety. Because 
audiences respond spontaneously, there is something mysteriously 
persuasive about the experience of taking part […] A measure of wish-
fulfillment on the part of some listeners cannot, however, be entirely ruled 
out. In identifying his own response with that of a mass audience a listener 
may simply wish to be seen as endorsing the principle of a reality of human 
nature to which music refers, irrespective of the particular case. (1990: 13) 
 
In this case, Maconie argues, musical pleasure is aroused because the 
audience has a shared experience and reacts in a uniform manner. For 
instance, the audience is silent during the performance and applauds 
after the performance is done, when it concerns a traditional classical 
performance. Narrativization, as a means to communicate a listening 
experience, thus is not necessary for this kind of pleasure. On the 
contrary: exactly because the listener can refrain from discussion, from 
communication, but instead just has to react in uniformity with the rest 
of the audience, pleasure is aroused. 
                                                                    
11 But I do not argue that only narrative music can arouse affects. 
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Yet, is it really the case that there is agreement among the audience 
during and after a performance? Perhaps this might be so when 
(established) performers play traditional classical pieces in a 
conventional manner, but certainly not when new, contemporary 
compositions are performed. In these instances, the reactions of the 
audience can be anything but uniform, partly because there is not yet a 
(implicit or explicit) consensus regarding the status of these pieces. Put 
differently: the audience does not yet know how to react to these works 
in a socially correct manner. This relates to the second part of 
Maconie’s argument: the response of the audience is not so much 
elicited performatively by the music itself, but is largely determined by 
what the audience believes is the correct or socially desired manner of 
conduct. Thus, the music is the cause of the response, not because of 
its musical qualities, but as a result of its cultural status. Here narrative 
enters the stage again, for it is through narrative that this status can be 
articulated. 
Narrative is a means to mediate certain contents, such as ideas, 
beliefs, fantasies, histories, etc. As a consequence, one might expect 
that a musical narrative is capable of mediating certain contents as 
well. But what could the contents of a musical narrative be? This is an 
important question, for many theorists deny the possibility of musical 
narrativity exactly because they are convinced that such contents 
cannot exist. In the next chapter I try to demonstrate that a musical 
narrative does have contents, albeit contents that differ in many 
respects from that of verbal narratives. 
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6 THEMES 
Narrative Doubts 
Many musical works, especially tonal ones, consist of the exposition of 
one or more themes and their development. Through this treatment of 
themes, a temporal development can be represented and a musical 
narrative might be created. Yet, it is not an easy task to explain what 
this narrative is exactly about, since, in contrast to language, music has 
no clear referential qualities. And indeed, with the exception of the 
account I gave, in chapter 2, of Lachenmann’s Second String Quartet, I 
have not really discussed the possible narrative contents of the pieces I 
analyzed in this study. However, a musical narrative, in order to be a 
genuine narrative, has to have contents. Therefore, the central theme of 
this chapter will be the discussion of the possible histories a musical 
narrative can cover. 
Various tonal works, especially those that were written during the 
nineteenth century, are composed in order to depict some underlying 
story. A well-known example of such a work is Paul Dukas’s 
symphonic scherzo L'Apprenti Sorcier (1897), which is supposed to be 
a musical translation of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s ballad Der 
Zauberlehrling (1797). And indeed, when one compares the 
symphonic scherzo with this ballad, it is fairly easy to relate the 
musical events to the events represented in Goethe’s text. Yet, Nattiez 
asks, is it also possible to reconstruct the verbal narrative by listening 
to the music only? In order to answer this question, he performed an 
experiment in which listeners, who were not familiar with Dukas’s 
piece, and who were not told what the title of the composition was, had 
to reconstruct the story that is supposed to be depicted by the music 
they were listening to. None of the verbal accounts these listeners came 
up with had any resemblance with Goethe’s ballad. Moreover, the 
diversity of accounts was remarkable. Each listener seemed to hear a 
different story in Dukas’s music (Nattiez 1990: 246-248). Therefore, it 
appears to be very hard to determine, by listening to the music only, 
that the narrative contents of particular tonal works are conceived of as 
musical depictions of specific verbal narratives. But, at least the 
listeners were able to hear a story in the music, to articulate some 
narrative contents. 
The articulation of the possible narrative contents of a musical piece 
becomes more difficult when it concerns contemporary, atonal works. 
In chapter 1 I explained that many theorists believe that these kinds of 
compositions cannot be grasped in a conventional manner, because its 
compositional methods do not lead to perceptibly rational results. 
Chapter 6 
 
196 
Furthermore, this kind of music is not “natural” in the sense that it can 
be regarded as a construction using a tonal order, i.e. the music does 
not make use of established Western tonal conventions. This music is 
regarded as fragmentary; the fragments do not constitute a larger 
whole. This would make it almost impossible to consider this music as 
a narrative with narrative contents. 
However, as Theodor W. Adorno argues, the ideal that music 
consists of unrelated fragments leads to erroneous accounts of the 
meaning of those fragments: 
 
With the elimination of the principle of representation in painting and 
sculpture, and of the exploitation of fragments in music, it became almost 
unavoidable that the elements set free – colors, sounds, absolute 
configurations of words – came to appear as if they already inherently 
expressed something. This is, however, illusory, for the elements become 
eloquent only through the context in which they occur. The superstitious 
belief in the elementary and unmediated, to which expressionism paid 
homage and which worked its way down into arts and crafts as well as into 
philosophy, corresponds to capriciousness and accidentalness in the relation 
of material and expression in construction. To begin with, the claim that in 
itself red possesses an expressive value was an illusion, and the putative 
expressive values of complex, multitonal sounds were in fact predicated on 
the insistent negation of traditional sounds. Reduced to “natural material” all 
of this is empty, and theories that mystify it have no more substance than the 
charlatanism of Farbton experiments. (1997: 119) 
 
Adorno thus reemphasizes that meaning cannot be inherent in media. 
Meaning emerges as a result of the relation between object and 
context. A single tone does not have any meaning; it only becomes 
meaningful when it is related to other tones, to other works, practices, 
extramusical phenomena, in short: when it is placed into internal and 
external contexts. To claim that contemporary atonal music consists of 
unrelated fragments only, fragments that have nothing to do with 
anything outside of themselves, ultimately implies that this kind of 
music is meaningless, let alone having a narrative content. 
Giomi and Ligabue, too, discuss the narrativization of contemporary 
music. They argue that 
 
[e]very creative process (in music, literature or whatever) develops its own 
type of narration, even independently of its creator’s purpose. This does not 
mean that we must find “non-intentional narrative structures” when the 
author used an abstract compositional organization (serial, for example) but, 
nevertheless, the composition can develop its own autonomous narrative 
path (perhaps even a random one), or it could include elements with a 
narrative character created by particular uses of the signification parameters 
(for example, through pitch or timbral ranges). (1998: 45) 
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On the one hand, Giomi and Ligabue contend that the listener must not 
look for non-intentional narrative structures in abstract musical 
structures, such as serial structures. Yet, they do acknowledge that it is 
possible to narrativize, at least to a certain extent, almost any cultural 
expression, regardless of the creator’s intentions. And by analyzing, in 
chapter 3, Stockhausen’s Studie II I have tried to show that serial 
music, too, in principle can be regarded as a narrative. 
Still, John Neubauer is rather skeptical about the possibilities for 
musical narrativity in general. He does acknowledge that instrumental 
music has narrative potentialities, but he nevertheless concludes that it 
cannot actually be narrative: “Though instrumental music is incapable 
of narrating, it can enact stories: it can show even if it cannot tell, it 
can suggest plots, for instance in terms of themes and thematic 
development” (1997: 119, emphasis in original). Neubauer contends 
that music can suggest narrativity, without actually being narrative. 
However, narrating stories is a way of enacting, i.e. perform, present, 
or stage, stories. Narrating and enacting are not equal – enacting is 
more than just narrating – but they are not incommensurable, either. In 
another possible reading of Neubauer’s remark story is equaled with 
temporal development. As I explained in chapter 2, drama can be 
regarded as the presentation of a temporal development. Consequently, 
in this reading, music would be a form of drama, instead of narrative. 
But, since many (instrumental and vocal) musical works can be 
regarded as the representation of a temporal development, rather than a 
presentation, these works are capable of being narrative. 
Neubauer is not the only theorist who doubts the narrative 
possibilities of music. Nattiez holds a similar view. He observes that 
 
[i]f, in listening to music, I am tempted by the “narrative impulse,” it is 
indeed because, on the level of the strictly musical discourse, I recognize 
returns, expectations and resolutions, but of what, I do not know. Thus I 
have a wish to complete through words what the music does not say because 
it is not in its semiological nature to say it to me. It is, to take up Adorno’s 
paradoxical comment referring to Mahler, “a narrative which relates to 
nothing.” (1990: 244-245) 
 
Nattiez acknowledges that music has traits that resemble a narrative. 
Moreover, he lists two of the three characteristics that constitute the 
most basic definition of narrative, i.e. narrative is the representation of 
a temporal development. He acknowledges that music is temporal, and 
that during the listening the interplay of tension and resolution, which 
makes up a temporal development, can be heard. The only element that 
he does not mention is the fact that a musical narrative is a 
representation of such a development. In fact, it seems as if it is exactly 
because music lacks such a representational ability that he denies the 
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possibility of musical narrativity, for he remarks that he does not know 
to which the perceptible expectations and returns refer. Moreover, as I 
explained above, an experiment that he conducted showed that 
listeners invent many different, almost idiosyncratic, stories as a result 
of listening to the same piece of music. Therefore, Nattiez argues, 
“[t]he narrative, strictly speaking, is not in the music, but in the plot 
imagined and constructed by the listeners from functional objects” 
(249, emphasis in original). He concludes that 
 
[…] music is not a narrative and […] any description of its formal structures 
in terms of narrativity is nothing but superfluous metaphor. But if one is 
tempted to do it, it is because music shares with literary narrative that fact 
that, within it, objects succeed one another: this linearity is thus an 
incitement to a narrative thread which narrativizes music. Since it possesses 
a certain capacity for imitative evocation, it is possible for it to imitate the 
semblance of a narration without our ever knowing the content of the 
discourse, and this influence of narrative modes can contribute to the 
transformation of musical forms. (257, emphasis in original) 
 
Just like Neubauer, Nattiez acknowledges that music has the 
potentiality to be narrativized. Not because he thinks music can be 
narrative, but because it has the appearance of one as a result of its 
linear character. Nonetheless, Nattiez holds that music has no narrative 
contents and therefore he concludes that it cannot be narrative. 
This is an argument against musical narrativity that is often made. 
Werner Wolf, for instance, claims that 
 
every discourse that is said to be narrative, has to be able to achieve precise 
heteroreference, i.e. a reference that goes beyond the work and its medium, 
in order to comply with the basic representational quality of storytelling. 
The visual arts undoubtedly are capable to do so, at least as concerns spatial 
objects, and of course verbal speech, too; speech cannot escape 
heteroreference at all, as the possibility of referentiality in even the most 
extreme literary experiments shows again and again. The “language” of 
music, however, is only capable of such reference in very few exceptional 
cases, and is in general resistant to precise nonmusical referentialization to 
such a degree that any linguistic characteristic of music is denied.1 
                                                                    
1 “Jeder Diskurs, der im Dienst des Narrativen stehen soll, muß zur erfüllung der 
basalen Darstellungsqualität des Erzählens zur präziser Heteroreferenz, d.h. zu einer 
Referenz jenzeits des betreffenden Werkes und seines Mediums, befähigt sein. Die 
bildende Kunst ist hierzu zweifellos in der Lage, wenigstens was räumliche 
Gegenstände betrifft, und natürlich auch die verbale Sprache; ja diese kann der 
Heteroreferenz gewissermaßen gar nich entkommen, wie die Möglichkeit der 
Referentialisierung selbst extremer literar-sprachlicher Experimente immer wieder 
zeigt. Die “Sprache” der Musik kann dagegen nur in eng begrenzten 
Ausnahmefällen einer vergleichbaren Referenz dienen und ist allgemein so resistant 
gegen präzise außermusikalische Referentialisierungen, daß ihr Sprachkarakter 
sogar überhaupt in Abrede gestellt wurde.” (Wolf 2002: 77-78, my translation) 
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Again, because music cannot explicitly refer to nonmusical 
phenomena, it does not comply with the most basic function of 
narrative. Instead, Wolf claims, the reference of the “language” of 
music is mainly self-referential. This in contrast to verbal narratives, 
which cannot do otherwise than to refer to something outside itself, as 
Wolf maintains. 
Apparently, for both Nattiez and Wolf verbal narrative is the 
paradigm to which every narrative has to comply. As a result, their 
conception of narrative is not medium independent, in contrast to the 
definition of narrative that I use, i.e. narrative is the representation of a 
temporal development. Yet, in this definition, too, the element of 
referentiality is accounted for, as narrative is supposed to be a 
representation of a temporal development, i.e. it has to refer to such a 
development. And indeed, as I explained in chapter 2, in music 
temporal developments can be represented; the listener can perceive 
expectations and resolutions in the music, yet these are not caused by 
the music itself. Music elicits expectations, by giving the impression 
that musical events lead to or cause other events. Real physical 
causation in music does not exist. It is the listener who interprets 
musical events as wanting to lead to other events, which leads to 
musical expectation. As a result, music is not actually tense or 
resolved. Rather, music represents tension and resolution. Even so, 
Wolf maintains that 
 
the progression of a musical discourse and its coherence is in general far 
more dependent on form and medium, i.e. determined by an innermusical 
syntax. As a consequence, it is at odds with the progression and coherence 
of narrative created by causality and teleology that relates to the logic of a 
fictional world outside of the respective narrative medium.2 
 
But musical causality, linearity, and goal-directedness are not in the 
music itself. Instead, these are represented by the music, which means 
that the music refers to phenomena, such as causation and teleology 
that are outside of the music itself. Apart from the fact that musical 
causation does not exist in the music itself, all these phenomena 
depend on musical motion, which is evoked by the succession of 
musical events, that themselves are representations, as I explained in 
chapter 2, rather than actual physical entities. Thus ultimately, musical 
causation, linearity, and teleology are the product of representations.  
                                                                    
2 “Die progression eines musikalischen Diskurses und dessen Kohärenz ist ingesamt 
wesentlich form- und mediumsabhängiger, d.h. bedingt durch eine 
innermusikalische Syntax, und steht damit quer zur Progression und Kohärenz des 
Erzählens durch Kausalität und Teleologie […] die sich auf die Logik einer 
scheinbaren Welt jenseits des jeweiligen narrativen Medium beziehen.” (Wolf 2002: 
78-79, emphasis in original, my translation) 
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A musical narrative’s capacity to refer to extramusical phenomena, 
i.e. to a temporal development, might not be explicit enough for Wolf 
and Nattiez. Perhaps they would like to know what this development 
means and verify whether the meaning of this development is 
intersubjectively shared, before acknowledging that music can be 
narrative. I have to admit that music probably will not meet this 
demand. Nonetheless, the temporal development that can be heard in 
the music is the result of a representation. Consequently, it is this 
temporal development that is the contents of the musical narrative, 
however abstract this content might be. In the following analysis of 
Petals (1988), for violoncello and electronics ad libitum, composed by 
Kaija Saariaho, I will try to make this conception of musical contents 
more specific. 
Petals’ Possible Stories 
Petals starts off very quietly, with the cello playing bowed tremolos in 
different intervals. These intervals, played sul ponticello, gradually 
change, resulting in a alternation of dissonant and more consonant 
intervals.3 While changing, the music increases in volume. At 0’39” (as 
performed by Scott Roller, violoncello, in the recording released by 
Kairos 0012412KAI) the timbre of the cello is manipulated 
electronically. The sound becomes progressively more brutal and the 
texture thickens. The resulting timbre, which is a marked term here, 
sounds as if many cellos are played simultaneously, while the bows are 
pushed very hard into the strings. This timbre, which I label timbre I, 
develops, at 0’58”, towards a bowed tremolo on a single note, 
accompanied by reverberated echoes of this note. 
The focalization at the beginning of the performance of this piece, as 
well as of the piece as a whole, is similar to that of the performance of 
Boulez’s Anthèmes 2, which I discussed in chapter 2. As in that 
performance, the electronic sounds in Petals are influenced by the 
manner in which the live part is performed. Nevertheless, the 
electronic part has a big impact on the narrative that is depicted by 
Petals, for the main musical actor in this piece is timbre, which to a 
large extent is created by electronic manipulations of acoustic sounds. 
Dynamics functions as an additional actor in the opening statement of 
this piece. As a result of the transformations to which these two 
                                                                    
3 With “consonant” and “dissonant” I mean “resolved” and “tense,” respectively. 
And although these consonant and dissonant intervals sometimes might be equal to 
what are considered consonant and dissonant intervals in functional harmony (in 
Petals a perfect fifth often sounds like a resolved interval), this does not necessarily 
have to be the case. For instance, in this piece, at 4’08”, a major seventh appears 
which sounds like a resolution. Consonance and dissonance thus are not necessarily 
dependent on functional harmony, but depend on the local contexts in which they 
appear. 
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musical parameters are submitted a temporal development from quiet, 
bowed tremolos in different intervals, via electronic transformations of 
the cello’s timbre, to a single note is represented. Hence, it is because 
of these parameters that the listener is able to plot his/her way through 
the beginning of the piece. Moreover, a musical context is created that 
codetermines the listener’s expectations regarding this piece, and thus 
the UNLL-process that s/he undergoes. In this case, the musical 
context does not outline the limitations or possibilities regarding 
pitches or harmonies, although, as I remarked above, a sense of 
dissonance and consonance can be noticed. Rather, the musical context 
here mainly outlines the range of timbres that the listener might expect, 
i.e. tremolos and certain electronic manipulations of these tremolos. 
This musical context holds for the continuation of the piece, but also 
a new element, i.e. melody, is introduced. At 1’03” short ascending 
lines, consisting of notes which are being played tremolo, that sound 
agitated and that gradually ascend. In between these lines short rests 
are placed. The highest note is reached at 1’17”, which is also played 
tremolo. This note is being played until 1’22”, where another note, a 
major second higher, sounds, which is played sul ponticello. This note 
sounds like the resolution of the previous one. The note is 
accompanied by a low note that functions as a bourdon at 1’26”. Both 
notes are progressively detuned electronically, and the sound 
eventually transforms into timbre I, while different intervals are played. 
At 1’45” this texture thins out again. A continuing tremolo can be 
heard at 1’50” while the music becomes more quiet. A gradually 
descending line is played, interjected by a bourdon note. Ultimately, 
the music resolves, in a low register, into a perfect fifth. 
Pitch has increased in importance in this section of Petals. By 
focusing on consonance and dissonance, tension and resolution 
becomes apparent, which determines the temporal development that is 
represented, as well as the listener’s plotting activity. As a result, pitch 
becomes an actor, next to timbre and texture. Dynamics does not 
function as an actor here. Furthermore, the musical context is 
augmented as well; the range of melodic and harmonic possibilities, as 
implied by the music thus far, is added. 
Pitch continues to be a principal actor, as is timbre. Motif A – i.e. a 
marked melodic phrase, played tremolo, appears at 2’04”. Variations 
on this motif are played sequentially, sul ponticello, until 2’13”. At this 
point, motif B, derived from motif A, is played with timbre I. Motif B is 
repeated and varied from 2’21” onward by the cello, non vibrato, while 
slowing down. This variation is marked and thus stands out in this 
piece, because it is not played as a tremolo, in contrast to most of the 
music that has sounded up until this point. At 2’30” another variation 
on motif B can be heard, this time with longer notes. The music slows 
down even more and ends on a harmonic major seventh interval. Other 
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intervals are played, non-vibrato, from 2’46”, resolving in a perfect 
fifth, followed again by a major seventh. Ultimately, the upper note of 
this interval is sounding on its own. This note is accompanied by a 
note, a perfect fifth higher, at 3’00”. Next, this higher note sounds 
alone, before different long lower notes are played along with this note, 
which results in an alternation of dissonant and consonant intervals. 
This phrase is resolved in a perfect fifth at 3’33”, while the music 
slows down. At 3’35” this interval is played as a tremolo, while 
reverberated tremolos at different pitches can be heard as well. This 
results in texture becoming an additional actor, for the music 
transforms, at 3’42”, in a thick texture, consisting of several different 
tremolos, whose pitches gradually change while the frequency of the 
tremolos slows down. At 3’52” the tremolos stop, while a low note is 
played. Next, this note is accompanied by a high note, played as a 
tremolo and sul ponticello. This high note progressively detunes and 
transforms into timbre I at 4’03”. Within this timbre, different intervals 
are noticeable, and ultimately there is a feeling of resolution, although 
a major seventh interval can be heard, an interval which is considered 
to be very dissonant in tonal harmony. The music slows down, as is the 
frequency of the tremolo, until the tremolo disappears. 
A different marked term appears at 4’13”, when a pizzicato note is 
played, which acts as both the closure of the previous phrase and the 
start of motif C. This motif consists of the pizzicato tone, a minor 
second played as a tremolo, followed by a high note, played with a 
slight glissando and non vibrato, while the reverberation of the minor 
second interval is still audible. Consequently, again both pitch and 
timbre (because of the alternation between plucked and bowed notes) 
act as principal actors in this motif. At 4’18”, 4’23”, and 4’27” 
variations of motif C can be heard. In each of these variations, the 
motif gradually ascends, while the pizzicato note retains its original 
pitch. Hence, they are not literal repetitions of the original motif. 
Nevertheless, these variations do contribute to the process of binding 
that ultimately leads to comprehension. By grouping sounds into 
phrases, and labeling them as variations of a certain motif that is 
identified as well, the music that is sounding is structured, which 
ultimately results in comprehension of the music. Moreover, the result 
is that the listener has clearer expectations with regard to the music that 
will sound next. These expectations again might lead to eliciting 
feelings of tension and resolution, which becomes apparent in the third 
variation. In this variation, the cello is played with the bow pressing 
hard into the strings, and ends at 4’41”, after the appearance of the 
pizzicato note is delayed. There is a silence between the variation and 
this note. This pizzicato note can be regarded as indicating the 
beginning of a variation, but it also evokes a sense of closure. Its 
function thus is ambiguous in the sense that it can belong 
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simultaneously to the previous and to the next variation. This 
ambiguity is enhanced by the fact that the note always has the same 
pitch; it does not ascend along with the rest of the variation. This 
makes it even harder to classify the note as belonging to a particular 
variation. Thus, the note can both mark the beginning and the ending 
of any of the variations of motif C that have appeared thus far. As a 
consequence, the delaying of this note results in a building up of 
tension – for the anticipated ending is postponed – and, ultimately, in 
the resolution of this tension.4 
Pitch and timbre remain the principal actors during the remainder of 
the work. A longer motif D starts at 4’42”, with the ending of this motif 
being similar to motif C, namely a slight glissando up to a high note, at 
the same pitch as in motif C. This glissando, because it is a repetition of 
earlier glissandi, helps in the process of binding. At 4’51”, 4’55”, and 
5’01” variations of motif D are played. The ending of the third 
variation does not end with a glissando, but in a tremolo, which 
descends at 5’05”. The tremolos ascend again at 5’10”, and 
subsequently descend at 5’16”, while their frequency slows down. 
Ultimately, the music ends up in a minor second, played as a tremolo, 
which becomes progressively more and more reverberated. While the 
tremolo fades away, a long note, played non-vibrato, starts at 5’31”. 
Next, a new variation of motif C appears, with the pizzicato opening, 
at 5’34”. At 5’40”, 5’47”, 5’54”, 6’01”, 6’07”, and 6’16” new 
variations on that motif can be heard. They all begin with the same 
pizzicato note, and each variation is more reverberated and sounds 
more electronic. In doing so, a feeling of distance is elicited more and 
more in each variation. The appearance of these variations can be 
regarded as an analepsis; a returning to a previous section in which 
motif C and its variations were first introduced. At 6’25” the pizzicato 
note of motif C is played again, now acting as a closure, which once 
again underlines the ambiguous character of this note. It is followed by 
a heavily reverberated tremolo, that resolves into an interval that feels 
like a consonant. The music becomes almost silent. 
The appearance of the variations of both motifs C and D, along with 
the feeling of resolution and the diminuendo that starts at 6’25”, all 
contribute to the representation of a temporal development in Petals. 
These musical phenomena, together with the feeling of tension and 
resolution these variations sometimes elicit, do hint at some kind of 
progression. Moreover, a sense of completion is evoked as a result of 
the diminuendo and the resolution into a consonant interval. 
                                                                    
4 The glissandi at the end of each variation sound more univocally like an ending, 
even though these, too, glide between the same pitches in each variation. Probably, 
this is because, in contrast to the glissandi, the pizzicato note is played just before 
the first appearance of motif C. And there, too, this note acts both as a closure and as 
a beginning.  
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Yet, Petals does not end here. It continues with a final section, 
which can be regarded as a recapitulation of the piece. The main 
characteristics of the work, such as tremolos, alternations between 
dissonance and consonance, and electronic manipulations of the sound 
of the cello – including the reappearance of timbre I, which are caused 
or undergone by the composition’s principal actors, i.e. timbre and 
pitch, are presented again. At 6’33”, a low note, played as a tremolo, 
appears. Much reverb is added. Next, several intervals, played as 
tremolos, can be heard, alternating between dissonance and 
consonance. High-pitched tremolos are played from 6’56” onwards. At 
7’03”, the bow is pressed harder into the strings of the cello, resulting 
in a distorted sound that resembles timbre I. This distortion is 
augmented electronically. At 7’09” more quiet high-pitched tremolos 
are played that are accompanied at 7’15” by a lower-pitched tremolo. 
The higher-pitched tremolo fades away. Several intervals are played as 
tremolos from 7’19” onwards, which converge at 7’23” into single note 
tremolos with much reverb. Gradually, other tones are added. 
Progressively, the timbre changes into timbre I at 7’37”. Different 
ascending intervals can be heard within timbre I that alternate between 
consonance and dissonance, ending at 8’01” in a single, non vibrato 
note, accompanied by low-pitched electronic reverberations of timbre 
I. Next, this single note is played as a tremolo with much reverb and 
echoes of timbre I, and is electronically altered while starting to fade 
away at 8’14” until all sound has disappeared at 8’46”, which marks 
the ending of the piece.  
This analysis of Petals actually is an account of one of the possible 
paths that can be plotted while listening to the piece. It is one of the 
manners in which this composition can be comprehended, a 
comprehension that is accomplished by regarding the work as a 
narrative: it is comprehended by narrativizing it. This approach could 
fail if it were the case that Petals could not be considered as the 
representation of a temporal development. Yet, as my analysis shows, 
this is possible. Firstly, I was able to divide the piece into separate 
sections, each of which representing a local development. Secondly, 
the work as a whole represents a development: it shows an 
introduction, a clear ending at 6’33”, and a final recapitulation, which 
also has a definite ending. Again, it is important to bear in mind those 
notions such as “introduction,” “ending,” and “recapitulation” are not 
inherent in the music. Instead, they are musical representations of 
attributes that do not exist in the music itself. In between the beginning 
and ending, four motifs are presented, as are their respective 
developments. Moreover, the motifs themselves are related: motif B 
evolves out of motif A, and D out of C. Additional unity is created by 
the timbre of the sounds, and the repeated occurrence of timbre I 
throughout the piece. In fact, Petals could be characterized as 
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representing the development of the interplay of acoustic and 
electronic sounds, told by an imperceptible external narrator. 
Although this characterization can be considered as complying with 
the assertion that timbre is one of the principal actors in the 
composition, it is not the only possible characterization one can give. 
Since pitch is the second principal actor, one could also say that Petals 
is a representation of the development of pitch turning from an 
unimportant factor at the beginning of the work into a principal actor 
during the course of the piece. A third characterization that is possible 
involves both actors, for Petals can also be considered as the 
development of the tension between pitch and timbre. Timbre obscures 
the clarity of pitch, but at the same time, even in timbre I pitches and 
harmonies can be discerned throughout the work. 
Because of these accounts, it could be argued after all that Wolf’s 
criticism regarding the lack of music’s referential qualities is justified. 
And indeed, because of my definition of musical actor, i.e. that musical 
parameter that causes or undergoes a musical event, a narrative account 
of a musical piece to a certain extent always involves the music itself. 
However, musical narratives are not just about musical actors, but also 
about temporal developments in which these actors play a role. As I 
argued above, these developments are not in the music itself. Thus 
ultimately, a musical narrative does refer to extramusical phenomena, 
namely to such a temporal development. The fact that this might be the 
representation of the development of one or more musical parameters 
does not diminish its extramusicality. Moreover, it is because of this 
special characteristic that a musical narrative can tell about narrativity 
itself, as I will argue below. 
The above accounts do not exhaust the possible narrative 
characterizations of Petals that can be given. It is because of my 
selection of pitch and timbre as the principal actors that the above 
characterizations are possible. But even though these parameters are 
the principal actors in this reading, this does not imply that no other 
choice is possible. Perhaps rhythm, which I hardly discussed, or 
dynamics could also be considered as important actors, which would 
result in different accounts of the work. The composition does not 
dictate a particular account. The possibility of giving different 
narrative accounts of Petals is not foreclosed by the piece itself. The 
listener has to decide for him/herself which narrative path s/he will 
follow, and thus which story s/he will hear in Petals. 
A Narrative on Narrativity 
Not only particular musical works may explicitly call upon the 
listener’s capacities to narrativize music. In verbal narratives, too, the 
reader may be forced to actively contribute to the shaping of the 
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narrative. McHale signals this phenomenon in certain postmodern 
novels. As an example he mentions Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961), 
which shows a temporal indeterminacy. In this novel, McHale 
explains, a crucial event, Snowden’s death over Avignon, happens both 
before and after the Great Big Siege of Bologna (1987: 108-109). It is 
up to the reader to decide how to place this event temporally, or even 
to leave it undecided. Furthermore, McHale refers to multiple-ending 
texts, such as John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1964), 
which contains three alternative endings, of which at least two are 
mutually exclusive (109-110). Again, the reader’s narrative impulse is 
called upon by the novel, but is at the same time frustrated by it. 
Because of the narrative ambiguities in these novels, the process of 
narrativization is complicated. This process now becomes a conscious 
activity, instead of something that is done without really paying 
attention to it, which for instance might be the case when reading 
conventional novels. Such novels do not really challenge the reader’s 
capacities for narrativization, unlike the postmodern novels mentioned 
above. As a result, in these unconventional novels the process of 
narrativization is made explicit. 
Likewise, in atonal music, such as Petals, the process of 
narrativization is foregrounded. In atonal music linearity and musical 
causation, which are constitutive of musical narrativity, are not 
straightforward. This is often not the case in tonal music. For instance, 
a Western Listener can interpret a dominant chord in tonal music as a 
clear metaphorical cause of a tonic chord, without consciously 
reflecting on it. The process of musical narrativization, during which 
such decisions are made, oftentimes remains implicit in tonal music. In 
atonal music, on the other hand, this process is made explicit, which 
stresses the artificiality of narrative. Atonal musical narratives 
articulate the fact that a narrative is a construction. Conversely, tonal 
musical narratives usually give the impression of being narrative in a 
more “natural” way, because the process of narrativization remains 
implicit, and thus does not highlight the process responsible for the 
creation of this construction called narrative.5 It is possible that tonal 
music produces problematic narrative moments as well, but these 
moments are far more numerous in atonal music. Atonal music 
explicitly foregrounds the artificiality of musical narrativity, whereas 
this happens far less frequently in tonal music. 
Perhaps it is because of this supposed naturalness of tonal musical 
narratives that Susan McClary (2004) holds that only tonal music can 
be narrative. Since atonal music is not based on functional harmony, 
                                                                    
5 Again, with this remark I do not imply that the object itself, in this case music, has 
nothing to do with narrativity. On the contrary, narrativization is a two-way process, 
in which an object has certain narrative potentialities which might invite the 
observer to narrativize this object. 
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she argues, these musical works cannot be narrative. McClary claims 
that the narrative processes in music composed from 1700 to 1900 
stem from the tonality that undergirds this music. It is tonal, functional 
harmony that gives this kind of music a sense of direction and a goal, 
and it is the deviation from accepted models and forms that makes a 
particular story interesting. McClary, however, does not seem to 
acknowledge the possibility that musical narrativity can also be 
constituted by means other than functional harmony. Rather, she 
regards music composed after 1900 as anti-narrative, for this kind of 
music does not comply with functional harmony. In her view, 
contemporary music should be seen as attempts at breaking the 
hegemony of turning musical processes into narratives, this hegemony 
being functional harmony. And indeed, atonal contemporary music can 
be regarded as breaking a certain kind of hegemony, namely the 
hegemony of tonality as the only means of establishing narrativity. 
Consequently, atonal musical narratives might be considered to 
show that the grand architecture called functional harmony is a human 
construct, despite claims of functional harmony being some kind of 
naturally given, universal sonic order. Some musicians, composers, 
and theorists believe that tonality is a natural phenomenon, since it is 
supposedly based on the natural overtone series, which is a natural, 
acoustic phenomenon. However, as I explained before, this claim 
cannot be sustained. The intervals that make up tonality only partially 
match with those given in the natural overtone series. Moreover, many 
forms of non-Western music do not make use of tonality, but are not 
less “natural” because of this. Therefore, the belief that Western 
tonality is universal is nothing more than just that: a belief, which has 
attained an almost mythical status. Atonal music is not less “natural” 
than tonal music, but because atonal music does not conform to 
generally known musical conventions, grasping this music requires 
quite some effort on the part of the listener. Adorno argues this 
position as follows: 
 
Aesthetic norms that are said to correspond to the perceiving subject’s 
invariant forms of reaction are empirically invalid; thus the academic 
psychology is false that, in opposing new music, propounds that the ear is 
unable to perceive highly complex tonal phenomena that deviate too far 
from the natural overtone relations: There is no disputing that there are 
individuals who have this capacity and there is no reason why everyone 
should not be able to have it; the limitations are not transcendental but 
social, those of second nature. (1997: 346-347) 
 
Adorno asserts that music that is closely related to the natural overtone 
series is easier to grasp. And perhaps it is indeed the case that systems, 
such as functional harmony, which are to a certain extent related to the 
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natural overtone series, are easier to learn. This might explain the 
power of tonality, at least for the Western listener. After all, many non-
Western forms of music are not that closely related to the natural 
overtone series, yet seems not difficult to grasp for the participants of 
the culture in which this music is produced. As Adorno stresses, 
listening is socially determined. This implies that listening 
competencies are not fixed, but change along with cultural changes. As 
a result, a listener should in principle be able to grasp atonal music. 
However, the listener has to make an effort to learn new musical 
conventions with which contemporary music can be comprehended. As 
the composer Hanns Eisler and Adorno contend: 
 
The ear of the layman, […] as contrasted to that of the musical expert, is 
indefinite and passive. One does not have to open it, as one does the eye, 
compared to which it is indolent and dull. But this indolence is subject to the 
taboo that society imposes upon every form of laziness. Music as an art has 
always been an attempt to circumvent this taboo, to transform the indolence, 
dreaminess, and dullness of the ear into a matter of concentration, effort, 
and serious work. Today indolence is not so much overcome as it is 
managed and enhanced scientifically. Such a rationally planned irrationality 
is the very essence of the amusement industry in all its branches. Music 
perfectly fits the pattern. (2004: 74-75) 
 
Eisler and Adorno argue along the same lines as Lachenmann does: 
lethargy is sustained by the music industry – which mainly produces 
music that does not challenge the listener. Atonal music offers new 
sounds and sonic structures that can be grasped by the listener, but in 
order to achieve this s/he cannot rely on his/her musical habits alone. 
The listener cannot expect to grasp new kinds of music just by 
passively undergoing this music. S/he has to concentrate and make an 
effort in order to be able to make sense of the music. Listening 
becomes a conscious activity, and narrativization is an example of the 
way this activity can be performed.  
As I have argued, narrativization is one of the modalities for 
processing atonal music. Functional harmony is not the only possible 
way through which musical processes can be turned into musical 
narratives. It is, however, a very effective one; perhaps even more 
effective than other musical parameters. It is because of the 
effectiveness of functional harmony that the process of narrativization 
of tonal music often remains implicit. In atonal music, on the other 
hand, the listener has to make an effort in order to discern any linearity 
or causation, to distinguish a possible narrative path. This path is not 
clearly laid out. Due to the idiosyncrasy of the music and the frequent 
lack of clear, univocal linearity in atonal music, it is up to the listener 
to select one of the many possible paths that might be possible, if any. 
But this does not necessarily imply, as McClary argues, that atonal 
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music is anti-narrative. Rather, in atonal music, just as in certain 
postmodern novels, the process of narrativization is foregrounded, 
whereas in many tonal musical works, like in conventional novels, this 
process remains implicit. In trying to narrativize atonal music, an 
activity which can be either successful or fail, the listener’s attention 
has to be focused explicitly on this process, as well as on the decisions 
which have to be made.6 
Because the process of narrativization is made explicit in atonal 
musical narratives, the contents of narrative atonal music actually 
consist of an account of the process of narrativization. The 
representation of a temporal development, the abstract contents of an 
atonal musical narrative, is in fact a report of the way in which a 
particular musical piece can be comprehended in a narrative manner. 
An atonal musical narrative makes explicit the mechanisms of a 
narrative. It is a metanarrative; a story about the principles of 
narrativity. 
                                                                    
6 The conclusion that the narrativization of atonal music can be successful has 
important consequences for the claim that narrative presupposes some fixed 
underlying structure. Hayden White asserts that by means of the creation of 
narratives self-repressing or self-disciplining social subjects are produced. It is “[…] 
a process in which individuals are compelled to introject certain master narratives of 
imaginary social and life histories or archetypical plot structures, on the one side, 
and are taught to think narrativistically, on the other, that is, to imagine themselves 
as actors or characters in certain ideal story types or fables, and to grasp the 
meaning of social relations in narrational, rather than analytical, terms” (1999:155-
156). Through narrative, human subjects can view themselves as coherent 
individuals that have a clear place within the culture they live in. They believe their 
life histories are linear and teleological, i.e. the life they lead has a purpose. In order 
to sustain this belief, to become adequate actors in these ideal story types, and to 
comply with the master narratives of their culture, they have to make up their own 
“tales of becoming.” The events they experience during their lives are structured, 
manipulated, or neglected in order to comply with these master narratives or 
archetypical plot structures. As a result, the individual’s life is a construction, a 
construction s/he is constantly changing and adjusting as new events are 
experienced. Hence, the creation of the narrative construction that makes up the 
individual’s identity is an ongoing process. Moreover, it is not something that is 
naturally given, but an artifact that individuals create themselves while referring to 
archetypical master plots. Likewise, McClary seems to regard only those musical 
works as narratives, which are based on functional harmony, which she seems to 
consider as a particular archetype. Yet, functional harmony is not some universal, 
natural order. The supposed universality of functional harmony is a belief that has 
attained an almost mythical status. Hence, I consider functional harmony as a 
mythical master plot. But music does not have to comply with this order to be 
regarded as narrative, as I have shown in this study. Perhaps this is what narrative 
analyses of contemporary music might teach us: resistance to archetypical plots or 
master narratives does not automatically imply a condemnation to incoherence or 
chaos. Nor does it mean that it is impossible to regard objects or individuals that 
resist these plots and narratives, in a narrative manner. Idiosyncrasy does not 
exclude narrativity. On the contrary: unique phenomena sometimes tell the most 
interesting stories. 
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It is possible that tonal narratives can be regarded as metanarratives 
as well. In theory, tonal music can also foreground the process of 
narrativization. However, atonal musical narratives do so in a 
conscious manner. Atonal musical narratives explicitly activate this 
particular perspective, and this perspective can subsequently be 
adopted when listening to other kinds of music.  
An atonal musical narrative foregrounds the modes of musical 
structuring, and more specifically the narrative processing of music. It 
results in a kind of structuring that is distinct from other types of 
structuring. However, in discussing the narrative structuring of music, 
Keith Potter does not seem to fully acknowledge this distinction. He 
argues that, regardless of the kind of music,  
 
[…] repeated listening to a work is in itself narrative-forming. We tend to 
construct narratives for ourselves even on a single hearing of a piece. And 
how can we be surprised in the ways I’m implying non-narrativity may 
surprise us if there is no expectation to be thwarted, no narrative logic to be 
denied? Must all good music ultimately be listened to – must all good music 
ultimately be composed – as a sequence of expectations created, then 
fulfilled or denied, as Hans Keller seems to have maintained? Even more 
problematically, don’t all of us – even we sophisticated experimental or 
postmodern listeners – break up music along proportional lines we can take 
in and remember, if not actually impose what we would call a fully-fledged 
narrativity? But then can’t the difficulties and ambiguities of non-narrative 
forms themselves become the subject of experiment among composers and 
of more discussion by all of us? I increasingly feel that we don’t pay 
sufficient attention to the way music moves through time, or – perhaps 
better – articulates its own space. Most of my listening to new works 
suggests that even when composers appear interested in non-narrative 
forms, they still end up indebted to “conventional” notions of structure, 
especially of proportion. (1996: 8-9) 
 
Potter makes a rather surprising comment by remarking that we have to 
pay more attention to the way music moves through time, or “perhaps 
better – articulates its own space.” On the one hand, it seems as if 
Potter is claiming that a spatial conception of music is more accurate 
than a temporal one. But we could also read “space” as meaning 
“context,” rather than spatiality. This context, then, would be created 
by the UNLL-process. In this reading, the music articulates its own 
space via the UNLL-process, i.e. it creates its own musical context, 
which is the simultaneous organization of sounds and/or events. And 
this context is indeed articulated with the aid of what Potter calls 
“conventional” notions such as structure. 
Yet, narrative is a special kind of structure, namely a structure that 
represents a temporal development. Potter seems to argue that a 
listener is always inclined to narrativize the music, whether this listener 
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is an experienced contemporary music listener or not. But he does not 
really specify the characteristics that are distinctive for this kind of 
structuring. A musical metanarrative, however, has to articulate those 
characteristics, if it is to be a narrative about narrativity, instead of 
about, say, musical structuring in general. Consequently, I will 
examine below which of the narrative elements are made prominent in 
a musical metanarrative.  
Events. Music can represent musical events because of musical 
tense. Musical tense makes the detection of discrete, retainable 
segments in the music possible, and thus is also a condition for musical 
comprehension. As I argued in chapter 3, musical tense cannot be 
pointed out in the music directly. Rather, the listener’s ability to detect 
discrete, retainable segments in the music acts as an index for musical 
tense. In tonal music, musical events, in the form of clearly demarcated 
themes, for instance, often are represented in a relatively 
straightforward and conventional manner. This is not always the case 
in tonal music, but far more frequently than in atonal music, in which 
the representation of musical events generally is far more complicated. 
Take Ligeti’s Désordre, for instance, which I analyzed in chapter 2. In 
this piece, closures, which bracket musical events, are represented in a 
rather complicated manner. Cadences or clear themes do not constitute 
musical events here. Instead, the rhythmical shifts of octaves act as 
closures and thus bracket musical events, which is a far less 
straightforward manner of representing events. As a result, this 
representation is made prominent. 
Sariaaho’s Petals, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, also 
foregrounds the representation of musical events by making closure 
explicit. Closures, by which musical events can be identified, are 
represented by the breaking off of ascending lines, as for instance 
between 1’03” and 1’17”, or the changing of timbre from a cello 
tremolo into timbre I, as happens between 1’22” and 1’45”. Again, 
closures and events are represented in more unconventional manners, 
such as through the use of timbre. Likewise, Ligeti’s Ten Pieces for 
Wind Quintet, analyzed in chapter 4, closures and musical events are 
represented in unconventional ways. For instance, texture is one of the 
principal means by which closure is represented in Ligeti’s quintet, as 
is dynamics, which are parameters to which the (Western) listener is 
not conventionally attuned. Consequently, these remain relatively 
obscured in this composition. The same holds for Lachenmann’s 
Second String Quartet, “Reigen seliger Geister,” where the alternation 
of pitched and unpitched sounds is one, less conventional, way in 
which closures are represented and musical events are articulated. In 
Boulez’s Anthèmes 2 the same is achieved by the alternation of 
electronic and acoustic sounds. Stockhausen’s Studie II, lastly, exhibits 
clear musical phrases, which on the one hand sound very unfamiliar 
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because of the timbres that are used, whereas on the other hand 
closures are often represented through established musical paradigms. 
As a result of the tension between familiarity and unfamiliarity the 
representation of musical events, i.e. the musical phrases, are 
foregrounded. 
In the abovementioned atonal compositions, the representation of 
musical events is not established in a conventional, straightforward 
manner. In atonal music, the representation of musical events generally 
does not make use of established musical conventions. As a result, this 
kind of music does not feel as “natural” as many tonal musical works 
might appear. Rather, these atonal musical works articulate the fact 
that the representation of musical events is the result of a construction, 
that it is artificial. 
Space/location. Musical events can be placed in a musical space. 
Musical space is the explicit demonstration and/or manipulation of this 
placement, while location is the placement of sounds and/or events, 
which remains implicit, i.e. it is not thematized or manipulated. Most 
musical compositions do not make the placement of musical events 
explicit. Nevertheless, the geometric distribution of performers, and 
thus of the sounds that they will produce, is thematized by several 
contemporary composers, such as Stockhausen, Galina Ustvolskaja, 
Wolfgang Rihm, and György Kurtág.  
Furthermore, many electronic and electro-acoustic musical works 
manipulate musical space. In Anthèmes 2 and Petals, for instance, 
artificial reverb is used in order to create the illusion of a changing 
distance. Heavily reverberated musical events seem to be in the 
background compared to events that are not as heavily reverberated. 
Moreover, events seem to move from left to right and vice versa in the 
stereo image. Because the placement of the musical events is 
manipulated in these manners in Anthèmes 2 and Petals, these works 
make musical space explicit. 
Sequential ordering, rhythm, frequency. Ordering in music is 
represented by the succession of musical events. Via this ordering, the 
rhythm, or pace, of the music can be determined. The music can slow 
down or speed up by alterations of the ordering of events. A good 
example of this is Reich’s Piano Phase, which I discussed in chapter 2. 
Here, the development that is represented by the music is delayed by 
the numerous repetitions of events. Yet, as I argued in my discussion 
of this piece, this does not make the music non-narrative. It only delays 
the unfolding of the musical fabula. This is in contrast to Vitiello’s 18 
(watery variation), where repetition obscures any clear development. 
In this piece, there is no clear start, and no ending either, only local 
developments that do not contribute to the representation of a 
development by the work as a whole. 
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As can be concluded from the analyses of these pieces, ordering, 
rhythm, and frequency are means by which development can be either 
supported or frustrated. It is in these capacities that atonal music makes 
ordering, rhythm, and frequency explicit. Hence, I will incorporate the 
elaboration of how atonal music can do this in my discussion of 
linearity and goal-directedness. For, as I explain below, it is the 
combination of linearity and directedness that makes possible the 
representation of a temporal development, and it is through ordering, 
rhythm, and frequency that this representation can be influenced. 
Linearity and goal-directedness. Linearity and goal-directedness can 
be assessed by relating a sequence of events to musical contexts. The 
succession of musical events, as well as the simultaneous occurrence of 
events, makes up a musical context. Within a musical context events 
can be evaluated. Musical events are related to the musical context that 
is constituted by the events that have sounded thus far. In this way, 
these terms can be combined into larger events, thereby creating larger 
(sub)contexts in which can be observed which sounds stand out in 
relation to other sounds within the composition. In this way, new 
markedness relations, and thus new meanings, can emerge.  
In Ten Pieces for Wind Quintet, one of the ways these contexts are 
created is through the repeated occurrence of the alternation of staccato 
chords and short melodic phrases, which both establishes coherence 
between the different pieces and acts as a context within which musical 
events can be evaluated. Again, in order to be aware of these contexts a 
conscious effort on the part of the listener is required. As a result, the 
listener has to try to actively, consciously recognize musical contexts 
in order to ultimately grasp and comprehend the music. For these 
contexts make it possible to assess musical events, as well as providing 
some kind of continuity between these events. This is actually not that 
different from verbal narrative. Gerrig and Egidi, paraphrasing 
Wolfgang Iser, note that 
 
[…] narratives refer to a small selection of details and let readers complete 
their work by imagining the rest […] The resulting discontinuity that 
characterizes narratives requires an active role on part of the reader. (2003: 
36) 
 
Narratives only give hints – some, such as postmodern novels and 
atonal music, less than other narratives – and leave it up to the reader, 
or listener, to fill in the blanks. The filling in of these blanks results in 
the recognition of the musical context created by musical events and in 
which these events can be evaluated. 
The events in Petals also provide contexts, by outlining the range 
the pitches and the kinds of timbre within which the musical events of 
the piece can be evaluated. Other, less prominent contexts are provided 
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by dynamics and texture. In a similar manner contexts are created in 
“Reigen seliger Geister,” in this case through the presentation of 
unconventional musical sounds and the sparseness of conventional 
musical phrases. The musical contexts in Studie II are a combination of 
more familiar tonal contexts, those that concern timbre, and others that 
are the result of the segmentation of the music and its melodic 
idiosyncrasies. In Désordre contexts are created as a result of the 
representation of musical events that are primarily outlined by rhythm, 
whereas in Anthèmes 2 the principal context concerns timbre. All these 
contexts determine the expectations the listener might have regarding 
the course the music will take. If in, for instance, “Reigen seliger 
Geister” a sudden melodic phrase appears, this phrase is marked 
relative to the rest of the music, which is characterized by a lack of 
conventional music. This characterization is determined by the musical 
context, which is created through the presentation of unconventional 
musical sounds and the sparseness of conventional musical phrases. 
But this context, just as the others I mentioned above, is not 
conventionally given and do not refer to established musical 
conventions, but has to be recognized by the listener by comparing 
musical events. As a result, atonal music makes explicit the 
construction of these contexts. 
As I remarked above, these contexts determine the expectations the 
listener might have regarding the course the music will take. Hence, 
linearity and goal-directedness, which literally are particular courses 
music can take, are determined by musical contexts as well. A structure 
that exhibits a certain degree of linearity and goal-directedness can be 
considered as a narrative structure, for it is through these components 
that a temporal development can be represented. As I explained in 
chapter 4, in contrast to poetry, narrative meaning is related to 
linearity, i.e. some kind of forward motion that is implied by the 
narrative. Narrative arouses the sense that the reader/listener has to 
read/listen on to the next sentence/note, the next page/phrase, the next 
chapter/movement. In short: the arousal to read/listen for the end. 
Narrative is predominantly linear, whereas poetry is nonlinear. 
Moreover, since narrative is the representation of a temporal 
development, a narrative also has one or more goals, or ends. A 
development is the transformation from one state to another, with this 
other state being the goal of the development. This does not mean that 
a narrative always has to be unequivocally directed to that particular 
goal. In some cases this goal is anticipated retrospectively, i.e. after a 
particular goal has actually been reached. During the reading/listening 
the reader/listener might not be aware of the goal that is anticipated, 
but after the reading/listening the goal is actually recognized as such, 
and s/he might retrospectively recognize the manner in which this goal 
is anticipated, an anticipation that s/he was not aware of before. 
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Feldman’s Rothko Chapel, on the other hand, does not represent a clear 
goal at the end of the composition. Instead, this piece can be said to be 
narrative, and represent a temporal development, until bar 313 only. 
The remainder of the work is not narrative, for, although linearity is 
elicited, there is no clear goal anymore. It remains unclear which state 
or states are transformed during the course of this part of the 
composition.  
Linearity and goal-directedness are made prominent in the separate 
sections of Petals as well, in which local developments are represented 
as a result of linearity and goal-directedness, for instance because of 
the interplay of consonance and dissonance. The work as a whole 
represents a development, and thus linearity and goal-directedness, too, 
as I outlined in the analysis above. The same is achieved in “Reigen 
seliger Geister” by representing the development of the interplay of 
musical and nonmusical sounds. Anthèmes 2 evokes linearity as well, 
by the development of the almost dialogue-style interplay of acoustic 
and electronic sounds. Furthermore, in different movements material of 
earlier movements are repeated or varied, which provides clues for 
binding. Moreover, the piece represents a clear resolution at its ending. 
Studie II exhibits linearity and goal-directedness by making use of 
more or less conventional cadences which are sometimes anticipated, 
and sometimes not. Désordre, on the other hand, evokes linearity and 
goal-directedness by representing a building up of tension that is 
released at 0’51”, followed by a section, which lasts until 1’22”, that is 
unclear, and a final section in which clarity has returned, and that can 
be regarded as a goal, namely as a resolution of the preceding section. 
The linearity and goal-directedness that are represented by these 
compositions are not straightforward. Instead, the music requires an 
active listener who cannot rely on established musical conventions 
such as tonality exclusively, in order to recognize these 
representations. Rather, it is because of the recognition of the musical 
contexts that are unique for that particular piece that linearity and goal-
directedness can be anticipated, that the listener can plot his/her way 
through the music, and that the music can be bound.  
Character/actor. One component that is very important in many 
verbal narratives is not explicitly featured in a musical metanarrative, 
namely character and its development. In verbal narratives, the process 
of narrativization is often, to a large extent, determined by this 
development. “When a character appears for the first time,” Bal 
explains, 
 
[…] we do not yet know very much about it. The qualities that are implied 
in that first presentation are not all “grasped” by the reader. In the course of 
the narrative the relevant characteristics are repeated so often – in a different 
form, however – that they emerge more clearly. Repetition is thus an 
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important principle of the construction of the image of a character. (1997: 
125) 
 
In addition to repetition, the accumulation of a character’s qualities 
during the course of the narrative, as well as the relations to other 
characters and the transformations the character might undergo 
contribute to the character’s development (126). Obviously, this 
development happens over time, as the narrative unfolds. Gerrig and 
Egidi remark that 
 
[…] experiments suggest that, as readers update their models, they are still – 
automatically – compelled to revisit the past. As such, the past and the 
present crowd together to give a nuanced sense of how a character has 
developed. (2003: 51) 
 
During the reading, the reader compares new information with what 
s/he already gathered from earlier parts of the novel, and in so doing 
reconstructs the development of the novel’s characters as represented 
in the narrative. Thus, by reading a narrative in this manner it is 
primarily regarded as a representation of the character’s or characters’ 
developments. 
In my analysis of Petals I argued that the work could be 
characterized as narrative in several ways: as representing the 
development of the interplay of acoustic and electronic sounds, as a 
representation of the development of pitch turning from an unimportant 
factor at the beginning of the work into a principal actor during the 
course of the piece, and as the development of the tension between 
pitch and timbre. In all characterizations, the principal actors, i.e. 
timbre and pitch, play a leading role. In chapter 2, I defined a musical 
actor as a musical parameter that causes or undergoes an event, 
whereas a musical character consists of that parameter plus the values 
assigned to that parameter, thereby complying with Bal’s definition of 
character, i.e. an actor provided with distinctive characteristics. In 
music, these characteristics are concrete values during a particular 
event, such as certain frequencies or decibel levels. This implies that in 
music actors can only be identified as soon as they become characters, 
i.e. specific instances during a musical event. In other words: a musical 
character acts as an index for a musical actor, which the listener cannot 
perceive directly. Therefore, I prefer to speak of the development of 
actors in Petals, rather than of the development of characters. Musical 
character is incidental, in contrast to the underlying musical parameter 
which is the musical actor. It is this parameter that develops, which is 
perceptible through the changing values of the musical character.  
Actually, in music the listener cannot perceive anything but musical 
characters, since s/he can only get access to music through the 
THEMES 217 
perception of musical parameters, which are embodied in musical 
characters. This is an important difference compared to verbal 
narratives, where fragments that do not feature characters are also 
possible. Often, these fragments are descriptions, which Bal considers 
to be non-narrative moments within the narrative, since in descriptions 
no development in time is presented (1997: 32). In contrast, musical 
narrative cannot contain fragments without characters.7 Musical 
narrative is always established through the construction of character 
development, i.e. through the experience of the specific, concrete 
instances of the musical parameters that make up a musical piece. Via 
these musical characters the listener is able to identify events, s/he can 
establish contexts for a particular piece, by outlining the range of 
musical parameters within which musical events can be qualified, and 
recognize linearity and goal-directedness as a result of his/her ability to 
identify musical events. Therefore, an atonal musical narrative also 
tells about musical characters. Not directly, but by accounting for 
specific products of musical characters that enables the listener to 
comprehend the music in a narrative manner. 
Focalization. Just as with musical characters, musical focalization is 
not expounded upon in any direct manner in an atonal musical 
narrative. Instead, as soon as this narrative is performed, it is at the 
same time focalized. As I explained in chapter 2, it is impossible to 
have a sounding musical narrative that is not focalized. For 
performance, which is a necessary element in the production of 
sounding music, always implies focalization, since the performance is 
the external focalizor.  
Narrator. The musical narrator is a function that is posited in a 
musical work, as soon as this work is considered to be narrative, but is 
not assigned to the elements that are essential for the physical existence 
of the music. Thus, a musical narrator can only be assumed after the 
conclusion that a particular musical composition is narrative. 
Moreover, since in many cases the musical narrator is external and 
imperceptible, in these cases the conclusion that a musical work is 
narrative is the only clue the listener has for assuming a musical 
narrator. Nevertheless, in some instances, musical narratives can make 
the narrator more explicit, such as in “Reigen seliger Geister.” As a 
result of the idiosyncrasies of this composition, i.e. the combination of 
conventional and unconventional musical sounds, this work makes 
explicit a perceptible first-person narrator that tells the story of its own 
making.  
 
                                                                    
7 One could perhaps consider musical fragments in which no development is 
noticeable, such as the noise section in Andriessen’s Sweet for recorders, as a 
musical equivalent of a verbal description. But this, then, would be a description 
which features a musical character, namely the parameter timbre.  
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The above elaboration of the narrative elements explains how a listener 
might be able to comprehend music – all kinds of music – through 
assuming a narrative listening stance. By recognizing a temporal 
development that is represented by one or more musical parameters of 
a musical work, the listener has a clear clue for structuring the music. 
This comprehension will always be limited, in the sense that the music 
still represents many dead ends or structural anomalies, which cannot 
be bound. However, this incompleteness is not necessarily a negative 
result of narrativization. On the contrary: incomplete comprehension 
might be one of the reasons a listener wants to listen again to a 
particular musical work. The work remains fascinating exactly because 
of these anomalies, while the re-listening of the music might lead to a 
less limited narrative comprehension of the piece. 
Yet, in comprehending contemporary atonal music narratively, the 
listener not only has grasped the music, but s/he has also constructed a 
narrative that demonstrates the process of narrative comprehension. In 
other words: by comprehending an atonal musical work in a narrative 
manner the listener makes explicit how this is done. Hence, an atonal 
musical narrative is self-reflexive, but it is the narrative that is self-
reflexive, rather than the music.8 An atonal musical narrative does refer 
to extramusical phenomena, namely to that phenomenon called 
narrativity. Thus, paradoxically, exactly because atonal musical works 
are to a large extent idiosyncratic, those that are narrative all are about 
the same topic, i.e. narrativity itself. This topic can be told in many 
different ways, as the examples in this chapter have shown, and 
therefore they do not actually tell the same story. But the underlying 
theme is the same. One might argue that this is a rather reductionist 
view on atonal musical narrativity, a view that reduces all atonal 
musical narratives to the same topic. However, this theme can be 
considered as belonging to a more universal issue that contemporary 
atonal music addresses: the fact that music does not originate from 
some sort of natural order, but instead is a construction, a fabrication. 
Contemporary atonal music foregrounds this fact. Consequently, when 
assuming a narrative listening stance, atonal music makes the 
artificiality of this stance explicit as well. Musical narrativity is not 
presented as a representation of reality, but as a human construct. 
Hence, by assuming a narrative listening stance while listening to 
contemporary atonal music, the listener might learn at least two things: 
firstly, how to comprehend this kind of music, and, secondly, about the 
artificial nature of music and music listening. 
                                                                    
8 Again, tonal musical narratives might also be self-reflexive, although this is much 
more rare. Also, I would like to stress that the self-reflexivity of musical narrative is 
not the same as “music about music,” which is a qualification that is given to many 
tonal and atonal works. A musical metanarrative is about narrativity, and thus is 
“music about narrativity.” 
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The comprehension of contemporary music through narrativization is a 
confirmation that idiosyncrasy can be grasped. It is a demonstration of 
the human facility to comprehend objects which are unique and, to a 
great extent at least, do not comply with established rules and 
conventions. Narrative analysis can articulate the ways human subjects 
may be able to comprehend such idiosyncratic phenomena. However, 
in narrative analysis the object is regarded as something that it, in 
itself, is not, i.e. a narrative. As Adorno puts it: 
 
No artwork is an undiminished unity; each must simulate it, and thus 
collides with itself. Confronted with an antagonistic reality, the aesthetic 
unity that is established in opposition to it immanently becomes a 
semblance. The integration of artworks culminates in the semblance that 
their life is precisely that of their elements. However, the elements import 
the heterogeneous into artworks and their semblance becomes apocryphal. 
In fact, every penetrating analysis of an artwork turns up fictions in its claim 
to aesthetic unity, whether on the grounds that its parts do not spontaneously 
cohere and that unity is simply imposed on them, or that the elements are 
prefabricated to fit this unity and are not truly elements. (1997: 138) 
 
An artwork only pretends to be a unity, be it narrative or otherwise. 
Not intentionally, but rather as the result of the observer’s urge to 
integrate the artwork’s elements into a graspable whole. An analysis of 
the artwork’s unity, however, exposes the fictionality of this unity. “A 
coherence of meaning – unity – is contrived by art,” Adorno argues, 
 
[…] because it does not exist and because as artificial meaning it negates the 
being-in-itself for the sake of which the organization of meaning was 
undertaken, ultimately negating art itself. Every artifact works against itself. 
(139) 
 
An artwork evokes unity, yet in doing so undoes its true self. As a 
result, an artwork can only be apprehended by perceiving what it 
represents, and not by what it truly is. Likewise, the narrativization of 
contemporary music leads to a construction that is fabricated by the 
listener, and not to the exposure of the true essence of the music 
(whatever that may be). As a result, narrativization is a synthetic act, 
not an analytic one. 
By regarding music as a narrative whole, one might argue that it is 
submitted to what Aldous Huxley calls the “reducing valve of the brain 
and nervous system” (1972: 16). In their everyday life human subjects 
focus on elements that proved to be essential to their survival, while 
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ignoring other elements. Consequently, they are only aware of a tiny 
fragment of what happens around them. As Huxley puts it: 
 
[E]ach one of us is potentially Mind at Large. But in so far as we are 
animals, our business is at all costs to survive. To make biological survival 
possible, Mind at Large has to be funneled through the reducing valve of the 
brain and nervous system. What comes out at the other end is a measly 
trickle of the kind of consciousness which will help us to stay alive on the 
surface of this particular planet. To formulate and express the contents of 
this reduced awareness, man has invented and endlessly elaborated those 
symbol-systems and implicit philosophies we call languages. (16-17)  
 
The creation of narrative is a means to grasp what happens in our 
world. But it is at the same time a reduction of reality, and thus also a 
repression of what Huxley terms Mind at Large. Ricoeur (1985) has a 
similar view on the relation between human nature and narrative. He 
locates narrativity in the human soul as its fundamental way of 
comprehending the fact of death. Only by narrativizing death, which in 
Huxley’s terms means submitting it to the reducing valve of the brain 
and nervous system, the human subject can come to terms with it.  
In contrast, Huxley argues that apprehending the world through the 
concept of Mind at Large means to perceive the inner and outer world 
directly and unconditionally, not within the ruts of ordinary perception, 
not as they appear to “[…] an animal obsessed with survival or to a 
human being obsessed with words and notions” (1972: 58). So, Huxley 
would probably prefer trying to appreciate an artwork, such as music, 
not in a narrative manner, but in an unrestricted, direct way. Yet, how 
this can be accomplished he does not say. He does, however, 
acknowledge that it is very hard to achieve, as reduced awareness is 
such an innate characteristic of the human subject. 
Huxley himself tried to apprehend the world through the concept of 
Mind at Large by taking, under medical supervision, a low dose of 
mescalin, a drug that reduces the sugar level of the brain. “When the 
brain runs out of sugar,” Huxley explains, 
 
the undernourished ego grows weak, can’t be bothered to undertake the 
necessary chores, and loses all interest in those spatial and temporal 
relationships which mean so much to an organism bent on getting on in the 
world. As Mind at Large weeps past the no longer watertight valve, all kinds 
of biologically useless things start to happen. (19) 
 
The reduction of the sugar level in the brain reduces the efficiency of 
the reducing valve that the human brain normally is, allowing the Mind 
at Large to emerge. 
Apprehending things by Mind at Large would result in seeing the 
things as they are, which is not as an imperfect reflection of Platonic 
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Ideas, but rather being as it is while in the process of becoming. 
Moreover, Huxley holds, viewing the world under the influence of 
mescalin resembles the way a true artist sees the world, as he reports 
while looking at paintings: 
 
What the rest of us see only under the influence of mescalin, the artist is 
congenitally equipped to see all the time. His perception is not limited to 
what is biologically of socially useful. A little of the knowledge belonging 
to Mind at Large oozes past the reducing valve of brain and ego into his 
consciousness. It is a knowledge or the intrinsic significance of every 
existent. (25) 
 
Many theorists and composers would like music to be experienced in a 
manner that resembles Huxley’s apprehension by Mind at Large. They 
are convinced that there are positive alternatives for “classical” 
listening stances in which the listener seeks for security, in the form of 
structure, in the music s/he is listening to. In my analysis of Feldman’s 
Rothko Chapel, in chapter 3, I already mentioned the composer’s ideal 
of creating music that does not comply with such stances. Stances that 
presuppose structure, with a narrative listening stance being one such 
stance, results in a framing of the music by focusing on some musical 
aspects and neglecting others, and thus in a restricted perception of the 
music.  
The composer Francisco López strives at removing these 
restrictions. He remarks that 
 
[i]n my work with nature sound environments, I have moved away from the 
rationalizing and categorizing of these aural entities. I prefer this 
environmental perspective not because it is more “complete” or more 
“realistic” but because it encourages a perceptional shift from the 
recognition and differentiation of sound sources to the appreciation of the 
resulting sound matter. As soon as the call is in the air, it no longer belongs 
to the frog that produced it. (2004: 83) 
 
López advocates a listening stance in which every attempt to link 
sound and source is eliminated. The listener just has to appreciate the 
sounds as they are. This listening stance is very similar to the concept 
of acousmatics, as proposed by the composer Pierre Schaeffer: 
 
Deliberately forgetting every reference to instrumental causes or preexisting 
musical significations, we then seek to devote ourselves entirely and 
exclusively to listening, to discover the instinctive paths that lead from the 
purely “sonorous” to the purely “musical.” Such is the suggestion of 
acousmatics: to deny the instrument and cultural conditioning, to put in 
front of us the sonorous and its musical “possibility.” (2004: 81, emphasis 
in original) 
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The emphasis in the concept of acousmatics is on the exploration of the 
musical possibilities of sounds, regardless of their origin. Moreover, 
the listener has to try to do away with a culturally conditioned 
approach when listening to music. As López puts it: 
 
[I]t is my belief that music is an aesthetic (in its widest sense) perception/ 
understanding/ conception of sound. It’s our decision – subjective, 
intentional, non-universal, not necessarily permanent – that converts nature 
sounds into music. We don’t need to transform or complement the sounds. 
Nor do we need to pursue a universal and permanent assignment. It will 
arise when our listening moves away and is freed from being pragmatically 
and representationally oriented. And attaining this musical state requires a 
profound listening, an immersion in the inside of sound matter. (2004: 87, 
emphasis in original) 
 
Regarding sounds as musical sounds is an intentional act, López 
asserts. Moreover, when a listener listens to what s/he believes to be 
musical sounds, all kinds of conventions, beliefs, and habits are put 
into operation, such as, for instance, the belief that “[…] music must 
organize the intratemporal succession of events meaningfully: Each 
event should ensue from the previous one in a fashion that no more 
permits reversal than does time itself” (Adorno 1997: 30). In other 
words: the traditional classical belief is that music has to show musical 
causality and a high degree of linearity. Yet, as Adorno observes, “[…] 
the necessity of this temporal sequence was never literal; it participated 
in art’s semblance character” (30). Music, at most, can be a 
representation of a linear temporal whole. Musical causation and 
linearity are never “really” in the music, but instead are read – heard – 
in the music by the listener.  
López opposes a listening stance in which the linearity of music is 
presupposed. He advocates a listening stance with as few 
presuppositions as possible. Where contemporary music is concerned, 
Adorno argues along the same lines: “Today music rebels against 
conventional temporal order; in any case, the treatment of musical time 
allows for widely diverging solutions” (30). Contemporary music 
might be regarded as protests against consistency, or continuity. One 
could even go so far as to argue that contemporary music is an attempt 
to break through the biological predispositions of the listener, such as 
his/her efforts to comprehend the music s/he is listening to. Considered 
in this way, contemporary music complies with the listening stance as 
proposed by López. 
Luigi Nono, too, strived to compose music that calls for a listening 
stance in which comprehension is not the aim. Rather, he wants his 
music to be listened to in a non-interpretative manner, i.e. listening to 
sounds instead of listening for that which the sounds refer to. Nono 
maintains that it is crucial to listen to a sound without trying to assign 
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any kind of meaning to it, other than the sound itself, as it appears in 
space and time (Broers 1999: 9). Thus, when it concerns listening to 
contemporary music, Nono and López, as well as other theorists and 
composers, reject a classical listening stance in which linearity and the 
striving for comprehension is presupposed, such as a narrative listening 
stance.  
Yet, the stance these composers and theorists are aiming for can 
only be achieved at a cost. What seems lost in that stance is the 
interaction between the listener and the music. Instead, it appears as if 
the listener is expected to be just a passive receiver of the musical 
sounds. S/he is not allowed to do anything with it, for if s/he did, s/he 
would be interpreting these sounds, something a listener is not 
supposed to do. As a result, any creative input the listener might 
contribute to the listening process is denied. 
In contrast, many other possible listening stances do allow for the 
creative input of the listener. A focus on sound fascination is an 
example of an active listening stance, and is particularly productive 
when it concerns contemporary music. This stance might resemble the 
one Nono and López advocate, but there is an important difference: a 
focus on sound fascination involves not only listening to sounds, but 
also their interpretation. In assuming this stance, Ligeti’s Ten Pieces 
for Wind Quintet, for instance, might also be regarded as a study on the 
sonic possibilities of wind instruments, instead of as a collection of ten 
short studies on the ways in which plotting can be elicited or disturbed, 
as I did in chapter 4. However, this stance is not limited to 
contemporary music. One could, for instance, assume, to borrow a 
notion that Bal introduced, a “preposterous” listening stance (in the 
sense of a “before after” listening stance). This is a listening stance that 
is geared toward contemporary music, such as the focus on sound 
fascination, but is assumed when listening to older, classical music. As 
a result, the listener does not listen for linearity or goal-directedness in 
music of, say, Mozart, but for sounds, disregarding the forward motion 
this music might suggest.1 As a matter of fact, I would regard 
Webern’s orchestration (1935) of Johann Sebastian Bach’s six-part 
fugue No. 2 from Das musikalisches Opfer, BWV 1079 (1747), and 
Salvatore Sciarrino’s Le voci sottovetro (1999), which are adaptations 
of several of Carlo Gesualdo’s vocal works that he composed in 1586 
                                                                    
1 Again, this is not to say that Mozart is only linear and goal-directed. For instance, 
in the first movement of his “Jupiter” Symphony No. 41 in C Major, K. 551 (1788), 
after a moment of complete silence a minor triad is played fortissimo. Since the 
context in which this chord appears is major, this is literally an unexpected moment. 
For an instant, all attention is absorbed by the sound and loudness of this chord. As 
a result, musical linearity is disturbed. Subsequently, the listener might try to fit this 
moment in the piece as a whole, for instance with the aid of the musical events that 
sound after the minor triad and which might enable the listener to recontextualize 
this moment. 
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and 1611, as instances in which this preposterous listening stance is 
made external. In these versions, musical linearity is suppressed in 
favor of an emphasis on sound. 
A narrative listening stance, on the contrary, is an active stance that 
does focus on linearity. Narrativization is a fundamental human 
tendency in order to come to terms with temporal phenomena. It is a 
tendency that depends on both the narrative potentialities of a 
phenomenon and of an interpretative act of that phenomenon on the 
part of the human subject. As a result, a narrative listening stance, a 
stance in which the music is narrativized, explicitly calls for the active 
contribution of the listener in order to structure the music in time.  
Consequently, to regard a musical work as a metanarrative is not a 
highly specific, exceptional instance of musical narrativity. On the 
contrary: a metanarrative is an articulation of the interaction between 
music and listener, and ultimately a demonstration of the fundamental 
human tendency to structure time in a narrative manner. Hence, 
metanarrative is a more general and inclusive model of narrativity, as 
opposed to the limited, restricted versions of musical narrativity that 
take verbal narrative as their model. One could even go so far as to 
claim that to regard music as a metanarrative is a more natural 
approach to musical narrativity. It is an articulation of the human 
subject’s natural inclination to try to grasp the temporal nature of 
music. Narrative approaches to music which take verbal narrative as 
their model, on the other hand, are more artificial methods. These 
approaches are not based on narrativization as a natural human 
tendency, but on the extent to which music resembles a verbal 
narrative. 
By assuming a narrative listening stance music, which in itself 
already is an artifact, is transformed into another artifact, namely a 
narrative. Yet, the interaction between listener and music that leads to 
this other artifact is based on a natural human tendency. Although 
Huxley may call this tendency a result of the reducing valve of the 
brain and nervous system, it is not necessarily as negative as Huxley 
considers it to be. Because of this reducing valve, the music itself 
might never be exposed to the listener in its entirety. When listening to 
music, the music is not perceived as it truly is, as Adorno observes as 
well, but is interpreted as a particular representation, for instance as a 
narrative. Yet, this view on music is not necessarily inferior to the 
complete, uninhibited apprehension of music that Huxley promotes. 
Apparently, he is more interested in the object called music itself, 
whereas I am more concerned with the interaction between listener and 
music. The narrative analysis of music focuses exactly on this 
interaction, and not on the essence or “truth” of the music itself. In the 
end, musical narrativity concerns the manner in which the human 
subject can cope with the temporal phenomenon called music. 
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SUMMARY 
Narrative is perhaps the most prevalent cultural object worldwide. The 
representation of some event that begins at a given time, and that is 
followed by the representation of other events, which together 
constitute some kind of temporal development, is an aspect of many 
things that the human subject encounters in life. Moreover, many 
theorists, such as David Herman, claim that human subjects have a 
basic inclination to interpret everything that they experience or 
undergo in a narrative manner. Therefore, these theorists argue, 
narratives are paramount in order to grasp the world in which the 
human subject lives.  
Since music is a temporal cultural expression, it would seem to 
make sense to assume that music has a narrative aspect as well. Yet, 
there are theorists, such as Jean-Jacques Nattiez, who claim that 
narrativity can only be associated with verbal and visual texts, and they 
doubt the mere possibility of musical narrativity. However, I contend 
that music can indeed be narrative, and that the study of musical 
narrativity can be very productive. Moreover, I contend that 
contemporary music, too, can be narrative.  
The purpose of the study of the narrative aspect of contemporary 
music in particular is twofold. Firstly, in so doing, I am able to 
articulate this narrative aspect in a precise manner. Since many 
contemporary musical works question or problematize the notion of 
musical narrativity, the analysis of these works might be the key to 
identifying the limits of musical narrativity. Secondly, I argue that, in 
assuming a narrative listening stance, the listener’s comprehension of 
contemporary music might be enriched. As I mentioned above, 
narrative understanding is a basic disposition that human subjects 
share. Thus, I expect that a narrative interpretation of contemporary, 
atonal works may lead to a greater understanding of these works, 
which are often regarded as being incomprehensible or ungraspable by 
many listeners (and by many musicians and researchers alike). In short: 
I maintain that the study of the narrative aspect of contemporary music 
leads to a greater understanding of both musical narrativity and 
contemporary music. Yet, although I mainly focus on the analysis of 
contemporary, instrumental musical works, the results of this study, are 
valid for all kinds of music, thus for both instrumental and vocal 
music, classical and popular, ancient and contemporary. 
In chapter 1, I examine what it means to grasp a musical 
composition. In particular, the problems regarding the grasp of 
contemporary, atonal music are addressed. (Western) listeners seem to 
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have no problem understanding tonal music, but seem unable to grasp 
atonal works. Contemporary, atonal music complicates musical 
comprehension, because it sometimes uses sounds that are not 
conventionally associated with music. Moreover, atonal music does not 
make use of established tonal conventions and musical forms, with 
which the listener is familiar, and this makes it more difficult to 
structure the music. I suggest that it might be possible to grasp this 
kind of music, as well as all other kinds of music, through narrative 
structuring, and that a narrative listening stance might help the listener 
in comprehending contemporary music. 
Next, in chapter 2, I discuss what a musical narrative, i.e. a musical 
work that is narrativized by assuming a narrative listening stance, 
might be composed of. In order to do so, I examine the basic narrative 
elements that are distinguished in narratology, and explain how these 
can be modified, in order to come up with a musical narratology. The 
musical analyses in this chapter illustrate the ways in which narrative 
elements function in contemporary music, how contemporary musical 
compositions can tell musical stories, and in which sense these 
compositions might problematize these separate elements.  
Since a narrative is a representation of a temporal development, and 
music necessarily is temporal, temporality is vital in both music and 
narrativity. Therefore, in chapter 3, I explore the relation between the 
representation of temporality in musical and verbal narrative, in order 
to see whether or not there are crucial differences between the two. In 
particular, I concentrate on the notion of what I call musical tense, 
which is the establishing of a relation between the unfolding of musical 
sounds (the musical present) and the representation of events (the 
musical past). As a consequence, musical tense is a prerequisite for the 
possibility of musical narrativity. For, in order to talk about a musical 
narrative, one has to be able to talk about musical events. A narrative 
without events is not possible. And musical tense exactly is the 
possibility music offers to represent events. As a result, a musical piece 
without musical tense cannot represent events and thus cannot be 
narrative. Therefore, musical tense is necessary for musical narrativity. 
Narratives move towards certain goals. Narratives suggest some 
sense of motion, a sense of going in some direction. And music elicits 
this sense perhaps even stronger than verbal narrative does. Therefore, 
in chapter 4, I discuss the ways in which music can arouse this feeling 
of linearity and goal-directed motion within a narratological context. In 
order for music to elicit this impression during the listening, the 
listener must be able to plot his/her way through the music, i.e. being 
able to structure the music and distill some kind of meaning from it. I 
argue that this is only possible because of musical tense; would the 
music lack tense, then the listener would have no opportunity to 
structure and reflect on the music. 
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Eero Tarasti argues that musical narrativity emerges precisely from a 
series of emotions that are caused by the music itself. This would 
imply that musical emotion is a key ingredient in musical narrativity. 
In my account of musical narrativity, however, musical emotion does 
not play a central role. In chapter 5, I examine to what extent Tarasti’s 
account is compatible with mine. Psychoanalysis might be a suitable 
approach to address this question. In this chapter I conclude that the 
recognition of discrete events is the cause of the fact that the music can 
evoke some sense of linearity and goal-directedness. It is the result of 
the listener’s perception of an interplay of tension and resolution, and 
this interplay makes the listener react affectively to music. At the same 
time, the interplay of tension and resolution leads to the representation 
of a temporal development, and might ultimately result in musical 
narrativity. Thus, in the end, both musical narrativity and affective 
responses to music can be caused by the same phenomenon, i.e. the 
interplay of tension and resolution.  
Psychoanalysis might also be useful to address the second question 
that is discussed in chapter 5: can a listener comprehend a musical 
piece that on the one hand elicits narrativity, but on the other hand 
frustrates the possibility of narrativity? In referring to trauma theory, in 
which the impossibility of closure and the resistance to narrative 
integration are discussed, I argue that this kind of music does not 
necessarily have to be ungraspable. 
The narrative structuring of music results in a musical narrative. Yet, 
the question remains what this narrative is about. Since many theorists 
deny the possibility of musical narrativity exactly because they are 
convinced that there cannot exist a musical narrative content, this is an 
important question. Therefore, in chapter 6, I demonstrate that a 
musical narrative does have contents. In this chapter, I focus explicitly 
on the possible contents of atonal musical narratives, and contend that 
these musical narratives ultimately can be considered as 
metanarratives: they tell the story of the process of narrativization. 
Contemporary atonal musical narratives foregrounds the fact that 
music does not originate from some sort of natural order, but instead is 
a construction, a fabrication. Consequently, musical narrativity is not 
presented as a representation of reality, but as a human construct. 
Hence, by assuming a narrative listening stance while listening to 
contemporary atonal music, the listener might learn at least two things: 
firstly, how to comprehend this kind of music, and, secondly, about the 
artificial nature of music and music listening. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Het verhaal is wellicht het meest verspreide culturele object in de 
wereld. De representatie van een gebeurtenis die op een gegeven 
moment begint, en die wordt gevolgd door de representatie van andere 
gebeurtenissen, welke tezamen een temporele ontwikkeling vormen, is 
een aspect van veel dingen die het menselijk subject in zijn/haar leven 
tegenkomt. Bovendien stellen veel theoretici, zoals David Herman, dat 
subjecten een basale neiging hebben om alles wat zij ervaren of 
ondergaan op een narratieve wijze te interpreteren. Daarom, stellen 
deze theoretici, zijn verhalen cruciaal om vat te krijgen op de wereld 
waarin het subject leeft. 
Aangezien muziek een temporele culturele uitdrukkingsvorm is, lijkt 
het aannemelijk dat muziek ook een narratief aspect heeft. Toch zijn er 
theoretici, zoals Jean-Jacques Nattiez, die beweren dat narrativiteit 
alleen met verbale en visuele teksten geassocieerd kan worden, en 
betwijfelen de mogelijkheid van zoiets als muzikale narrativiteit. 
Echter, ik stel dat muziek wel narratief kan zijn, en dat de studie van 
muzikale narrativiteit zeer productief kan zijn. Bovendien 
beargumenteer ik dat ook hedendaagse muziek narratief kan zijn. 
Het doel van de studie naar het narratieve aspect van hedendaagse 
muziek is tweeledig. Ten eerste stelt juist de hedendaagse muziek mij 
in staat om dit narratieve aspect op een precieze wijze te articuleren. 
Aangezien veel hedendaagse werken de notie van muzikale 
narrativiteit problematiseren, kan de analyse van deze werken een 
manier zijn om de grenzen van muzikale narrativiteit te definiëren. Ten 
tweede beargumenteer ik dat het begrip van de luisteraar met 
betrekking tot hedendaagse muziek verrijkt kan worden wanneer hij/zij 
een narratieve luisterhouding aanneemt. Zoals ik hierboven heb 
opgemerkt, is narratief begrip een basale dispositie die gedeeld wordt 
door subjecten. Daarom verwacht ik dat een narratieve interpretatie 
van hedendaagse, atonale werken kan leiden tot een groter begrip van 
deze werken, die door luisteraars (en door veel musici en 
onderzoekers) vaak als onbegrijpelijk of onvatbaar worden beschouwd. 
Kortom: ik beargumenteer dat de studie naar het narratieve aspect van 
hedendaagse muziek tot een groter inzicht in zowel muzikale 
narrativiteit als in de hedendaagse muziek leidt. Maar, hoewel ik me 
voornamelijk richt op de analyse van hedendaagse, instrumentale 
muzikale werken, zijn de resultaten van deze studie geldig voor alle 
soorten muziek, dus zowel voor instrumentale als vocale muziek, 
klassiek en populair, oud en eigentijds. 
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In hoofdstuk 1 ga ik na wat het betekent om grip te krijgen op een 
muziekstuk. Ik richt me hier met name op het probleem van het vatten 
van hedendaagse, atonale muziek. (Westerse) luisteraars lijken geen 
probleem te hebben om tonale muziek te begrijpen, maar zijn 
klaarblijkelijk niet in staat om atonale werken te vatten. Hedendaagse, 
atonale muziek compliceert het muzikale begrip, omdat het soms 
geluiden gebruikt die niet conventioneel geassocieerd worden met 
muziek. Daarnaast maakt atonale muziek geen gebruik van gevestigde 
muzikale conventies en muzikale vormen waarmee de luisteraar 
bekend is, en dit maakt het moeilijker om deze muziek te structureren. 
Ik beargumenteer dat het mogelijk is om deze, en andere, muziek te 
vatten, door deze op een narratieve wijze te structureren, en dat een 
narratieve luisterhouding de luisteraar kan helpen om grip te krijgen op 
hedendaagse muziek. 
Vervolgens, in hoofdstuk 2, bespreek ik waaruit een muzikaal 
verhaal, een muziekstuk dat is genarrativiseerd middels het aannemen 
van een narratieve luisterhouding, kan bestaan. Hiertoe richt ik mij op 
de basale narratieve elementen die worden onderscheiden in de 
narratologie, en leg ik uit hoe deze kunnen worden aangepast teneinde 
te komen tot een muzikale narratologie. De muziekanalyses in dit 
hoofdstuk laten zien op welke manieren narratieve elementen 
functioneren in hedendaagse muziek, hoe hedendaagse muziekstukken 
muzikale verhalen kunnen vertellen, en op welke manieren deze 
werken die afzonderlijke elementen kunnen problematiseren. 
Aangezien een verhaal een representatie is van een temporele 
ontwikkeling, en muziek noodzakelijkerwijs temporeel is, is 
temporaliteit cruciaal in zowel muziek als narrativiteit. Daarom richt ik 
mij in hoofdstuk 3 op de relatie tussen de representatie van 
temporaliteit in muzikale en verbale verhalen, teneinde te onderzoeken 
of er belangrijke verschillen zijn tussen de twee. Ik concentreer me 
vooral op de notie die ik musical tense noem, wat de realisering van 
een relatie tussen het zich ontvouwen van muzikale geluiden (het 
muzikale heden) en de representatie van gebeurtenissen (het muzikale 
verleden) is. Daarom is musical tense een voorwaarde voor de 
mogelijkheid van muzikale narrativiteit. Want, teneinde over een 
muzikaal verhaal te kunnen praten, moet het mogelijk zijn om over 
muzikale gebeurtenissen te praten. Een verhaal zonder gebeurtenissen 
is niet mogelijk. En musical tense is precies de mogelijkheid die de 
muziek biedt om gebeurtenissen te representeren. Dit betekent dat een 
muziekstuk zonder musical tense geen gebeurtenissen kan 
representeren, en dus niet narratief kan zijn. Daarom is musical tense 
noodzakelijk voor een muzikaal verhaal. 
Verhalen gaan op bepaald einddoelen af. Verhalen suggereren een 
gevoel van beweging, een gevoel van richting. En muziek suggereert 
dit gevoel wellicht zelfs sterker dan verbale verhalen. Daarom 
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bespreek ik in hoofdstuk 4 de manieren waarop muziek dit gevoel van 
lineariteit en doelgerichte beweging binnen een narratologische context 
kan oproepen. Om in staat te zijn deze indruk op te wekken moet de 
luisteraar in staat zijn zijn/haar weg door de muziek te “plotten,” in 
andere woorden in staat te zijn om de muziek te structureren en een 
betekenis uit deze structuur te destilleren. Ik beweer dat dit alleen 
mogelijk is vanwege musical tense. Zou de muziek deze tense 
ontberen, dan zou de luisteraar niet in staat zijn om de muziek te 
structuren en te reflecteren over de muziek. 
Eero Tarasti beweert dat muzikale narrativiteit ontstaat uit een reeks 
van emoties die worden veroorzaakt door de muziek zelf. Dit zou 
impliceren dat muzikale emoties een belangrijk ingrediënt zijn in 
muzikale narrativiteit. Echter, muzikale emoties spelen geen rol in mijn 
opvatting van muzikale narrativiteit. In hoofdstuk 5 ga ik na in 
hoeverre Tarasti’s opvatting verenigbaar is met de mijne. De 
psychoanalyse lijkt een productieve benadering om deze vraag te 
beantwoorden. In dit hoofdstuk concludeer ik dat de herkenning van 
discrete gebeurtenissen de oorzaak is van het feit dat de muziek een 
gevoel van lineariteit en doelgerichtheid kan opwekken. Het is het 
gevolg van het feit dat de luisteraar een samenspel van spanning en 
ontspanning waarneemt, en dit samenspel zorgt ervoor dat de luisteraar 
op een affectieve wijze reageert op de muziek. Tegelijkertijd leidt dit 
samenspel tot de representatie van een temporele ontwikkeling en kan 
uiteindelijk resulteren in muzikale narrativiteit. Dus, uiteindelijk, 
kunnen zowel muzikale narrativiteit als de affectieve reacties op 
muziek veroorzaakt worden door hetzelfde fenomeen, namelijk het 
samenspel van spanning en ontspanning.  
De psychoanalyse kan ook nuttig zijn bij het beantwoorden van de 
tweede vraag die centraal staat in hoofdstuk 5: kan een luisteraar grip 
krijgen op een muziekstuk dat aan de ene kant narrativiteit ontlokt, 
maar aan de andere kant de mogelijkheid tot narrativiteit frustreert? 
Door te verwijzen naar traumatheorie, waarin de onmogelijkheid tot 
afsluiting en de weerstand tegen narratieve integratie aan de orde 
komen, stel ik dat deze soort muziek niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
ongrijpbaar is. 
De narratieve structurering van muziek resulteert in een muzikaal 
verhaal. Echter, de vraag is waar dit verhaal over gaat. Dit is een 
belangrijke vraag, aangezien veel theoretici de mogelijkheid van 
muzikale narrativiteit ontkennen omdat ze er juist van overtuigd zijn 
dat er niet zoiets bestaat als een muzikale narratieve inhoud. Daarom 
probeer ik in hoofdstuk 6 aan te tonen dat een muzikaal verhaal wel 
degelijk een inhoud heeft. In dit hoofdstuk richt ik mij met name op de 
mogelijke inhoud van atonale muzikale verhalen, en beweer ik dat deze 
muzikale verhalen uiteindelijk beschouwd kunnen worden als 
metaverhalen; zij vertellen het verhaal van het proces van 
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narrativisering. Hedendaagse atonale muzikale verhalen maken het feit 
dat muziek niet is ontstaan uit een natuurlijke orde, maar juist een 
constructie, een fabricatie is, expliciet. Als gevolg hiervan wordt 
muzikale narrativiteit niet gepresenteerd als een representatie van de 
realiteit, maar als een construct, gecreëerd door mensen. Dus, door het 
aannemen van een narratieve luisterhouding tijdens het luisteren naar 
atonale hedendaagse muziek kan de luisteraar ten minste twee dingen 
leren: ten eerste hoe deze muziek te kunnen vatten, en ten tweede leert 
hij/zij over de kunstmatige aard van muziek en van het luisteren ernaar. 
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